


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**BIBLIOTHECA
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MONACENSIS.**

THE HISTORY OF

ENGLISH POETRY

FROM THE EARLIEST PERIODS TO THE PRESENT

BY JOHN RUSSELL WALLACE, LL.D.,
PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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ANTI-TOOKE;

OR AN

ANALYSIS

OF

THE PRINCIPLES AND STRUCTURE

OF

LANGUAGE,

EXEMPLIFIED IN THE

ENGLISH TONGUE.

By JOHN FEARN.

"AND ALL THE PEOPLE, THE NATIONS, AND THE LANGUAGES, FELL DOWN
AND WORSHIPPED THE GOLDEN IMAGE THAT NEBUCHADNEZZAR THE
KING HAD SET UP."

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1824.

Fearn
Anti-Tooke

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ANTI-TOKE

ANALYSIS

THE PRINCIPLES AND STRUCTURE

LANGUAGE

Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek
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BY JOHN PEARL

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1851

TO
MY CRITICS
AND THE OTHER GENTLEMEN CONCERNED IN
THE MONTHLY REVIEW,
AND IN THE LATE
NEW EDINBURGH REVIEW.

GENTLEMEN,

UNQUESTIONABLY, the General Subject in which I have been many years deeply engaged is bound to you, by an obligation of no ordinary occurrence. At an epoch when, in general, owing to the state of the prevailing taste, the most intense and painful researches into Intellectual Philosophy, cannot, unless from some adventitious circumstance, find the time and the labor of the popular critic; and can still less find admission into the pages of a periodical Review; you have exhibited an instance of a very remarkable exception to this fatuity. It would be much worse than impertinent in me to advert to this liberal conduct, if I could not along with it declare, as I now do in the presence of those who know me, that I not only have not the smallest connexion, or even acquaintance, with any of the persons whom I have the honor to address; but, beyond this, that, after assurances received from such friends as I could in the least degree suspect of being adequate to the task, I firmly believe the office in question has been discharged by individuals who have no personal knowledge of me.¹ After such a declaration, however, it cannot be improper to own, that I am much gratified to find the Literary History of the Age exhibiting such an instance of jus-

¹ I deem it fit that this statement should be duly accompanied by the intimation, that *once, and once only, at a considerable time after the appearance of the critiques in question, I accidentally met, in a mixed party, with a Gentleman whom I understood to be connected with the Monthly Review; and, certainly, spoke to him under this impression.*

tice toward that neglected walk of study to which I have devoted my time.

As you have, respectively, perused and commented upon, my printed Letter of remonstrance to Professor Stewart, prefixed to my "First Lines of the Human Mind;" you will naturally anticipate, that, although I have much indeed to acknowledge of your attention to the general tenor of that work, the primary cause of my offering this tribute of obligation and respect to you, is the fearless and decided sentence you have not hesitated severally to pronounce, upon the merits of my claim on that Gentleman, that he should publicly render up to me his admission of my priority to him, in the position which he has asserted in the *First Part* of his "DISSERTATION" IN THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, that "a VARIETY OF COLOR *is necessary* to the perception of *Visible Figure or Outline.*"

You are at the same time aware, that I have urged this of Mr. Stewart, not only inasmuch as it is very seriously prejudicial to my views and progress, in the department of research in which I have so long labored; but, much more than this, that it must be believed *by the readers* of the TEXT WRITINGS ONLY OF BOTH of us, that it is *I* that have taken HIS philosophical property; and, that I have been setting forth to the Public, as my own matter, a position which *I must have known* to be his.

Such, Gentlemen, is the double necessity which compels me to persevere in the only desire which I can have with regard to the point at issue;—namely—that the real facts and merits of the case shall be as generally known, as the matter in Mr. Stewart's writings, (prejudicial to my reputation) which gave origin to the difference between us.

In yielding, on the present occasion, to the necessity which Mr. Stewart has laid me under, of not going before the Public with any new work without accompanying it with my protest against his proceeding in refusing me the admission which I require; I have particularly to acknowledge the correctness of quotation, and the explicitness of statement, which the MONTHLY REVIEW, especially,¹ has made of that contradiction, as

¹ I am not the less sensible of the conclusive verdict which has been pronounced by my Critic in the Metaphysical Capital of Britain; although he has not devoted so large a space to the analysis of my work, as has been afforded in the Monthly Review.

pointed out by me, in the doctrines of Mr. Stewart, whereby, in the momentary bent to refuse acknowledging my priority in the matter in question, he has furnished to the world the spectacle of his change, from being, through Five Editions of his Elements, the Apostle of the IN-EXTENDED colors of Reid, to be the Assertor and Promulgator of the EXTENDED COLORS of "Monboddo" and of Locke. And here I would ask, Is there, or Can there exist, a man of a character so high, as that after such an appeal, and such an award, he should not feel himself bound, (if only in respect to the Public,) to come before that Public with some defence, or explanation? Yet Professor Stewart has not only remained silent upon my remonstrance, and your decision; but he has also suffered the *Second Part* of his "DISSERTATION" to go forth to the world, without adverting in the slightest manner to the claim thus urged upon him.

Upon this proceeding I shall at present only remark, that, under the inexplicable silence which Mr. Stewart has hitherto resolved to observe, it is impossible for me to conceive what motive could have weight enough to induce a man, with whose character I had always, in my imagination, interwoven notions of high honor and a towering intellectual ambition, to withhold the acknowledgment indispensably requisite to remove the evil under which I labor.

For a man of an unelevated character, who would be content with an ephemeral fame, and for such fame would incur the judgment of posterity, I can certainly discern a motive for silence. The fact is, that, in the present state of public opinion, very few persons will read an Elementary Work on the Human Mind;—and, indeed, a great proportion of the reading public are wholly incapable of apprehending either its merits or its drift. At the same time, it was well known, from the beginning, that there was no chance of my work being taken up by either of the two principal vehicles of periodical criticism. Hence it was manifest that my appeal must take a long time; and both Professor Stewart and myself might pass away; before it could get into general circulation. But Mr. Stewart well knew; (and I leave it entirely to others to judge, whether he acted from this knowledge;) that the moment he should, in his writings, advert, *in any way*, to my claim upon him, the eyes of Europe would be drawn upon what I am about, and all that I have advanced, in my "First

Lines," against the Metaphysics of the School of Reid, would be examined and adjudged.

In fine, I observe, that, while you, as my critics, have borne testimony to my having evinced every proper consideration for Professor Stewart; it is natural that his admirers might, from the strength of the case which I have stated, suppose that I had made it, at least, as particular, and as pointed, as facts would admit. I beg leave to assure you, however, that I am far from having gone this justifiable length; my earnest wish having been to avoid all unnecessary particularity; as must be evident from my previous endeavours to obtain my object by *private* and, I trust, delicate appeals to the justice of Mr. Stewart.

Gentlemen, I turn now from this Subject: and desire to reciprocate the independence of mind which you have displayed with regard to it, by inscribing to you the following Volume; concerning which I shall only say, that, having bestowed upon it my best endeavours to render it a finished labor, as far as it extends, I hope it will not be found altogether a discreditable offering. With this, I have the honor to be,

With unfeigned respect,

Your Most Obedient Servant,

JOHN FEARN.

*Torrington Square,
June 21, 1824.*

P. S. Since writing the above, I have been struck by a curious coincidence, which I had neither designed nor thought of; and which I deem it proper to notice, in order that it may not be looked upon as my intending to run a parallel. Upon opening the "DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY," for the purpose of referring to it in the Preface to this work, it is brought to my recollection that Mr. Tooke has inscribed his Second Volume to a Jury of his countrymen, by whose verdict he had been rescued from imminent danger. This was as it should be. There is one difference, however, between the two cases; to which I must advert, although not with the smallest insinuation against the political conduct of Mr. Tooke,—namely—that he has expressed his gratitude to those who had *acquitted* him; but I to those who have labored to bring my proceedings to *trial*.

TO

DUGALD STEWART, ESQ.

F.R.SS. LOND. AND EDINB., &c. &c. &c.

**FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.**

SIR,

As I understand, from common report, that your health requires abstinence from intellectual exertion ; (although I cannot imagine it is more incapacitating, or forbidding, than that against which I have struggled through the whole labor of the following volume ;) I shall, on the present occasion, only call your serious attention to the foregoing address to my Critics, and to my printed Letter to yourself prefixed to the "First Lines of the Human Mind." The painful necessity which you have laid me under, of not putting forth any new work without urging the weight of my claim upon you, as explained in the papers already mentioned, renders it the least I can do (even in the present state of the health of both) to afford you, by this call, an opportunity for explanation.

To this I shall at present only add, that, from the growing popular interest which appears to be mani-

fested in the subject of LANGUAGE, I confess, I entertain considerable hope, that the circulation of "Anti-Tooke" will render it a matter not principally interesting to *me*, whether or not you will choose to listen to the voice of my repeated remonstrance ; or to the verdict of a literary jury, who, most certainly, cannot be supposed to have been biassed by friendship for me, or hostility toward you.

In all charity, sincerely wishing you a complete re-establishment of health ;

I am, Sir,

Your Most Obedient Servant,

JOHN FEARN.

P. S. I shall order a copy of this volume to be carefully forwarded to your address, in order that there may be not a doubt in the Public mind with regard to the result.

J. F.

N. B. The Reviews referred to, above, are the MONTHLY REVIEW for *February* 1822 ; and the NEW EDINBURGH REVIEW for *October* 1821.

PREFACE.

If any thing can be imagined more truly mortifying than another to the intellectual pretensions of our Species; it is, that we should be doomed to signify our thoughts in a jargon of utterance, with regard to the true logical import of which we are profoundly ignorant. Every man of education, when he happens to listen to the articulate effusions of a plough-boy, or untaught peasant, is filled with unmixed compassion, to behold a large number of his fellow creatures chained down, by their lot, to the dark necessity of expressing their ideas in a way that approximates, not a little, to the instinctive signs of brute animals. What, then, must be the reflections of the educated man, if it were had in proof, that, with regard to THIS sort of attainment, he is in a state not much elevated above the level of the Clown whom he pities and despises?

Anal.

b

Assuredly, no stronger incentive than this ought to be requisite, to induce men to examine into any stated objections, which may be raised against the doctrines concerning Language that now exist. But, in addition to this, Need it be said, that there are other and far more urgent reasons for such investigation; insomuch, that there is no human being, in a civilised country, of whatever rank or profession, who is not *personally and most deeply* affected by this UNIVERSAL MEDIUM OF COMMUNICATION, of men's THOUGHTS, DUTIES, AND ENGAGEMENTS?

It is but little to say, that the enacting and enforcing of laws; the conducting of war and of politics; the bequeathing of our possessions, and the disposition of our private affairs; are vitally interwoven with the import ascribed to Words considered as the Signs of our Ideas. If a familiar example of this truth can be requisite; We have only to be reminded of the *different and often incompatible* constructions which are daily given, by different Lawyers and Magistrates, to the wording of a Will, the drawing of a Contract, or the intent of an Act of Parliament: by which construction, the Property, the Liberty, or the Life, of an Individual, or of a Number of Individuals, may be placed in jeopardy.

The Illustrious Philologer, to whose writings a very principal though unaccording reference will be had in the following volume, informs us ("DIV. OF PURLEY, Vol. 1, page 75") and dwells on the fact with a sensibility which vibrates throughout his Work, and tinges the whole color of his Philosophical views, that his own "life" was under imminent danger, and his "*civil extinction*" became the "*consequence*," of a wrong import ascribed to "TWO PREPOSITIONS and a CONJUNCTION." And, without our here entering into the question of fact, Whether the matter was actually as he conceived; it is quite certain that such a course and consequence MIGHT in SOME times exist; and equally certain, that a very near epoch MIGHT make such times our own. Any more stimulating example than this, therefore, cannot be necessary, to rouse men to a sense of the evils involved in the want of a TRUE OR REAL PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

It is a curious metaphysical fact, or question, What it is that occasions mankind, in every rank and calling, to acquiesce so uniformly, as they certainly do, under an evil of so vast a magnitude. The ruler, and the ruled, are alike sensible of this evil; if not alike sufferers from it. The strong and the weak, in CIVILISED society, are, in a greater or less extent, the victims of it. The timid and

the brave are equally incapable of protecting themselves from its effects. The sophist and the dealer in obliquity are alone gainers, and thrive upon it. And yet, it is vain, at least in ordinary life, to lift a voice against an affliction that appears no more to be done away with than death itself.

The truth seems to be, that the thing is acquiesced in, universally, under a belief that it is a Law of our Intellectual Constitution and is equally irresistible and irremediable: And the operation of it is regarded, like that of our evil passions; which are deeply to be dreaded, and as far as possible guarded against; but, in great part, never to be prevented, or removed.

But, What if it should come out, that the enormous mischief in question is NOT a Law of our Nature; but is merely the accidental and temporary result of a darkness which the progress of cultivated reason can remove?

If it be here asked, Whether there is any reasonable probability that the desideratum last mentioned shall ever be attained? The brief and the only fit answer in this place is, to point to what has been done, almost within our own time, in the various departments of Physical Science: And, along with this, to remark, *how small* a proportion of human acumen has been applied, PHILOSOPHICALLY, to

the attainment in question. For example, it may be asked, Who would believe, if the fact were not on record, that, Two Thousand years after the Stagyrite had furnished the World with a gigantic System of General Logic (no matter here how far true, or false,) the estimable English Philosopher Locke, with ingenuous simplicity, informs his readers, that “ When he first began his discourse of the *Understanding*, and a good while after, he had not the least thought that any consideration of WORDS was at all necessary to it.”

The small number of those who have cast at all WITH A PHILOSOPHICAL BENT, in this direction, must be known to those who have looked into the writings of Mr. Tooke : Who, in alluding to the subject, has bestowed the end of his unsparing lash upon those Philosophers that have NOT cast this way ; but yet, in order to excuse themselves from the attempt, have affected a CONTEMPT OF ITS IMPORTANCE, or have pretended engagements of a more weighty and urgent nature.

“ The same sort of corruption,” (says he, speaking of Conjunctions and Prepositions) “ from the same cause, has disguised both : and ignorance of their true origin has betrayed Grammarians and Philosophers into the mysterious and contradictory language which they have held con-

“ cerning them. And it is really entertaining, to
“ observe the various shifts used by those who
“ were too sharp-witted and too ingenuous to re-
“ peat the unsatisfactory accounts of these Prepo-
“ sitions handed down by others ; and yet not
“ ingenuous enough to acknowledge their own
“ total ignorance on the subject. The Gramma-
“ rian says, it is none of his business : and for that
“ reason only he omits giving an account of them.
“ Whilst the Philosopher avails himself of his
“ dignity ; and, when he meets with a stubborn
“ difficulty which he cannot unravel, (*and only then,*)
“ disdains to be employed about WORDS : although
“ they are the necessary channel through which
“ his most precious liquors must flow.”

DIV. OF PURLEY, *Vol. 1, page 307.*

The last sentence, in this stricture of Mr. Tooke, contains a most important feature in a Preface to a Work on Language ; upon which one might dwell, with proportionate interest, if the fact were not already too well known to Philosophers. It is therefore the more requisite matter, in this place, to insist that Speech is not only the necessary channel through which the most precious liquors of the Philosopher must flow ; but, that, at the same time, it is the indispensable channel through which must proceed what may well be called all the

issues of life. But we are here brought to a stand, in our reflections : For Two formidable, if not insuperable barriers present themselves : One of which, at least, must be removed ; else, mankind must remain, as hitherto they ever have done, under the progressive operation of the imperfection of Language.—FIRST, The Structure of a REAL Language must correspond to the Structure of Human Thoughts : And, SECONDLY, All Speculation concerning the Nature of Human Ideas has, in this enlightened age, become stamped for a Species of ALCHEMY.—It is a Pursuit, indeed, the Nothingness of which is now so completely ascertained, that, *among persons of a liberal education*, the contempt for it, or prejudice against it, is generally found to be nearly in proportion to the Square of their Distance from all Knowledge of what has been done concerning it. And the natural consequence of this is, that it amounts to an imputation on the Understanding of all persons who still heretically devote themselves to the study of it.

Is this fatuity to last?—Or, Is the Philosophy of Human Thought to CONTINUE, henceforth, to be classed with the Mystery of turning Lead into Gold ? This Preface is not the place for me to attempt to answer, or say any thing with regard to the question now put. The reader will use his pleasure,

in examining, and judging, whether any thing in the following work tends, in any degree, to the illucidation of it.

With regard to my own labor or what I may have effected in the work ; I shall only embrace the professions of Mr. Harris ; (I hope the quotation of him, on this occasion, is not ominous ;) that, “ if
“ I have failed, the failure has been my misfortune,
“ not my fault ;”—that it is “ not the hasty fruits of
“ a few idle hours ;”—and, that “ I do not wish to
“ shelter myself under any such method of anti-
“ cipating pardon for a bad performance.”

One remark remains to be offered here, with respect to the LANGUAGE in which the following Analysis of Grammar is embodied. There is no person, who possesses any knowledge at all of the subject, who does not know how immeasurably the English Language has risen, of late, in the estimation of learned men, as a medium of investigation of the Nature of Grammar. One testimony alone, to this fact, I shall herein quote. And, in so doing, I furnish the suffrage of the most profound of Etymologists: who, moreover, on this occasion, only reiterates and confirms the assertions of Mr. Tooke. “ It is fortunate for this inquiry,” (says Dr. Murray)
“ that, of all illustrations, those drawn from old,

“ common, or even vulgar English, are particular-
“ ly suitable. The mysteries of language in its
“ rudest state can be explained by the words of our
“ own tongue to better purpose, than by those of
“ any other speech. By a careful study of the
“ Anglo-saxon, Visi-gothic, and the elder English
“ writers, more knowledge may be obtained of the
“ original structure of the Greek, Latin, Celtic, or
“ Sanscrit, than the deepest erudition can possibly
“ supply.”

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ANTI-TOOKE;
OR AN
ANALYSIS
OF
THE PRINCIPLES AND STRUCTURE
OF
L A N G U A G E,
EXEMPLIFIED IN THE
ENGLISH TONGUE.

ERRATA.

P. 133.	l. 32.	dele	"here."		
135.	2.	for	<i>I lay myself</i>	read	<i>I lay on myself.</i>
—	3.	—	<i>on which latter</i>	—	<i>which latter.</i>
161.	23.	—	<i>represents</i>	—	<i>represent.</i>
179.	12.	—	<i>is</i>	—	<i>in.</i>
247.	26.	—	<i>HA HAVE HAVE</i>	—	<i>HAVE HAVE, or HA HAVE.</i>
320.	33.	—	<i>"Actors"</i>	—	<i>an Actor.</i>
326.	15.	—	<i>Tooke</i>	—	<i>Mr. Tooke.</i>

ANTI-TOOKE;

OR,

AN ANALYSIS, &c.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF THE NATURE OF SIGNS,
AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE GENERIC STRUC-
TURE OF THE CATEGORY OF RELATION, AS
FORMING THE FOUNDATION OF THE STRUC-
TURE OF LANGUAGE.

SECTION FIRST.

INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF THE NATURE OF SIGNS.

SUBSECTION I.

*Of the Proper Object of the Philosophical Gram-
marian.—Comparison of Ordinary Language with
Algebraical Notation. These Two apparently dif-
ferent kinds of Signs generically and specifically
identical.*

THE justly celebrated grammatical speculations
of the late Mr. Horne Tooke, which, after every
due deduction, must continue to mark a splendid
epoch in the History of Language, have been fol-
lowed by other very elaborate and important con-
tributions to the public stock, from the stores of
Etymology—works which have advanced to a
great additional depth into the arcana of ancient

Anal.

A

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dialects: And although the farther harvest, which this field is capable of yielding, appears to be great, if not inexhaustible; yet, in so far as concerns the nature of Language, *considered as a SIGNATURE OF THOUGHT*, it is unquestionably warrantable to anticipate the future, from the past. More extended researches of this nature may throw light upon the affinity, or the migration of nations; upon the origin, or original country of mankind, or the remote origin of speech; or may solve other problems of a less dark and difficult nature. But, with regard to the Principles of GRAMMAR, there cannot exist a hope, in the minds of those who have consulted the past labors on the subject, that Etymology can ever do more than it *has* done. STILL, the Nature of Language—*its STRUCTURE and its ELEMENTS*—might well claim a part of that mysterious inscription which is said to have been found graven in a temple dedicated to the Egyptian Minerva:—“ * ** ***
 “ **** ** *** ***** ** ; AND MY VEIL HATH
 “ NO MORTAL EVER REMOVED.”

The existing state of Philosophy, in the department of Language, presents, perhaps, the most wonderful phenomenon that has resulted from the whole course of human speculation. The mind of man expatiates in knowledge through the medium of Two remarkably distinct Systems of Signs: One, or Other of, which he must employ, to “ MARK” his ideas for the purpose of recalling them to his own recollection, or “ SIGNIFY” them when he would communicate them to other persons. But the Scheme of Notation by which he

proceeds, in *One* of these systems, is of a nature the most definite and precise; and it expresses the various Relations between the Subjects of his reasonings, with a truth that is absolutely perfect: Whereas the *Other* has at all times proved so vague and defective, not to say absurd or fallacious, that no one ever pretends it is capable of expressing any thing like certainty, or precision, of the various Relations between its Subjects. It hardly needs to be explained, that, in the former of these Systems, I allude to the Symbols and Characters of Algebraical Notation; and, in the latter, to WORDS—or the Signs by which we express the Subjects of Ordinary Discourse.

Can any thing, indeed, be more wonderful, when we reflect upon it, than to observe, upon one hand, a perfect model of logical signification, in the System of Algebraical Signs; while, upon the other, of all the Ordinary or Popular Languages which have been invented, whether of ancient or of modern use, (although some of these have undergone every cultivation which art and labor could contribute) the PHILOSOPHER has never been able to assign the true, or *any thing like the true*, GRAMMATICAL import of the Signs which they comprise; or, in other words, the most enlightened individuals of the species have *never known what GENERAL Notions, or Ideas, of RELATIONS BETWEEN THINGS, they had, or ought to have had*, in their minds, when they have employed the Signs in question? It is, however, at the same time, *scarcely less* wonderful, that Philosophers uniformly agree to lay the fault upon the SIGNS, in the

case of Ordinary Language; when it is a self-evident truth, which can admit of no controversy, that the defect of these Signs is altogether bottomed in men's ignorance of the Relations which they ought to express.

The difference of knowledge between the man of learning and the mere mechanic, with regard to this subject, has always in reality been so small, *when compared with the actual amount of darkness in both*, that, of itself alone, it would hardly be worthy of a commentary. And, in fact, no vanity could be imagined more empty, or unfounded, than the assumed vast superiority of the former, to the latter, in so far as regards the *Principles and Structure* of Language.

The absolute truth of this statement will not be controverted; especially, down to a very recent period. Mr. Tooke, in entering upon the course of his etymological speculations, has declared, and declared with a force of truth which has never been contradicted, that, after the mention of NAMES, "From this moment Grammar quits the day-light, "and plunges into an abyss of utter darkness." Down, therefore, until the commencement of the labors of this illustrious Etymologist, the ignorance of the learned, with regard to the nature of Speech, is a matter which no one will ever pretend either to dispute or dissemble. And I shall depend upon the reasonings and evidences contained in the following pages, to justify the assertion that the light thrown upon the subject by Mr. Tooke, and by his meritorious Successors, although it is undeniably very great in its KIND, IS NOT OF THAT

KIND that could illustrate the Structure of Language; and, in point of fact, *has not, in any material or consolatory degree*, lessened that ignorance which has hitherto so nearly levelled the Scholar and the Clown, with regard to it.

Nothing, indeed, I am aware, is less awakened in the public mind, than any suspicion that such an opprobrium at this moment hangs over Philosophy, in the department of Language. The very contrary has become a universal and a deep-rooted opinion with the learned. But if, in the course which I have been led to embrace in the prosecution of the subject, I have not fallen into a very rare degree of human illusion, (concerning which, I confess, I feel not much anxiety) such will be found to be the real amount of reproach due to the reasoning powers of man on account of it, after all that has been done by Philosophers for its advancement, that, even if there were no other utility, or incentive, it would form a sufficient stimulus, and an object of high philosophic attainment, to rescue the Human Understanding from a state of darkness so profound, as that in which the most successful writers have both found and left it, in its conceptions of the Science of Grammar.

And here, in the contemplation and commencement of such an undertaking, inasmuch as some of our first-rate Philosophers have been led into a most egregious error with regard, even, to what is the *Province* of the Grammmarian, it becomes necessary to enter into a concise view, or explanation, of the proper Object of the latter;—especially,

as being preparatory to submitting a specific example, which, (for a particular purpose,) I consider it requisite to furnish in this place, of the *nature and degree of that contrast*, which subsists between the efficacy of the Language of Science and that of Ordinary Language, as already adverted to.

In order to this, it may in the first place be laid down, as a position which will be abundantly supported by proof throughout the progress of analysis, that Each of the Systems in question is made up of *Two, and ONLY Two, Kinds of Signals*—namely—*Signs of Subjects or Quantities*, and *Signs of Operations between these Subjects or Quantities*. Now it is to be remarked briefly, here, but will be noticed more particularly hereafter, that some very eminent writers have cherished an opinion, not only that the imperfection of Ordinary or Popular Language consists in BOTH the Kinds of Signals which it employs; (which indeed is true and is a most important truth;) but, *also*, that *it lies within the power or province of the GRAMMARIAN, by the invention of some new species of Notation*, to remove the existing defect in BOTH kinds! Contrary to this view of the subject, however, I shall proceed upon an assumption, the truth of which I apprehend will never be deliberately controverted, that the Philosopher of Grammar has nothing to do with those *Signs of Subjects*, in Ordinary Language, which may be called *Quantities* and whose Signs are called NOUNS, any farther than to ascertain and lay down their *general grammatical* characters and accidents: Their imperfection as *particular* Signs, or, rather, the imperfection

of the *particular ideas or notions* which we attach to them, is a defect which lies entirely beyond the province of the Grammarian, or the Structure of Language, to remove. In other words, The whole business of *definition of particular Nouns* must be left to the Logician, the Natural Philosopher, the Natural Historian, and the Philosopher of every department, the *Philosopher of Language alone excepted*: and it is the province of the latter to determine (together with that of the *grammatical* characters and adjuncts of Nouns, as already mentioned) the nature of ALL THE DIFFERENT SIGNS OF OPERATIONS BETWEEN the Nouns of Ordinary Language; beyond which, his proper research, as a Grammarian, neither does nor can extend.

The position, thus laid down, enables me now to explain, that the great disparity of efficiency between the Two Distinct Systems under consideration; and which, I conceive, when duly examined, must present to our contemplation such a wonderful enigma; is owing to the defect of Ordinary Language in its SIGNS OF OPERATIONS; *altogether BESIDE the acknowledged and vast defect of the PARTICULAR ideas which we attach to its various NOUNS.* And What I suggest, as being so wonderful, is the fact, that human reason has succeeded so perfectly in the invention and use of Signs of Operations in Algebraical Science; and, YET, has *never been able to approach to any thing like an imitation* of this perfection, in the *corresponding Signs* of Ordinary Speech: While, from well-known causes, wholly foreign to Grammar, there is no wonder at all that we find the *Signs of Subjects or Quantities*, in Or-

dinary Language, as defective as they certainly are.

Having furnished this preliminary view of the *Nature* of that defect, which I suppose it should be the Object of the Philosophical Grammarian to remove from Language; I shall now proceed to offer the proposed specific example of it, with a design to afford some immediate conception of its actual *Degree*, and thus awaken the attention of my readers to the existing state of *what is called the Philosophy of Speech*, compared with what is, in the present day, tolerated, *as Knowledge, or Science*, in any other department of human speculation. Such an insular example, indeed, as is here proposed, can by no means approach to convey an idea of any thing like the whole magnitude of the contrast. But I entertain little doubt, that the fact will at least afford matter of surprise, or astonishment, to the highest classes of readers who suppose that the Science of Grammar may, assuredly, (since the speculations of Mr. Tooke,) be numbered among the branches of Human Knowledge.

In furnishing this comparison, it is evident, I must draw the requisite illustrations from the Symbols and Nature of Algebra. But the examples necessary for this purpose will be so elementary and obvious, that no person who is likely to take an interest in Universal Grammar can find any difficulty in apprehending them; nor could they, in fact, be misunderstood by any one who is acquainted with the Notation of common Arithmetic: And, as no other medium, or analogy, could

serve the desired purpose, I trust that no apology is required for their introduction. At the same time I intimate, that there will, I believe, be no occasion, of any consequence, to resort to this medium, in any subsequent part of the work.

FIRST, then, I observe, that *Every Sign of an Operation*, in Algebra, must have a *Sign of Some Quantity* on EACH side of it; between which Two Signs of Quantities the Sign of an Operation serves as a *Bridge of Logical Connection*: In other words, Every Operation in Algebra being an instance of a SPECIES OF LOGICAL ACTION between SOME TWO QUANTITIES, the *Sign of this Action* must necessarily have a Sign of Some Quantity on EACH side of it; else, it could *not be Any Sign of an Action or Operation*.

But, contrary to this, When we turn to Ordinary Language, we find that VERBS (which are the acknowledged Signs of Actions, and which, it will be shewn, can *never be a Sign of any other Thing* than Action) are uniformly considered as being, in the case of a large class of them, INCAPABLE of taking a Noun or Sign of a Quantity on EACH side. And, what is still more, it is a farther assumption and doctrine, in accredited Grammar, that, EVEN IN THE CASE OF THOSE VERBS WHICH do take a Noun or Quantity on Each side, the Verbs in question ARE NOT BRIDGES OF GRAMMATICAL CONNECTION between the Two Nouns which they divide.

From this statement, it is perfectly manifest, that no person, who has been taught in the
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existing doctrines of Grammar, can believe, or pretend to believe, that Algebraical Notation and Ordinary Language are specifically One and the Same System of Signs; because, in order to suppose this specific identicalness, the initiated person must obviously rebel against the most Fundamental Principle of his own *Grammatical Creed*.

As an example, in illustration of what is now stated, I observe, that a speaker of Ordinary Language will say, "*I walk*,"—" *I sleep*,"—" *I smile* :"—And he will suppose, that any one of these expressions conveys an intelligible idea, or meaning. But if he were to express himself in a way analogous to this in the Notation of Algebra, by saying, $2+$, $3\times$, or $4\div$, it is evident he would, in these instances, only furnish a *mark without meaning* : He would not express a *falsehood*, or yet an *absurdity*, which, if he did, might nevertheless be expressed *grammatically* ; but he would violate the structure of ALGEBRAICAL GRAMMAR, in the last and most deplorable degree, and exhibit nothing but a glaring effusion of nonsense.

Again. When a Grammarian, of the day, utters any such expression as "PETER *fights* RICHARD ;" he is imperatively bound, by his Creed, to DENY that the Word—" *Fights* "—is a *Grammatical Link of Connection* between the Two Nouns—" Peter " and " Richard ." But, in the case of Any Operation whatever between Two Quantities in Algebra,—such as in the expression $4+2$, 3×6 , or $5-4$,—no one will ever deny, or

can for a moment doubt, that the Sign of Operation is a Link of Logical Connection between the Two Signs of Quantities which it divides.*

Here, then, in the outset, is shewn an undeniable and a prodigious contrast, or contrariety, between the Two Systems of Notation in question, *according to the assumed and asserted doctrines of accredited Grammar.* But I pass on to other features of contrast, not less remarkable and important.

SECONDLY, therefore, I observe, that, in the Notation of Algebra, the Signs of *Addition*,—*Subtraction*,—*Multiplication*,—and *Division*, express Signs of OPERATIONS; While it is self evident that NO SIGN OF A QUANTITY can ever express—or stand for—any one of these, or of Any Other Operation. But, in Ordinary Language, the Nature of those important Signs of Operations which Grammarians call PREPOSITIONS is at this moment so little known, that the most successful grammatical writer which the world has yet seen hath confidently taught his contemporaries, and made it pass universally current with the learned, that SOME ONLY of these Words are *Verbs*, and OTHERS NOUNS: Which is precisely parallel to asserting, in the Notation of Algebra, that the

* It is here to be particularly observed, however, that even ALGEBRAISTS, in their view of things as *General Logicians*, have not in the least recognised that ACTIONS OR OPERATIONS are BRIDGES. And, to propose and demonstrate that they are Such Things, will form one of the Principal Objects of the following work. In a word; It is necessary to suggest and establish a NEW LOGIC, before it is possible to erect a new STRUCTURE OF GRAMMAR.

Signs of Addition, — Subtraction, — Multiplication,—and Division,—and all the Other Signs of a similar nature,—are, **SOME ONLY** of them *Signs of Operations*, and **OTHERS** **SIGNS OF QUANTITIES** !

When I said, just now, “the most successful grammatical writer which the world has yet seen;” I manifestly alluded to Mr. Tooke, as being the acknowledged precursor of that class of Inductive Etymologists whose labors have brought the phraseology of ancient dialects much into light. At the same time, I intimate, here, that I shall in the present work have occasion to take frequent notice of the researches of a still more recent author ; who, also, has gone far deeper into the arcana of ancient dialects, than Mr. Tooke has done ; and whom I consider as having, in very many important derivations of Words, annulled the views of his illustrious predecessor ; but who, nevertheless, altogether sides with him in asserting, upon etymological authority, that **SOME ONLY** of our *Prepositions* are *Verbs*, and **OTHERS** **NOUNS**,—a doctrine which I must stop, in this place, to hold up, as exhibiting a decisive test of the most profound darkness in the department of Language.

I am quite sensible how unwilling men of letters must naturally be, to be awakened from the pleasing dream that they are already in possession of the great desideratum of Language ; and am not less sensible, that it must require a very powerful example, indeed, to awaken their suspicion to a possibility of the contrary : And yet, I think, the

case which has already been put, for their consideration, cannot fail of the desired effect, provided it be duly contemplated. In order, therefore, that it should be so, I shall afford it a brief and simple repetition here, in rather a different shape.

What, then, (I ask) would be said of the knowledge of any People, in the *Notation* (*letting alone the SCIENCE*) of *Algebra*, if we were to be told, that, after having remained, since the beginning of things, in a complete ignorance of even the general nature of its most important Signs, this People had, through the researches and genius of one of its most acute individuals, discovered certain monuments, from which it was made out, that these Signals consist of Two different Kinds: ONE of which was rightly concluded to represent QUANTITIES; but, with regard to the OTHER, it was with equal confidence assumed, that SOME ONLY of them signified OPERATIONS and OTHERS QUANTITIES? What would be said of such a People, if we were told, that they *plumed themselves, as being highly enlightened*, in having become possessed of *this degree of advancement in the PHILOSOPHY OF SIGNS*? Yet, such is the GRAVEN IMAGE which the PHILOGER OF PURLEY hath set up; And such the Idol which (inasmuch as it substituted *some* visible and tangible objects, for the *nonentities* of preceding Grammarians,) hath been worshipped by the learned of Europe, during the last thirty years, as the NEW-RISEN SUN OF LANGUAGE!

In the concise view of the subject which has

now been stated, it was impossible to embrace a variety of existing and important considerations, which vastly augment the contrast, and which will develop themselves in the progress of the work. But there is one of these which could not here be passed over in silence, without peculiar injustice to the actual state of the subject. The fact to which I allude is, that the statement which has just been made is, in reality, very much too favorable to the doctrine which it describes. For although Mr. Tooke has asserted,—*in so many words*,—that *All Prepositions are either NOUNS or VERBS*; and though All Grammarians, after him, have asserted the same thing; yet, it will be seen that, by “*VERBS*,” Mr. Tooke, and all his followers, mean *IMPERATIVES*. Now I have no hesitation in affirming, that an Imperative (being undeniably an *Abbreviated Whole Speech*,) is a part of Grammar *so vastly different* from a *VERB*, that it exhibits no less than a very deplorable evidence of darkness and confusion in the Science of Language, when a writer of *Philosophical Grammar employs*, or a writer of *Any Grammar accepts*, the *One* for the *Other*. I am under the necessity, therefore, to assert, that it extinguishes what at first appears of partial light in Mr. Tooke’s Theory, (in his admitting that *Some Prepositions are Verbs*) when he proceeds, in his examples, to construe these Prepositions as *Imperatives*. And, when I come to discuss those examples, in their proper place, I anticipate being able to furnish the most decisive proofs of this darkness and confusion.

What has been advanced enables me to introduce the principal object which I had in view, in describing that disparity of nature which exists between Scientific Notation and Ordinary Language, *that is, according to the uniform interpretation given to the latter by Grammarians.* This object was no other than to assert, as a general conclusion resulting from the whole following analysis (and which conclusion I deemed it of importance to intimate in this introductory view of the subject,) that, *notwithstanding all the Doctrine of Grammarians, running virtually to the contrary,* there exists both a *Generic* and a *SPECIFIC identicalness* of the believed Two different kinds of Notation in question ;—the supposed difference between the Two Systems having arisen entirely from a profound misconception of the *Real Structure and Elements of Ordinary Speech.*

What I here mean to assert amounts, in its consequences, to this : that I consider the *Signs of Operations* in Ordinary Language may be explained, as expressing the Various Relations between the Subjects signified by its Nouns, with as much definiteness and precision, (allowing for the difference of Subjects) as is effected by the *corresponding Signs* in Algebraical Notation : although there exists at present not only the most profound ignorance of the *NATURE and USE* of these Signs—(namely—*VERBS, PREPOSITIONS CONJUNCTIONS, &c.*) ; but, also, along with this, an equal darkness with regard to the *NUMBER* of Some of them, especially of the Words called *Prepositions.*

For obvious reasons, I do not stop, here, to

enlarge upon, or even to mention, the various train of consequences which results from the position now asserted. I shall only observe, that, in asserting the Number of Prepositions in Language to be much greater than is acknowledged, I differ most extremely from the confident assertion of Mr. Tooke with regard to this Part of Grammar, and affirm my conviction, that the most perfect Language, and the most enlightened People, must have the *greatest number* of acknowledged Prepositions ; and that *No Preposition*, rightly understood, is a *corrupt Word*, or *can ever have proceeded from corruption*.

I shall trust altogether to the sequel, to substantiate these suggestions ; All that I intend, in this place, being merely to intimate the matter in question, with a view to enable a reader to form *some immediate general conception* of what degree of advancement may be expected, or rather which must result, in the Science of Grammar, if I should succeed in establishing the position thus proposed.

In the interim, I observe the fact, that the identicalness of the Two Systems of Notation must be obvious to the *Mathematician* at least. For, although Algebraical Analysis is *WRITTEN in Symbols*, it is *READ in Words*, And the Theorems of Geometry are *BOTH read and written in Ordinary Language*, Both which facts must have been impossible, if the Signs of Operations in Ordinary Language were not *capable of admitting* an interpretation as perfectly significant of the Relations to be expressed in the Sciences of Al-

gebra and Geometry, as can be said of the *Symbols* employed in those Sciences.

Hence it follows, that almost every Mathematician, but more especially every Algebraist *who is not at the same time a thorough Grammarian of the day*, should naturally incline to imagine that the Two Systems in question are only One and the Same Thing: And any such Algebraist therefore, might, in this place, be inclined to a hasty conception, that, in asserting the Specific identicalness of the Two, I have suggested nothing that has not been already, *at least tacitly*, acknowledged. But I have already shewn, beyond the reach of cavil, that any person, who can have supposed the two Systems to be specifically identical, must have done so in manifest contradiction of the most important Maxim of accredited Grammar. Thus, If any one supposes that he had discerned the identicalness in question; he must, as the *Very First Principle* of this identity, have known that VERBS *are* GRAMMATICAL BRIDGES OF CONNECTION between Some Two Substantive Nouns; precisely as the Signs of Addition, Subtraction, and Multiplication, are Bridges of Logical Connection between the Quantities of Algebra; or, as the Sign of Equality = (it *should* be called the Sign of EQUALLING,) is a Logical Bridge connecting the Two Sides of an Equation. But it is known to every person who has ever looked into a Grammar, that NO VERB is ever admitted as being a COPULA, AT ALL, with the sole anomaly or exception of the *Verb Substantive*; which anomaly, instead of lessening, only augments the absurdity of accredited Grammar,

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as shall be explained in its proper place : And even the *Verb Substantive* is never supposed to be a Copula of Any Two AGENTS OR SIGNS OF QUANTITIES.

Again. If any one imagines that he knew of the identicalness under consideration ; he must have known that ALL PREPOSITIONS *are* VERBS ; and he must have discerned, that, to affirm *Any Preposition* to be a NOUN is nothing but a manifestation of the most deplorable darkness in the Science of Language. But Mr. Tooke, and Dr. Murray, and Every Grammatical writer since the appearance of the DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY has shed its light upon the Subject, has, with one voice, affirmed, that Many of our Prepositions are NOUNS :—Nay, their *real doctrine* on this head, when rightly distinguished from their *phraseology*, amounts to this : THAT ALMOST NO PREPOSITION *is* a VERB. And here I need only ask, What Algebraist, or What Mathematician, has ever contradicted, or gainsaid them ?

In having described merely these two barriers, immense and manifest as they undeniably are, between the Nature of Scientific Notation and that of Ordinary Language, *as the latter is interpreted by consent of all Grammarians*, I feel satisfied that it never will for a moment be pretended, by any one, that the identicalness of the Two Systems is a matter at all contemplated in the Doctrines of accredited Grammar. I have intimated, however, that the identity must, to a certain extent, be obvious to any Mathematician who divests himself of the extant Creed of the Grammarian and

merely observes that *Words* and *Symbols* possess *correspondent offices*, in Ordinary Language and in Algebra. And, accordingly, we find, this has led to a very extraordinary doctrine of some eminent Algebraists: For, although these eminent persons have not discerned the identicalness herein asserted—namely—that of the **TWO NOTATIONS** in question; they have done what must, after due consideration, be regarded as a very wonderful thing in such an enlightened æra as that in which they have flourished—that is—they have *overshot* the mark,—and this to a vast and immeasurable extent, by asserting that a **LANGUAGE** or **NOTATION** is *One Same Thing* as a **SCIENCE ITSELF**.

The doctrine to which I now allude is so very remarkable, and is so momentously important in its bearing upon the Subject of **LANGUAGE**, as well as upon that of **GENERAL LOGIC**, that I shall devote the following subsection to an investigation of its merits; especially, since it will be seen, that it has not been corrected by any opposition, or any qualification of other writers, except what is, if possible, still more discreditable to the logical character of the age, than the original error itself.

SUBSECTION II.

Of the Doctrine of Certain Philosophers, that a Science is nothing but a Language well arranged.

THE doctrine to which it is requisite to call the attention of readers, in the present article, is one of the fruits of logical research in the eighteenth

century, and belongs to the French Philosopher Condillac. It has been adopted, in a sense more or less qualified, by some of the most distinguished writers in our own and in other countries. It amounts to this: that “*The art of reasoning is nothing but a Language well arranged,*”—and—“*That Languages are true analytical methods.*”

At a period antecedent to this, a project had been contemplated, by no less a genius than the German Philosopher Leibnitz, to invent a species of Notation, by means of which, all the Subjects of Dialectics should be treated with as much certainty and precision, as those of Geometry and Algebra now are. But upon this it may be observed, that it implies not, necessarily, the same view of the Subject as that of Condillac; because it does not follow, from such a project, that its author must have confounded a SCIENCE with the NOTATION of that Science: it only follows that Leibnitz calculated upon effecting an amelioration of Nouns—or Signs of Quantities—which can never be done, except by an amelioration of the IDEAS which we make those Signs to stand for. That this was the view entertained by Leibnitz appears, moreover, from his avowed method of procedure; which was, *first*, to invent an *Alphabet of Human Thoughts*. I merely mention this project of Leibnitz, because his view of the subject appears to have been thought altogether identical with that of Condillac, and because some observations of Mr. De Gerando, with regard to it, which I shall have occasion to quote, are more applicable to the

scheme of the German, than to the conclusion of the French Philosopher.

As I differ, as far as possible in opinion, from both the original view of Condillac and the expositions, or commentaries, which have been furnished of it by his followers, I shall here briefly state what I conceive to be the general nature of the Subject; Which will enable a reader the better to understand the objections which I propose to lay against those commentaries, or criticisms. In the end of the article, I shall add some farther observations, with regard to it.

1. A *Science or Analytical Method* consists in a Rule; by the observing of which, *One Truth*, or *Series of Truths*, OF RELATION, results in the indication of ANOTHER, as a necessary conclusion, drawn by the Mind, from the premises.

2. But a *Language* is NOT A RULE regarding *Any Truth*, or *Series of Truths*, or *Any Deduction* or *Consequence* whatever, out of its own peculiar grammatical construction. It has no election for Truth, more than for Falsehood: Nor can it be better arranged in the signification of either of these, than in the expression of the grossest absurdity, or downright nonsense. To say that *Color*, or *Sound*, loves *Virtue*; is just as good *Language*, as to say that *Men*, or *Women*, love *Virtue*.

3. It is manifest, that the very same nature is possessed by *Symbolic Notation*, as that which I have now asserted of *Ordinary Language*. Because the expression $2+2=4+4$, is just as good *Symbolic Grammar*, although it asserts a glaring falsehood; as can be said of the expression $2+2=2+2$,

which represents a certain truth. In the former of these two examples, moreover, it is plain, the SCIENCE OF ALGEBRA *does not exist* ; although, in this example, the LANGUAGE of Algebra is no less perfect than in the latter.

To shew the difference between the two Subjects in the *Other* branch of Mathematical Science, it may be observed, that many of the demonstrations in Geometry are effected through the medium of *false phraseology* and *absurd assumptions*. Yet, when Euclid says that, "*The lesser triangle is EQUAL to the greater ;*" he expresses himself in *Language as well arranged*, as if he had said "*the lesser is NOT equal to the greater.*"

4. It follows, conclusively, from these premises, that a LANGUAGE and a SCIENCE are Two Most Different Things. And I conceive it exhibits a very remarkable evidence of a low state of logical Science, when two things so extremely dissimilar, and so important in their respective natures, have been confounded into one, in the imagination of those who have taken the lead with regard to their illustration and definition.

That Language is a most close and intimate *attendant upon* Science, (and in the case of Human Beings *a necessary attendant*), is true : And, therefore, there is a *semblance of a certain kind* between the two Things. But this semblance is so general and loose, that nothing can be more discernible, when the attention is once called to the characteristic properties of each, than the difference between them. The *former*, I think, may, not unaptly, be compared to a SHADOW, in its attend-

ance upon a *Substance* which it accompanies. The different *Parts of the Substance* are connected together by certain laws of Organisation—Cohesion—Repulsion, &c.: but the *Parts of the Shadow* are NOT connected by any such laws; they only preserve a mere accidental and temporary SHAPE AND CONTIGUITY WITH ONE ANOTHER because they happen, for the moment, to be attendant upon the contiguous *Parts of the Substance* to which they belong. In a word, We might just as rationally affirm that a Shadow is of the same Nature with the most curiously Organised Substance upon which it waits, as that a Language is an Analytical Method.

In laying down this line of distinction between Language and Science, however, I by no means intend to deny, that Language is an Art founded on a SCIENCE OF ITS OWN KIND. On the contrary, I affirm that such is its nature: And the whole following Treatise will go to the confirmation of this assertion. It must be evident, indeed, the moment it is suggested, that there must be the *same kind of reciprocal dependence* between the Signs of Quantities and the Signs of Operations in Ordinary Language, that there is between the Signs of Quantities and the Signs of Operations in Algebra: although Any Concatenation of these Signs in ALGEBRA must express TRUE RELATIONS; whereas a Concatenation of Signs, expressed in the most Grammatical Language, MAY signify either Truth, or Fiction, or Downright Nonsense.

In order, here, that I may not be supposed to

have made an erroneous statement, in what I have to remark with regard to the *modifications* with which the doctrine, now in question, has been adopted by other writers of eminence, it is requisite to bring forward what has been advanced on the subject by some distinguished followers of Condillac. With this purpose, it will be comprehensively illustrative of the whole proceeding, to quote that account of it which has been furnished by Professor Stewart, in the *Second Volume* of his "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind" (*Second Edit. Oct. Chap. 2. Sect. 2.*): which statement, although rather diffuse for a quotation, will not admit of being curtailed.

"Condillac himself falls, in no inconsiderable degree, under this censure; having, upon more than one occasion, expressed himself as if he conceived it to be possible, by means of precise and definite terms, to reduce reasoning, in all the sciences, to a sort of mechanical operation, analogous, in its nature, to those which are practised by the Algebraist, on the letters of the alphabet."—"The art of reasoning"—"he repeats over and over"—"is nothing but a Language well arranged."

"One of the first persons, as far as I know, who objected to the vagueness and incorrectness of this proposition, was Mr. De Gerando; to whom we are further indebted for a clear and satisfactory exposition of the very important fact to which it relates. To this fact Condillac approximates nearly in various parts of his works; but never, perhaps, without some degree

“of indistinctness and of exaggeration. The
“point of view in which it is placed by his inge-
“nious successor, strikes me as so just and happy,
“that I cannot deny myself the pleasure of en-
“riching my book with a few of his observations.”

‘It is the distinguishing characteristic of a lively
‘and vigorous conception, to push its speculative
‘conclusions beyond their just limits. Hence, in
‘the logical discussions of this estimable writer,
‘these maxims (stated without any explanation or
‘restriction) *That the study of a science is nothing*
‘*more than the acquisition of a language; and, That*
‘*a science properly treated is only a language well con-*
‘*trived.* Hence the rash assertion, *That mathema-*
‘*tics possess no advantage over other sciences, but*
‘*what they derive from a better phraseology; and*
‘*that all of these might attain the same character of*
‘*simplicity and of certainty, if we knew how to give*
‘*them signs equally perfect.*’

‘The same task which must have been executed
‘by those who contributed to the first formation of
‘a language, and which is executed by every child
‘when he learns to speak it, is repeated over in the
‘mind of every adult when he makes use of his
‘mother tongue: for it is only by the decomposition
‘of his thoughts that he can learn to select the signs
‘which he ought to employ, and to dispose them in a
‘suitable order. Accordingly, those external actions
‘which we call *speaking* or *writing*, are always ac-
‘companied with a philosophical process of the
‘understanding, unless we content ourselves, as too
‘often happens, with repeating over mechanically
‘what has been said by others. It is in *this* respect

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‘ that languages, with their forms and rules, con-
‘ ducting (so to speak) those who use them into the
‘ path of a regular analysis; tracing out to them,
‘ in a well-ordered discourse, the model of a perfect
‘ decomposition, may be regarded, *in a certain sense*,
‘ as *analytical methods*. But I stop. Condillac, to
‘ whom this idea belongs, has developed it too
‘ well to leave any hope of improving on his state-
‘ ment.’

Before I proceed to comment upon this modification of Condillac’s views, by M. De Gerando, it is due to its author that I should state an improvement of his upon the text now given.

“ In a note upon this passage,” (says Professor Stewart) “ M. De Gerando has certainly
“ improved not a little on the statement of Condillac.”—‘ In asserting,’ (says he) ‘ that Languages may be regarded as analytical methods, I
‘ have added the qualifying phrase, *in a certain sense*,
‘ for the word method cannot be employed here
‘ with exact propriety. Languages furnish the
‘ *occasions* and the *means of analysis*; that is to say,
‘ they afford us assistance in *following* that method;
‘ but they are not the method itself. They resemble
‘ signals or finger-posts placed on a road to enable
‘ us to discern our way; and if they help us to
‘ analyse, it is because they are themselves the re-
‘ sults, and as it were the monuments of an analysis
‘ which has been previously made; nor do they
‘ contribute to keep us in the right path, but in proportion to the degree of judgment with which that
‘ analysis has been conducted.’

Such are the logical views, and their improve-

ments, with which Professor Stewart could not deny himself the pleasure of enriching his book. And, accordingly, in the conclusion of them, he says, "I was the more solicitous to introduce those
"excellent remarks, as I suspect that I have my-
"self indirectly contributed to propagate in this
"country the erroneous opinion which it is their
"object to correct."

I wish it had not lain so unavoidably in my way, to object my own opinions of the subject, against what has here been stated with regard to it. But if I should fall into any error, or any undue severity of criticism upon it, my own judgment must proportionably suffer in the opinion of all those who shall hereafter be competent to decide. With this consequence before my eyes, I cannot help expressing my belief, that never was eulogium more undeservedly bestowed, than in the high strain of praise, and of reciprocal compliment, which mark the passages in question.

In the first place, we have M. De Gerando's TEXT: which, after a mass of loose verbiage and demonstrable contradiction, in which he talks about a '*decomposition of thought*,' and '*philosophical processes of the understanding*,' (considerations which might well be applied to the *project* of LEIBNITZ; but which touch not the *conclusion* of CONDILLAC,) *ends in a* PROPAGATION OF THE GROSS ERROR OF CONDILLAC, *in only an attenuated shape*; for, *after all*, in this text, M. De Gerando asserts, that, "IN A CERTAIN SENSE, Languages may be
"regarded as analytical methods."

But I pass on, to the *Note*; in which the additional and final improvement is contained.

And here the principal feature that presents itself, is an express contradiction, or nullification, equally of itself and of the text. The *Text* says, 'It is in *this* respect that languages, with their forms and rules, conducting (so to speak) those who use them into the path of a regular analysis,'—'may be regarded, *in a certain sense*, as analytical methods.' But, in the *Note*, the real truth of the matter is confessed, that Languages DO NOT CONDUCT *us* in the path of analysis; 'nor do they CONTRIBUTE to keep us in the right path, but in proportion to the degree of JUDGMENT with which that analysis has been conducted.'

The real fact is, that both the Text and the Note, when duly examined, amount to one and the same tenor: both contradict themselves, in the very same manner; both do this by an expression of that species of absurdity, seldom incurred by Philosophers, facetiously called a *Bull*; and both completely abandon the conclusion of Condillac, by the expression of that absurdity. The very credit of the logical character of the age appears to be so deeply affected by the proceeding in question, and by the praises with which it has been held up to admiration, that it becomes an indispensable duty to criticise it with proportionate justice.

When the TEXT says, 'it is in *this* respect that languages,' &c.; the definitive term "*this*" refers, undeniably, to '*philosophical processes of the understanding*' and to a '*decomposition of thought*.' And

the real sense of the whole text is indisputably this : that a LANGUAGE conducts a man in the path of analysis, by means of his *employing a philosophic process of his* UNDERSTANDING and a *decomposition of his own* THOUGHTS : Which is precisely parallel to asserting, that *One Man helps Another by the fact of that other's helping Himself.*

The NOTE, (after some most notable confusion which I shall be under a necessity to criticise,) ends in stating the same thing as the Text, by the same absurdity of expression ; in acknowledging the *truth*, that a Language DOES NOT *even so much as* 'CONTRIBUTE to keep us in the right path, but 'in proportion to the degree of JUDGMENT with which 'an analysis has been conducted :' Which expression, I repeat, amounts to a conclusive admission, that LANGUAGE does not contribute to keep us in the right path AT ALL.

I am now under the necessity of adverting to that confusion, which, I have said, is exhibited in the body of M. De Gerando's *Note* ; and which is so remarkable, for the darkness and negligence which it betrays, that I am almost ready to suspect myself of laboring under some very great defect of understanding, when I observe it has been the subject of such extraordinary panegyric.

And *First*, I must assert, against the express assumption of M. De Gerando, that Languages do NOT "furnish the *occasions* and the *means of analysis* : " They furnish *only the* SIGNS or RECORD of analysis, *after* the UNDERSTANDING OR MIND has furnished the *occasion* and the *means*. Language, indeed, fur-

nishes the *means* of RECORDING the Rule which the Mind has discovered : but it furnishes no means of DISCOVERING that Rule.

Secondly, I observe, Languages DO NOT “resemble” *finger-posts placed on a road to enable us to discern our “way.”* On the contrary, Every Language, or Every Express Speech, (*while we are travelling along it,*) resembles a WAY ITSELF, and NOT a way-POST : for, if we follow it, it necessarily conducts us SOMEWHERE ; but *there is Not One Sign, or Signal, in Any Language, or in Any Express Speech,* that can, by any possibility, inform us, or afford us the *slightest suspicion*, whether the way which we are travelling leads to Truth, or to Fiction ; to Science, or to Nonsense.

As a proof of this, I need only desire, of any Englishman, who is ignorant of Arithmetic, to read the following Sentence : *Twice ten are equal to three times sixty.* And, then, I would ask him, Can he tell whether this proposition is true, or false ?

Besides this fact—namely—that a LANGUAGE IS A ROAD, in which Road there never is any Signal to tell you whether you are travelling in Truth, or in Falsehood,—I assert, here,—as a General Principle,—that *No Word, considered merely as a Sign, ever can point either FORWARD or BACKWARD* : But Every Word is the Sign of an Idea that is to be regarded as being RELATIVELY PRESENT : And we get forward, from the Idea signified by One Word, to that Signified by Another, *by an Operation of the UNDERSTANDING* ;—Every WORD in a Language resembling a STEP-PING STONE in a Road. For, when we say,

“*Three into Three, equal Nine ;*” it is certain that the Words “*Three into Three*” could never direct us one hair’s breadth on the way to the equality “*Nine*,” any more than it could to Nine Thousand, or to the Nine Muses : And it is self-evident that we get to the *result*—“*Nine*”—solely by an ACT OF THE INTELLECT. A man who hath not Arithmetic in his Soul, could not tell, whether the Word *Nine*, in this case, is the *Sign* of a RESULT, or the *Sign* of a FICTION.

Thirdly. I am under the necessity of objecting, that Languages ARE NOT “*results ;*” although I grant, *when a portion of Language records a process in SCIENCE*, it may *then*, in that accidental case, with truth be called a ‘*monument*’ of analysis. Languages, when they happen to record truth of any kind, are Monuments : but Monuments are not Results. A Victory, or a Conquest, is a Result ; but the Column, or Inscription, which records this Conquest, is not that Result : The same difference exists between an *Analytical Result* and the *Words*, or *Symbols*, in which it is recorded. Algebraical Results are so far from being ‘*Monuments*,’ that they *eminently require Monuments* to preserve their remembrance. Assuredly, therefore, never was confusion more deep, than the confounding of Analytical Results and their Monuments, into One Same Object, or Subject.¹

¹ In a farther note upon this subject, Professor Stewart says, (*Second Ed. Oct. p. 142.*) “The unsoundness of Condillac’s assertion, that *the art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged*, was, I believe, first pointed out “by M. Prevost. See some acute and decisive objections to “this proposition in his treatise *Des Signes, &c.*” I have not

Unavoidable as I conceive these strictures to be, and quite impossible as it was for me to have omitted them with justice to the subject, I must confess they appear to me to call doubly for animadversion on account of the terms of eulogium with which the exposition or views of M. De Gerando have been held up for the admiration of the world. Of course, I suppose, Professor Stewart could not have in the least degree suspected the egregious error which they propagate; and far less the tissue of absurdity and contradiction which I have been under the necessity to point out; otherwise, it is impossible to suppose he could have dwelt, in such terms, upon a proceeding which I take to be infamously below what ought to be the logical character of the age. At any rate, I have no hesitation in declaring, as being what I think due to Condillac, that I would as soon have it imputed to me that I had fallen into *his original* mistake; as that, after being once awakened to a suspicion of his error, I had furnished such an exposition of the subject as that which has been thus exhibited.

I would not have it for a moment supposed I seen this work of M. Prevost. And in fact the state of health against which I have had to struggle throughout the whole execution of my present task, although it has given me time, has rendered it impossible for me to take a wider range of authorities than I have done. Nor do I (unless in the case of M. Prevost) consider this to be of much loss to the reader. If however the "*acute and decisive* objections" of M. Prevost be more decisive, than the eulogised exposition of M. De Gerando, I think it was due to the subject that Mr. Stewart should have corrected the former, by an example of the latter.

wish to dissemble the recollection, that these strictures fall heaviest upon the views of a writer, who has strained with perhaps unexampled pertinacity in affecting to refuse me all philosophical consideration ; and with whom, it has appeared, I am otherwise at issue, upon a claim of a special nature. I am fully aware that the various criticisms and objections which I have been urged to hazard, with regard to the doctrines and assumptions of Mr. Stewart, both in my present and in my former work, may, on these different accounts, be very naturally viewed by his warm admirers as taking a tone from my sense of his procedure. But I aver that my animadversions upon his views have not been so critical, or far carried, as I think they very fairly might have been. And to this remark, indeed, I may add, that an early and a long continued veneration for the philosophical cast of his mind, and respect for his general character, have, throughout, precluded every feeling in the most distant manner allied to hostility towards him. In testimony of what I now assert, I may appeal to the strictures which I have felt it to be a duty, on different occasions, to hazard with regard to the speculations, respectively, of Dr. Reid, Mr. Tooke, and other writers : And I believe that whoever will take the trouble to compare the tone of animadversion in all of them, including those on Mr. Stewart's writings, will sit down convinced, that no personal consideration has actuated me with opposition to the latter. I might indeed remark, that public and impartial criticism has borne testimony to my having observed great

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consideration toward Mr. Stewart. And I certainly believed myself possessed of nobler means of leading him to appreciate the course he has chosen, than that of any undue strain of animadversion.

Having duly adverted to this matter; I shall leave it to every competent and impartial reader to decide, according to the real merits of the subject.

Professor Stewart informs us, that, when he first gave into the view of Condillac, as propagated by Lavoisier, he “was fully aware of the looseness “and indistinctness of Lavoisier’s expressions.” But he “did not think it necessary, in the *introduction* to his Work,” (i. e. in his *First Volume*,) “to point out in what manner Condillac’s propositions were to be limited and corrected.” Be this accorded. But I must, in this place, totally object to the phrase, “*limited and corrected*,”—a phrase which I conceive to be not more fortunate, or more applicable to the subject, than if he had employed almost any other two verbs in the language.

Suppose, for a moment, that any Philosopher had fallen into the mistake of asserting, that a *Man* and his *Shadow*; Or a *Road* upon which a man travels and a KNOWLEDGE IN THAT MAN’S MIND that the Road carries him *East, West, North, or South*, are One Same Thing: (And of this nature and extent I take to be precisely the mistake of Condillac: In this case, I ask, What should we say of any Philosophical Critic, who should *first* give into this assertion; and afterwards inform the world, that he had at the time in view to *limit and correct* it?

If I have not been extremely deceived, throughout the foregoing view of the subject, the credit of Human Understanding could hardly, in any case, be more depressed, than in any attempt to apply the word *limit*, or even that of *correct*, to a position, or doctrine, which must certainly be *expunged altogether* from the face of Philosophy; and, at the best, passed off, as being one of those oversights into which, perhaps, the best human intellect is sometimes liable to fall.

SUBSECTION III.

Of a Phrase and Assumption of modern Logicians, that Language is an Instrument of Thought.

It has appeared, in what has gone before, that Language, in the present work, is considered as being the Object of two very different classes of inquirers—namely—*First* of the Grammarian; and, *Secondly*, of the Logician in Some Other department of Philosophy. It has also been intimated, that the general tenor of the present treatise has for its object to exhibit only the *Grammatical* character of Language. In this introductory chapter, however, it has been necessary to touch upon, and somewhat to overstep, that line which separates the province of Grammar from that of Logic in General: and, in addition to what has been advanced of this nature in the last article, it appears requisite to advert to the doctrine or assumption which is named in the title of this subsection. The object I have in view, in so doing, is to remove

what has become a very fashionable, but, I must think, a very erroneous phrase and assumption with the most eminent writers of the last and present age.

No phrase employed by authors of this description appears more in favor, or is used with more appearance of a refined philosophical discrimination, than that of “*Language considered as AN INSTRUMENT of thought.*” Thus, among other examples, we find, that such is the partiality entertained for this phrase by Professor Stewart, (although he is by no means alone in the matter) that he, by a device seldom adopted by him, emphatically marks the expression of it with SMALL CAPITALS ; as may be seen in one of the notes, in the *Second Volume* of his *Elements*, to which I have already referred.

Now it has appeared, from the whole tenor of the foregoing article, that Language neither is, nor can be, in any sense, an INSTRUMENT of Thought. And, although the phrase in question goes very smoothly over the tongue, and has an insidious influence upon the imagination, especially as it has now acquired some root in habit and prejudice, I humbly conceive, it must be abandoned, as parcel of that fallacy which I have already endeavoured to explode : And I apprehend that even the influence of fashion will not be able to save it, provided the present, or future generation, shall advance in the scale of rationality.

Language, it has been shewn, is both a SIGN and a RECORD or MONUMENT of Thought. But, if it be also, in any sense, an INSTRUMENT of Thought, it must HELP *us to* THINK, that is, it must

serve Some Such Office with regard to thinking, as the Spade, the Plough, or the Harrow, does in the cultivation of our fields, or gardens; which Office, I have very distinctly shewn, by particular examples in the foregoing article, it never does, nor can do.

A Language is a *Road of Signs*, CORRESPONDING TO AND SUGGESTING a *Road of Thoughts*. But we do not consider a ROAD to be an INSTRUMENT of travelling; And so, neither can we consider a Language an INSTRUMENT of Thought. The *Real Instruments* of travelling (unless we adopt some *secondary or artificial* power) are our *Limbs*, actuated by the powers of our Body: And the *Real Instruments* of Thought are the *Faculties* of our *Mind*, actuated by our Will. It is a *Faculty of our Mind* that STEPS *from Word to Word*; and, in so doing, *informs us* WHAT IS THE CONNECTION between the Two Words in question; or whether, indeed, there is *Any Connection at all* between them, any more than if they were two stones, thrown, by chance, into a contiguity, or proximity.

The Words, in *Any Speech*, no more HELP us to move forward, and no more *indicate any Object beyond themselves*, than can be said of the Two Banks of a River, with a Bridge standing between them. Now, when we are walking on a Bridge, WE (i. e. THE MIND) know that *One Bank has been passed*,—and that *Another Bank must follow*: but it is not the *passed Bank* that indicates the Bridge; nor the *Bridge* that indicates the Bank that is to come: The Banks and Bridge *indicate nothing*; they only PROCLAIM THEMSELVES, *respectively*, as objects of

our contemplation ; and they leave it to OUR MIND to connect them (*if we can*) *in idea*, conformably to the connection that really exists between them.

I am very sensible, that when I first suggested, in the foregoing article, that Language *does not help to carry us on*, in thinking ; it must have been viewed as a paradox and an untenable position. But the truth of the matter is so certainly demonstrable, that I cannot anticipate any future objection to it : and I trust that nothing more need be said, here, to render the proof of it complete.

There is another phrase, or expression, to be noticed here, however, which, at first sight, may be thought something less objectionable—namely—that Language is a “VEHICLE” of Thought. But the use of this phrase is an exhibition of as false philosophy as the other ; and it must be exploded along with it. If Language, indeed, were a *Vehicle* of Thought, it would, then, be an *Instrument* : because, although we do not, in ordinary discourse, call a *Stage Coach*, or even a *Horse*, an *Instrument*, it certainly is one in the philosophical sense of the word. But Language *never did, and never can*, CONVEY *Any Thought* : It can only *excite, or suggest*, ANOTHER *Thought*, in Another Mind, SIMILAR to the Thought which it expresses ; just as a foot-path, in a field, suggests to *One Man*, a course of action similar to that which *Another Man* has gone before him. A Speech, of any sort, therefore, when *heard, or read*, is merely a PATH FOR THOUGHT TO *travel in*, traced out in an *otherwise markless void* ; which *One man* has *trod down*, and thus *left Signs* that enable *Another man*

to follow him : While the man who follows, as well as he that precedes, must travel under the **LAW OF GRAMMAR** ; or, else, the Road he traces is **NOT PURE LANGUAGE** : And the precursor may also, at the same time, travel under a *collateral Law of Analytical Science* ; though he that comes after may not in the least know whether he is travelling a Road of Analytical Science, or not.

In order to illustrate the last remark, I observe, that every Sentence, Proposition, or Speech whatever, must exhibit, (to those who understand both subjects,) an example of *Two Most Distinct and Different Systems of Laws* : that is, it must exhibit, first, the **LAWS OF MERE GRAMMATICAL CONNECTION** : And, distinctly from this, it must display the **LAWS** either of, *Some Rational Connection of Ideas*, or of *Some Truth*, or *Some Fiction*, or *Some Concatenation or Other of Ideas*, **EXTRA GRAMMATICAL**.

I might add to the observations of both the present and the past article. But I do not wish to augment their bulk ; and I trust that what has been hazarded in them is amply sufficient for the purpose I had in view. I shall close this article, therefore, by remarking, that I can anticipate that fashion, supported by prejudice, may strain hard to retain the use of the phrase “ **INSTRUMENT OF THOUGHT** ;” which expression, like a cherished play-thing, will not willingly be thrown aside. But if the claims of reason, in modern logical speculations should happily triumph over sound embodying error, I think no writer of eminence will, in future, deliberately stake his reputation to

a use of this phrase: And if, in violation of reason, the fashion should still prevail; I observe, that the matter in question is not merely an innocent foppery in science; but it is an expression which involves and promulgates a very serious error, in our conceptions of the nature both of Language and of Thought itself.

I shall have occasion to shew, in the sequel, what *fruits* have been produced in the doctrines of Language by the error of Condillac; modified, as it has been, by other writers.

SUBSECTION IV.

Of the different Methods which have been pursued by Philologists, with a view to solve the Problem of Language; and, especially, of that which has been followed by Mr. Horne Tooke.—Of the General Cause of past failure in the Subject of Language.

THERE are two very different methods, by which an exposition of the nature of Language may be attempted; and which have actually been put in practice by those who have speculated in this direction. ONE of these is, to demonstrate, or at least *assume*, Some General Principles of Relation between our Ideas; and, thence, to seek out, in the reputed imports of the different *Species of Words*, in any Language, such *Grammatical meanings* as might reduce them to a strict conformity with this Structure of Relation. THE OTHER is, without any consideration whatever of the nature of our Ideas, or their Connections, to “*dig*” down, as

far as may be done, into the unknown number of strata which the accumulation of ages has heaped upon the original forms and particular imports of Words; and, thereby, endeavour to determine what their *Primitive Grammatical Imports* have been: In effecting which, it has been imagined, by the votaries of this method, that they should arrive at the real nature of the thing sought.

The last-mentioned of these two methods is that which has been prosecuted by the late Mr. Tooke; and, since him, by other eminent Etymologists. The other is the course which appears to have been followed, (though together with the most erroneous views of Relation) by Mr. Harris and by other preceding writers on Philosophical Grammar; and is now also embraced by me, in the following work; but having, for its basis, a view of the Category of Relation altogether incompatible with that heretofore uniformly entertained.

From the real and great importance of Mr. Tooke's philological labors; and from the very opposite views of Language which I have been under the necessity of taking up, to those which he has suggested and maintained; it is evident I must unavoidably have frequent occasion to animadvert upon the nature of his speculations; and must, even, hazard some passing opinions with regard to his philosophical genius. The principal part of these animadversions I shall reserve for the Chapter of PREPOSITIONS; in which place a statement of them will be the most requisite and indispensable: But it appears necessary that some

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of these should be offered upon the present occasion.

Mr. Tooke himself informs us, that he produced his Theory of Language from “reasoning *a priori*.” In his *First Volume*, page 130, he says, “If I have “been misled, it certainly is not by Etymology : “of which I confess myself to have been shame- “fully ignorant at the time when these my notions “of language were first formed. And (Not- “withstanding Lord Monboddo’s discouraging “sneer) it was general reasoning *a priori* that led “me to the particular instances; not particular “instances to the general reasoning.”

Again, back in page 122, he says, “I protest “to you, that my notions of Language were formed “before I could account etymologically for any “one of the words in question, and before I was “in the least acquainted with the opinions of “others.”

In page 131, he even says, “This Etymology, “against whose fascination you would have me “guard myself, *did not occur to me till many years “after my system was settled.*”

Although I consider Mr. Tooke profoundly mistaken, when he thinks he ever begins with a *general* and not with a *particular* truth, I am glad, for the sake of those who have been impressed with a high opinion of his understanding, and of his excellence especially in grammatical acumen, that he has recorded his testimony, so unequivocally and emphatically, to the propriety of investigating the nature of Language from general reasoning *a priori*. But, What are we to say of the Prince

(because the Precursor) of INDUCTIVE ETYMOLOGISTS, and the man whom the most illustrious Linguist since himself has taken for his avowed leader and model as an inductive inquirer in exclusion of every thing like reasoning *a priori*, thus declaring that ETYMOLOGY *had nothing to do* with his discoveries?

If it should be asked, in this place, What had Mr. Tooke, then, to do with Etymology? The answer, I think, he gives somewhere—namely—that he had recourse to it *only in order to convince others*; not as the means of informing *himself*.

But the real truth of Mr. Tooke's proceeding is, that, notwithstanding his avowals already quoted, his whole Work, with one or two trifling exceptions which will be duly noticed in the sequel, is void of any thing like general reasoning *a priori*; and proceeds wholly upon *inductive principles*: In which assertion I am borne out by the express declaration of Dr. Murray, (whose grammatical labors will claim very repeated notice in this work) that Mr. Tooke “was the first writer who “applied the inductive philosophy to the history “of speech;”—and—that, “By applying the inductive philosophy to language, he has been able to “demonstrate the origin of all the indeclinable “parts of speech from the noun and the verb.”

In fact, there is a contrariety to the last degree between Mr. Tooke's professed method and his actual proceeding; which I have never been able either to reconcile, or to account for in any way that does not appear to arraign him of an inconsistency of the most general extent.

That the Philologer of Purley possessed both a vigorous and a cultivated understanding, capable, under a right direction, of effecting much more than he has done toward an exposition of the Nature of Language, there can be no doubt. But he subjected his mind to a bias, so strong, against the CONNECTIONS, or COMPOSITIONS, of *our Thoughts*, as forming the Foundation of Language, that he commences his speculations by scouting, with the most unqualified contempt, any toleration of such Things as *Operations in the Mind, or a Composition of Ideas*.

“Grammarians” (says he, *Vol. 1. page 23.*) “have
“since pursued just the same method with the
“*Mind*, that they had before done with *Things*.
“The different operations of the Mind, are to ac-
“count now, for what the different things account-
“ed before : and, when they are not sufficiently
“numerous for the purpose, it is only supposing
“an imaginary operation or two, and the difficul-
“ties are for the time shuffled over. So the very
“same game has been played over with *Ideas*,
“which was before played with *Things*. No sa-
“tisfaction, no agreement has been obtained : but
“all has been dispute, diversity, and darkness :
“Insomuch, that many of the most learned and
“judicious Grammarians, disgusted with obscurity
“and contradiction, have prudently contented
“themselves with remarking the difference between
“*Words*, and have left the causes of Language to
“shift for themselves.”

The extract, now given, forms a conclusive evidence, of what I should think certainly demanded

proof, namely, that Mr. Tooke actually proceeded upon an attempt to solve the Problem of Language by the help of WORDS THEMSELVES, to the utter exclusion of all consideration of *Ideas*. I cannot say that I in the least comprehend what is meant by “a *difference between Words*,” that is not founded on a *difference between the Ideas* which they signify: but that this is the express doctrine of Mr. Tooke is certain; because, what he sarcastically means by the “CAUSES of Language” are, manifestly, our IDEAS and their CONNECTIONS.

As it must be of material weight, in furnishing a preliminary view of my own undertaking, that I should afford the reader a just and indubitable estimate of Mr. Tooke’s *general proceeding as a Philosopher*, I would here solicit particular attention to the question, What could have been the *assumed Principles or Data* (for Principles or Data of some sort he must have had) which he could have employed for his reasonings *a priori*; since he had so signally discarded THINGS (i. e. *external Things*) and IDEAS: For these, I apprehend, with the exception of WORDS *considered as THEIR SIGNS*, make up the *Whole Sum of the Universe*; and we have seen that Mr. Tooke had formed and settled his System of Language, many years before he meddled with *Etymology*?

It becomes plain, from what has been quoted, that WORDS—MERE ABSOLUTE LIVING WORDS—as they pass from mouth to mouth,—*without any reference to IDEAS*, and *without any reference to ETYMOLOGY OR DERIVATION*, were the MATERIALS which formed the Data or Principles of

Mr. Tooke's *general reasonings*. And the following, which are to be collected from the first thirty pages of his work, appear to be the **SOLE FACTS** or **DATA THEMSELVES**, upon which he has proposed to hang so mighty a fabric as the whole exposition of Language.

In page 26, of his *First Volume*, his fellow dialogist—B.—says,

“ I think I begin to comprehend you. You
“ mean to say that the views of Grammarians have
“ arisen from supposing all words to be *immediately*
“ either the signs of things or the signs of ideas :
“ whereas in fact many words are merely *abbrevia-*
“ *tions* employed for dispatch, and are the signs of
“ other words. And these are the artificial wings
“ of Mercury, by means of which the Argus eyes
“ of Philosophy have been cheated.”

To which Mr. Tooke, under the letter H, tersely replies,

“ It is my meaning.”

Now, upon these Data, I have to observe, *First*, that although they involve a true and a very important distinction—namely—that which must exist between the *Signs of Ideas* and the *Signs of Signs*; and although the investigation of the consequences of this distinction constitutes a very wide field of Grammar,—a field in which, if Mr. Tooke has not reaped the whole crop, he has certainly reaped much honor for himself;—yet the whole result of *any* success that could possibly be attained therein could regard only a *very subordinate part*, and that **NOT AN ESSENTIAL part**, of the **SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE**. Besides which, I remark, that **BOTH** the

Kinds of Signs in question are *founded* on our *Ideas and their Connections*. Secondly, I observe, that Mr. Tooke, in the sequel of his work, has had recourse to the particular mention of Ideas, as being the Objects of which Words are the Signs;—a proceeding, indeed, which it was impossible for him to avoid, if he wrote upon Grammar at all: And he has thereby, in the most decisive manner quashed the Assumption which he had previously set up, against what he calls the “CAUSES of Language.” Thus, in his Chapter of PREPOSITIONS, Vol. 1, page 319, he founds this Part of Speech (although in a most erroneous and visionary manner) upon Ideas, in the following assumption. “So does the necessity of the Preposition (or of some equivalent invention) follow from the impossibility of having in Language a distinct *complex term* for each different COLLECTION OF IDEAS which we may have occasion to put together in discourse.”

Without quoting Mr. Tooke farther, at present, (because I shall have occasion to notice this, his inconsistency, more particularly hereafter) I have here only to add, that he goes on, at some length, in the same place, talking thus of Ideas, individually and collectively, as being the Objects which Words signify and stand for.

After this statement, which, from the nature of the extracts given in proof, cannot admit of any hesitation, I may venture to affirm, that a more comprehensive and sweeping contradiction is not to be found in the general proceeding of any Writer, than is here manifested between Mr. Tooke's prelimi-

nary doctrine and the course which he has actually followed in the sequel of his speculations.

2.

After the view which I have now taken of the general method pursued by Mr. Tooke, I proceed to observe, with reference to his preliminary assumption, that it was NOT *the taking of THINGS, or IDEAS*, for the foundation of Language; and the consequent endeavour to make the *Parts of Speech conform* in their Structure to the NATURE of *Ideas*, that has proved the great stumbling block to Grammarians. For although it is very true, as Mr. Tooke has asserted, that “the very same game has “been played over again with the MIND,” (or IDEAS) “which was before played with THINGS;” yet, the real and profound cause of failure has uniformly been, that, in *assuming the Generic Structure of THINGS, or the Generic Structure of IDEAS*, (for both these must have One Same Structure, in our apprehension) Grammarians have plunged themselves into a vast abyss of error, which the Logicians had prepared for them: which error, it will form a leading object of the present work to expose, as being the only possible means of ever explaining the real Structure of Language.

The error upon the exposure of which I propose to lay so great a stress, is, certainly, one of the most extraordinary, as it is, at the same time, the most profound and comprehensive, of any that ever beguiled the imagination of Philosophers. It consists in the view which has, uniformly and without any contradiction or suspicion, been taken of

the GENERIC STRUCTURE OF THE CATEGORY OF RELATION. All that I shall say with regard to this fallacy at the present moment, however, is, that it is of such a nature, that, so long as Grammarians proceeded to build upon it, as their common foundation, it was impossible that any strength of genius, or any labor of research, could avail them : One and all were, of necessity, sunk in the abyss upon which they had laid their Structure ; the strong and the weak were equally unable to surmount the barrier in which this abyss had involved them ; and logical acumen was only exhausted in vain, in attempting to over-leap it.

If it should, here, (especially to many readers,) be matter of surprise that a fallacy so vast should have prevailed so long, and so unsuspected, in the accredited System of Logic, as that which I have now ventured to impeach : I shall be content, for the present, to observe, that those who are conversant with the History of Philosophy cannot be ignorant, that there are parallel instances ; which, if not so extensive in their consequences, are at least nearly as wonderful in their having ever existed : One, or two, of which, I shall appeal to, farther on. Indeed, if I should ever be able to accomplish the sequel of a work, the First Part of which is already before the public, (although I have now very faint expectation of effecting it,) I hope to be enabled to show, that the fallacy thus in question, and which was first pointed out in the Volume to which I allude, is only a part of a far greater defect which obtains in the General Sys-

tem of Scholastic Logic. Upon which I may here merely remark, that such a result, if effected, would prove the Science of Universal Logic to be vastly more in its infancy, than our most guarded Philosophers at all imagine.

In fine. In calling the attention of readers to the *Generic Structure of Relation*, of which I propose to treat in the next article, I have to observe, that there is no Subject which has been *so remarkably neglected, as this one has by modern metaphysicians*. The elaborate analysis of Relation furnished by Mr. Locke, in his Essay, is the only important exception I know; and, unfortunately for Philosophy and for Language, Mr. Locke's views of the subject have only served to exemplify and confirm the profoundly erroneous theory of that Category which had been handed down, uncontradicted, from ARISTOTLE; and which still reigns, without a dissentient voice. The great reputation of each of these geniuses, and their unhappy unanimity upon this subject, operating together, have contributed to lay all men asleep with regard to any suspicion of fallacy in the assumed Structure of Relation: and an error of the utmost consequence to Science, and ESPECIALLY FATAL TO GRAMMAR, has triumphed through the supineness of philosophers.

SECTION SECOND.

ANALYSIS OF THE GENERIC STRUCTURE OF RELATIVES AND RELATION, AS FORMING THE PRIMARY LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THINGS IN THE UNIVERSE AND THE FOUNDATION OF LANGUAGE.—COLLATERAL STATEMENT OF THE STRUCTURE OF RELATION ASSUMED BY GRAMMARIANS AND LOGICIANS.—VAST INCOMPATIBILITY OF THESE TWO STRUCTURES.

Preliminary Observations.

THE Analysis of the Category of Relatives and Relation which was offered in a work already alluded to, and which, in point of extent, forms a very considerable part of that volume, was therein requisitely carried to a length of particularity that is neither necessary nor convenient in a Treatise of Language. On the present occasion, therefore, I shall confine my view of the Subject to such a limited and concise statement, as I conceive will be not more than sufficient to enable a reader to apprehend, with ease, the analysis of Language which is founded upon it: And, if curiosity, or a philosophical interest, should stimulate any one to consult a more minute investigation of its nature, including that of its various modes, I refer to the original work.

In attempting to delineate any unusual views in Philosophy, it is known, that we shall the more

effectually impress the understandings of different readers, by different modes of exposition. In the re-statement of analysis, now proposed, I shall endeavour to avail myself of this fact: and, with this intention, I have determined to exhibit the present delineation in a vehicle which I shall not employ in any other stage of the work. Every reader, of Mr. Tooke's celebrated Treatise of Grammar, knows, that he has therein proceeded by the method of DIALOGUE. To this procedure I would, upon general ground, object. From various considerations, I deem it to be an improper method of conducting a voluminous Treatise of Language. At best, it must be diffuse and circumlocutory, and no better than a go-cart for infant Philosophers, or a jaunting-car for indolent ones. And it has, too often, been perverted, (as it has in a peculiar degree by Mr. Tooke) to become the vehicle of any thing, rather than of mere argument with regard to the subject at issue. If properly made use of, however, Dialogue is a method well adapted to the infant, or neglected state of any subject: and, in particular, where *description alone* is wanted, and all that is required is to impress the imagination with a series of lively and familiar images, this mode, I conceive, may be employed with as much fairness as effect. Now this last is precisely the case with regard to the CATEGORY OF RELATION. The real nature of this Category has been misapprehended to a most profound and surprising degree; and this, with an undeviating uniformity of opinion, which has presented no dissentient voice: The consequence of which is, that all men of letters

are lulled into such a security of prejudice with regard to it, that it can be no easy matter to rouse them to a *suspicion* of its fallacy ; which can only be effectually done by employing the most impressive means. And yet, I venture to believe that it demands *nothing more than description*, to bring all parties over to a full conviction, that the past doctrine of the Subject has been as seriously erroneous, as I have here supposed it to be.

In a case, therefore, which I take to be so peculiarly fitted for the admission of Dialogue, I shall not hesitate to employ it. At the same time, I trust some of my readers will believe, that nothing is farther from my view than an attempt to rival the piquancy of Mr. Tooke's composition, or style of writing.

In offering this explanation of my reasons for adopting the proceeding in question, I desire, among other objects, to prepare my readers to expect nothing but simplicity in the Foundation of Language ; and, thereby, to prevent their distracting the attention by a continued research after subtleties which do not exist in the Subject : For the Foundation of Language, and Language itself which must strictly conform thereunto, are, in their *generic nature*, EMINENTLY SIMPLE things : although each of them involves a very large field of reasoning or discursive investigation.

I proceed, without farther preface, to the intended discussion.

A DIALOGUE CONCERNING RELATION.

A.

Your incredulity is natural. But it is the result of your having imbibed a general reverence for the fabrications of Philosophers, without having had leisure to examine into the real merits of what they have built up.

Z.

How can I choose but be incredulous, when you admit that there is an unbroken uniformity of authority against your views? As, however, I cannot help being deeply interested in any thing that professes to bear with moment upon the nature of Language, I am disposed to listen to what you have to say with regard to it.

A.

I have already asserted, that the Problem of Language is to be completely solved, by tracing the respective imports of the several Parts of Speech to a strict conformity with the *Necessary Principles of Relation between our Ideas*. But the real Structure of Relation having been profoundly misapprehended by the Logician; and the Grammarians having uniformly bottomed their views of Language upon that misconception; one common failure has been the inevitable result, and all the existing theories of Language, without exception,

evince little better than a total darkness in this department of knowledge.

Z.

What you tell me is very wonderful. But it would be still more so, if you expect that I should yield you my credence, unless you shall demonstrate the matter with a rigor not inferior to that of the proof of any theorem in geometry. I can easily conceive, indeed, that such a mistake, as you have supposed, might fully account for all past difficulty, and let in important light for the future; but nothing short of the most incontrovertible proofs shall convince me that such a vast fallacy has in reality been tolerated, through all time past. As the subject, however, is of such logical importance, and the credit of Philosophy is so deeply arraigned, I promise you my attention; and it shall not be my fault, if you fail in your undertaking.

A.

If I entertained the least doubt on the subject, I would not give either you or myself the trouble to enter upon the discussion. And, as my confidence in it has at least been the result of much intense application, I trust it is not altogether unwarrantable in me to feel as I do with regard to it. I undertake, then, to prove to you, in this discussion, that the *Generic Structure of Relation* (which, in other words, means the *Generic Logical Structure of Things in the Universe*) as forming *The Primary Object of the Logician and The Foundation of Language*, has been profoundly misapprehended.

Z.

I am all attention. Begin.

A.

There is one thing, of which I must make you aware, beforehand ; in order that your vanity may not be offended. If you consent to enter upon this investigation with me, you must agree to be put into a GO-CART ; and you must not think, or complain, that the thing is childish, or that any affront is offered to your dignity, as a lover of wisdom. For, if, in any case, Philosophers themselves happen to be found stumbling, like children, they must deign to be treated as such ; and I am obliged to believe that such is their case with regard to the subject in question.

Z.

O ! I understand you. You intend to proceed in the most simple and elementary way. I like this : It is the certain method to know, that the ground whereon we build is solid and unassailable. Be assured, I shall take no offence. The GO-CART, *by all means !* Let us set out !

A.

If you should happen to be contemplating ANY COUPLE OF OBJECTS, let them be *Two Houses*, or *Two Banks of a River*, with respect to the DISTANCE between them ; you would, if the question were asked, naturally say, that Either of the 'Two Houses, or Two Banks, is DISTANT with respect to the Other.

Z.

CERTAINLY. What then ?

A.

Why, then, I ask you, FOR WHAT REASON would you say, that Either of the Two Objects in question is distant from the other ?

Z.

This is putting a man into a GO-CART, with a vengeance. Is it with such a question as this, which any clown could solve, and any school-boy would disdain to answer, that you introduce your vaunted scheme, of proving that all Logicians, through time past, have been laboring in an abyss of error with regard to the Category of Relation ? I thought the vehicle which I consented to enter was at least a go-cart for *men*, and not for *children* : although I noted, you thought proper to name the mistakes of philosophers and the stumbling of children together.

A.

Nay. But be patient ; and answer my question, according to your promise.

Z.

Well then, if I have consented to indulge this humor, as the price of getting at your meaning, I answer, that Each of the *Two Banks* is said to be distant from the Other, owing to a *Thing that is interposed between* the Two. Which thing, (if I may venture to speak here beyond my Primer) when it

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is spoken of *absolutely* (i. e. without reference to any other thing with which it might be compared) is called **LENGTH**, or **LINEAR EXTENSION**; but, when viewed *relatively*, (i. e. with regard to any **Two Things** which it *divides and also logically connects*) is called **DISTANCE**: from which Substantive Word—*Distance*—the Adjective—**DISTANT**—is derived.

A.

I understand, by this, that you consider the **Two Banks**, in the present case, to be *Relatives*, or rather *Correlatives*, to each other, by reason of the **DISTANCE THAT IS INTERPOSED** between them.

Z.

Unquestionably, I do.

A.

Putting this question, however, (as I must do) in yet another shape; I say, You consider the **Two Banks**, in this case, as being **Two Correlatives**, NOT *merely in virtue of any Quality or Attribute of either of these Banks*; but **PRINCIPALLY IN VIRTUE OF A THIRD THING**—namely—**THAT THING that is INTERPOSED BETWEEN the Two**, and which, with respect to them, we now call **DISTANCE**.

Z.

Most certainly.—The truth of the matter is so simply self-evident, as to preclude every doubt, or hesitation, in the case. But, it seems, you choose

to banter me, a little, with this trifling ; as a trial of my patience, before you venture to present me with the more distasteful cup of your serious opinions.

A.

Then, according to your view of the Subject, the Two Banks are Two Correlatives in virtue of a THING FOREIGN TO BOTH of them, and which thing is actually *as external to each*, as an *Arc, or Line*, that subtends an Angle, is external to and distinct from the *Legs of that Angle*.

Z.

I tell you, again, The matter is so obviously and so obtrusively self-evident, that I cannot conceive the use of your thus reiterating the question, in different shapes. You, surely, are not going to DENY the thing. But, if you are, I inform you that my patience is exhausted, and I must *get out here* ; since reason would be insulted by any farther proceeding.

A.

Not I, indeed ; I am not going to deny the matter at all : for I may say in this case, (as Bishop Berkeley said upon a very different occasion,) “ *I am of a Vulgar cast* :” And I suppose that my conception of a Relation of Distance is just like that of any school-boy, or clown, in the kingdom. What is more : I do not think that any Grammarian, or Logician, that ever existed, would deny your conception of the matter when the question is stated in any such example as that which I have

now given: for the error, which I here impute to Philosophers, has not resulted after any *controverted investigation* of the subject; but appears to be the fruit of *mere oversight*, unsuspected by any one. But I must now inform you, (and it will fully account for the seeming impertinence with which I have repeated the question,) that your conception of the nature of Relation, although it perfectly coincides with my own, is DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE TO THAT WHICH HAS BEEN ENTERTAINED OF IT BY ALL GRAMMARIANS, AND ALL LOGICIANS, *from ARISTOTLE, down to TOOKE, inclusive.*

Z.

Impossible! I will never believe this. You have fallen into some miserable illusion, in ever imagining such a thing.

A.

Pardon me. But you *will* believe it; and will be astonished at it; and will be completely satisfied of the truth of all the *consequences to Language*, which I have said has flown from it.

Z.

You talk in a high strain, of what I shall believe. In the interim, let me understand, at once, What is it you mean, when you say, that my judgment of the subject is completely in opposition to that of all Logicians?

A.

There are occasions, on which it becomes an

imperative duty to talk with confidence of a subject: As, for example, when you have a thorough conviction of truths, which can remove deep discredit from Philosophy, and must draw the attention and trust of literary men especially to the *Philosophy of the Mind*; which now labors under so melancholy a neglect, but which, besides its various though unacknowledged utility, contains problems, *capable of solution*, that are pregnant with more good to human beings than all that has resulted from the *Philosophy of Matter*.¹

Z.

Ah! I perceive, all mankind, alike, are traders.

¹ It has been very fittingly objected to me, that, even supposing the *Spirituality of the External World—or of All Things*—upon which I lay so much stress, were as conclusively had in evidence, as I assert it is; still, it would be impossible to make the bulk of readers, (and far more the lower million) understand, or believe it; and, therefore, that it must be impossible, by this medium, to annihilate Atheism.

To this, however, I reply, that such ultimate want of universal belief could only result if Philosophers, and the higher classes of Philosophical readers, should fatally continue to be as supine with regard to the Subject as they now are. For it is indisputable, that, if ALL Metaphysicians were agreed upon this point, as ALL Astronomers now are that our Earth revolves about the Sun, there is no person of the least education but would be ashamed to disbelieve the Spirituality of all Things, although not one man in ten thousand would take the trouble to learn the *reason* of the matter; as is now the case with respect to the astronomical fact just mentioned, with regard to which *no educated person is an infidel*, although the fact in question presents a most violent contradiction to the evidence of sense, and none but astronomers can explain why our senses are to be herein utterly discredited.

It is with the abstracted metaphysician, as it is with dealers of every other sort : Each man cries up the stuff in which he happens to traffic. We all know, full well, that, in order to the fortifying of a town, there is nothing like LEATHER.

A.

There is much truth in your remark. Yet, you urge me to reply, that it must be impossible to fortify a town with ANY thing, if those who DEFEND it be nothing but leather.

But, a truce with repartee. And here, in answer to your demand to know what I mean, by the opposition to which I allude ; it consists, (in gross,) of this : That, according to your view of the matter, the *Generic Structure of Relation or of Things in the Universe* is made up of what may be called *Logical Clusters*, containing THREE THINGS EACH—namely—*Two Related Subjects* and a RELATION OR LINK OF CONNECTION interposed between them : Whereas, according to the doctrine of ALL Logicians, the *Generic Structure of Relation or of the Universe* is made up of *Logical Clusters* containing ONLY Two Things each—namely—*One Related Subject* and *Another Subject its Correlate*, EACH viewed with *reference* to the OTHER.

You will instantly discern the infinite difference between these two Schemes. Because it is plain, if you and I are right in our conception, that the Universe around us is made up *Nearly One Half* of these LINKS or THIRD THINGS which connect related subjects together ; and these LINKS, *which must be* OBJECTS OF THE VERY FIRST LOGICAL

MAGNITUDE AND IMPORTANCE, must be represented in Language by a PRINCIPAL PART OF SPEECH EXCLUSIVELY APPROPRIATE to them: which Part of Speech *can have no existence* in Any Grammar that assumes Relation as consisting only of *Two Related Subjects* referred to each other, WITHOUT ANY LINK OR THIRD OBJECT BETWEEN them.

You cannot, indeed, from such a momentary view as this, discern any thing like the *various nature* of the absurdity and confusion which this Scheme of Logicians has introduced, into the *supposed Structure of Language*: but this I may observe, by the way, that, if our view of Relation be tenable, it must be just as possible to erect a SCIENCE OF GEOMETRY, from assuming *Every Triangle* to contain *Only Two Angles*; as to erect a SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE, from assuming Relation to consist of Clusters of *Two Related Subjects*, void of any THIRD THING which logically connects them.

Z.

What you now assert is perfectly manifest. The only thing, therefore, that is wanted, in order to satisfy me of what may be done, or at least of what has been left undone, on the subject, is to *prove to me the fact*, that Philosophers have actually entertained so vast an absurdity, for the Generic Structure of Relation, as that which you have here imputed to them. I know, indeed, that, if I look into any Cyclopedia, for the article RELATION, I shall find it defined by some modified assertion, that it consists in TWO THINGS; *One* referred to the *Other*: and, of course, this doctrine is taken

from Books on General Logic. But I can never suppose that Logicians, or Philosophers, have made no provision, in their General System, for those MIDDLE THINGS which, I plainly discern, are necessary in order to make Related Subjects be what they are.

In the *first place*, however, relieve my doubt, as to *How* such a misconception, or omission, could at all have happened. Or, at least, show me, indubitably, that OTHER mistakes, of nearly equal magnitude, have ever taken place in Philosophy : Which might serve to remove the improbability, that the like actually exists in the present case.

A.

I will do both. The latter, with certainty : the former, with evidence, which, I think, carries some probability. And perhaps it may be better that I should point out *How* I conceive it may have happened ; before I state to you the *fact*, that such mistakes certainly have happened.

FIRST, then, I observe, that the doctrine of Relation which has reigned hitherto in the world, appears to have owed its origin, and its continuation also, to the *Mathematicians* ; who, I shall make appear to you, have been led into the profound mistake in question by *not having their attention engaged in such vulgar and OBVIOUS Relations, as that which I have supposed in the foregoing example* ; but having usually to do with Relations of the *most subtle nature*, and which therefore *escape due observation*. And here I have to observe to you, that, although Relation is, in its *Generic Nature*, *eminently*

a simple subject ; it is, in some of its Species, the most subtle and deceptive of any in Philosophy. In the mean time, I observe, it seems that the Logicians have founded all their views of Relation upon those of the Mathematicians. Now the Mathematicians will tell you, that their Science is the Science of RELATIONS : And you will start with incredulity when I venture to affirm to you, that this is a grand error. But I do affirm, that, although Relation itself, between Two Quantities or Subjects, is often a Secondary, Subordinate, or Auxiliary Object of the Mathematician ; yet, his PRIMARY OR PRINCIPAL Object is ONLY THE RECIPROCAL RELATIVENESS of One Quantity to That of Another. Thus, when the Geometrician is demonstrating, that One Figure is Double to Another ; and, consequently, that the latter is as Half to the former ; his WHOLE OBJECT is the Greater and the Lesser Figure, and he never once thinks, he does not even in the least degree KNOW, or SUSPECT, that there is, of necessity, a Logical Partition called Difference existing interposed between the Two Figures : Which Partition, being the CAUSE that makes the Two Figures to be in this case Relatives ; and which Partition, or Cause, never having received Any Name, because it has never at all been recognised in Philosophy ; I call a RELATION, in order to distinguish it from the Two Related Subjects which it connects. In giving it this Name, however, I desire you to observe, that I mean it only as the Abstract Name of the thing : Its proper Concrete Name is RELATING. Thus Any Difference, between Any Two Things, is a Species of Logical Action between

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those Two Things ; and its real Concrete Name is **RELATING**, just as the real Concrete Name of *Battle* is **BATLING**. I shall prove to you, hereafter, that *All Relations are Logical Actions* between Related Subjects.

In like manner to the Geometer, When the Algebraist has stated an Equation ; his Object is the **RELATIVENESS** of the Quantity, or Quantities, on *One Side* of the Equation, to that of the Quantity, or Quantities, on the *Other Side* ; and he never once attends to the Link of Relation which connects the Two Sides of the Equation in a Bond of Comparison, although, in Algebra, this Link is *actually signified to his sense by an express and appropriate Sign* : He thinks, indeed, of what **HE** calls the **EQUALITY** of the *One Side* to the *Other* ; but he never thinks, *nor suspects*, that there is a **LOGICAL ACTION OF EQUALLING**, existing between the Two Sides.

Hence it happens, that the Mathematicians, having rarely occasion to contemplate any Thing except the Relativeness of Things to One another, have confounded *Relation itself* with this *Relativeness*, and have always employed **EITHER** of the *Two Terms*, *indiscriminately*, as being perfectly synonymous or convertible.

You will understand me, however, when I say that the Mathematician never attends to the Link of Relation between Two Quantities, I mean this : That he attends to it, in any case, (even in such a palpable case as that of the *Link signified by the Sign of equalling* placed between the Two Sides of an Equation) only in some such way as an Architect

attends to the *Scaffolding* of a Structure which he is erecting ; which Scaffold he employs to enable him to effect his purpose, but does not regard as *any integral part* of the building : on the contrary, throws it away, when done with, as a thing that never had been. Now, to this remark I have to add, *for your particular attention* : That *What is, (for the most part,) ONLY SCAFFOLDING IN MATHEMATICS, is ever AN INTEGRAL AND MOST ESSENTIAL PART OF THE BUILDING IN LANGUAGE.* Hence the mighty difference in CONSEQUENCES, to the different Subjects, when we only confound Relation with Relativeness in Mathematics, and when we do so *in the Category of Relation as forming the FOUNDATION OF LANGUAGE.*

You must be sensible, that I am obliged to compress this exposition of the subject. But enough, I trust, has been said, to awaken you to a strong suspicion of the *means* by which the mistake concerning the real nature of Relation may have crept into all the views of Logicians : And I can affirm, in particular, of the elaborate but erroneous analysis furnished by Mr. Locke, that he has afforded what I consider to be express, though mere accidental evidence, of his having founded his whole view upon what the Mathematicians call Relation ; of which fact I shall provide you with proof, farther on.

Z.

I confess, you have opened upon me facts, which I was not prepared to expect, and which have much excited my curiosity.

A.

I may add, here, then, in order to awaken your curiosity the more completely, that *this is not the only* absurdity that is tolerated in *Mathematics themselves*, and that, too, upon the *mere ground of convenience, or to save circumlocution*. The Schism, for example, concerning the *identicalness of equal quantities*, is, and ever has been, an opprobrium of that justly boasted Science; *and, STILL, the absurd side of the question prevails*, and has prevailed against all the reason and the eloquence of a BARROW, merely because it is an absurdity of *some convenience* to tolerate, and the toleration of it involves *no absurd consequences* in the reasonings of the Mathematician. But, Can you therefore suppose, that Eternal Truth will suffer herself to be thus violated in ONE Science, without avenging herself, in its *consequences*, in SOME OTHER department of knowledge? Be assured, She will not, or, rather, She HAS not; although the matter has not been discerned in the extant System of Logic: And you may live to see it acknowledged.

Z.

I am, certainly, prepared for the possibility of the event. But you have promised, also, to shew me that *other* mistakes, of something like equal magnitude in their logical consequences, have actually happened in Philosophy. Proceed, therefore, to this matter.

A.

Well then, I ask, Do you think there is such

thing, either in the External Universe around us, or in the Conceptions of the Human Mind, as a *General Horse*, a *General Cart*, or a *General Feed of Corn*? Or, in other words, Is it possible to conceive any other Things whatever, besides INDIVIDUALS, of Every Kind and Sort?

Z.

If I had not known, beforehand, that such a doctrine has existed, as that of *General Ideas*; or, otherwise, of *General Conceptions*; I should have looked upon your question with unqualified contempt,—a doctrine which, indeed, now that I recollect the matter, I am aware had long reigned triumphant with the Schoolmen; until Roscellinus and Abelard, in the Eleventh century, first attacked it,—a doctrine, too, which, after suffering repeated defeats, revived and flourished, in all its pristine vigor, insomuch, that it has been supposed to be the brightest feather in the cap of modern philosophy, to have put this *Chimera* down in the last age: Nor are there yet wanting some few individuals, who, under a Scholastic bias, retain a belief in it, in defiance of all the artillery of reason.

A.

TRUE. And since, from your own confession, any unbiassed man would scout the doctrine of *General Conceptions*; and since our most enlightened Philosophers, in modern times, have been proud to shew, that every plain man, of the vulgar stamp, thinks *soundly or philosophically* with regard

to the subject; I ask, Do you think it would have been *a fortunate* event for Philosophy, if men of learning had refused to listen to the arguments of Roscellinus, upon a plea of its being IMPROBABLE that the *Schoolmen could be so far wrong*, and the *Vulgar so far right*? Or, Do you think it was *less equivalent to a discovery*, in Roscellinus, thus to erect the Standard of revolt against the doctrine of the Schoolmen; although this Standard, when duly appreciated, is *nothing but a judgment of the Vulgar*?

Z.

These questions, I must own, come with great force. They have answered the purpose you intended for them, by fully rousing my attention to hear what you have farther to advance upon the subject.

A.

First let me add, (as a matter of great importance,) to what has been said, that the error concerning *General Conceptions* is vastly different, *as to the means there are of detecting it*, from that concerning the *Category of Relation*. The *former* subject involves very considerable subtilty; insomuch, that, *in some views* of it, a defence of error may be, and has been made, which it requires great ingenuity to expose, and which cannot be shewn by means of any DIRECT demonstration: Hence it is that the Subject has been the ground of repeated, and of the most ardent controversies: But the *latter*—namely—the NATURE OF RELATION, has

never been controverted at all; but has only been overlooked: and this nature is so OBVIOUSLY DEMONSTRABLE, especially in those STANDARD EXAMPLES which we must exclusively choose for its illustration in a treatise of Language, that, I confidently anticipate, it never will become the subject of a war in Logic after these Standard Examples shall have been once examined. It is, at the same time, more natural to expect that a mistake may have crept in and hitherto survived through *oversight*, than that it should have outlived the repeated storms of controversy.

Z.

What you have said last has considerable weight; and it seems materially to lessen the improbability that an error has in reality crept into the doctrine of Relation, as you have asserted. Let us now, if you please, proceed to the *proofs* you have to offer of the *fact itself*.

A.

I have said, you shall have proofs until you are satisfied. But, previously, it will be proper to furnish you with a farther brief view of the Category of Relation; in order that there may be no possibility of your *wavering*, hereafter, in your judgment, unless you choose to do so by incurring the penalty due to the grossest absurdity. Because this Category contains a *vast variety of SPECIES*; and, in many of these Species, as I have already hinted, the nature of Relation is so subtle, and even evanescent, (*although it is nevertheless rigorously demon-*

strable), that it demands a great exertion of acumen, or circumspection, to detect, or evince, the Link in question : Hence, alone, it has happened, that it has escaped the observation of Mathematicians themselves.

Z.

Do as you judge fit in that. And, indeed, I take along with me, that it is your present purpose to establish the reality of your own Scheme of Relation, as well as to prove the fact that this Scheme has been overlooked, or never thought of.

A.

The first and most important observation, then, which I have to offer upon the subject, is to point out to you, as a self-evident necessary truth, that the GENERIC PRINCIPLE of Relation must run through, or be contained in, *All the Species and Every Individual instance of Relation in the World*: This, you know, is an admitted and incontrovertible maxim of Logic. Hence, as, in such an Obvious Relation as that of DISTANCE between the Two Banks of a River there is, of necessity, a MIDDLE OR THIRD THING interposed between the Two Banks : So, in like manner, there must, of necessity, be an *analogous Middle or Third Thing* interposed, in a *logical sense*, between *Any Greater* and *Any Lesser Figure* in Geometry, that are compared together ; even although it should be very difficult, or altogether beyond our ability, to *demonstrate distinctly* this Middle Thing. And the same reasoning must apply to Every instance of Relation, the most occult,

or the most evanescent whatever. I have already said, that, in cases of *Proportional* Relation, it is a very nice matter to demonstrate, so as to gain an ideal sight of, the Relation or Partition of Logical Action between Two Related Subjects: but, that it *can* be done, I consider as certain; and, if curiosity stimulate you to examine the fact, I believe you may be satisfied, in the larger analysis which I have offered of the subject. Supposing, however, that these subtle Partitions COULD NOT, *in some cases*, be DEMONSTRATED; it would be nevertheless certain that they MUST EXIST, since it has been shewn that such Partitions exist in the OBVIOUS Species of Relation.

From the statement now made, therefore, it becomes impossible for you, (or for any *Mathematician* who may happen to read this Dialogue,) to *go back*, or to *waver* for a moment, under any bias or prejudice derived from the reigning doctrine of Relation to be found in the writings even of Mathematicians themselves.

Z.

I fully subscribe to your position, that the GENERIC PRINCIPLE of Relation MUST run through *All the Species and Every Individual instance of Relation, whatever*: Nor can this be doubted, notwithstanding the obscurity, or evanescence, of any Species of Relation. I agree, moreover, that the Standard Example which you have given—namely—a RELATION OF DISTANCE is undeniably conclusive of the *Real Generic Nature of Relation*. By these two positions I feel myself bound: And

Anal.

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if you shall prove that Logicians have, IN ANY CASE, *clearly in effect*, denied that **RELATION** is a **MIDDLE THING**, *connecting Two Related Subjects*; I shall, then, fully esteem them as having virtually denied the matter in ALL CASES. This being conclusively settled between us; Proceed, now, to your proofs, or authorities rather, that ALL Logicians have done as you say.

A.

TO THE PROOFS, then. But, on the way, it is fit I should observe to you, that there are MANY WHOLE SPECIES OF STANDARD EXAMPLES of Relation, *besides* those of DISTANCE; Any One of which would equally serve the purpose of proving to you what is the Real Nature of the Subject. I shall here merely mention ONE of these Species; in order to shew you *how broad* is the OBVIOUS basis upon which we are to build. EVERY ACTION, either of what is called *Physical Contact* or of *Collision* between Any Two Bodies, is One of those Logical Partitions which I call a Relation between them: and Each of the Two Bodies is, in such case, a *Relative Subject* by reason of this Partition or Link which is *interposed* between the two. And now for the authorities.

A DIALOGUE CONCERNING RELATION.

PART SECOND.

A.

To begin at the fountain head of accredited logical authority, the definition of Relation given by ARISTOTLE; and which I shall quote here in the words of Mr. Harris, who may be accounted one of the echos of the Ancients in matters of Philosophy; runs thus: “Such things as these
“are said to be Relatives—namely—as many as
“are said TO BE WHAT THEY ARE, by BEING
“THINGS BELONGING TO SOME OTHER THING, OR
“which, in any other sense, have reference to
“something else.”

Z.

Why, there now: I see your mistake already. That which you have just quoted is not a definition of RELATION, as you suppose: It is only a definition of a *Relative*, i. e. of *One* of Two Related Subjects, as viewed with reference to the Other; and it appears to be a very unexceptionable definition of the thing, according to your own shewing.

A.

TRUE. But you will find, that Aristotle meant this as a definition of what he and all other Logicians call RELATION; although he has here called

it a *Relative*. In other words, All Logicians, without exception, have uniformly held the terms *Relative* and *Relation* to be perfectly SYNONYMOUS OR CONVERTIBLE. And, as a proof of this in the case of Aristotle, I now furnish you with *another* definition of Relation, quoted from him by no less an authority than Dr. Barrow,—a Mind of the first order,—who, in his capacity of a *Mathematician* (in which character he here speaks) must have been critically attentive to what he conceived to be the real nature of this Category. “The essence “of Relations” (says he) “consists in this, that “they have themselves in a certain manner, or are “in some sort, affected to something else.” Now, in this definition, you see, Barrow employs the word “RELATION,” where Harris uses the word RELATIVE; and there can be no doubt of the fact which I assert. As a farther proof of this, however, I observe, that Barrow has expressed himself still more fully upon the subject, in the following words: “Relation is said of things which are referred to “one another, as the Son to the Father, a Friend “to a Friend: for these both relate to and are “related to one another, and therefore are termed “*Relations*.”

Again, Barrow says, “Logicians have hitherto “taught that Relations are inherent to absolute “things.” Now the fact is, that the *Quality* or *Qualities*, which make a *Relative* of any *Absolute Subject*, are, certainly, for the time being at least, inherent in, or belong to, that *Absolute Subject*: But it has been demonstrated, in the case of a RELATION OF DISTANCE, that the RELATION OR

LINK OF CONNECTION between the Two Related Subjects is NOT ANY QUALITY IN EITHER OF THOSE SUBJECTS. For the fidelity of my quotations, however, see Barrow's *Mathematical Lectures*, Lect. 18th and 27th.

Z.

I confess, all this appears to me to amount to proof, unanswerable. But, What say the *contemporaries* of Barrow, and the contemporaries of Harris, to this doctrine?

A.

According to LOCKE, (who has furnished by far the most extensive elementary analysis of the subject of any modern writer, so far as I know,) "RELATION is a way of comparing two things together." In illustrating which definition, he says, "the immediate signification of *relative* words is very often *other supposed relations*." In another place, he says, "Patron and Client are easily allowed to be *Relations*; but a constable, and a dictator, are not so readily, at first hearing, considered as such." Again, he says, "These and the like *Relations* are expressed by *Relative terms*, that have others answering to them, as Father and Son, Bigger and Lesser," &c.

In a word; Barrow and Locke, both, propagate the very same doctrine of the subject, in the very same words: and both these coincide with Aristotle, as rendered by Harris.

And here I shall cite the evidence from Locke, to which I formerly alluded, and which, I think,

curiously proves that he built his whole view of the subject upon that of the *Mathematicians*. In the 28th *Chapter, of his Second Book*, he has expressed himself as follows: "This is so manifest in that 'sort' (of Relation) 'called *proportional*: for 'when a man says, '*Honey is sweeter than wax*,' it 'is plain that his thoughts in this relation terminate in this simple idea, *sweetness*, which is *equally* 'true of all the rest.'"

Now, I observe, by the way, it is manifest, that, in the instance which Mr. Locke has thus taken for HIS STANDARD EXAMPLE, (although it has deceived him, in common with all other Logicians) the idea of the Relation DOES NOT *terminate in any idea of "SWEETNESS" at all*; but it terminates in a vastly different thing—namely—A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO SEVERAL SWEETNESSES; owing to WHICH DIFFERENCE it is that "HONEY IS SWEETER," and WAX IS LESS SWEET;—the Word "SWEETER" *being only the Relative Name of ONE OF THE SUBJECTS COMPARED*.

But the purpose for which I brought the quotation, is only to shew the curious evidence, that, although Mr. Locke has here applied the word, "PROPORTIONAL," to a Relation of *Taste*, yet, his use of the word, in this case, is a critical indication that he had the reciprocal Relativeness of MATHEMATICAL QUANTITIES *in his mind at the time*: because men do not usually attempt to ascertain the PROPORTION of ONE SWEETNESS to that of ANOTHER, and especially not that of *Honey to Wax*; and, therefore, the word *Proportional* cannot with logical propriety be applied to such a Relation of

Taste : although One Sweetness is often spoken of as being *Greater*, or *Lesser*, than Another.

I trust, therefore, you will admit, that I have traced Mr. Locke's analysis to its real origin, or starting post.

Z.

It looks something like it.

A.

Perhaps I ought here to observe, as forming a part of the error already pointed out, that, while the Mathematicians suppose *Relation* to be nothing but *Relativeness*, they entertain this fallacy by supposing that the *Excess*, or *Defect*, of any Quantity, RESIDES IN that Quantity. This fallacy, as I have already hinted, suits perfectly well for the purpose of the Mathematician ; because all that he usually desires, is to determine the AMOUNT of either the Excess or Defect of Any Quantity ; and his views do not demand any strict logical investigation, on his part, to ascertain whether or not this Excess, or Defect, is a thing ACTUALLY INTRINSIC in the Quantity to which it is referred. But there is a distinction to be made, between a mere *Demonstrating* Mathematician and a *Mathematical Logician* : And I must insist, here, that, for the great purpose of Universal Logic, and especially for that of solving the problem of *Language*, it is a vast fallacy, and one indeed that is subversive of the whole foundation of general reasoning, to assume that an ACTION OF EQUALLING, an ACTION OF EXCEEDING, or an ACTION OF FALLING SHORT (for these are the

Real Concrete Names in Nature, of what in the Abstract are called EQUALITY, EXCESS, and DEFECT,) is a thing that RESIDES IN ANY QUANTITY, OR SUBJECT WHATEVER.

At the same time, I would strongly recommend, to any person who is merely inquiring into the nature of *Language*, not to waste a thought upon “*those Relations called Proportional.*” Because it is evident, from what has been said, that they involve much subtilty: and because the inquirer into the nature of *Language* has *nothing at all to do with any Relations, except those OBVIOUS Species* which must always be chosen for Standard Examples of the subject.

In fine, I apprehend, that *Proportional Relations* have proved the hidden rock, upon which the Mathematical or Aristotelian Logic hath struck: And they have riven such a hole (though unobserved) in its bottom, that it never has floated, and never can float, in correspondence with the Nature of Things. Had the Philosophy of Relation been originally laid down by *Soldiers*, by *Sailors*, or by *Post-boys*; they would have begun with such *Obvious Relations* as those of DISTANCE between Two Towns, or Two Sea-Ports; and thus they would have presented the world with a Theory true to nature. But, it happening that the Philosophy of Relation was laid down by Geometricians; these men, in the profundity of their speculations, began the Subject of Relation at the *wrong end*, by taking for their standard examples those *occult species called Proportional.*

And thus I have endeavoured to account to you,

for the MANNER HOW the fallacy in question has crept in.

Z.

The account you have given of the matter has, doubtless, some verisimilitude. One thing, at least, is certain—namely—that all the authorities you have yet quoted are in one story on the subject: And, contrary to their view of it, I have the most perfect conviction of the EXISTENCE *and* NECESSITY of a *Third Thing*, interposed between Every Two Related Subjects; which Third Thing is a Logical Link of Connection between the Two, and is the LOGICAL CAUSE of their being Two *Relatives*. Proceed, therefore, with such other evidence as you deem requisite to offer upon the subject.

A.

There is one other authority, which I shall add, here, merely on account of the general estimation which he has gained, and justly gained, for metaphysical acumen and originality; although several of his most important philosophical conclusions are remarkable for their unsoundness: I mean no other than the Sceptical Philosopher—Mr. Hume.

According to this writer, as expressed in his "*Treatise of Human Nature*"—"The word Relation stands for *that* QUALITY by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination." I have curtailed the passage: but these words indubitably contain the substance of his creed on the subject.

Anal.

L

Z.

Give me leave to interrupt you, for a moment. I have all along entertained some embering doubt, which your citation of Hume has kindled into avowal. Let me understand you, distinctly, then. Is it your meaning to *deny* that a *Relative or Related Subject* is a *Related Subject* by reason of *Some Quality or Attribute belonging*, (for the *time being at least*,) *in some way or other*, to that *Subject* itself?

A.

No, certainly. I never thought of denying this : I only assert, that *Any Such Quality* of a *Thing* constitutes that *Thing* a *RELATIVE SUBJECT*, and NOT A *RELATION*. Thus, in the Standard Example of a *Relation of DISTANCE* between *Two Houses* ; If we suppose this *Distance* to measure a *Mile* ; Each of the *Houses* is then a *Mile* distant from the *Other*, *only because Each House* happens to *occupy that Particular Spot of the Earth's Surface* that is a *Mile* apart from the *Spot* occupied by the *Other*. And if either of the *Two Houses* were put upon wheels, and were moved to *Any Other Spot* ; this *House* would thus lose the *Quality* of occupying its *first Site*, and would acquire the *Quality* of occupying *Another Site* : owing to which, there would no longer be a *Relation of a Mile* of *Distance* between the *Two Houses*, but there would be a *new Relation of Distance, of Some Other extent*.

By a variation of this process, it is plain, we might move *One* of the *Two Houses* into a situation to *TOUCH* the *Other* : And thus we should

annihilate every Relation of DISTANCE between the Two ; and give existence to a RELATION OF CONTACT or CONTIGUITY between them.

From the nature of the example now given, you must clearly discern, that, although RELATIVENESS certainly depends upon *Some Quality possessed by the Related Subject*, yet this cannot do away with the *Necessity*, nor in the least lessen the *Importance*, of the LINK OF ACTION which connects Every Two Related Subjects together and is the PRINCIPAL CAUSE that makes them be what they are.

Z.

I am perfectly satisfied with regard to the doubt I had entertained. But all that you have yet cited is the authority of *Logicians* and *Mathematicians*, considered especially *as such* : and it does not follow, from this, that the GRAMMARIANS have bottomed their views, as you say they have, upon this fallacious Logic. I desire, therefore, to know what has been the *actual fact* with regard to the latter. Proceed, then, I pray you, to the GRAMMARIANS.

A.

To the GRAMMARIANS, then. According to Mr. Harris (whose theory of Language stood so high with the learned, until it was overthrown by the more fortunate genius of Tooke, that I could not name an equal authority,) Relation is no other than that which it has been defined to be by ARISTOTLE, as already described. For Mr. Harris has entitled the *Tenth Chapter* of his “*Philosophical Arrangements*” thus: “*CONCERNING RELATIVES.*”

And, in a foot note, he has deemed it proper to *justify* this Title, in the following terms. “The title “of this Arrangement is expressed by a *plural*, and “*not a singular*, like Quantity and Quality, because “ALL Relation is necessarily between Two.”

In quoting this passage, I have, in the first place, to point out to you a most important AMBIGUITY OF LANGUAGE, which it involves; and against which, it is of the utmost consequence that every inquirer should be put upon his guard, when he is reading any Treatise, by Logicians, on the Subject of Relation. Mr. Harris (you see) asserts, that “ALL RELATION *is necessarily between Two.*” And So say All the Logicians: And So say I, also. But I desire you to observe, *how infinitely different, and opposite*, is THEIR meaning, from that which I attribute to this phrase: and, then, you will not much wonder, though many readers should have altogether *misconceived* the meaning which Logicians have intended it to convey, when they have, at any time, affirmed that *Relation is between Two Things.*

When I demonstrated that EVERY RELATION *must be* BETWEEN Two Things; I shewed you, that this means in the *same sense as* a FETTER *is a* LINK *between* TWO PRISONERS. But, When Mr. Harris and the Logicians affirm that Every Relation must be BETWEEN Two Things; they mean this only in the same sense as we in ordinary say that *Two Boots, Two Spurs, or Two Coach Horses, make a Pair* BETWEEN them; and they ground this phrase upon the mere fact that *No Subject can be a Relative, except only while Some Other Subject CO-EXISTS WITH IT, as its Correlative.*

Z.

The ambiguity you have now pointed out is certainly calculated, in a very rare degree, to deceive: and, very probably, many readers have been betrayed, by it, into an acquiescence with the doctrine of Logicians with regard to Relation; when, if they had understood the import which was meant to be conveyed, they would have dissented, and not have left it for you to be the first to raise the standard of revolt.

A.

I go on to observe, with regard to the authority of Mr. Harris, that in his Work appropriated to GRAMMAR—namely—his HERMES (chap. 9.) he expresses himself still more explicitly, in coincidence with Aristotle and the rest, by saying, that “*The Attribute of Quantity passes insensibly into that of Relation.*” By which assertion he, plainly, means, that *Relation* is nothing but that *superinduced acquired character* which belongs to Any Quantity or Subject in virtue of its being *comparable*, or *compared*, with *Some Other Co-existent Quantity or Subject*: Which definition answers, precisely, to that given of Relation by Mr. Hume and by all other authorities.

Z.

The matter is perfectly plain: The GRAMMARIAN Harris is the same as the LOGICIAN Harris: and, as far as this goes, your position has been made good.

A:

I may now, then, open to you, at once, a clear although momentary view of the vast operation, or effect, of this bottomless Scheme of Relation, upon the General Doctrine of the Structure of Language.

It is because Mr. Harris (like all other Grammarians) discerned *No Middle Object* between Two Related Subjects, that he (like them) has supposed a VERB (EVERY VERB) to be a Sign of Some Quality or Attribute of ONE ONLY, *of Any Two Related Subjects* between which Any Relation (i. e. *Any Logical Action*,) subsists. In other words, he has supposed Every Verb to be the Sign of Some Attribute of its NOMINATIVE ONLY; instead of having discerned that Every Verb is the Sign of a BRIDGE OR LINK OF RELATION between a *Nominative* and an ACCUSATIVE NOUN, which makes it be NOT the Sign of an Attribute of ANY SINGLE Subject whatever, but to be the Sign of a DISTINCT THIRD OBJECT—*namely an ACTION*—interposed between Two Co-Agents.

Here, then, is the BEGINNING of that “*great darkness*,” in which the Structure of Language hath at all times been involved; and this darkness, you plainly perceive, is in consequence of Logicians having uniformly asserted that *Relation* is Nothing but *One Related Subject referred to Another*. I say this is the *beginning* of the obscurity. The *extent* of it can only be judged from going through the successive stages of the analysis which I propose to offer to you. In the mean time, Have you enough of Mr. Harris?

Z.

Yes ; Enough of HIM : But not enough of AUTHORITY. You appear to think yourself *out of the wood* ; but I am not yet satisfied. I grant, that the authorities you have cited are of the first rate : Yet, one alone of them (Mr. Harris) expresses himself *professly* as a GRAMMARIAN : and Mr. Harris, in this character, was manifestly hoodwinked by his over deference to the notions of the Ancients ; which may well account for his having sailed with the general tide of opinion on the subject. But the Theory of Mr. Harris has passed away ; and a NEW EPOCH in the History of Language has been justly hailed by the world,—an epoch which has ushered in a splendid and, indeed, a noon-day light upon this department of Philosophy : upon the first blush of which, the *shadows* of Mr. Harris's imagination, or, rather, those of *All preceding Grammarians*, were dispelled, like sick fancies of the night ; and mankind became possessed of the TRUE Theory of Speech. Now, then, I desire you to observe, from what you have advanced concerning the true nature of Relation, I may confidently infer, that such a change in the Doctrine of Language could not have been effected, as that which has been happily produced, unless its author had departed from that doctrine of RELATION which has certainly been entertained by All his predecessors. And besides this, when I consider the general reputation of that author for great logical acumen, and his unsparing severity with regard to the faults of Philosophers in general, I can never suppose that he could have been led into this error of the “METAPHYSICIANS :” The

LYNX-EYED PHILOLOGER OF PURLEY (for you are certain it is to HIM I allude) was not to be caught in such a trap. MR. TOOKE, then; I demand of you, peremptorily, to cite MR. TOOKE upon the subject: And, if you can parry this thrust, I shall own myself content.

A.

Well, then, MR. TOOKE; since you will have it so.

In the *Second Volume* of the DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY, (page 499,) he has expressed himself in the following terms.

“ *Relative* has indeed, within my memory, by a
 “ ridiculous affectation of false and unfounded ac-
 “ curacy, crept forward into improper use, to the
 “ exclusion of *Relation*. Certain precise gentlemen
 “ will no longer permit us to call our kindred our
 “ *Relations*: No, but our *Relatives*. Why? What
 “ is the meaning of the termination *On*, and the
 “ meaning of the termination *Ive*, which qualifies
 “ the one, and disqualifies the other? They have
 “ both appropriate meanings; without the know-
 “ ledge of which, how can these gentlemen deter-
 “ mine their proper use? If they say they have
 “ not appropriate meanings: by what rule do they
 “ prefer the one to the other? They who do not
 “ take what they find in use, but propose a change,
 “ are bound to give a reason for it. But, I believe,
 “ they will be as little able to justify their innovation,
 “ as Sir Thomas More would have been to explain
 “ the foundation of his ridiculous distinction be-
 “ tween NAY and No, and between YEA and

“ YES. But these petty fopperies will pass away
 “ of themselves, and when the whim is over, we
 “ shall all find our *Relations* again, as safe and
 “ sound as ever.”

Such is the View of the Category of Relation, entertained by Mr. TOOKE!—What do you think, now, of AUTHORITY ; and, especially, of the authority of GRAMMARIANS ?

Z.

ENOUGH ; Enough ! ALL AUTHORITY,—ALL CITATION—beyond this—would be worse than useless. I am quite satisfied. I will never, again, pin my opinion upon NAMES, or entertain any confidence in the fabrications of Philosophers, that are at all called in question, until I shall have examined the subject for myself and drawn my own conclusions.

A.

That is the *true* and the *only* way to become yourself a Philosopher. But it is a way that has been most wofully neglected in time past ; as you now clearly discern. The fact is, that, throughout the different Divisions of the SUPERSTRUCTURE of Science, we generally find the marks of admirable ratiocination, labor, and circumspection : but when we examine the FOUNDATIONS (which have sometimes been very properly called the FIRST PHILOSOPHY) we may discern the most serious and most wonderful proofs of negligence and fallacious assumption. As a grand example of this, you have now before you the full and complete evidence of

Anal.

M

the existence of that OVERSIGHT, (for an Oversight, and NOT A DEFENDED error, it is) with regard to the Generic Nature of Relation which I ventured to impeach in the outset of this discussion. And, as another example of it, connected with that just mentioned, I ask you, *What do you think, now, of Mr. Tooke's boasted assertion, " that the " most judicious Grammarians, disgusted with ab- " surdity and contradiction, have prudently con- " tented themselves with remarking the difference " of WORDS, and have left the CAUSES of Language " to shift for themselves?"*

Z.

I think, on the contrary, that the CAUSES OF LANGUAGE, (i. e. *the RELATIVENESS OF and the RELATIONS BETWEEN Things*) having been profoundly misapprehended by the *Logicians*, have left the GRAMMARIANS to shift for *themselves*. And a most disastrous shift, I fear, they have made of it.

A.

Here then, in passing, I observe to you, that the RELATIVENESS OF *and the RELATIONS BETWEEN Things* are the *Cause, Foundation, or Object*, not only of LANGUAGE, but also of ALL PHILOSOPHY, including UNIVERSAL LOGIC. I express this remark to you, only that you may judge, from it, what extensive effects must be produced in the WHOLE CIRCLE OF THE SCIENCES, by the great Oversight with regard to the Category of Relation which I have thus labored to expose.

I might enlarge here, upon other baneful effects which have been produced by the fallacy in question. But it would be beside the Subject before us : And we will now, if you please, descend from this Vehicle ; and get into the ordinary foot-pace of analysis.

CHAPTER II.

OF VERBS.

Preliminary Observations.

IN an Elementary Treatise of Language, it would appear proper, in point of logical order, to investigate the nature of NOUNS, previously to examining that of VERBS. But there are several reasons which make against this disposition and demand a contrary arrangement.

In the first place, I may observe, that the obscurity which hangs over the *grammatical* nature of Nouns, (under which Half of Grammar I comprehend not only all *Pronouns*, but also all *Adjectives*, *Articles*, and *Simple Definitives whatever*) is not of that kind which can deeply affect our General Views of the Structure of Language: For none of the more important arcana of Speech lie concealed under this Part of Grammar.

Secondly. I deem it to be of very material consequence, not to interrupt the connection of order, that ought to subsist between the Chapter, or Subject, which has gone before and that upon which I am now to enter; since the matter determined in

the former is the immediate and necessary Foundation of that contained in the latter.

Thirdly. I believe it will be found of considerable advantage to postpone the treatment of Nouns, to that of Verbs and So-called Prepositions; especially, (among other reasons) as what are called the CASES of Nouns involve a consideration of the *real* nature of the Words called Prepositions.

For these and other reasons, I have given to the analysis of Verbs the precedence, in point of arrangement.

In asserting that Nouns are, in point of logical consideration, a prior grammatical subject to that of Verbs, I do not overlook that I am opposed by very high etymological authorities. But the ground upon which I venture to dissent from these is of such a nature, as, I think, does not admit of being either shaken or approached by any etymological argument; and I shall explain the nature of this ground, in its proper place.

The principal authority which I have in view, in stating the last observation, is that of the late Dr. Murray, to whose grammatical labors I have already alluded in this work, and whose speculations will claim my repeated notice in it as I proceed.

With regard to the point now in question, however, I shall offer no present observation: but shall merely risk the following general remarks on the views of Dr. Murray, as being introductory of the criticisms which I may subsequently be induced to hazard upon his writings.

Unlike Mr. Tooke in his professions with respect to *method*, this writer has taken professly and exclusively the matter of fact course, in his researches into the nature of Language; and has valued himself upon adhering with the utmost rigor to this procedure. And, although it should be thought that the ultimate ramifications of his research have terminated in conclusions which are not more bold than unfounded, I suppose there can be no doubt that he has, within certain limits, eminently fulfilled the task of the **INDUCTIVE ETYMOLOGIST**. The treatise which I now offer to the reader was in substance nearly ready for the Press, and I had actually given instructions to have it announced as such, when the posthumous publication of Dr. Murray's book, which had just appeared, was put into my hands. My own views of the subject having been founded upon that Scheme of the Category of Relatives and Relation which has been delineated in the foregoing Chapter; and which Scheme, I knew, had never been proposed by any Logician, or Grammarian; I felt assured that Dr. Murray could not have anticipated my general conclusions. At the same time, I could not fail to be deeply curious and interested in comparing the Speculations of so profound a practical Linguist, with the conclusions to which I had been led by my own course of inquiry: Nor could I feel satisfied to let the latter pass out of my hands, without availing myself of the very opportune appearance of Dr. Murray's Work, to afford to my own views any advantage which could be derived from his researches. I therefore de-

terminated to defer, for a little time, the printing of my book.

Since then, a succession of interruptions from a state of health which admitted of no intellectual exertion has protracted the matter some time beyond my expectation; and has, at the same time, prevented my giving that minute attention to all the parts of Dr. Murray's Two Volumes, that perhaps they may justly claim: Which last circumstance I deem it due to his memory to mention; while at the same time, I venture to hope, that I have been able to apprehend the *general spirit* of his contributions, for every requisite purpose which I had in view.

If I am not rash in hazarding this belief, it appears to me that he never deviates from his inductive course, to enter into any consideration of what Language *ought to have been*, or is *capable of being made*; Far less does he seem to consider the Essential Structure of Language as a Fabric constituted of *Necessary Principles*; but, on the contrary, he views this Structure as being a thing whose Elements are *merely instituted or conventional*, and their Mechanism or the manner of putting their Principles together *various or mutable*. As a single example of the truth of this observation, I observe, (in his *First Volume*, page 50,) he expresses himself as follows.

“While the Noun underwent these important changes, the Verb, the fountain of language, acquired new and interesting properties.”

It is plain that, according to this view of the subject, the *Noun* and *the Verb* must, in their in-

stitution, resemble the *Canoe* and the *Hut* of the savage; which have been gradually altered and improved into the *Ship* and the *Citadel* of enlightened nations. And I concede to Dr. Murray, that such, in point of fact, has been what may well be called the *GROWTH of the Speaking Art in past ages*; and *such is Language, as it now stands instituted, according to the conceptions or apprehension of those who speak it.* But I deny that this Natural History of Speech exhibits any thing like the *Real Principles and Structure of Language*: and I equally deny that *any such Phraseology is applicable* to its real Structure, as that of the *NOUN*, or the *VERB*, having “*acquired new and interesting properties.*”

LANGUAGE consists, essentially, of Principles which possess a *Necessary Connection and Dependence*, one with another, perfectly conformable to those *General Principles of Relation* which are at once its *FOUNDATION* and its *OBJECT*. As such, it is impossible that Any of its *Essential Parts or Elements* should ever *acquire any new properties*: although mankind might make *new discoveries* of the nature of these Parts. If Dr. Murray had been writing a *History of Mathematics*, he would never have mentioned the *SQUARE*, or the *CIRCLE*, as having *acquired new properties*; he would only have noted upon what occasions, or by whom, the known *Necessary and Eternal properties* of these figures were first *brought to light*.

I point out the exceptionable phraseology of Dr. Murray with respect to the *Noun* and the *Verb*, in the present case, therefore, as furnishing, of itself alone, a conclusive evidence that this very merito-

rious writer has infinitely misapprehended what I conceive to be the Real Nature of Language.

After this statement, I hardly need observe, that, in perusing the speculations of Dr. Murray I have found my conjecture altogether verified, that his general views of the subject do not at all interfere with those entertained by me. I shall explain, hereafter, the ground upon which I differ from his assumption that the Verb is the "*Fountain of Language.*" I shall, also, have to point out various particular expressions of Language, quoted by him, which, although only insular and occasional, afford very remarkable and satisfactory coincidences with the general views which I propose to lay down. Upon the whole, the observations, or strictures, which I shall have occasion to make upon the labors of this illustrious disciple of the School of Tooke (who has as far outstript his master in research, as I think he has stood superior to him in the article of consistency,) will, I think, afford to my own work a degree of completion, *in the etymological parts of its evidence*, which it could not have possessed but for the timely coming of the "*History of the European Languages.*"

SECTION FIRST.

OF THE GENERAL NATURE AND OFFICE OF VERBS,

SUBSECTION I.

Of the Doctrine of Grammarians, that Verbs are not Copulas between a Nominative and an Accusative Noun.—Statement of the Fundamental Principle of Language.—Suggestion of the Principle of Alternation of a Verb, in a Sentence.

It is the Object of the PHILOSOPHICAL Grammarian to ascertain and delineate the Real Principles and Structure of Language, *as founded on the General Principles of Logical Connection between those Subjects, or Objects, in the Universe, of which Language is the Mark or Signature.*

Upon the other hand, it is the business of a writer of VERNACULAR Grammar to APPLY the Principles of Philosophical Grammar, to the EXPLANATION and IMPROVEMENT of the genius of particular Languages.

In other words, I suggest, that the Science of Philosophical Grammar (*when once it shall be erected*) must bear a relativeness to the Various Grammars of Particular Languages, in some sort analogous to that which Geometry holds with re-

spect to the Art of Building, as that Art was, in early and ignorant ages, variously practised in those Countries, with more, or less, of accidental conformity to the Science in which it ought to have been founded.

It is upon this general understanding of the subject, that the several analyses of the Different Parts of Speech, and of their Different Connecting Principles, will be prosecuted in the present work: And I deem the fact to be of sufficient importance to demand that I should intimate it, distinctly, in the above precursory observations, in order the more particularly to impress it upon the judgment of a reader, as he proceeds in examining the intended details.

There are Two Fundamental Assumptions in the Doctrines of accredited Philosophical Grammar, which serve virtually as the very First Maxims of that supposed Science, and which it is requisite to state, in the above precursory observations, for the purpose of objecting to their truth or validity.

ONE of these Assumptions is, that there are certain VERBS *which do not admit an Accusative Case.*—The OTHER, that those Verbs which do admit an Accusative Case are NOT LINKS OF GRAMMATICAL CONNECTION between their Nominative and their Accusative.

Now it is a leading object of the present Chapter to show, that Accredited Grammar, in these Two Fundamental Assumptions, takes up a position in a direct hostility to the First Principles of Reason;

and continues to deviate from truth, throughout the whole supposed Structure of Language.

In order to consolidate the objects of my present dissent, the Two Assumptions in question may be reduced to One, and stated in terms which have been rendered familiar to grammatical ears by the speculations of Mr. Harris—namely—that VERBS *are* ATTRIBUTIVES—and NOT CONNECTIVES,—a Doctrine which has not only been virtually assented to by all Grammarians who have *preceded* the writer above mentioned; but have also been sanctioned by Mr. Tooke, and by all who have come *after* him. Now, owing to the necessary dependence which all the other Parts of Grammar must otherwise have upon this assumed fundamental position, it is necessary to arraign and explode it, here, by means of an appropriate analysis.

Preparatory to this, however, it is requisite to entertain a very secondary, though indispensable consideration. It sometimes happens, in matters of Philosophy, that one, or two, ambiguous or dubitable expressions, employed by an eminent writer, lay a foundation for cavil, or dispute; and it becomes, in consequence, necessary to enter into proofs, or evidences, of a fact, or position, which, upon general ground, must appear as plainly as the sun at noon-day. This happens to be the case with respect to the import, or acceptation, of one of those assumptions that are impeached in the foregoing observations. For although it is known to every person, who has any acquaintance at all with the subject, that Every Verb in Language is supposed by Grammarians to signify some Property

or Attribute of its NOMINATIVE ONLY ; and also known to those who have a more extensive knowledge of it, that this assumption has always obtained without any dissentient voice ; still, there are, in the case of some writers, certain expressions made use of, which, if not duly examined, and their real import ascertained, might, I have no doubt, be made the foundation of a cavil, or pretence, that Verbs have been *tacitly and virtually understood* as connecting Nominatives with Accusative Nouns ; although the EXPRESS tenor of Grammar Doctrine has always run manifestly to the contrary.

The truth of the matter is, and it is a truth worthy of notice here, that, as in the case of RELATION, so in that of the VERB, the *natural* reason of man is against the Logician and the Grammarian. For, as Mr. Tooke has observed of "*certain gentlemen*," that they could not be satisfied without at least *some* vague notion of a difference existing between *Relation* and *Relatives* ; so, I believe, it will be found, that any plain man, who had never been taught the rules of accredited Grammar, would naturally conceive that a Verb connects together Any Two Nouns between which it is placed. I may indeed venture to affirm this, from having met with several individuals of profound classical attainments and great acumen, who, obeying the dictates of their reason, and wholly overlooking and violating the extant fundamental Rules of Grammar, have actually supposed that a tacit and virtual Grammatical Connection is meant in those Rules, between a Nominative and an Accusative Noun, through the medium of a Verb. I proceed, there-

fore, to show, that *Any such Grammatical Connection is NOT meant.* And I deem it to be of no small importance to close the door, thus effectually, against a misunderstanding which has prevailed in any such instance.

For this purpose, I shall principally select that View of the subject which is, at once, the most prevalent and most favorable, that I know, to the supposition of any such doctrine; and which contains that dubiety of expression already alluded to. Its author is no other than the very learned Bishop Lowth: And its Assumptions are repeated, in the words of its author, in by far the most popular or current English Grammar now extant; more than Thirty Editions of which attest the present state of public opinion, with regard to the LOGIC OF LANGUAGE. I may add, that I am aware of no writer who has done more justice to that Definition of the Verb which he advocates, nor any one who has come nearer to discerning the real general nature of the Verb without discerning it at all, than Dr. Lowth has. There is, indeed, only one other writer, whose statements, with regard to the point at issue, I shall at all consider; and I shall notice his particular opinions only upon the same ground as those of Dr. Lowth—namely—on account of certain ambiguities of expression which the author last alluded to has employed, and which, if not cleared up and explained, might leave an opening for cavil or dispute. I could certainly have wished, that the point in question could have been passed over, without this scrutiny. But, at any rate, I feel assured, that the opinions, or expressions,

of no other writer need be investigated, on this head, after those now referred to have been discussed : And it is at least a compensation for the trouble, that the discussion will involve several considerations which must tend to elucidate the general nature of Speech. Those who know the infinite consequences which depend upon laying the foundations of any Science in solid Principles ; and also know the evils that are avoided in removing from such Principles every plea for misunderstanding ; will never deem the intended elucidation either unimportant or tedious.

It is sufficiently recognized, by all Philosophers of the first order, that the Foundations of every Science, not excepting that of Mathematics itself, must be laid in the transcendental or metaphysical conceptions of the Mind. Now with regard to those which are necessary to Mathematics, they are so far established as to admit of the Superstructure's going on, without flaw, or objection. But, in order to erect a Science of Language, this foundation-work is yet to be laid : And although it must certainly take up some of our time, in different places, to attend to it as we go along, it should always be recollected that this time is not unprofitably but very precious bestowed, inasmuch as any new truth which we attain in the First Principles of Logic, (with whatever labor it may be dug into light from under an accumulation of revered fallacies,) is a step of elevation gained by our Species—an interminable possession and a freehold for ever.

In the present article, I shall confine myself to

the Statements of Dr. Lowth ; involving therein the positions or assumptions of Mr. Harris, with whose sentiments on the Subject those of Lowth will be found altogether identified. The other writer to whom I have alluded, and whose views are stated in the article GRAMMAR in Rees's Cyclo-pedia, I shall consider in a subsequent place.

“ *A Verb Active*” (says Dr. Lowth) “ expresses
“ an action, and necessarily implies an Agent
“ and an Object acted upon.”—And—“ *A Verb*
“ *Passive* expresses a passion, and necessarily im-
“ plies an Object and an Agent by which it is
“ acted upon.”

Now with regard to this first statement, I ask ; Would not any one suppose, that, *in so far as concerns those Verbs that are called Active and Passive*, Dr. Lowth has not only clearly discerned that a Verb is a Link of Grammatical Connection between an Agent and its Object or Co-agent ; but, also, that this is the very Grammatical Maxim which the passage was meant to inculcate ? Yet I affirm, that nothing was farther from the thought of this writer, than to intend any such matter.

As a decisive evidence of this, I need only appeal to the doctrine of Mr. Harris, whose view of this part of Grammar has neither been affected nor attacked by the speculations of his successful opponent Mr. Tooke, and whose grammatical decisions have received the highest approbation of Lowth, insomuch, that it is impossible to doubt that Lowth and Harris were completely identified in the matter in question. In making this conclusive reference to the doctrine of Harris, it is very

material to the point in question that a reader should take notice, that HE ALSO deals in expressions which are perfectly in unison with those of Lowth: But there is this momentous difference between the expressions of the two writers, that Mr. Harris's work, in its context, carries its explanation along with it; whereas in Lowth's "*Introduction*" we have no such mark, to enable us to determine, critically, what was his real meaning. We must therefore search for the certain meaning of Lowth, in the "HERMES" of *Harris*.

Now Mr. Harris has entitled Two Divisions of his HERMES, The *One* by the name of *Attributives*; The *Other*, by that of *Connectives*: And he has treated of VERBS under the *former* head; while he has excluded them altogether from the *latter*. The Verb Substantive, which he and all other Grammarians have absurdly considered as a grammatical *monster* or *anomaly*, is the only exception to this doctrine; and even *this* Verb is never supposed to connect a Nominative with an *Accusative Noun*.

Having merely mentioned this DIVISION OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH in Mr. Harris's work, as a paramount evidence, which precludes every possibility of a supposition that he could, in any subsequent expression, or any subordinate explanation, have intended to convey the meaning that Verbs are Grammatical Connectives between Nouns Substantive; I now proceed to notice those expressions in Harris which coincide with the assumptions of Lowth, and which would naturally lead a reader to suppose, if he had not decisive

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proof to the contrary, that the former really considered Verbs as being Connectives.

Thus it is observed by Harris, that “Every Energy doth not only require an *Energiser*, but “is necessarily conversant about some *Subject*.”

Upon this short passage, I am under the necessity of remarking, by the way, that its author has employed the term, “*Subject*,” improperly, instead of the term *Object*: because Every *Energiser* or *Nominative* is, in a *grammatical sense*, a SUBJECT; and *The Thing which it requires* is not a “*Subject*,” but an OBJECT.

Harris goes on to say,—“that Every Energy is “necessarily situate between Two Substantives, “an *Energiser* which is *Active*, and a *Subject*” (it should be *Object*) “which is *Passive*.”—“Neuters in their *Energisers* always discover their “*passive Subject*,” (Object,) “which other Verbs cannot, their passive Subjects” (Objects) “being infinite; hence the reason why it is superfluous in “these Neuters to have the *Subject*” (Object) “expressed, as in other Verbs it is necessary, and “cannot be omitted. And thus it is that we are “taught in common Grammars that *Verbs Active* “*require an Accusative Case*, while *Neuters* require “*none*.”—“HERMES,” *Book 1. Chap. 9.*

The reader will readily discern, that, in order to render this passage intelligible, it was necessary for me to insert the word, *Object*, where Mr. Harris has employed “*Subject*.” And, together with this correction, the requisite commentary upon the passage appears to be, to explain its author’s meaning; which I apprehend is as follows: In the case of

Neuter Verbs, the *Object*, being always the *Agent* or *Energiser himself*, or *itself*, MUST ALWAYS BE KNOWN; Whereas, in the case of what are called *Active Verbs*, the *Object* MAY BE ANY ONE OF AN INFINITE VARIETY OF THINGS, and, therefore, *in order to make it known*, it MUST BE SIGNIFIED. Thus, although Mr. Harris admits, that Every Energy must be between Two Substantives; yet, he is so far from supposing that VERBS ARE GRAMMATICAL CONNECTIVES between Two Nouns Substantive, that he imagines the *signification of an Accusative*, in the instance of what are called *Active Verbs*, is *merely a thing* USEFUL, or *requisite for the INFORMATION OF A HEARER*, to let him know WHAT, or WHO, is *the Particular Object of an Action*; and NOT AT ALL A THING NECESSARY IN THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE, that a Verb should have an *Accusative Case to support its farther end*, upon the Same Principle that a *Bridge* must have an OFF BANK to support *its farther end*.

In confirmation of my being justified in this exposition, I observe, Mr. Harris, in his Chapter of Prepositions, says, “In like manner Actions co-alesce with their Agents, and Passions with their Patients. Thus we say, *Alexander conquers*; *Darius is conquered*. Nay, as every Energy is a Kind of medium between its Agent and its Patient, the whole *three, Agent, Energy, and Patient*, co-alesce with the same facility; as when we say, *Alexander conquers Darius*. And hence, that is from *these Modes of natural Co-alescence*, arises *the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, and of the Accusative by its Verb.*”

The general tenor of this passage appears to come so near the truth in question, that those who are wholly unacquainted with the *fact* and the *manner* by which Philosophers have, in other subjects, done the like and have yet altogether missed the truth they sought, would certainly suppose Mr. Harris's discernment was completely open to it. But the passage contains particular expressions, which critically prove his real darkness on the subject. Thus he says, "Energy is a **KIND** of medium "between its Agent and its Patient." And, with regard to this expression, I need only ask, Would any writer of Philosophical Grammar, who for a moment believed the Verb to be the *Fundamental Grammatical Link which Connects Nouns—the Principal Link* which connects Subjects or Agents together *in the Chain of Language*—have ever divided his Work into **ATTRIBUTIVES** and **CONNECTIVES**, and have assigned Verbs to the *former Division*; and, *afterwards, in a mere incidental remark, in the sequel of his work*, have spoken of the *Sign of Action*, as being a **KIND** of Medium between a Nominative and an Accusative Noun?

Lastly, however, as a final test that I am right, as to what were the real views of Mr. Harris,—views which on this occasion he takes laudable pains, in his notes, to inform us he derives and advocates from the united voices of the Ancient Grammarians,—I shall quote the following passage from his subsequent Chapter of "Cases;" which passage I distinguish by *italics* and **CAPITALS**, precisely as Mr. Harris himself has done.

"From what has been said, we may make the

“ following observations,—that as there can be *no*
“ *Sentence without a Substantive*, so that Substantive,
“ if the Sentence be *regular*, is always denoted by
“ a *Nominative* ;—that on this occasion *all the At-*
“ *tributives, that have cases*, appear as *Nominatives*
“ also ;—that there may be a regular and perfect
“ *Sentence without any of the other Cases*, but that
“ *without one Nominative at least*, this is utterly im-
“ possible. Hence therefore we form its charac-
“ ter and description—THE NOMINATIVE is that
“ *Case, without which there can be no regular and*
“ *perfect Sentence.*”—“ HERMES,” *Book 2. Chap. 4.*
page 281.

I have thus taken the trouble to follow the ambiguous language of Harris (which manifestly involves the analogous expressions of Lowth) through every ramification of doubt which could possibly have hung over it: and I cannot help feeling assured that every such doubt must be dispelled and annihilated by the exposition here given of his real views, insomuch, as to preclude the possibility of any cavil upon the subject. It must certainly appear, that, of all the Grammarians, Ancient or Modern, who have ever speculated on the Subject, not one of them has ever supposed the Verb to be a Grammatical Link of Connection between a Nominative and an Accusative Noun. And I may here reassert, (with redoubled confidence if possible) that their not having discerned this has been the primary or leading Cause why all Treatises on Grammar have equally and entirely failed of exhibiting the real Structure of Language. When Lowth, therefore, asserts that an Action requires

an Agent and “*implies*” an Object acted upon ; it is manifest, he means no more than that it implies the EXISTENCE, or CO-EXISTENCE, of an Object ; and he does not mean that it implies a GRAMMATICAL CONNECTION, BY MEANS OF A VERB, between a Nominative and an Accusative.

I shall close these quotations of authorities, by citing the concurrent doctrine of Bishop Wilkins ; —a writer on Philosophical Grammar whose genius and eminence are acknowledged even by Mr. Tooke himself, fastidious as he justly was with respect to writers on this subject.

“That Part of Speech which by our Grammarians is styled the *Verb* (whether Neuter, Active, or Passive) ought to have no distinct place amongst integrals in a Philosophical Grammar, because it is really no other than an *Adjective*, and the *Copula Sum* affixed to it.” —“ESSAY TOWARDS A REAL CHARACTER,” page 303.

Thus we see, that, according to Wilkins, a COPULA OR CONNECTIVE IS EXPRESSLY CONTRADISTINGUISHED from a VERB, by its being asserted that a *Verb* is an *Adjective* WHICH REQUIRES A COPULA to connect it with its Substantive.

But, without any appeal at all to authority, or to the language of particular writers, on this question, I might distinctly and conclusively have asked, Is it not self evident that Grammarians never could have entertained any *tacit* or *virtual* maxim, or any suspicion whatever, that Verbs are Copulas between Two Substantive Nouns ; when it has been fully demonstrated that, *in their charac-*

ter of Logicians, or Philosophers, they never have discerned the EXISTENCE, IN THE UNIVERSE, of that Logical Link between Any Two Related Subjects, OF WHICH LINK A VERB IS THE SIGN? It may, indeed, on a first view, appear strange that Lowth and Harris should have used the language they have uttered, without their at the same time discerning the real nature of the Subject. But I may here observe, that various oversights of this description exist in the fundamental assumptions of Philosophers, in different departments of knowledge. And, in order to account for the present instance, we have only to recollect, that both the learned persons in question, as scholars, inherited an *imperative bias* concerning the nature of the Verb from the Ancient Grammarians; and that both belonged to that host of School Logicians which, doubtless, would have joined the Philologer of Purley in his unsparing castigation of those "*gentlemen,*" already mentioned in a former place. I ought, by the way, to remark, that the Subject is indebted to these maltreated gentlemen; who, under the guidance or suggestion of mere natural reason, attempted to introduce into Language a Phraseology which, of itself alone, lets in some dim ray of indefinite light upon the matter, when they ventured, (*in their expressions at least,*) to discriminate their "*Relatives*" from "*Relations.*"

In closing the course of evidence, now adduced, that Verbs have never, in any sense, been regarded, either expressly or tacitly, as GRAMMATICAL COPULAS, I justify the position which was expressed

in the Dialogue concerning Relation—namely—that, owing to Logicians never having discerned the existence of Relations, it was impossible for Grammarians to have, in their Scheme of Language, a PART OF SPEECH *significant* of this most important Object of Thought. Accordingly, therefore, I now remark, that in fact there is *No Such Thing in Accredited Grammar as a VERB*, according to the true or real definition of this Part of Speech.

Besides the ambiguities of expression which have just now been discussed, there appears in the *Assumptions* of Dr. Lowth, and of all Grammarians, ANOTHER phrase, which demands a critical examination. The matter to which I at present allude is the assertion, that certain *Actions* “PASS OVER” *from their Agent to their Object*. The investigation of this question, however, must be deferred, until I get to treat of the *Universal Neutrality of Verbs*: and I proceed, now, to lay down the Fundamental Maxim of Grammar that *Every Verb in Language must have an ACCUSATIVE, as well as a Nominative Case*.

FIRST, therefore, I observe, that a NOUN, when it is considered *by itself alone or absolutely*, is NOT ANY SUCH ELEMENT OF LANGUAGE as is by Grammarians denominated A PART OF SPEECH. For, although any such Word is, certainly, a Part of Language, it is NOT ANY SPECIAL Part, but is a *Homogeneal Element* of the *Whole Mass* of Speech, since *Every Word in Language*, considered in it-

self, is equally a *Noun*. Any Noun, or Word whatever, therefore, when it is not viewed in connection with other Words, (such for example as the case of Any Word in a *Lexicon*,) must be regarded like a Type distributed in the Box of the Compositor: It is *No "Part of Speech," technically so called*; but is *Merely a Mass of Lingual Material, shaped and adapted to be employed as a Part of Speech*; just as any mass of stone, in the quarry, is not the key-stone, or any other stone, of an Arch, or Building, but is *merely cut and adapted to serve as a key-stone, or any other stone, in an Arch, or Building*.

Upon the other hand, When Any Word whatever is TAKEN INTO COMPOSITION, *and is made to stand for the Sign of a RELATED SUBJECT*, (which is only another Name for an AGENT) it receives, in that moment, and by that act, a *Grammatical Life*, and becomes a PART (i. e. a *Special Part*) of SPEECH—a *Grammatical or Syntactical Noun*—in a word—what is called a NOUN SUBSTANTIVE. From this position, it follows, that a *Noun Substantive of Grammarians* is a NOUN RELATIVE IN LOGIC.

SECONDLY. As a Noun Substantive is the Name or Sign of an AGENT or RELATED SUBJECT; So a VERB is the Sign of an ACTION or RELATION between ANY TWO Relative Subjects. A VERB, therefore, is a VERBAL LINK which connects Some Two Co-Agents together, in Any Case of Action or Relation.

THIRDLY. It follows, from these respective Offices of the Noun and the Verb, that Every Verb in Language (equally and without the possibility of an
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exception) MUST have both a Nominative and an Accusative Noun for its support or existence: because, if it were not so, it would then be possible for a *Related Subject or Agent* to exist and to *carry on Some Relation or Action by itself alone, without the aid of ANY CO-AGENT, or CORRELATIVE*—a supposition which exhibits one of the most crying absurdities that can be announced in words, and which is acknowledged as such by All Logicians themselves: for it is a Fundamental Maxim in Logic, which I may quote here in the emphatic words of Mr. Harris,—that “*Relatives must begin TOGETHER,—exist TOGETHER,—and cease TOGETHER.*”

I shall shew particularly, from examples hereafter, that Every One of our individual or particular conceptions of Verbs, when we are put upon our guard, must resolve itself strictly into a conformity with this first Axiom of Logic.

It is collateral to the position just now laid down, but it is a most important consideration, to observe, that, Such as Language is, Such is the Nature of the Things of which Language is the Symbol; in-somuch, that I could not, with justice to the Subject, omit stating here the *Juxtaposition* of the Two Natures. I observe, therefore, that, in like manner as *Every Word*, when it is contemplated *absolutely*, that is by itself alone, is NO SPECIAL Part of Speech, but is a *Mere Homogeneal General Element* thereof, and must be regarded as *barren and without any connection with the Other Elements of the Mass*; So, *Every Subject in the Universe*, when it is contemplated *absolutely*, that is by itself

alone, is only as it were a Homogeneal Mass thereof, and is, in this situation, *unconnected* with Any Other Mass or Subject thereunto belonging; and, as such, although it is certainly an Object Signified by a NOUN, it is NOT AN OBJECT OF LANGUAGE *considered as a* CONNECTED SERIES OF SIGNS representing a Connected Series of Ideas. It is only when Any of the *Absolute* Subjects in the Universe, is contemplated in the *Character or Office of a* RELATIVE Subject, that this Absolute Subject becomes a COMPONENT Part of the Universe, or an OBJECT OF LANGUAGE *considered as a* SYSTEM OF SPECIAL SIGNS, distinguished from that *Homogeneal Part* of Speech called a *Noun*. Philosophers have attempted, without any satisfactory result hitherto, to divide the Things of the Universe into CATEGORIES or MOST GENERAL CLASSES. ARISTOTLE has assumed TEN of these Categories: Mr. Hume has enumerated SEVEN: Locke has adopted THREE: And the *Nature* of these Divisions is as *different*, as the *Number* of Classes assumed in each. Nevertheless I may venture to affirm, that the Subjects of the Universe, *considered as* FORMING THE OBJECTS OF GRAMMAR, may safely be assumed to consist of ABSOLUTE THINGS IN THEMSELVES, ABSOLUTE THINGS VIEWED AS RELATIVE THINGS, and RELATIONS *between Every Two of the Latter*.

But, to resume the Subject; The Principle now laid down, with regard to the Essential General Nature of the Verb, forms the First Axiom in Grammar. And all the rest of the Structure of Language is built strictly upon this First Principle. This Position, moreover, (we have seen) is founded

in the *Necessary Structure of Relatives and Relation*. Such is the basis of Language according to the views of the Different Parts of Speech which will be followed out in the sequel of this work.

As it has been shewn, that No Such Principle has been admitted, or suspected by Grammarians, as that which has just been laid down, especially in the case of either what are called *Passive* or *Active Verbs*; I pass on to examine what has been the accredited doctrine in Grammar, and, in particular, what has been advanced by Bishop Lowth, with regard to those Verbs which are acknowledged to be *Neuter*. And here, when we come to discern the real merits of the subject, we shall find our wonder and astonishment excited in a vast additional degree, at the glaring violations of reason which have passed current in the assumptions of Philosophers, under the character of Grammarians.

According to Dr. Lowth,—“A Neuter Verb
“expresses being, or a State of being, when the
“Agent and the Object acted on coincide, and the
“event is neither Action nor Passion, but some-
“thing between both: as ‘*I sleep*,’ ‘*I walk*.’”

In this passage we have a striking example of the illogicalness of attempting to write at all upon Grammar, without previously consulting, and constantly adhering to, the *Generic Structure of the Category of Relation*; which Structure is herein violated, in the most egregious manner.

First. We are called upon to conceive, and contemplate, a STATE OF BEING; of which, ITS

AGENT and ITS OBJECT (*i. e.* its *Agent* and its *Co-Agent*) COINCIDE.

Secondly. Although the Subject of the Verb is expressly said to be *therein an AGENT*; yet, we are told, that the EVENT is NEITHER ACTION nor PASSION, *but is SOMETHING BETWEEN BOTH.*

Thirdly. The *examples*, given to illustrate this doctrine, are ‘*I sleep,*’ and ‘*I walk.*’

The first objection to be stated against this Scheme is, that, in the case of any such Verbs as those in question, it is a great fallacy to assume that the Agent and its Object *coincide*. Because it will be shewn that they do not coincide, *even in a physical sense*. And, even in the case of Reflecting Verbs, of which the Agent and the Object do in reality *physically* coincide, (such as when we say, “*HE respects HIMSELF,*”) it is a monstrous fallacy and violation of reason to assume, for a moment, that they *coincide in a logical or grammatical sense*. Both these considerations it is necessary to insist upon.

With regard to the first one, I observe, that, if a person *sleep*, or *walk*, he must sleep, or walk, *at Some Time*, and *upon Some Thing*; which *Time*, or *Thing*, may, *either of them*, be put as the real Objective Case to the Verb: And, most certainly, the Sleeper, or the Walker, cannot, without the grossest absurdity, be considered as *his own Object*.

In like manner, When a person *laughs*, *smiles*, or *sighs*; he must laugh, smile, or sigh, *at Something*, and thus the Agent and the Object are *physically* different.

It has, indeed, been observed, by some writers,

and especially by Dr. Campbell, that the Verbs now in question take an Accusative Case *through the medium of a Preposition*. But we are to recollect, that the taking of an Accusative Case does not, according to Grammarians, constitute *Any Verb a Copula* between its Nominative and its Accusative. And I have also to observe, that Dr. Campbell supposes the taking of an Accusative through a Preposition to constitute a *Distinct Sort of Verb*, which he has called *Compound Active Verbs*: Whereas, I shall, upon the most imperative necessary ground, throughout deny that there is *Any Such Thing in Language as a Compound Verb*: and I propose to shew, that *Every Major Verb*, in logical Strictness, demands a *So-called Preposition* between it and the Noun to which it is annexed; insomuch, that, whenever it is not so expressed, the Sentence is *elliptical* and Some Preposition ought to be understood. In the mean time, I may here appeal to the fact of actual usage, to prove, that, in the case of what are called Active Transitive Verbs, we very often either express, or omit, a Preposition, between a Verb and its Accusative Case, just as it suits our pleasure: As, for example, we say, “He *struck* the Table,”—or—“He *struck* “*upon* the Table,”—“His Head *struck* the Ground,”—Or—“His Head *struck against* the Ground.” And hereupon I affirm, that, in any such expression the *Verb is perfectly Simple*: for it will be demonstrated, hereafter, that a Compound Verb is absolutely an impossible thing.

Perhaps, indeed, it may be better, in this place,

to suggest to a reader the Principle upon which the perfect simplicity of all Verbs depends; since it may be of service to him to bear it in mind, as he proceeds: Although it will be requisite to recur to it, in the sequel, with more appropriate consideration. The truth, then, is, that the matter in question depends, (like all the other Principles of Grammar,) upon the *Necessary Generic Structure of Relatives and Relation*; and it consists in this: That, As it is impossible for there to be *More than One Simple Link of Relation* to connect together *Any Two Related Subjects, taken in ANY ONE VIEW* of them; So, therefore, it is impossible for Any Verb to be *Double or Compound*, between Any Two Nouns, (considered at that moment as Syntactical Nouns) in a Sentence. This truth, which is *self-evident, necessary, and paramount to every consideration*, gives rise to the following curious Principle and peculiarity in the Structure of Language; to which it will be requisite, at a future stage of the work, to call the attention of readers in a very particular manner; but which, notwithstanding its great and momentous importance in that Structure, has been entirely overlooked by Grammarians—namely—that EVERY VERB, in a Sentence in which there are more Verbs than One intervening between Any Two Primary Nouns Substantive; whether such Verb be reputed as a *Principal*, an *Auxiliary*, or a *So-called Preposition*; must serve, in that Sentence, ALTERNATELY, AS VERB and AS NOUN.

Although it was impossible that Grammarians should have discerned this Principle of ALTERNATION OF A VERB IN A SENTENCE, since they

never had discerned the Structure of the Category of Relation upon which it necessarily depends ; yet, it has, through the force of natural reason, found an opening, in one, or two, solitary and anomalous instances, in the assumptions of accredited Grammar : For it is admitted, that what is called the *Infinitive Mode* can serve, in a Sentence, in the alternate office of Noun and of Verb ; and, that *Verbals in ING* serve as a Noun, and at the same time have a *Regimen like* a Verb. Thus the Principle in question is, in these anomalous instances, already virtually acknowledged by Grammarians : And it is nothing but a most profound darkness, with regard to the *Real Cause or Foundation* of this Principle, that has prevented writers on Language from converting what in *their Scheme* appears as a mere anomaly and absurd excrescence, into a GENERAL RULE grounded not only in reason, but in an Absolute Necessity, and forming no less than a Modification of the Fundamental Axiom of Grammar.

The Principle of Alternation of a Verb in a Sentence is, indeed, of so high and important a Nature, that it might well be called the *Axis* upon which All Language turns : For it operates throughout the whole of Speech, almost continually ; and can submit to no exception.

I resume, here, the consideration of Bishop Lowth's statement, with regard to the Nature of Neuter Verbs. There seems no doubt that he was led into the supposition that the Agent and the Object of a Neuter Verb coincide, by the fact, that

in other Languages, these Verbs take what is called an *Active Form*, wherein the Agent is assumed to *act upon himself*, and thus is supposed to be *his own Object*. This, however, (although I have shewn it is a great mistake, since every such Action, as that of sleeping, or walking, demands an Object very different and foreign from the Agent,) is of minor importance when compared with the grand absurdity and violation of Logic involved in the assumption that an *Agent* and his *Object* are the SAME LOGICAL MAN, in the case of an Action wherein Any Agent in reality acts upon himself, strictly speaking, such as when we say,—“HE respects HIMSELF,”—“HE loves HIMSELF,”—“HE hates HIMSELF.”

It is manifest that when Bishop Lowth, or any other Grammarian, talks of an *Agent* and an *Object* as COINCIDING, he talks AS a Grammarian: and, if he does not mean to assert that these Two Things coincide *logically* and *grammatically*, he can, in this case, have no rational meaning whatever. But it is a self-evident necessary truth, acknowledged by all Logicians and Philosophers, and it lies at the very basis of the Category of Relation, that NOTHING CAN EVER BE RELATED TO ITSELF; and, therefore, the moment we talk of Any Subject as acting upon itself, we, by a *necessary logical fiction*, assume that Subject as being *divided*, or *duplicated* rather, into Two LOGICAL SUBJECTS, or AGENTS, which must, for the time being, be regarded as distinct and different from one another as if they had been Hector and Achilles, or any other Two contending Parties. This truth

forms a Principle in Grammar which can never for a moment be overlooked, or violated, without plunging the subject into a bottomless abyss of absurdity. It is collateral indeed, to the subject, to suggest the remark which immediately follows: but I may observe that this Principle extends to a department of Knowledge far beyond either Grammar or Logic; and it is, in that department, *no fiction*: For it exists in Morals also, since he can hardly be regarded as the *Same Moral Agent*, who *condemns* HIMSELF and who STANDS THUS SELF CONDEMNED. But (to confine ourselves to the subject in hand,) the supposition or assumption of Any Agent acting upon itself, in a GRAMMATICAL SENSE, is an absurdity so palpable and revolting, that it never can be tolerated, for a moment, after it has been duly exposed.

The consequence, to Dr. Lowth, of neglecting and violating this Fundamental Axiom of Relation, has been that of betraying him to assert, that an "EVENT" *produced by an* "AGENT," is "NOT AN ACTION," but "SOMETHING BETWEEN Action and Passion;"—than which assertion nothing, assuredly, could be more deplorable in the mouth of a Logician.

It is in such sort, and with such force, that the Necessary Structure of Relatives and Relation will be found to re-act, and to assert its own reality, against all those who shall attempt to treat it as if it were a house of cards, erected by children and to be blown down by the breath of every fancy that is alien to reason, or that happens to be a minion of fashion in any particular language.

In fine. I repeat, here, as forming the First Maxim in Grammar, that Every Verb whatever must have both a Nominative and an Accusative Noun; and Every Verb is a Copula or Link of Grammatical Connection between its Nominative and its Accusative Case. And the Simple and necessary *Reason* of the thing is, that Every Verb is the Sign of Some Relation between Two Related Subjects; while Every Nominative and Accusative Noun are the Signs of Two Related Subjects.

There is only One Verb in Language that can for a moment appear to present an exception to this rule: And this appearance is merely in consequence of the erroneous understanding of the Nature of this Verb which universally obtains. It is the *Verb Substantive*. And, as a right understanding of the nature of this Verb involves very important grammatical consequences and demands a particular consideration, it is requisite I should treat of its analysis in a distinct appropriate article.

SUBSECTION II.

1. *Of the Verb Substantive.*—2. *Remarks on Dr. Murray's Etymological Account of this and other Neuter Verbs of Grammarians.*

THE Doctrine which has been uniformly entertained concerning that Verb, whose particular analysis I am now going to state, exhibits one of the most remarkable masses of that general dark-

ness which still rests over the Nature of Language, after all that has been done by Philologists with a view to its elucidation. This Verb has been considered, by all Grammarians, as an anomaly—or of a nature extremely different from that of all other Signs belonging to the Same Part of Speech. It is assumed to be a COPULA, *indeed*; but not to be a Copula of a Nominative with an *Accusative Noun*,—a doctrine which is precisely parallel to assuming, that there exists in the Universe a certain Relation which serves to connect Any Related Subject, but not to connect it with *Any Cor-related Subject*. This gross absurdity has arisen, manifestly, from the fact, that, in the Case of the Verb Substantive, the real Accusative is by no means obvious to ordinary remark. Nothing, however, can be more self evident or certain, than the true nature of the thing, the moment our attention is drawn toward it.

In ordinary, when a person affirms, of any thing, that it *exists*; he imagines that he asserts some *predicate or attribute of that thing* ITSELF ALONE; and he has no thought of connecting it, *by a Species of Action*, with *Any Other Thing* serving the First in the Office of a *Correlate*; far less does he suppose, that the Word—EXIST—is the SIGN of a *Species of Action* between the Two Subjects in question. Thus the Thing that is asserted to exist is considered to be, like an Island in the midst of a boundless Ocean, *without any other Land, or Object*, with which it can be supposed to support *Any Bridge or Link of Relation*. Nor is this exclusively the vulgar or popular view of the subject: for it is

precisely that of the Grammarian also. According to the latter, the Verb Substantive is assumed to signify, Not Any Action between Two Subjects; but *merely a quiescent STATE* of the Single Subject called its Nominative. Such is, at one and the same time, the Conception of the Mechanic and the Maxim of the Scholar, with regard to the Verb in question.

But the absurdity of this assumption is so glaring, that it can only demand to be pointed out, in order to be exploded. For, in the case of an Island in the midst of an Ocean, if there be supposed no other Land, or Object of any obvious similitude, with which it must support some Bridge of Relation; it is still self evident, that this Island must be related to the *Ocean itself*. It must, indeed, support its own end of an infinite number of Relations between itself and the Infinite Parts of the Ocean: It must support Relations of *Distance* with all the Parts which it is neither actually IN, nor AT: It must maintain a Relation of *Contiguity* with those Parts which it is AT, but *not* IN: And it must uphold the Relation of *Congruity or Coincidence* with those Parts which it actually occupies or fills with its Volume. Now, analogous to this, Every Individual Subject in the Universe, of which we do, or can, predicate existence, occupies Some Part of those *Infinite Absolute Oceans* called SPACE and TIME: And it is self evident, that Every Such Subject does thus maintain its own side, or end, of an *Action or Relation of Compenetration* with Space and Time: Which Action or Relation is the Thing that we, speaking in *Concrete*, call ex-

ISTING ; and, when we name it in *Abstract and General*, we call EXISTENCE.

As for the *manner* in which things actually *pene-
trate and are at the same time penetrated by* Space,
and Time ; it is a metaphysical question, with
which Grammar has nothing at all to do : And, I
may here freely add, it is a thing altogether incom-
prehensible to man. But it is a difficulty not
greater than some that exist even in the Science of
Mathematics itself : And, as it is certain that we
always *must* contradistinguish *Space and Time*, from
the THINGS THAT OCCUPY Space and Time ; we
MUST ASSUME this mutual penetration, not only
in Grammar, but also in Philosophy. And nobody
will dispute, that both *Penetration* and *Compene-
tration* are, certainly, Species of LOGICAL ACTIONS.
It is plain, therefore, that, so long as we continue
to distinguish between Space and Time and the
Subjects, or Objects, of discourse contained there-
in, the Verb TO EXIST must signify an ACTION be-
tween Any of those Subjects and One or Other of
these Infinite Matrices of Things.

It is curious to remark, that, in the view of the
Substantive Verb now stated, I am borne out by
the DEFINITION OF EXISTENCE furnished by the
Logicians themselves : Although, at the same time,
the matter is altogether and in the most wonderful
manner virtually denied, or overlooked, in the
doctrine of the GRAMMARIANS. Thus, according
to our English Lexicographer—Johnson—*after*
Dr. Watts, “ Essence is but the very nature of
“ any Being, whether it be actually existing or

“no ; a rose in *winter* has an **ESSENCE** ; in *summer* it has an *existence also*.”

From this Definition of Existence, given by the Logicians, it is manifest, that what constitutes it, is the *occupation* of Time and Space. And, accordingly, it is always affirmed of *All Universals*, or *Generals*, that they **DO NOT EXIST** ; and this merely upon the ground that they are things which do not, and cannot, occupy Time or Space. Now it is manifest that **OCCUPYING** (*like penetrating*) is, in a strict logical sense, **ACTING** ; and **OCCUPYING Space** is **ACTING in, or with Space**.

Here it is plain, that **SPACE** (for we may leave out the continual mention of *Time*, in order to save circumlocution) is the **UNIVERSAL ACCUSATIVE NOUN** to the Verb Substantive, wheresoever this Verb is either expressed or understood. It follows, also, that wheresoever Any Subject is mentioned as being an Agent of Any Action, the *Verb Substantive* (*i. e. the Sign of the Action of Occupying Space*,) must be either expressed or understood *as being prefixed* to the Verb expressive of the Special Action in question. And, as for the fact that the Substantive Verb is, in this office, much more frequently understood than expressed, (as, for example, when we say “Peter *strikes* James,” instead of “Peter *is striking* James,”) it is very satisfactorily accounted for from the intolerable tediousness which would attend its continual repetition.

Having thus shewn, from a strict analysis, what is the real Nature and Office of the Verb Substantive ; it remains to be pointed out, in its proper

place, *in what manner Any Quality* of a Subject can be grammatically signified along with the Name of that Subject, since it has become manifest that the Office of connecting an Attribute with its Subject DOES NOT BELONG TO THE VERB IN QUESTION, *nor to Any Verb whatever*. But our business, at present, is entirely with the Substantive Verb itself; and our present object has been to bring its true Nature to light. By the exposition now furnished, therefore, I trust, that not only is the Verb Substantive itself rescued from the profound obscurity and error which had all along attended it; but, that, in addition to this, Grammar in general is cleared of that egregious fallacy which assumes, that *Every Adjective Verb signifies both the Action expressed by itself and the Verb Substantive together*; while the office of the *implied Substantive Verb*, in such case, is not supposed to be that of being a Sign of the *Existence of the Agent*, but to be that of ASSERTING THE ADJECTIVE ACT,—than which, it is not easy to imagine a more deplorable perversion of reason, or a confusion in Grammar more discreditable to philosophy.

2.

As the account which I have now given of the Nature of the Verb Substantive is, in substance, the same as that which I had hazarded in my previous work, which appeared I believe nearly three years antecedent to the publication of Dr. Murray's "*History of the European Languages*;"

and as I certainly had no knowledge of the speculations of this eminent Etymologist, until the posthumous appearance of these his labors; it is impossible that my judgment, or imagination, could have been biassed by any thing he has advanced therein. It must therefore, I apprehend, be matter of satisfaction, especially to those who may, on this subject, be more inclined to confide in etymological evidence than in reasoning *a priori*, to find that the Principles which I have here laid down, prove to be in a very remarkable unison with the grammatical conceptions of those early Teutonic Tribes of men, whose Speech has been recognised as forming the Source or Original, not only of our own and of other kindred Tongues, but also of the Latin, and Greek, and other learned Languages of antiquity. In the appeal to this etymological consent, moreover, it will appear, that the learned Languages, with all their just pretensions, have not, any more than other and meaner dialects, improved upon, *but on the contrary have remarkably sunk below*, the natural reason or Grammar of those early Tribes. At the same time, it will come out, that, although the conception entertained of the Verb Substantive, and of other So-called Neuter Verbs, by these Primitive Tribes, was *Generically* right; it was, however, marred by a *Specific error*, which will be explained farther on: And thus it will appear, as might well have been expected, that the rationality which guided those Hordes, in their understanding of Language, was neither certain nor uniform.

In the "*Facts and Illustrations*," annexed to the

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First Volume of Dr. Murray's History, (page 340,) he expresses himself in the following terms.

"All Verbs which express a fixed, immoveable, or settled state, arise from Verbs which signified the contrary."

He, then, enumerates some examples of this fact; and proceeds, in page 342, to add the following observations.

"I have given the above illustration of neuter verbs to shew, that, by the original construction of language they are all active. I stand, I sit, I am, may be expressive of states, unconnected in idea with action; but I stand, literally signified, in old times, *Ic STAGENDA-A*, *I am setting my feet*, not I remain in the state of having set them; *Ic SIG-TA*, I perform the act of sitting, or I sit down voluntarily and actively. *Ic AM*, for *Ic SIGM* or *SUM*, denoted I move, I actively live in a place, a word analogous to *Ic BIG*, I dwell, I cultivate, I stir, I lie."

Thus we have the fact put indubitably in evidence, that *mere natural unassisted reason* had very early led mankind to understand, that the *Verb TO EXIST* does not signify a *Quiescent STATE*, but an *ACTION*. And, precisely according to what I have myself asserted from Principles *a priori*, they classed "I AM," "I BE," along with all those Verbs which in any way connect Subjects with SPACE, as "I move,"—"I actively live in a place,"—"I stir,"—"I cultivate."

In fact, it may be laid down, as a Principle in Language, that *Every Action* which in any way connects a Subject with Place is a *Modification*

of the Action of existing : And, hence, *Every Verb* expressive of such Action (as, for example, the Verb *to live, to stand, to sit, to walk, to move, or any other such*) is a *Modification of the Verb Substantive*. It is not a little to be admired, therefore, that the primitive men of nature should have viewed this grammatical fact with a rationality which places the Logic of the Latins and the Greeks in a truly unenviable light.

The only fault of the natural reason of those untaught men was, that, after having rightly conceived the *general* nature of the Verb Substantive, and of Other Analogous Verbs, *as being significant of ACTION*, they, at least in some cases, mistook the *Real and Universal Accusative* to these Verbs ; and, instead of discerning that it was necessarily no other than *Some Mode of SPACE*, (or of *TIME*) they erroneously assumed the *Agent* to be, by a certain fiction, *his own Object* : Thus, instead of “ I sit,” or “ I sit upon the Ground,” they said, “ *I am setting my feet* :” Which expression, although it exhibits no violation of grammatical rule, asserts a gross fallacy in fact and partakes of the illogicalness, or sheer nonsense rather, of those Languages which affect to say, “ *Thou SLEEPEST Thee*,” — “ *Thou WALKEST Thee*.”

Here, I think, I might safely invoke every Philosopher, who was ever intentionally true to the standard of reason ; and ask him, Would he consent, for a moment, to desert that standard, by admitting that we can suffer Grammar (Universal or Philosophical Grammar) to be debased into any Conventional Structure, or System, which glaringly

violates, or contradicts, the Necessary Principles of Reason. thus demonstrated? Yet such is the despotism of Scholastic prejudice—such our implicit subjugation to the Assumptions of a System which we have been early taught to venerate,—that, we find, the genius of Dr. Murray himself was not awakened, even by all the etymological light of his own researches, to a discernment of the gross absurdity of that Grammatical Structure, which I am now laboring to explode. On the contrary, he appears to have considered the deprivation of the Verb Substantive of its Real and Rational Office of expressing an ACTION, and the assumption of it to express a STATE, as being AN IMPROVEMENT in Language; and thus he, in another instance (besides the one to which I have already alluded,) virtually advocates the CONVENTIONAL POWER OR OPTION of man, to make Language take on whatever Structure any particular People may contrive, or conjure up.

“All Verbs” (says this author, *Vol. 1. page 55.*)
“were naturally actives; no provision had been
“made for designating a passive State. I bear,
“I suffer, I tolerate, I stand, sit, sleep, die, and
“every other word pertaining to a fixed, passive,
“or inanimate condition, were active in form, and,
“as it should seem, to a certain degree, in idea.
“Besides the neuter sense, which such Verbs, as
“are now mentioned, gradually acquired, a new
“voice was invented in every verb, to be called
“the Middle, Reciprocal, or Proper, at the pleasure of Grammarians.”

I trust it will be admitted, by every one who

pretends to take rationality for his guide, that it presents a lucid spot in the Grammar of our early Teutonic Ancestors, that, *by them*, “no provision “had been made” (AMONG VERBS) “for designating a Passive State.” And, as for the “INVENTION OF A NEW VOICE,” by those *learned* nations which came after them; to be called the “*Middle, Reciprocal, or Proper*,” I apprehend, that such an instance of sinking in the scale of reason, from the standard example set them by the “*Barbarians*” in question, cannot readily be paralleled in the history of the Human Mind.

I propose to shew, hereafter, by what sort of Sign ANY STATE can logically be signified; and, that this Sign can consist, *Not in a Verb at all*, but in an ADVERB signifying the Subject as ACTIVELY POSSESSING OR OCCUPYING *the State* meant to be expressed.

It will not have escaped the notice of the reader, that, in a passage already quoted, Dr. Murray asserts, that the Verbs now in question expressed an active state only “*in old times*,” and, that, *at present*, the Verbs “*I stand, I sit, I am*, may be “expressive of states *unconnected in idea with action*.” It is against *this* violation of rationality that I direct the principal force of the observations which have now been stated, and which I hope must appear sufficiently effectual.

Here I remark, that the So-called Middle, Reciprocal, or Proper Voice, unworthy though it is in itself of a logical commentary, may claim a few observations here, on account of the manner in which it has been advocated. Dr. Murray observes,

that “it literally described the Verb to be performed upon the actor.” And he adds, that it “was transferred in Greece, India, and Germany, to the passive.”—He again says, that “this voice, being formed in a manner too intricate for continual imitation, was corrupted by the Visigoths, and relinquished by the later Germans, for the easier method of circumlocution.” And, upon this, he adds, “I venture to restore the Visigothic passive, from a comparison of its parts with the Greek and Sanscrit.”

Here I refer the reader to Dr. Murray’s work, for the restoration of the *Visigothic* : But I insert a quotation of the *English* which he has given of it, in order that the competent reader may judge, how far such a Structure of Language is logical, or worthy of resuscitation.

“I lay on, or to, myself.”

“I speak to myself.”

“I cling to myself.”

Now every person is doubtless aware that a man may, certainly, *lay on, or to, himself*;—may *speak to himself*;—or may *cling to himself*. But the reader will take notice, that these are *Not the Sort of Actions, or THINGS*, meant by Dr. Murray to be signified in the expressions now quoted : On the contrary, the Things meant to be signified are, what are called STATES, or, at least, “IN-TRANSITIVE ACTS”—*I lie, I speak, I cling*.

In order to stamp the manifest irrationality of this restored Visigothic, it is only necessary to observe, that, according to it, (besides the fallacy of *fact* involved,) we must make use of the *same ex-*

pression to signify, generally, I lay, I speak, or I cling; and to signify I *lay myself*, I speak to *myself*, or I cling to *myself*: on which latter Actions are *real and specific acts*, of which *Myself* is the *proper Grammatical Object or Accusative*.

In fine. From what has been advanced in the present subsection, in addition to what had been laid down in the preceding one, it follows, that **ALL VERBS WHATEVER ARE OF ONE SAME GENERAL NATURE**; and, that all pretended differences, in *Sorts of Verbs*, are wholly void of any foundation in reason. It will be shewn, in its proper place, that this Rule holds good, as well with respect to Auxiliary or what are called *Incipient Verbs*, as in the case of any other Verbs in Language.

I have asserted, in a former part of this work, that the real Structure of Speech is a thing eminently simple. And the Grammatical General Principle which has resulted from the analysis just now concluded, affords a striking example of the truth of this remark.

SECTION SECOND.

OF THE UNIVERSAL NEUTRALITY OF VERBS.—BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL ACTION, AS BEING THE OBJECT SIGNIFIED BY A LARGE PROPORTION OF VERBS.

THE error, which it is the object of the present Section to remove from the doctrines of Philosophical Grammar, exhibits another conspicuous example of the result of overlooking and violating the Structure of Relatives and Relation, in attempting to erect the Structure of Language. The brevity requisite, in order to admit a consideration of the different topics to be entertained in this work, demands that I proceed to the subject without farther preface.

VERBS *are the Signs of ACTIONS.* This is a Principle of Grammar settled by universal consent. But **ACTIONS** *are not ACTIVE*: and, consequently, the **SIGNS** of Actions cannot be Active. How, then, has it happened, that all Grammarians, without exception, have entertained a doctrine of *Active Verbs*?

As it is a self-evident truth, of the most obvious kind, that an Action, considered in itself, cannot be Active, (that is to say, unless we consider it in a *Secondary Character* wherein it becomes an *Agent of Some OTHER Action*, as when we say, "**WATCHING** *exhausts*," or "**SLEEPING** *restores*," "a man,") it would be a waste of time to add any

thing farther with a view to render this truth more manifest than it stands in its own primitive aspect. It remains, therefore, only to examine, Whether the *sense*, in which Grammarians have uniformly entertained this doctrine of Active Verbs, can be so understood, or modified, as to do away the apparent gross absurdity of the assumption. I have already given notice, in a foregoing Section, that I should entertain this question, as bearing upon that concerning Verbs considered as Connectives.

According to Dr. Lowth, "The Verb Active is
"called also Transitive; because the Action pass-
"eth over to the Object, or hath an effect upon
"some other thing: and the Verb Neuter is called
"Intransitive; because the effect is confined within
"the Agent, and doth not pass over."

Now with regard to the phrase—"PASSETH
"OVER"—as contained in this passage, although it could not, with the least propriety, be employed in any loose or ambiguous sense in a Treatise of Language; or be used in any sense, except that in which a *Man*, or a *Boat*, is said to *pass over a river*; yet, there certainly is a loose or popular acceptance, by which the expression of Bishop Lowth might be supposed to import that a Verb EXTENDS OVER from a Nominative to an Accusative Noun, just as a *Bridge* EXTENDS OVER *a river from Bank to Bank*. Let us, therefore, critically examine, Whether it is possible that the phrase in question was meant by Dr. Lowth in this sense.

We may popularly assert of the *Girth* of a
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Horse, when it is buckled round the animal, that it *PASSES under* his body : Or, of the Belt of a Soldier, that it *PASSES over* his shoulder. At the same time, it is manifest, that the Girth, or Belt, *does not MOVE or PASS at all* ; and the expression thus employed, although it is perfectly intelligible, is indisputably the assertion of a FICTION OR UNTRUTH, arising very naturally from our speaking with reference to the *operation or motion* which usually takes place when the Bandage in question is fastened upon its wearer. But I hardly need observe, that it is not possible Dr. Lowth could have meant the phrase in that quiescent sense in which we apply it to a Girth, or Belt ; and which, (if he did,) would agree with the *passing or extending of a Bridge* from Bank to Bank : because he and all other Grammarians have manifested their real meaning, with critical precision, by the use of the word “ TRANSITIVE.”

The Belt of a Soldier, like the Subject that wears it, is a *Transitory* being ; it *passes away in TIME*. But no person—not even any of those who would say that a man’s Belt passes over his shoulder—would also say that his Belt is “ TRANSITIVE,” which would mean, that, *in its station and office of a Belt*, it *PASSES OVER OR ACTUALLY MOVES IN SPACE*.

But even the critical expression—*Transitive*—was not requisite to prove, beyond all question, what is the real sense in which the phrase *PASSETH OVER* is meant by Grammarians ; since it has already been insisted upon, that Grammarians admit of *No Verb as being a Copula or Bridge* from a Nominative to an Accusative Noun.

From these considerations, therefore, it is perfectly conclusive, that Bishop Lowth and All Other writers on the Subject have supposed an Action to *pass over*, from its Agent to its Object, in the same sense that a Boat crosses a ferry and arrives at the opposite side.

Besides the manifest certainty of this fact, moreover, we are enabled to assign the *cause* of it. This cause I apprehend to be, evidently, the uniform assumption of Logicians, that an ACTION is *No-thing but an ENERGY of that SINGLE SUBJECT* which they call *the AGENT*. Now this assumption I must impeach, here, as being a fallacy of vast magnitude and moment, in its logical and grammatical consequences; insomuch, that I had intended to enter into a full exposition of it in the work which has already been repeatedly referred to, and which treats of various First Truths, analogous to that in question. But I was then under a necessity to postpone the matter: And, even on the present occasion, the Subject can only be entertained in such a compressed view of it as appears to be sufficient for the purpose of a Treatise of Grammar.

In strictness, indeed, the question concerning the Activity, or Neutrality, of Verbs does not depend upon the question whether, or not, we ought to call an *Accusative or Suffering Subject* by the Name of a PATIENT, or by that of a Co-AGENT; but it depends *merely upon the fact, whether an Accusative or Suffering Subject must be CONCERNED, BEFORE AN ACTION CAN EXIST*. But I suppose that the General Nature of Language will be

placed in a much clearer light, by my stating here a brief analysis of the Nature of Action, in opposition to the existing doctrine entertained by Logicians on the Subject. To the Philosopher of Language the matter cannot be unimportant, if the Principles laid down be found valid. And those who may be only interested in Grammar to a limited extent, may confine their attention to the example of Action which I propose to state in the close of this article, and which, I conceive, involves the only fact upon which the Universal Neutrality of Verbs depends.

The investigation, I conceive, independent of its immediate purpose, will furnish a very impressive example of the existing state of General Logic, in its doctrine concerning Action.

In proceeding to this analysis, it is proper in the first place to observe, that it is the nature of *Physical Action alone* that is to be considered in it. At the same time, it is to be held in mind, as was formerly shewn in treating of Relation, that All Relations whatever are Actions; and that All Actions are of *One Same General Nature*.

According both to Locke and to Harris—(Names little given to agree in Philosophical disquisition, though both were writers on Logic and on Grammar)—ACTION is assumed to be Nothing but an ENERGY of *Some SINGLE Subject*: And the Two Words—ACTION and ENERGY—are employed as being strictly synonymous or convertible. The doctrine of these two writers, moreover, might serve, if necessary, as the Creed of all other authors on the Subject.

According to Dr. Hutton, in his *Mathematical Dictionary*, "ACTION, in Mechanics or Physics, is
" a term used to denote, sometimes the effort which
" some body or power exerts against another body
" or power, sometimes it denotes the effects re-
" sulting from such effort."—"AGENT is that by
" which a thing is done or effected, or any thing
" having a power by which it acts upon another
" called the PATIENT, or by its Action induces
" some change in it."

According to Dr. Reid, who, as a Metaphysician, has written very particularly on the nature of *Power*, and who opposes one of the views of Locke upon this subject, "The name of a *Cause*,
" and of an *Agent*, is properly given to that being
" only, which, by its active power, produces some
" change in itself, or in some other being. The
" change, whether it be of thought, of will, or, of
" motion, is the *effect*. Active power, therefore, is
" a quality in the Cause, which enables it to
" produce the effect. And the exertion of that
" active power, in producing the effect, is called
" *Action, Agency, Efficiency.*"

Here, then, we have it, unequivocally, according to Dr. Reid, in perfect concurrence with all the other authorities herein cited, *First*, that Active Power is a *Quality*; which is true, indeed: And, *Next*, that the *Exertion of this QUALITY* is called ACTION. According to this doctrine, therefore, it is plain, that the *Object or Accusative Noun to Any Verb* is excluded from having any concern in the existence of the Action signified by that Verb.

Hence, according to the Logic and Grammar which now prevails, when a Cannon propels a Ball toward the wall of a besieged Place; the Action of battering that Place is complete the moment the Gun, or the Powder, has exerted its intended energy. This doctrine, however, I confidently deny. And I affirm, that, not only must the *Wall be Struck* before the Action can exist; but also that, in a strict Logical and Grammatical sense, the PLACE, so struck, is as much an AGENT, as is the Cannon, or Instrument by which it is assaulted.

In order that the general principle, upon which I propose to argue the nature of Action, may be at once apprehended, so as to enable a reader very readily to understand all that is to follow, I observe in this place, that there are Three Different Views in which any Physical Action may be contemplated:

First, As a Physical Action.

Secondly, As a Moral Action.

Thirdly, As a Logical Action.

NOW UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR, if it can be erected into a SCIENCE; (and, that it can, I hold to be most certain;) must undeniably belong to the Department of LOGIC. And it is the business, therefore, of THIS KIND of Grammar, to view the Nature of Action *only in so far as it is exclusively a Logical Subject*. This consideration, which I must insist upon as being paramount and imperative, will present to us Action under an aspect vastly different

from that which it usually displays, either in its Moral or its Physical exhibition. While it is certain, that Grammarians and Philosophers have been accustomed to contemplate it only in its two last mentioned characters ; or, rather, chiefly, if not altogether, in its *Moral* aspect.

This being premised ; I proceed to shew by what means Grammarians, viewing the subject in the light just mentioned, have introduced the utmost degree of confusion into the reputed Structure of Language.

It is quite manifest, from the evidence of Logical writers already cited, that not only the Grammarians, but the Logicians also, have founded their doctrine of Action upon the contemplation of its Moral Nature. Now, in the Moral contemplation of Action, it is of primary importance to distinguish *only the Voluntary Agent or Aggressor* ; because the *Moral Quality* of the Action must be ascribed to *him alone*. And it is merely in analogy with this fact, that, in any case of Physical Action between Two Inanimate Subjects, we ascribe Agency exclusively to the *Subject that Moves to Another*, i. e. that is supposed to be an *Assailant*. Hence it is, that either the Voluntary or the Leading Co-Agent, of Any Action, has uniformly been assumed, by Philosophers, to be the **SOLE Agent** : While the following Co-Agent has, as constantly, received the denomination of a **PATIENT**.

But, in the face of this doctrine, it is a self-evident necessary truth, which will not admit of a moment's denial, or hesitation, that a *So-called Patient* of an Action, (*inasmuch as it MUST co-operate*

BEFORE *the Action can exist,*) is, in a strict logical sense, AS MUCH AN AGENT *or* CAUSE of that Action, as the Subject usually called the Agent. *And this truth forms* a FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN THE NATURE OF A VERB; because a Verb is always, of necessity, the *sign of an Action or Link of Connection* between Two Co-Agents.

At the same time that I assert the Principle of Action now laid down, it is to be observed, that EITHER, or BOTH, the Co-Agents of an Action MAY ALSO *be* PATIENTS OR SUFFERERS *from that Same Action*. But, along with this, it is to be widely distinguished, that the being a SUFFERER is a vastly different Thing from being a FOLLOWING Co-AGENT, of Any Action; insomuch, that the fact of Suffering, although it may be, to all human observation, strictly *contemporaneous* with the Action in question, is in reality *subsequent* to it, and is a fact *altogether extrinsic* to the Action. Thus if a man happen to fall upon a child, or upon any small animal; he may kill, or hurt, this animal, and may remain himself unhurt: But, if he fall upon a stone; himself may be killed, or hurt, and the stone, to appearance, remain unaltered. Now, in both these cases alike, the Action in question is that of Collision between Two Bodies; and, in the one case, the Two Co-Agents are the man and the child; while, on the other, they are the man and the stone. But in neither of these Actions, strictly considered, is there *Any Sufferer*: for the child in the first case, and the man in the second, has become a PATIENT OR SUFFERER ONLY IN

RESULT OR CONSEQUENCE of that *Action* in which he had, as a Co-Agent, performed his part.

It could not in the least degree tend to invalidate this argument, if any one were to observe here, that there is in reality NO INTERVAL of *time between* a Cause and its Effect: Nor, even, could it avail, if it were contended, (which however I deem to be a fallacy) that a Cause and its Effect are things *strictly contemporaneous*. It is enough that, in the Necessary Structure of our Ideas, we *must* distinguish a Cause from an Effect, as being Two Different Things, and *Not Parts of the Same Thing*. And, quite independent of this, there is no Axiom in Philosophy that can stand higher than that which connects *Every Related Subject* with its *Correlate Subject*, by a Link of Action which makes *Each* of the Subjects equally a *Co-Agent*.

In the example just now given it has been seen, that a Physical Assailant may be the sufferer from his own assault. And I have observed, that BOTH the Co-Agents of Any Such Action may be Sufferers from their mutual Energies. I now add, that they may, in such case, be EQUAL Sufferers: and, hereupon, I would ask, What becomes of the doctrine of "AGENT and PATIENT," in any event of this description?

Thus, for example, if Two Billiard Balls, or Two Bodies of Any Similar Size and Shape, come, with equal and opposite velocities, into collision; BOTH the Bodies MIGHT be *equally indented*, and both might move with precisely opposite and

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equal forces. Such a fact, indeed, may never happen, in a strict philosophical sense; but it is a fact *as possible, and as fit for our present argument*, as if it were an every-day occurrence. In such case, then, the Grammarian, (and the Logician also,) would be utterly puzzled to resolve the *Two Subjects* engaged in the Action, into an AGENT and a PATIENT.

I suppose this last example exhibits the doctrine of AGENT and PATIENT, or of SINGLE AGENCY, in a light so strikingly absurd, that it cannot be requisite to take up farther time in exploding it.

Upon this ground, therefore, I venture to remark, that the Phraseology (for it is the *Phraseology alone*) of the Newtonian Doctrine of Action participates in the common error of the Logicians. In that doctrine it is affirmed, that ACTION is equalled by RE-ACTION: And this phraseology answers perfectly well for the purpose of the Mechanical Philosopher: But, if it be employed as a Phrase in *General Logic*, I must insist that it is erroneous: for it implies, that, in a Single Fact of Collision between Any Two Bodies, there exist *Two Different Actions* between the One Pair of Related Subjects. It is to be granted, indeed, that Two Bodies, in *apparent* Collision, *may be supposed* to perform Two Distinct Actions; and, if this were the meaning of the Newtonian Phrase, it would then be strictly a logical one. But I must conclusively assert, that *Every One Action* demands the Energies of *Two Co-Agents*: And I humbly conceive, therefore, that the real fact of the Newtonian doctrine

is, that, in EVERY ACTION, ENERGY is equalled by RE-ENERGY.

These observations lead me to a final consideration of the Nature of Action. And here, therefore, I observe, that we must not suffer the Newtonian theory, or *Any Physical Theory whatever*, how high soever may be its claims to truth of fact, to intervene, or obtrude itself, into *Any Course of Reasoning from the Necessary Structure of our Ideas*; Because, if we did so, it must inevitably prove a stumbling block to our conclusions. In point of fact, we do not know whether Action is carried on by what we call *Energies*: Neither do we know what the term *Energies* precisely means. But this we do know—namely—that ACTION IS SOME LINK OF CONNECTION BETWEEN *Two Related Subjects*; and is the Thing that MAKES *Two RELATIVE Subjects*, of the OTHERWISE ABSOLUTE *Subjects in question*.

From this view of the Nature of Action, there certainly are *Some Actions* of which we can give the LOGICAL REASON, and *which are, in fact, PHYSICAL Actions*; although we can demonstrate their Nature, *as Actions*, only because they happen to be *not merely PHYSICAL Results*, but *also at the same time NECESSARY Results*. This identification of the OBJECTS OF PHYSICAL Science with Those of DEMONSTRATIVE Science, is a matter so entirely foreign to the notions of Philosophers on the Subject, that I should not have ventured to touch upon it, here, if I had not previously suggested and treated the matter at large in another work. But, upon the strength of what is advanced in that work, I may now observe, as an illustration of the present

argument, that **EVERY VISIBLE LINE** which we perceive is a **PHYSICAL ACTION** of the **MEETING** of *Two contrasted Colors*: although, in such case, **NO EXERTION OF ENERGIES** *between the Two Colors* is to be supposed; but the Result is merely a *Necessary Product of the Contiguity of Two of Our Own Sensations*. And, while we never can confound a perceived **LINE**, with the **TWO COLORS** between which it is thus *necessarily produced*; we never can be in the least doubt as to the *truth and necessity* of the **LINE's** being the **LINK** OR **CAUSE** which connects the **Two Colors**, as **Two Related Subjects**, in the case in question.

Such, I apprehend, is a logical example of **ACTION**, complete in its evidence, and divested of every extraneous fact or circumstance.

To this example may be added, that *Every Hypothetical Line of Contiguity between Two Defined Mathematical Subjects*, is a **HYPOTHETICAL ACTION** of **TOUCHING**, OR **MEETING**, *precisely of the Same General Nature as that of a Visible Line* between **Two Colors**.

It may be proper, in this place, (in order to correct or guide the imagination of a reader,) to observe, that **An Action**, as it has been defined, or demonstrated, in this work, is a **Thing** which may not, on a first view of it, appear to coincide altogether with the **Structure of a Bridge**; to which last-mentioned fixed and neutral **Object** I have all along uniformly likened both *Action* and its *Sign*—a *Verb*. **An ACTION**, (as has already appeared) is a **MEETING**; and it is, therefore, a **CONNECTION** of **CONTIGUITY** between *Some Two Things*. On

the other hand, a BRIDGE, in the *ordinary* sense of this term, is a Connection NOT OF CONTIGUITY, but of SEPARATION, between Some Two Things. The Modification of each of these Two Sorts of Bridge is such, that Objects may pass over, or under, an Ordinary Bridge, but Objects cannot pass over, or under, an Action. This difference being explained; I now observe, that an Action is nevertheless, in a true *Generic sense*, a Bridge: because, Every Action is a *Logical Link of Connection* between Some Two Things; and the mere fact of the CONTIGUITY, or the ACTUAL SEPARATION, of the Two Things, thus connected, is merely a *specific* difference, and a subordinate consideration. This truth being manifest and indisputable; all that remains to be said upon this distinction, is to remind a reader, that when in the sequel of the work I come to supply a Diagram of the Structure of Speech, and shall therein depict *Verbs* as being of that sort of Bridge which SEPARATES their Piers or Supporters; I shall do this only for the sake of illustration, and allowance will have to be made, in the imagination, for the necessity of this expedient.

After the exposition now given of the subject, I trust it is altogether out of the question to suppose Action to be a thing of a DOUBLE or TWO-FOLD Nature. At the same time, if allowance be made for the Newtonian *Phrase*, the Newtonian *Doctrine* manifestly agrees with the view of the subject which is herein laid down, against that of the Logicians. Thus, When we press a seal upon yielding wax; a Logician would tell us, that the

Seal is an AGENT, and the *Wax* a PATIENT, of this Action: But a Newtonian would affirm, that BOTH the *Seal* and the *Wax* are, in this case, EQUALLY AGENTS; and he would justly argue, that, if the *Wax* did not Act, as well as the *Seal*, the latter would *not impress*, but would *pass through and dissipate*, the former.

I return, now, to the consideration of the Grammatical Doctrine of Bishop Lowth and of all other writers on the subject; It is very manifest, that it is the supposition of Logicians that an ACTION is *merely an ENERGY OR EMANATION*, as it were SHOT OUT OR EJECTED from *Some SINGLE Subject* called THE AGENT, (which Energy is supposed, and perhaps justly supposed, to be ACTIVE, or MOTIVE,) that has led to the Uniform Doctrine of ACTIVE VERBS; since a Verb, being the Grammatical Sign of Action, must partake of the Nature of the Thing which it represents. But it has been rigorously demonstrated, that Action is a Thing infinitely different from ENERGY, or from ANY ATTRIBUTE of ONE SINGLE Subject; because it is a MEETING BETWEEN *Two Energies*, —or *SOME Two Things*: And, unless the analysis now stated shall be invalidated, it would be as grossly illogical to confound ACTION with ENERGY, as it would be to confound two Mathematical SURFACES, or SOLIDS, with their *Common Line of Contiguity*; than which, no Two Objects in Geometry are more distinct, or different, in the logical conceptions we form of them, respectively.

In fine.—If we take a case in which Agency can be supposed more than in any other to belong to *One only* of the Two Related Subjects engaged in an Action, we shall find, that this case, as much as any other, falls under One Same Universal Law. Thus, If we suppose a Ball discharged from the Mouth of a Cannon, and propelled to Any Distance (let it be Fifty Yards,) in Void Space. This Motion of the Ball is a Species of Action; although, in an ordinary physical sense, it would not be called an Action, since there is no Subject that directly or obviously resists it: for it is an Action of the *Ball* with *Space*. And here, if in any case, the Ball might be assumed to be the Sole Agent of the Action. But I affirm, that, in a strict logical sense, SPACE is as much a *Co-Agent* of this Action, as the Ball is: For an *Action of Moving Fifty Yards*, is an Action which takes place ONLY THE MOMENT AFTER the farthest edge of the Ball has *arrived at* and MET that Part of Space which is Fifty Yards beyond the Part from which it started. We may, indeed, suppose the Ball to move from Some *Energy*: but its Action, in the present case, consists in *Nothing but its changing of Relations* with the *Parts of Space*; and *Space* is a necessary and manifest CO-AGENT, in Every Change of this kind which Any Object makes.

I hardly need observe, that if we here bring in the power of gravitation, the resistance of the air, or any other cause, for stopping the Ball; we shall thus give a character to the Action which I had excluded by the previous terms. And any such new Subject, even if introduced, could only serve,

(*instead of Space,*) as a Second Co-Agent of the Action. The object, here, is merely to illustrate the *nature* of Action as being necessarily **SOME-THING—SOME MEETING—BETWEEN Two Subjects.**

The result of the analysis now stated, is, that **ACTIVITY** (and **PASSIVITY** also) does not and cannot belong to **VERBS**. Activity and Passivity are **Attributes of NOUNS ONLY**: And it would be a deplorable perseverance in absurdity if the force of prejudice, or habit, should be able to uphold the doctrine of Active Verbs in Philosophical Grammar.¹

¹ The doctrine of Active Verbs has been acquiesced in, or rather advocated, by Mr. Tooke; and is entered into with zeal by Dr. Murray: Which, indeed, might naturally be expected, from the Logic they respectively entertained with regard to the Category of Relatives and Relation.

SECTION THIRD.

OF THE DIVISION OF THE OBJECTS OF LANGUAGE, INTO ACTION ITSELF, THE STATE OF ONE CO-AGENT WITH RESPECT TO ACTION, THE STATE OF THE OTHER CO-AGENT, OR PATIENT.—AND OF THE CONSEQUENT FORMATION AND USE OF A PRINCIPAL CLASS OF ADVERBS.

IN the foregoing Section I have asserted, that Philosophical Grammar is, or rather must be, founded strictly upon the LOGICAL Nature of Action or Relation; and that, consequently, Verbs must conform to the Necessary Structure of this Category, in exclusion of any limited or partial views into which we might be led by a mere *Moral* consideration of Actions. But I may be told, that Language was not made for *Logicians*; but was invented, in great part, for the purpose of marking and signifying the Moral intercourse between human beings. Hence, perhaps, it may be said, that we are not to make Verbs conform to the Abstract Nature of Relation; but, ought to leave Relations (i. e. the *Causes of Language*) to shift for themselves, and to continue to uphold the supposed Nature of Verbs in the existing absurdity of their doctrine, since it is convenient for the purposes of life or of mankind.

To this reasoning, I reply; It is true, that Language was not made for Logicians; but, in great part, for the Moral intercourse of the Species. And,

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to this I add, that Speech ought still, and always, to be eminently (and as its main object) adapted to express this intercourse. But at the same time I affirm, that, as for the existing doctrine of Verbs, it could never have found a toleration, or an origin, except owing to the profound ignorance of mankind with regard to the real nature of the Thing of which Every Verb is a Sign. And it would now be a darkness no less deplorable, in any Grammarian of the present day, to stand up and defend the doctrine in question, upon a plea that Language was not made for Logicians; than it would have been in one of our early Saxon or Gothic Ancestors to have stood up, in his native hovel, and scouted every improvement in the Art of Building, upon a plea that Houses, or Ships, are not made for Mathematicians.

The real truth of the matter is, that the logical proofs which have been in the foregoing articles laid down, that Verbs are Signs which are neither formed to represent, nor are capable of representing, Actions in that particular view of them called *Moral*, but are necessarily constructed to signify Action in its complete nature and aspect, present no objection, nor obstacle whatever, to our signifying a *Moral*, or *Any Other Partial View* of Action: Which we can signify, most simply and beautifully, by a Logical Sign belonging to a very different Part of Speech; and to which, I apprehend, we must resort, unless we resolve to become martyrs to a strange generosity, and be content to wear a cap and bells of Reason, merely because the oversight, or the negligence, of Logicians has

hitherto chanced to fix it upon us. I shall therefore appropriate the present article to a suggestion of what appears to be indicated as being requisite in this case.

First, then, I observe, that the Whole purpose and business of Language is to signify *the Related Objects in the Universe* and the *Relations between them*. Multitudinous, or Infinite, as may appear the Number and the Variety of Things which Speech is capable of expressing; they are all comprehended under this one single proposition.

Secondly. In consequence of the truth just now laid down, we have need to divide the Objects of Speech into *Three Great and Primary Classes*, which I shall enumerate as follows.

1. It is frequently necessary to signify *Action itself*, properly so called. And the expression of this demands, at the same time, the signification of *both the Co-Agents* of that Action.

2. It is frequently necessary to signify the *peculiar STATE* of the *Leading Co-Agent* of an Action, without introducing any expression of the state of the *Following Co-Agent*. And this demands the signification of *One Only of the Co-Agents* of that Action.

3. It is frequently necessary to signify the *peculiar STATE* of the *Following Co-Agent* of an Action, without introducing any expression of the *Leading Co-Agent*. And this, also, demands the signification of *One Only* of the *Co-Agents* of that Action.

Such are **ALL THE VARIETIES OF OBJECT** which it is possible for Language to express; always excepting the consideration of **LIMITED**

SILENCE, which must be admitted and entertained as an Element of Language, and of which Element due notice will be had hereafter.

Agreeably with this, it has already been laid down, that a *Mere Noun* belongs to NO PART OF SPEECH until it be made the *Sign of Some Co-Agent*. And it will be shewn, in its proper place, that an *Article*, a *Definitive*, and an *Adjective*, are *Nothing but CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS of a Noun Substantive or Name of a Co-Agent*: From which, and from other considerations, it will be found to follow, that there is *No Other Object ever signified, or possible to be signified* by Language, beside those three which I have here enumerated and described. These Three Views of *Action* and its *Agents*, therefore, stand, in this work, for the “*Different Sorts of Things*,” and “*Different Sorts of Ideas*,” into which, we have seen, Grammarians and Philosophers have (according to the sarcastic remark of Mr. Tooke) all along labored to divide the Objects or Prototypes of Words: And it remains here to shew, in what manner, or by what Signs, these three General Objects can be rationally signified.

With the purpose just expressed, it is to be observed, in the first place, that, of the Objects in question, ONE ONLY of the three is a *Natural Object* or such as *can exist in that form and complexion* which we ever signify by Words. This Object is an *Action*, considered together with its Two Co-Agents, as already described: And the signification of *this Object* has been fully provided

for by the *Verb* and by what has herein been asserted concerning it.

Each of the Other Two Objects in question is what may be called *Artificial*; it being formed, or completed, by the *Abstractive Faculty of the Mind*, parting off, in idea, a certain portion of the Natural Object first described. Thus, although in the contemplation of Any Action it is necessary to contemplate Each of its Co-Agents along with itself, since No Action can ever exist without Two Co-Agents to serve as its supporters; yet, by the Abstractive Power of the Mind, we can *divide* this Natural Object into departments, and can contemplate Either of the Co-Agents *as being in a CERTAIN STATE* with respect to the Action, without taking into this Complex Idea the Other Co-Agent, or yet taking in a complete view of the Action in question, which last cannot be had without introducing the Idea of the Other Co-Agent.

From the description now given, it will appear, that, whereas EVERY ACTION is a Species of BRIDGE between Two Piers or Supporters; So *Every Leading*, and likewise *Every Following Co-Agent* of an Action, when it is thus viewed as abstracted, and is contemplated as annexed only to its OWN PECULIAR STATE with respect to this Action, may be compared to the ARM of a Sign-post, which projects out from One Only Supporter. Thus, for example, if we say "PETER strikes RICHARD;" we have herein a Bridge of Action; and this Bridge of Action is rationally signified by placing a Noun of Action as a Bridge between Two Nouns Substantive or Piers of Language.

But if we only say, “*Peter* STRIKES,” or “*Peter* is STRICKEN;” we have, herein, No ACTION expressed; but only an ENERGY or STATE of *Peter*, with respect to an Action; and here, therefore, we have *No Bridge* between Two Co-Agents; but have only Some Energy or Quality, which may be compared to an ARM or GIBBET, projecting out from PETER, and signified as belonging to, or supported by, HIM ALONE.

Now if we distinctly consider the construction of a BRIDGE and that of a GIBBET respectively, as being two Different Objects of the contemplation of the Logician, we shall unquestionably discern that they are vastly dissimilar things; and we shall readily grant, that nothing could be more illogical, than to confound these two Things, or Structures, together, as being of One Same Nature or Composition. The same reasoning, also, of course, must hold good with regard to ANY TWO WORDS which we may choose to adopt to serve as the SIGNS of these Dissimilar Structures. But this confusion has actually been admitted and cherished by all Grammarians: for they have adopted *what they call Verbs*, to serve as the Signs not only of *All Actions*, but ALSO OF ALL STATES as *contradistinguished from ACTIONS*.

In order that no one may here for a moment mistake, by supposing that the matter in question is only a *mere verbal* distinction, I may remark, (although I think it can hardly be necessary,) that, abstractly taken, it could not make the smallest difference, whether we should call a Bridge of Language by the Name of a VERB, or by any

other Name. But the Name of Verb having been all along assigned to this Part of Speech : and it being here demonstrated, that the Objects which it properly signifies are Logical Bridges ; while, also, there are Other Classes of Logical Objects, of a vastly different nature from Bridges, which have most erroneously been supposed to be signified by the *Same Sign* : it follows, beyond a doubt, that the Name of *Verb* must be *continued to the Signs of Bridges* ; and, that *Some Other Appellation* must be found for those *Signs of Gibbets* which have just now been suggested. The Two Objects in question being immeasurably different ; the denominations of their Signs must certainly be *as different* : And it will be found, moreover, that the respective Denominations must have regard to the difference of the Structures represented.

Now it is a Principle in Speech, well known ; and it appears in fact to have been practised from the very earliest ages of Language, that *Almost Any Word* may, by a certain expedient, be employed to serve as an *Abbreviated Sign of Several Words* : And the *Expedient or Principle* by which this very useful end has been effected, has been merely that of ASSOCIATED POSITION, with respect to some Other Word to which it is annexed. These abbreviations, moreover, owing to one of their supposed principal uses, have been denominated ADVERBS : And, on the present occasion, they claim our particular regard ; although we shall have to consider them with more appropriate attention, in the sequel of this work. Thus, either a *Preposition*, an *Adjective*, or a *So-called Substantive*

Noun, (as these Words are rated by Grammarians) may become an ADVERB by POSITION: As, for example, when we say, "*He went IN*,"—" *He looked PALE*," "*He stood FATHER*;" which expressions mean, "*He went to an INNER PLACE*,"—" *He was of a Pale Color*," i. e. "*in a Pale State*,"—" *He stood in the Office or Relative State of Father*."

From what has been just said of the nature of Adverbs, two facts will be immediately evident—namely—that, by analogy of this Expedient or Principle, Words called VERBS may serve as ADVERBS BY POSITION; and, that, by thus employing them, we shall (as I before hinted,) most simply and beautifully express or signify the peculiar STATE of either a *Leading* or a *Following Co-Agent*, with respect to Any Action. Thus, from the *Whole Analogy* of the conversion of Words into Adverbs by Position, when we say "*Peter strikes*;" the Word "*Strikes*" becomes an ADVERB by Position, and it means "*Peter exists in a Striking STATE*, while it excludes the Sign and Signification of the *Object* which he strikes, and thereby excludes a proper or complete signification of the *Action itself* of striking.

By a rational and absolutely requisite extension, therefore, of the simple, natural, and already preceded and established method of conversion now described, we shall be able to signify the peculiar state of *Any Co-Agent*, or of *Any Patient strictly so called*, in the most logical manner; and shall thus, by the Sign employed, rationally contradistinguish *Any Co-Agent when viewed by itself*, from

the Same Co-Agent when it is viewed together with the Action itself and the Other Co-Agent concerned.

From this view of the subject, it results, as a Necessary and Universal Principle of Grammar, that, whenever the *Name of an Action* is annexed or apposited to a *Nominative*, without Any Accusative Noun being annexed to the farther side of the former; the *Name of Action so situated* is NOT A VERB, but an ADVERB.

According to the Principle now laid down, as well as to that other and Fundamental Principle which was asserted in the First Section of this chapter, a very remarkable but at the same time harmonious change will be made in that Part of Speech by Grammarians called the Verb. For it will follow, That Every One of our SO-CALLED VERBS, as it stands marshalled in its *So-called Paradigm*, in our Grammars, being Only a Name of Action annexed to a Nominative, without any Accusative Noun annexed to it, although according to the Fundamental Principle above referred to it cannot be a VERB, becomes a legitimate ADVERB or ABBREVIATION; which represent, at least, a So-called Preposition and a Noun in the Objective Case with its Article taken together.

And here we are to observe, that a Name of Action employed thus Adverbially becomes *More (Much More)* than a Verb: because it will be shewn at large that *Every So-called Preposition* is a VERB; and it has been just now said, that an Adverb involves, *at least*, the import of both a Preposition and an Objective Noun annexed to it.

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These considerations bring me to a delineation of the *more particular Mechanism* of that Great and Primary Class of Adverbs, which I have thus proposed to introduce into the Structure of Speech. And, first, it is to be observed that, in adopting the expedient under consideration, although it constitutes a Part of Speech very different from the Sign of either a *Related Subject* or a *Relation*, yet, in its construction, the Generic Structure of the Category of Relatives and Relation can never be defeated, or violated: As, for example, when we say, “I write,”—“Thou writest,”—“He writes;”—although the Word—*Write*—in any one of these three modified sentences is *Not a Verb*, but is a *Sign* of the Words—*in or innung* A WRITING STATE; yet, the Generic Structure of Relatives and Relation is not violated, because the Word—*in or innung*—being the *Name of an Action*—BECOMES a VERB by being placed between the *express Nominative* “I” and the *involved Accusative* “A WRITING STATE.” In this manner, therefore, a *New Sentence* is formed: Or, in other words, Every conjugated expression of a So-called Verb, in our Grammars, is an *Abbreviation of a Complete Speech or Sentence*, made up of a Nominative, a Verb, and an Accusative; but which Sentence is of a very DIFFERENT IMPORT from the Sentence usually supposed to be expressed. It is plain, from what has been said of the nature of Adverbs, that Every Adverb is a Sign, Not of Any Natural Object, but of *Words only*; that is to say, it is *Not an IMMEDIATE Sign of a Thought or Thoughts*; but is an *immediate Sign* of a PARCEL OF SIGNS. An Adverb, therefore, is, in a *two-fold*

sense, an *Artificial* Part of Speech; first, because it is only a Sign of *Signs*; and, secondly, because the Abstracted Parcel of Objects signified by Any One of these Signs cannot exist in nature, unattached to an Action and a Following Co-Agent.

The Grammatical Mechanism of Adverbs being thus delineated; I proceed to offer some general observations with regard to it.

And *First* I observe, that, from the View of the Subject which has been suggested, there follows a very remarkable and useful result—namely—that Whensoever Any One of the Essential Parts of Speech is found to be *Out of its Natural Position* in its association with other Words, *that is out of the Natural Structure of Language, as demonstrated in these analyses*; it is a mark of its being employed **ADVERBIALY**. Thus in the expressions,

“ He stalks **ON**,”

“ He rehearses,”

“ He plays **RICHARD**,”

“ He looks **FAINT**,”

the *So-called Preposition, Verb, Noun, and Adjective* (being out of their Natural Association and Position with respect to the Other Words in the Sentence) become **ADVERBS**.

Secondly, I remark, that, although the Adverb is not in fact an Essential Part of Speech; yet, it is so eminently useful, and *almost necessary*, that it has a full and a very high claim to be entertained in the Structure of Philosophical Grammar: Espe-

cially has that Principal Class of Adverbs, which I have proposed to introduce, such a claim.

Thirdly, I observe, that the establishment of this Class of Adverbs involves Two Grammatical Principles which will appear novel and strange to those who have imbibed the doctrines of Accredited Grammar—namely—*First*, that an ADVERB can agree with a NOUN; and, *Secondly*, that we ASSERT OR AFFIRM in what is called the PARTICIPIAL FORM. With regard to the reality or solidity of these two Principles, however, there cannot remain a doubt: For the *First* is established by the fact already shewn—namely—that a Name of Action, when annexed to a Noun, becomes an ADVERB to that Noun: And the *Second*, also, is established by its having been shewn that the Verb Substantive has no Office of enabling a So-called Participle to assert. Thus, in the expressions, “*I write*,” and “*I writing*,” the Words—“*write*,” and “*writing*”—are both of them ADVERBS annexed to a Noun, or Pronoun: And both the expressions are ABBREVIATED ASSERTIONS; because the One means, “*I inning a WRITING STATE*,” and the Other means the Same in yet a fuller manner, since the Word—*Write*—is, in fact, only an Abbreviated Modification of the Word *Writing*. But, with regard to this last mentioned Principle, of our asserting in the Participial Form, farther notice will be had in its proper place.

Fourthly. It is to be observed, that, from the whole of the foregoing reasonings it appears, conclusively, that there can be No Such Thing in Philosophical Grammar as a PASSIVE VOICE.

Because VOICE is an Attribute of an AGENT, and NOT OF AN ACTION ; since Voice is an Attribute of the MIND ; and No Agent, or Nominative, can ever be expressed as being Passive, in Philosophical Language. The Whole doctrine of Passive Verbs and Voice, therefore, as well as that of Active Verbs, falls for ever to the ground, unless it be upheld by a most manifest perverseness against reason. Any State, either of Activity or Passivity, must be expressed by signifying the Subject in question to be ACTIVELY INHERING OR OCCUPYING that State.

It only remains to remark, that the Principle now asserted must not be confounded with the very illogical and absurd expedient of those Languages which express the Subject of Any Mere State as being *Active upon itself*, in possessing that State. And here it may be particularly observed, that ANY STATE of a Subject is a most logical *Co-Agent* to that Subject, during the Action of its occupying that State ; and is, therefore, the *Necessary Accusative Noun* to the Verb or Sign of Action which connects this Subject with the State in question. Accordingly, we say, with the strictest propriety of Language, “ He is *in* PAIN,” “ He *is in* FEAR,” “ He is *in* HOPE,”—*in* ANGER,—*in* GRIEF,—*in* LOVE,—*in* HEALTH,—*in* SICKNESS,—*in* DEATH,—*in* DESPAIR,—and so on, throughout all the changes of supposed STATE which any Man, or any Subject, can possess : And it will be proved, at large, that the Word IN, (i. e. INNING) is a legitimate and efficient VERB, as is Every So-called Preposition whatever. In fine, it becomes plain

afresh in this place, that when, instead of expressing the State of Hope, or Fear, of a Man by means of the Preposition and the Noun of that State, we express it by turning this Noun into a *Noun of Action* by saying "*He HOPES,*"—" *He FEARS,*"—the Noun of Action here becomes an *Adverb* signifying the very Same thing—namely—*IN* or *INNING* a *State of Hope*, or of *Fear*.

If a metaphysical question should be started, here, As to the MANNER in which *Any Subject* occupies or possesses *Any State*? I would reply, *First*, that the *Mere Speaker of Language* has nothing at all to do with it: And, *Secondly*, that, nevertheless, *Every One* CAN answer it very readily. For, in the conceptions of the human mind, we MUST suppose a Man to *possess* HEALTH, or SICKNESS, in *some way* analogous to that in which we suppose him to *possess, measure, or take up, SPACE*, (or *TIME*). And it is altogether certain that HEALTH, or SICKNESS, or ANY OTHER STATE, is as distinct a Grammatical Subject from the Man who possesses it, and is connected with that Man by an Action (signified by a Verb) as perfect and efficient, as can be said of Any Subject that occupies or exists in Space. In its proper place, moreover, I shall produce the curious and complete *etymological* evidence, that the Word—INN—was once a *current VERB* in our *Language*,—a fact of which, I can assure my readers, I was wholly ignorant, until long after I had laid it down (in a former work) that ALL PREPOSITIONS are of the nature of VERBS. This INDUCTIVE proof, coming in collaterally with the foregoing Reasonings a

priori, (I cannot help trusting,) must establish the present argument with a strength which may look with tranquillity upon any attempt to invalidate it: And the mere mention of it, here, may serve as a specimen of the METHOD by which I propose to prosecute the general subject of Language, in grounding my views of it upon the two-fold basis of REASONING and of INDUCTION.

In closing this article, it may not be improper to remind my readers, that in it I have not been treating of Adverbs appropriately, or in full; but, on the contrary, have only been suggesting the necessity for the introduction of a New Class of Words into Grammar, under this denomination: Which Class, however, must form the *Very First, and Vastly the Most Numerous, Order of Words comprehended under this Part of Speech*; since it will be much more numerous, and of more frequent use or recurrence, than even that of Verbs themselves.

SECTION FOURTH.

OF THE PRINCIPLE AND THE ACT OF ASSERTION.

SUBSECTION I.

1. *Of the Doctrine of Grammarians that the Essence of the Verb consists in Assertion ; And, otherwise, that the Verb consists in an Assertion and an Attributive.*—2. *Suggestion that both Verbs and Adjectives involve a Sign of Assertion.*—3. *Profound Error of Locke and other Grammarians, acquiesced in by Mr. Tooke, in asserting that the Verb Substantive is the General Sign of Affirmation.*

IN the Second Volume of the *DIVERSIONS of PURLEY*, at the very close of that Work, Mr. Tooke's fellow Dialogist addresses him in the following terms.

“ If you finish thus, you will leave me much
“ unsatisfied : nor shall I think myself fairly treat-
“ ed by you.

“ You have told me that a *Verb* is (as every
“ word must be) a *Noun* ; but you added, that it is
“ also *something more* : and that the title *Verb* was
“ given to it, on account of that distinguishing
“ *something more* than the mere *Nouns* convey.
“ You have then proceeded to the simple *Verb*
“ *adjectived*, and to the different *adjectived Moods*,
“ and to the different *adjectived Tenses* of the *Verb*.

“ But you have not all the while explained to me
“ what you mean by the naked simple *Verb unad-*
“ *jectived*. Nor have you uttered a single syllable
“ concerning that *something* which the naked Verb
“ *unattended* by *Mood, Tense, Number, Person*, and
“ *Gender* (which last some languages add to it)
“ signifies *More* or *Besides* the mere Noun.

“ What is the Verb? What is that peculiar dif-
“ ferential circumstance, which, added to the de-
“ finition of a Noun, constitutes the Verb?”

Having put this most important of all grammatical questions; the Dialogist here proposes about a dozen of different definitions of the Verb, for Mr. Tooke's acceptance, or rejection. Upon which, the latter cries out, “ A TRUCE, A TRUCE.—I know
“ you are not serious in laying this trash before
“ me.” The Philologer of Purley then concludes his very meritorious labors, by pathetically observing, that his “ *evening is come*,” and his “ *night*
“ *fast approaching* ;” but that, “ if he should have
“ a tolerably lengthened twilight, he may still find
“ time enough for a farther conversation on this
“ subject.”

It certainly would be impossible for words to convey a more complete or explicit acknowledgment, (than is comprised in these concluding passages of Mr. Tooke's Work,) that he left the exposition of the Essential Nature of the Verb in the very same state of total darkness as that in which he had found it. And his merit, in this case, consists in his not having added to the
“ TRASH,” which preceding Grammarians had accumulated upon the subject: While it is altogether

manifest, that he had not himself formed any conception with regard to it, which he could deem in the least degree satisfactory. It is at the same time evident, that Mr. Tooke fondly meditated, (as might well have been expected,) a future attempt of this grammatical desideratum.

It is a known and a just observation in Philosophy, that the most primary and simple truths are frequently the most difficult of demonstration, or detection. Notwithstanding the very wonderful manner in which that "*peculiar differential circumstance*" which, added to the definition of the *Noun*, "*constitutes the Verb*," has eluded or defeated all the attempts of Grammarians and Philosophers to detect it, I venture to believe, that it is, in reality, a very simple matter, and a matter in the strictest manner demonstrable; or rather, I must conclude it has already, in the course of the foregoing analyses, been strictly demonstrated. A VERB is *just* as MUCH MORE than a *Noun*; as a BRIDGE *which connects the Two Banks of a River*, is MORE than the SAME MASS OF MATERIAL, (retaining the Same Figure,) WOULD BE if it lay along upon ONE ONLY of those Banks, and thus did NOT CONNECT Any Two Things whatever.

From this simple account of the Verb, which is manifestly the result of all the preceding reasonings with regard to it, it is plain that the *differential circumstance* in question is merely and purely the *External Mechanical Fact* of INSERTION—that is the FACT OF THE INTER-POSITION of a *Noun of Action* BETWEEN Two Other Nouns. And hereupon I observe, that INSERTION is the

SIGN OF ASSERTION: Because it is a self-evident and indisputable truth, that Words are Nothing but the Signs of our Thoughts, and that **ASSERTING** is a **VOLUNTARY ACT OF THE MIND ITSELF**, of which Act any Grammatical Principle, or Signature, can be only an *External Type* or *Symbol*.

From this statement, which I apprehend carries its own evidence most conclusively along with it, and which would only be clouded by any additional argument with a view to its farther illustration, we are led clearly to discern the merits of the various Assumptions, or Doctrines, which have been advanced concerning the **ESSENCE OF THE VERB**. The only definitions, or doctrines, of the subject which I deem worthy of consideration here, however, are the following two—namely—**ONE** which consists in supposing, That the Essence of the Verb lies in *Assertion*; And **ANOTHER** which assumes, That the Essence in question consists in an *Assertion and an Attribute*. The last mentioned of these two is the well-known doctrine of Mr. Harris. The former has been assumed by Mr. Tooke, in one place at least, in his writings; and has found its advocates among later Grammarians.

With regard to the *First* of these definitions, therefore, I observe, that it is plainly and vastly defective; Since a Verb is so far from being **MERELY ASSERTION**, that it is a **COMPOUND SUBJECT** made up of *Two different Elements*—namely—a **NOUN of ACTION** and the **ASSOCIATED POSITION** of that Noun *between Two Other Nouns*.

And here it is to be acknowledged, undeniably, that the Verb ASSERTS: Because the INSERTION, (or INSERTING,) necessary to convert the *Noun* into a *Verb*, is the SIGN OF THE MIND'S ASSERTING. In this manner the *Verb asserts derivedly or by representation*, as having for *One* of its *Two Elements* the *External Type or Symbol* of that VOLITION OF THE MIND which we call *Affirmation*. At the same time, it is altogether conclusive, that a Verb consists of TWO ELEMENTS—namely—A NOUN OF ACTION and an ASSOCIATED POSITION thereof with respect to Two Other Nouns.

With regard to the *Second* of the Definitions, now in question, I observe, that IT *also* is defective, or fallacious, in a vast actual degree; although not in a degree so extensive as the former one. For, notwithstanding it is virtually accorded, in this Second Definition, that the Verb consists of Two Different Elements, since it is said to contain an *Assertion and an Attribute*; Yet, it is a vast fallacy to assume that the *Second Element* which the Verb contains is an ATTRIBUTE, in the sense meant by Grammarians: because the Element in question is Not a Thing that can be *attributed to Any SINGLE Subject*, but is the *Sign of an Action or Link of Connection interposed between Two Subjects*, and is proper to neither of them.

These defects being thus briefly pointed out in the two definitions in question, respectively; The whole mystery of that *differential circumstance*, or *Specific Difference*, which, when added to a Noun,

constitutes a Verb, consists manifestly, I apprehend, in the following Element—namely—the ASSOCIATED INTER-POSITION of that Noun between Two Other Nouns, this INTER-POSITION being the SIGNATURE of the Mind's ASSERTION; it being duly provided, along with this, that No Noun can be so inserted, or converted, except Some *Noun of Action*.

It is requisite here to remark, that writers upon this head, besides their missing the object of their search, have fallen into great *oscitancy or contradiction of themselves* with regard to it. I shall notice only that of Mr. Tooke, however, as a specimen of a proceeding by no means singular in this respect.

He says, in ONE place, where he has offered a sort of passing definition of the Verb and the only definition of it which I think he attempts at all, that “the Verb must be accounted for from the “necessary use of it in communication.” To which he immediately adds: “It is the COMMUNICATION “ITSELF.” Now, to COMMUNICATE a thing, is to ASSERT that thing. And there can be no doubt that, by the word “*Communication*,” Mr. Tooke here meant *Assertion*. Accordingly, it has been ascribed to him by other writers, that he affirmed Assertion to be the Essence of the Verb. Yet, in ANOTHER place, (Vol. 2, page 432) he denies that the Verb even so much as “IMPLIES” Assertion. He says, “For the *Verb* does not denote *Time*; “nor does it imply any *Assertion*. No Single Word “can. Till one thing can be found to be a couple, “one single word cannot make an *adsertion* or

“*adfirmation*; for there is *joining* in that operation,
“and there can be no joining of one thing.”

In this last observation of Mr. Tooke, in my opinion, he evinces more of that sort of acumen which is adapted to the elucidation of Philosophical Grammar, than perhaps in any other part of his book. But he, at the same time, manifestly splits (as so many other Grammarians had done before him) upon the rock of *supposing, that a VERB is a “WORD:”* Whereas I have shewn at large that a VERB is NOT a WORD, but it is a WORD INSERTED OR ASSOCIATED BETWEEN TWO OTHER WORDS; just as a BRIDGE is NOT *an* ARCH, but it is an ARCH INSERTED between *Two Piers, or Abutments.*

In this place, perhaps, some explanation is requisite, in order to prevent a possible misconception of the Subject: For which reason I observe, that, in ONE sense, a Verb IS INDEED “a WORD”—a “SINGLE WORD”—as it has been called by Mr. Tooke. Thus a Verb is a Single Word as *contradistinguished from* A VERB AND ITS NOMINATIVE BLENDED INTO ONE APPARENT WORD, which is the practice of the Latin Language. If therefore Mr. Tooke had been directing his reasoning against the gross absurdity of this Latin confusion, it is certain he would, in *this* case, have been right in affirming a Verb to be a Single Word. And in this sense I have myself, upon a former occasion, asserted that a Verb is a Word and a Single Word. But it is in express evidence, in his text already quoted, that, when Mr. Tooke affirms that a Verb is a Word—and a Single Word

—he means that it is *in its* WHOLE ESSENCE AND PURITY a *Word*, to the exclusion of all consideration of its ASSOCIATED POSITION between Two Other Nouns. His error, therefore, consists in not admitting that ASSOCIATED POSITION (the *External Sign of Assertion*) is a CONSTITUENT ELEMENT OF THE VERB: for he *deliberately and ultimately* affirms that the *Verb* does not IMPLY any assertion.

It is to be adverted to, here, that an assumption of the *Absoluteness of Words in their Grammatical Character*, or of *their Never changing their Part of Speech in Any situation whatever*, is one of the most remarkable doctrines, (and, I must add, One of the most sweeping absurdities,) that is to be found in the whole compass of the DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY: Concerning which, I shall have occasion to take farther notice in the sequel of this section; and, probably, still farther in treating appropriately of Adverbs. At present I observe upon this head, in opposition to the opinion of Mr. Tooke, that ASSOCIATED POSITION is a Principle of Language of the greatest power and comprehensiveness: It is the GENERAL CONVERTING CAUSE OF VERBS, as well as of ADVERBS: It COMPREHENDS the *Principle of the Alternation of a Verb in a Sentence*: It turns *Substantives* into *Adjectives*; and *Adjectives* into *Substantives*: And it may be said to be *Almost every thing in the Mechanism of Language*. It is, certainly, one of the most important and most comprehensive of all Grammatical Principles. The reason of the thing, moreover, is perfectly and most simply explicable. In the case of VERBS, it depends

upon the Generic Structure of Relatives and Relation; according to which Structure *Every Relation* must have a *Relative Subject* on Each side of it: and, in this case, it is a *Necessary Principle*. In the case of *Adverbs*, it is indeed merely a conventional matter: but it is a truly logical device; and it has been established by the practice of all ages. In the case of *Adjectives* and of *Substantives*, it has its foundation in the *Natural order of the Association of our ideas*; and is, in fact, a *Necessary Principle*, since, when any Two Names of Objects come together, not meaning the Same Thing, *One* of these Names *must* be construed as a *Substantive*, and the *Other* as an *Adjective*; and there is nothing *optional* in the matter, except merely as to which Name, the *first* one, or the *last*, Any Nation shall choose to account the *Adjective*. An example of this truth is afforded in the expressions, *Horse-Chesnut* and *Chesnut-Horse*.

Mr. Tooke, we are to observe, grounds his view of the Subject upon a distinction which he makes between “the *Manner of Signification* of Words” and the “*Abbreviation* of their Construction,”—a real and a most important distinction, certainly, in Language;—and, upon a consequent assumption, that an Abbreviation is *not a Word or Sign of an Idea, or Ideas*, but is only a *Sign of SIGNS*. This assumption, also, I observe, is a just one: and from this last it follows, for example, that a *Noun put adverbially*, or an *Adjective put substantively*, is *not a Word*; and, when resolved into its primary grammatical import, it can become *only a Noun*, or an *Adjective*. But, after admitting this

special doctrine, as I do, to be valid so far ; I observe, that it cannot in the least degree tend to save Mr. Tooke's *general* doctrine, when it is applied to the VERB,—which is the most important of all the Parts of Speech and a *Necessary Part*. Neither, indeed, can it save his doctrine when applied to SUBSTANTIVES and ADJECTIVES ; *which Words necessarily convert each other by Position* : for each of these Words is a *Sign of an Idea, or Parcel of Ideas* ; and each, (I affirm,) is a *Necessary Part* of Speech, although Mr. Tooke tells us of a tribe of American Savages, who, he was informed, contrived to do without Adjectives.

I shall resume this topic in the next subsection, after having adverted to what remains to be advanced here with regard to Assertion.

2.

So true is it, that the ASSOCIATED POSITION of a Word is the External Sign of the Mind's asserting, that I have here to suggest the Principle, that ADJECTIVES contain a Sign of the Mind's asserting, as well as VERBS. An ADJECTIVE (any more than a VERB,) is NOT a *Mere Word or Name of a Thing* : but it is a NAME OF A THING APPOSITED TO ANOTHER *Name of a Thing*. An Adjective, therefore, as well as a Verb, is a Thing composed of TWO DIFFERENT ELEMENTS.

I repeat, therefore, that an Adjective involves a Sign of the Mind's Assertion. When, (for example,) we speak of KING ALFRED ; this means the

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Alfred Who was King : And, in like manner, when we talk of *The Black Man* ; this means *The Man Who is Black*.

And here the reader will recollect, it has been already shewn at large, that, in the last mentioned expressions of these two examples, the *Verb Substantive* has No part in asserting that Alfred was King ; or that the Man is Black. This Verb only serves as the *Necessary Link of Connection* between Each of these Nominatives and SPACE (or TIME) ; and the real Sign of asserting that Alfred was King, is the *APPOSITING* of the *Name—King*, to the *Name—Alfred*. Yet the Two different FORMS of the *Verb Substantive*, as expressed here, determine that the *Event* is PAST in the case of the *King*, but PRESENT in that of the *Black Man*.

I shall prosecute this topic no farther, on the present occasion : Because it properly belongs to the Chapter of NOUNS ; in which place I shall appropriately resume it.

3.

It is necessary, in this place, to animadvert briefly upon the doctrine of Locke, and of those Philosophical Grammarians who have taken up the same view of the Subject with him—namely—that “Is and Is NOT are the general marks of the Mind’s affirming or denying.”

Mr. Tooke, although he pays a general veneration, little short of idolatry, to the genius of

Locke, nevertheless, upon this head, blames him for having “too hastily adopted the opinions of “Aristotle, and Scaliger, and the Messrs. De Port “Royal, that affirming and denying are operations “of the Mind.” Now it is very important in this case to observe, that both Locke and Tooke were equally and egregiously wrong, in their respective views of the subject.

First, therefore, I remark, that, although Locke was certainly right in assuming that *affirmation and denial are ACTS OF THE MIND*, of which Act, a Verb is *One* of its *Two Elements*, in the External or Grammatical Sign; yet it is equally certain that he was wrong in asserting the *VERB SUBSTANTIVE* to be the *SIGN IN QUESTION*. This mistake of Locke, it must be added, as well as of Aristotle and his other associates in the subject, is, indeed, one of the greatest reproaches to the human understanding that is to be found in accredited Grammar; but I trust it will be found sufficiently exposed in the various places in which there will be occasion to touch upon it, in the course of this work.

Secondly, Upon the other hand I remark, that Mr. Tooke finds *no fault* with the Grammarians in question, for assuming that “*Is*” is the “*GENERAL*” mark of assertion: He only blames that party for assuming that affirming and denying are “*OPERATIONS OF THE MIND:*” and this he does merely in consequence of his having previously declared a general and an exterminating war against *ALL OPERATIONS OF THE MIND WHATSOEVER*.

Thirdly. But it has been shewn, in the strictest manner, that the *Assertive Element*, in Every Verb, is ONLY A DERIVED Principle—namely—*an External Sign of an Act of the Intellect and Will, in consent.* And it has been also shewn, *as a thing founded in Necessity itself*, that the conversion of a MERE NOUN into a VERB depends upon the VOLITION of the Mind; which Volition is signified by the MOUTH, or by the HAND, PLACING *this Noun* in an ASSOCIATED POSITION between *Two Other Nouns.*

To return, now, to the error of Locke and his associates; in which error Mr. Tooke has altogether acquiesced; I observe, that the Word—"Is, "AM, or WAS"—when it is placed between Any Nominative and the *Noun* SPACE, or TIME, (and *not before*) becomes a Verb: and, as a Verb, it certainly contains a DERIVED Principle of Asserting—namely—it Asserts ITS OWN NOMINATIVE *to exist in* SPACE, or *in* TIME. But the grand mistake of the Grammarians in question consists in their assuming, that this Verb (whether expressed, or only implied, or understood,) FORMS THE ASSERTING PRINCIPLE IN EVERY VERB: And hence they called it the GENERAL Copula—the GENERAL mark of the Mind's affirmation. Whereas I confidently and finally here assert, that it is *No mark of affirmation at all, except only of affirming the* EXISTENCE (i. e. the *Act of* EXISTING) of ITS OWN NOMINATIVE, as already said. And to this I add, that there is no Principle in Language which I deem it more necessary to introduce to its proper place, and to assert with the

utmost rigor, in order to rescue Grammar from the most merited contempt, than this one.

In a Chapter concerning the Principle and the Act of *Assertion*, it appears appropriate to introduce a consideration of the corresponding Principle and Act of *Negation*. This latter consideration, however, requires very little to be said with regard to it. It seems to be made out, conclusively, not only from the Etymological speculations of Mr. Tooke, but also from the concurrent report and much more extensive researches of Dr. Murray, that NEGATION *consists, purely, in ASSERTING OUR DISSENT from a Proposition previously put*. If this be admitted ; it follows, that All Denial or Negation is Nothing but Assertion. And I not only adopt this Principle: but I also suppose that the etymological evidence concerning it has been carried to a sufficient length to justify a belief, that this Part of Grammar is conclusively settled. This conclusion, moreover, if it be solid, affords another instance of the necessity which mankind are laid under, to speak *of Nothing*, and *in No Manner*, except in strict conformity to the *Generic Structure of Relatives and Relation* : Which Structure, I here again observe, forms the **WHOLE GRAMMATICAL OBJECT**, and **LIMITS THE POSSIBLE EXTENT**, of *our expressions in Language*.

SUBSECTION II.

1. *Concerning some Strictures which have been offered by Professor Stewart, upon the Doctrine of Mr. Tooke that Every Word in Language belongs, in all situations, absolutely and unchangeably, to One and the Same Part of Speech.*—2. *Of the United Doctrine of Mr. Tooke and Mr. Stewart concerning the Composition and the Comparison of Ideas. Their doctrine fallacious.*—3. *Fallacy of Logicians, in supposing that the bulk of a Language is made up of Abstract General Terms.*

1.

IN entering upon the present article, I deem it proper to intimate, that the matter of it, as well as that of one or two of the subsequent articles of this chapter, will necessarily detain me, some time, from the *more immediate* work of analysis of the PARTS of SPEECH; although it is by no means foreign, but, on the contrary, is essentially momentous to the *Nature of Language*. It is certain that we might in vain present the completest analysis to the eye, if existing prejudices were not previously removed by a clear exposition of errors which have crept into credit in consequence of having issued from high authorities. I proceed therefore to the matters in question; with this only remark, that I think our progress, in the sequel of the work, will not be interrupted by any such consideration.

In having shewn, in the foregoing article, how profoundly Mr. Tooke has misapprehended the Real Nature of Language, in asserting that Words possess an Absolute and Invariable Part of Speech in all situations; and, how vastly he speculated in the dark, with respect to the REAL GRAMMATICAL OBJECTS *which alone the Parts of Speech can signify*—namely—RELATIVES and RELATION; owing to the Nature of which last it is, that the Same Word which is the Sign of an *Absolute* Thing in ONE situation, becomes that of a *Relative* Thing in ANOTHER, and of a *Relation* in a THIRD; I say, in consequence of refuting this doctrine, it becomes necessary to provide against a confounding of the Principles which I have thus advanced against Mr. Tooke's opinions, with certain other Principles expressed in some animadversions which have been stated against Mr. Tooke's views by Professor Stewart, in his "*Philosophical Essays*."

With this purpose, it is requisite, in the outset, to state, what I have yet omitted to do—namely—the doctrine of Mr. Tooke, in his own express words. In the *First Volume* of the *Diversions of Purley*, page 82, he expresses himself, to his fellow Dialogist, in the following terms.

"Let them give the rule who thus confound
"together the *Manner of Signification* of words,
"and the *Abbreviations of their Construction*: than
"which no two things in language can be more
"distinct or ought to be more carefully distinguished. I do not allow that *any* words change
"their nature in this manner, so as to belong some

“ times to one Part of Speech, and sometimes to
“ another. I never could perceive any such fluc-
“ tuation in words.”

If Mr. Tooke never did perceive this sort of fluctuation, at all ; it is, then, no wonder he never perceived, that what is a *Mere Noun in One* situation, *becomes a VERB in Another*. But Mr. Tooke certainly knew, full well, that the Same Subject which is an Absolute Thing when considered merely as a *Man*, becomes a Relative Thing when it is viewed as a Lawyer, or Client : And, if he had known that Every NOUN ABSOLUTE in Language, *before it can be employed as a Noun Substantive*, MUST OF NECESSITY be viewed as a NOUN RELATIVE ; and, if he had also known the distinction between a RELATIVE and a RELATION ; he might then have easily discerned that a certain class of Nouns MUST serve as the Sign of a *Relative in One Associated Position*, and as that of a *Relation in Another*.

I shall only farther observe, upon this head, that it is quite plain Mr. Tooke, in the declaration just quoted, has fallen into precisely the same Kind and degree of the violation of Reason or Logic, as if he had affirmed that the *Same Absolute Mass of Material* which is merely an ARCH OR CURVE in *One* situation, *is in this situation AS MUCH A BRIDGE* as it is when it connects the Two Banks of a River. Mr. Tooke would have looked with pity upon an uneducated person, who should have fallen into so egregious an error with regard to the various Positive and Relative objects around him : What, then, are we to say to the

same egregious error when we find it making up part of the boasted Fabric of the Philosophical Grammarian? But I pass on, to the Strictures which have been offered upon this part of Mr. Tooke's doctrine by Professor Stewart, as mentioned. And, in so doing, I observe, that the brevity, which I am under the necessity of observing, will prevent my animadverting upon more of the Views of Mr. Stewart than what regards the points immediately in question; but that I must not be understood as thereby implying an acquiescence with the residue.

In the Philosophical Essays of Mr. Stewart, and in the Fifth of those Essays (page 156), which is devoted to a Criticism upon the Philological speculations of Mr. Tooke, the former has expressed himself in the following manner.

“ When I consult Johnson's Dictionary, I find
“ many words of which he has enumerated forty,
“ fifty, or even sixty different significations; and,
“ after all the pains he has taken to distin-
“ guish them from each other, I am frequently at
“ a loss how to avail myself of his definitions.
“ Yet, when a word of this kind occurs to me in a
“ book, or even where I hear it pronounced in the
“ rapidity of *viva voce* discourse, I at once select,
“ without the slightest effort of conscious thought,
“ the precise meaning it was intended to convey.
“ How is this to be explained but by the light
“ thrown upon the problematical term by the ge-
“ neral import of the sentence?”

Upon this passage, and upon the conclusion implied in its final question, I have in the first

place to remark, that the view of Language which it indicates is unquestionably just. But to this view I am under the necessity of objecting, that it does not bear either upon the **STRUCTURE** of Language considered as a **SYSTEM OF SIGNS** *made up by a* **DISPOSITION OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH**, or upon the speculations of **MR. TOOKE**. The purpose, however, for which the passage, or example, was brought, by its author, was to illustrate a preceding suggestion, or doctrine, concerning the **STRUCTURE** of Language : Which doctrine I must state here, in order to elucidate the whole matter.

“ Language, it is commonly said, is the express
“ image of thought,—and that it may be said with
“ apparent propriety to be so, I do not dispute,
“ when the meaning of the proposition is fully ex-
“ plained. The mode of the expression, however,
“ it ought to be remarked, is figurative ; and there-
“ fore, when the proposition is assumed as a prin-
“ ciple of reasoning, it must not be literally or
“ rigorously interpreted. This has too often been
“ overlooked by writers on the human mind.
“ Even Dr. Reid himself, cautious as he is in
“ general, with respect to the ground on which he
“ is to build, has repeatedly appealed to this
“ maxim, without any qualification whatever ; and,
“ by thus adopting it, agreeably to its letter, ra-
“ ther than to its spirit, has been led, in various
“ instances, to lay greater stress on the structure
“ of speech than (in my opinion) it can always
“ bear in a philosophical argument. As a neces-
“ sary consequence of this assumption, it has been

“ not unnaturally inferred by Logicians, that every
“ word which is not wholly useless in the vocabu-
“ lary, is the sign of an *Idea* ; and that these *ideas*
“ (which the common systems lead us to consider
“ as the representatives of *things*) are the imme-
“ diate instruments, or (if I may be allowed such
“ a phrase) the *intellectual tools* with which the
“ mind carries on the operation of thinking. In
“ reading, for example, the enunciation of a pro-
“ position, we are apt to fancy, that for every
“ *word* contained in it, there is an *idea* presented
“ to the understanding, from the combination and
“ comparison of which *Ideas*, results that act of
“ the Mind called *judgment*. So different is all
“ this from the fact, that our words, when examin-
“ ed separately, are often as completely insignifi-
“ cant as the letters of which they are composed ;
“ deriving their meaning solely from the connec-
“ tion, or relation, in which they stand to others.”

Such is the doctrine of the STRUCTURE of Lan-
guage laid down by Professor Stewart. And it
is immediately after this passage that he proceeds
to illustrate the same by an example, in which he
says, “ When I consult Johnson’s Dictionary,”
&c.

In order that I may not suffer the smallest in-
justice to be done, in these observations, to the
passages already quoted ; I observe, that the
Essay which contains them forms a mixture of
statements, which I view as being of two very
different kinds—namely—of some that are of a na-
ture *properly Grammatical*,—and of others that are
of a character *Philological*, indeed, but NOT Gram-

matical in the strict technical sense of that term ; the difference between both which, I shall fully explain. At the same time, I freely accord, that, in such an Essay, each of the subjects, although intermixed, might still be kept altogether distinct from the other.

This being premised, I am now under the necessity of observing, that, while the long passage last quoted has for its object *Language considered as a System of Signs made up of the Grammatical Parts of Speech* (since Mr. Stewart talks therein of the “*Structure of Speech*”) the example given from Johnson’s Dictionary in illustration of it, has NOTHING TO DO *with Language considered as a Structure made up of any dispositions of the Parts of Speech ; but regards only the PECULIAR import of ANY SINGLE WORD, considered as a Sign of Some Individual object, or set of Objects.* Thus the doctrine in question, and the example in which it is supposed to be illustrated, exhibit together a complete confusion of Two Very Different Departments in Science. The matter in question is so remarkable, in itself; and so important in the erroneous consequences which its influence must otherwise produce, in the minds of philosophical or logical students, especially in these countries; that it is indispensable I should insist upon a continuation of the subject.

When Mr. Stewart was giving his example in general terms, it is pity, for the sake of the general reader, that he did not specify some single Word, as his instance. But, in default of this, he has furnished to the Philosopher a clue to his mean-

ing : For he says, that, in Johnson, he finds, sometimes, *forty, fifty*, and even *sixty* different meanings under the same word : And here, therefore, we are certified, that he does not allude to so many PARTS OF SPEECH ; because the English Language, or Any Other Language in the world, has not any thing like the Number of Parts of Speech in question. It follows, manifestly, that, in his said example, he does not allude to the GRAMMATICAL import of Any Word, but refers ONLY to its PECULIAR AND MERE DIALECTICAL IMPORT.

As I conceive it is impossible to shew more clearly than is hereby done, that his said example does not belong to the GRAMMATICAL STRUCTURE of Language ; I proceed to shew, that neither does it apply to that *Doctrine of Mr. Tooke* which I have combated in the last subsection. At the same time, I observe, that the whole scope of Mr. Stewart's criticism, now in question, is certainly levelled at Tooke's doctrine concerning the PARTS OF SPEECH ; because it is its aim to DENY that *Every intelligible or proper Word is the ABSOLUTE Sign of Any Idea, or Object ;* while the *Absolute or Intrinsic Power or Signification of Words considered as PARTS OF SPEECH* is the very ground upon which Mr. Tooke supposed himself, and has been supposed, to have effected his grand triumph over Mr. Harris and all preceding Grammarians.

By the way I remark, that I cannot help being surprised at Mr. Stewart's ascribing to "*Logicians*" in general, and to *Dr. Reid* in particular, the doctrine that Every Word is the Sign of an Idea ;

because it is certain that Mr. Tooke is the father of this doctrine, and that No Grammarian antecedent to Tooke ever could consistently have supposed Language to be an express image of thought, otherwise than in a *figurative and very loose sense*, since it never was admitted that Prepositions, or Conjunctions, are the Signs of Objects.

With regard, then, to the Grammatical doctrine of Mr. Tooke ; I affirm my conviction, that he certainly never meant to deny that Words change their *individual peculiar dialectical signification* according to their association or relative situation with Other Words. As, for example, if we take the Word PLACE ; No man knew better than Mr. Tooke, that a PLACE *under a government*,—a PLACE *over subordinates*,—a PLACE *at table*, and a PLACE *in our esteem, or out of it*, are all very different Things : Nor do I suppose that any man knew better, than he did, that the peculiar import or signification of the Word—PLACE—in each of these examples, depends entirely upon the Relative situation the Word possesses, with respect to the Words that accompany it. The Grammatical Doctrine which Mr. Tooke labored to inculcate, when applied to this Word—PLACE—amounts to this—namely—that the Word PLACE is a NOUN SUBSTANTIVE ; and, therefore, that, *in whatever Association it may be placed* with respect to Other Words, it NEVER CAN CHANGE so as to belong to ANY PART OF SPEECH EXCEPT the Noun Substantive : And, he intended the same reasoning to apply to EVERY WORD in Language, considered as belonging to one, or other, of *what are called the PARTS OF*

SPEECH. His words admit of neither doubt nor hesitation. “ I do not allow” (says he) “ that *any* “ Words change their nature in this manner, so as “ to belong SOMETIMES TO ONE PART OF SPEECH, “ AND SOMETIMES TO ANOTHER.” I trust it is conclusively manifest, therefore, that the present view of Mr. Stewart does not bear, in the least degree, upon the doctrine of Tooke.

But the doctrine of Mr. Tooke, although not affected by the view in question, explodes itself in a moment, whenever we handle it. For (not to repeat how signally it is refuted by the formation of *Verbs* out of *Mere Nouns*,) the moment we pronounce the word PLACE-MAN—the NOUN SUBSTANTIVE—Place—becomes a NOUN ADJECTIVE.

The matter intended for the next division of this article renders it proper to postpone any concluding observations upon the present topic.

2.

The criticisms which have been offered by Professor Stewart upon the writings of Mr. Tooke, in the Essay already mentioned, are, as before observed, of two very different kinds: The One being of a nature in a general way Philosophical, or Philological: The Other, *strictly or technically Grammatical*.

That the speculations of Mr. Stewart, of the first mentioned kind, have their merits, I have no wish to deny: Although, whatever these may be, is a matter entirely foreign to my present object to

discuss. With regard, on the other hand, to his *Grammatical* Strictures, I am laid under an unavoidable necessity to examine them, from the influence they are otherwise likely to possess, owing to the general literary reputation of their author. The Criticisms of this kind, which Mr. Stewart has deemed fit to offer, are very few in number: And I am constrained to believe that they will not add to his future literary fame. If I am in an error, upon this head, the Criticism which I have already discussed, and the discussion of that which is now immediately to follow, must form the evidences against me: and I shall be content to be sentenced by their evidence, if the same be duly investigated by competent judges.

The Stricture to which I find it necessary, in the present instance, to solicit the particular attention of readers, is one in which Professor Stewart desists from his general opposition to the views of Mr. Tooke; and exhibits to us the wonderful phenomenon of his uniting with that extraordinary metaphysician, in denying that Language is founded upon *Operations of the Mind*; or, in effect, that there are Such Things in the Mind, at all, as Operations upon which Speech could be founded. The doctrine thus promulgated, by two writers eminently distinguished in this country, by their different departments of philosophical literature, is so vastly fallacious in itself, so destructive of the possible erection of a Science of Language, and so perniciously erroneous in the Nature which it ascribes to the Human Mind, that it cannot be too rigorously examined. The portion of *Meta-*

physical History, moreover, which it is necessary to state, in order to its due exposition, will furnish a most instructive lesson to the rising Philosopher: with which portion of history, therefore, I shall commence its investigation.

In Dr. Reid's "*Essays on the Intellectual Powers*," (Essay 4. Chap. 4.) he lays down the following assumptions. "Every man is conscious of a succession of thoughts which pass in his mind while he is awake, even when they are not excited by external objects."

"The mind on this account may be compared to liquor in the state of fermentation"—"in the state of fermentation, it has some cause of motion in itself, which, even when there is no cause of motion from without, suffers it not to be at rest for a moment, but produces a constant motion and ebullition, while it continues to ferment."—"From the constitution of the mind itself there is a constant ebullition of thought, a constant intestine motion; not only of thoughts barely speculative, but of sentiments, passions and affections, which attend them."—"It is often called the *train of ideas*. This may lead one to think, that it is a train of bare conceptions; but this would surely be a mistake. It is made up of many other operations of mind, as well as of conceptions, or Ideas."

Now, taking the words "*motion, fermentation, ebullition*," &c. in a figurative sense, as was intended by Dr. Reid, I altogether concur with him in the view expressed in the passages above quoted. But, in *his* case, they have been

accompanied by his usual fortune, of exhibiting an astonishing inconsistency with himself. For it was the fixed intention of Dr. Reid, at the same time, to DENY that there are in the Mind any such things as *Ideas in the sense of Locke*: (Which last mean occasional IDEAL FORMATIONS *in the Mind in the likeness of External Objects*, and which *Ideal Formations* the Intellect compares together and thereupon forms *Judgments* of their *agreements*, or *disagreements*,—a doctrine which Locke taught with a philosophic purity divested of the errors of the Aristotelian Scheme; and which I have, on various occasions, labored to assert with peculiar evidence :) And any clown could have suggested to Dr. Reid, that, in order to the boiling of a pot, there must be SOMETHING IN the pot, to be boiled.

The inconsistency of Reid in this case, however, appears not to have been overlooked by his Disciple; who, at least by the time that he thought of giving his *Philosophical Essays* to the world, discovered the necessity of either sinking as much as possible these *workings* of the Mind, or else admitting that there must be *something therein* to be agitated. Accordingly, therefore, in his strictures against Mr. Tooke's Grammatical doctrine, Mr. Stewart (although he sometimes and unavoidably mentions intellectual processes and Operations) exhibits to us the spectacle of appearing to turn suddenly round upon the doctrine of his Master, and to strike with one blow at the root of All his "*motions like liquor in the state of fermentation,*" and All his "*ebullitions,*" and All his "*trains of Ideas,*" and all his "*many other opera-*

“*tions*,” as well as conceptions or ideas;”—thus taking up his philosophical ground with Mr. Tooke, by expressing himself as if there were *No Such Things as THESE Operations* in the mind.

Those who are well acquainted with the zeal, and the unqualified totality, with which Mr. Stewart, in the *First Volume of his Elements*, has maintained Dr. Reid’s Theory of Ideas and of the Mind; especially, if they should at the same time not have attended to what he has advanced in his *Philosophical Essays* with regard to Mr. Tooke’s speculations; must, doubtless, think that I have egregiously misconceived, or mistated, the meaning of the former. It is proper, therefore, that they should judge of this, from his own expressions; which, for this purpose, I shall now quote. In his *Fifth Essay* (already referred to,) page 157, he continues his observations thus:

“ In instances of this sort, it will be generally
“ found, upon an accurate examination, that the
“ intellectual act, as far as we are able to trace it,
“ is altogether simple, and incapable of analysis;
“ and that the elements into which we flatter our-
“ selves we have resolved it are nothing more than
“ the *grammatical elements of Speech*;——the logi-
“ cal doctrine about the *comparison of ideas* bearing
“ a much closer affinity to the task of a school-boy
“ in *parsing* his lesson, than to the researches of
“ philosophers, able to form a just conception of
“ the mystery to be explained.”

If it were granted here for argument’s sake (although it is very far from being true even in the case to which this passage directly refers—namely

—that of the *peculiar dialectical* import of a Word uttered amongst other Words in a sentence)—that the *apprehension* of it is by an act “altogether simple ;” I should nevertheless deny, most decidedly, that the *elements* into which we flatter ourselves we have resolved our Ideas IN THE CASE OF INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS IN GENERAL are nothing more than the “*grammatical elements of Speech.*” And, if Mr. Stewart did not mean to assert his position as a GENERAL PRINCIPLE, it was plainly nugatory and beside the subject to assert it at all. But it is certain that he *did* intend to assert it as a General Principle ; because he, in general terms, adds, that “the *logical doctrine* about the COMPARISON OF IDEAS bears an affinity to *the task of a school-boy in PARSING his lesson.*” And, indeed, he immediately afterwards says, “These observations are general, and apply to every case in which language is employed.”

Now, therefore, at the risk of the consequences, I altogether deny that the doctrine of the COMPARISON OF IDEAS bears the smallest affinity to the task of a School-boy in PARSING his lesson : And I deem it to be of the last importance to confute this assumption, as a fallacy destructive alike of the true Theory of the Mind and of the Philosophy of Language. But first, I must repeat, as already observed, that this doctrine of Mr. Stewart chimes in, with a wonderful and ominous coincidence, with that of Mr. Tooke, concerning the Mind and its Operations ;——a doctrine which the latter has stated in the *First Volume* of the *Diversions of Purley* ; and to which the general lustre of his ety-

mological speculations has probably lent a most undeserved credit with the greater part of his readers. This Creed, which I have already noticed with decided dissent in the *first section* of the *first chapter* of this work, I deem fit to cite here in the words of Mr. Tooke, as expressed in pages 36 and 37, of the Volume referred to. It casts blame upon Locke for having “talked of “the *composition of ideas*.” And asserts, that he ought “to have seen that it was merely a contrivance of Language, and that the only composition “was in the *terms*; and, consequently, that it was “as improper to speak of a *complex idea*, as it “would be to call a constellation a complex “star.” But this same doctrine is more fearlessly and fully expressed in page 51, in the following terms.

The Dialogist, *B*, says, “Those” (words) “which “you call necessary, I suppose you allow to be the “*signs* of different sorts of *Ideas*, or of different “*Operations* of the mind?”

To which Mr. Tooke replies, “Indeed I do “not. The business of the mind, as far as it concerns Language, appears to me to be very “simple. It extends no farther than to receive “impressions, that is, to have Sensations or Feelings. What are called its operations are merely “the operations of Language. A consideration “of *Ideas*, or of the *Mind*, or of *Things*, (relative to “the Parts of Speech) will lead us no farther than “to *Nouns*: i. e. the Signs of those impressions or “names of ideas.”

It is difficult to pronounce, here, whether it is

more melancholy, to see any writer of consideration capable of uttering this account of the Operations of the Human Mind, or deplorable to find a writer of Professor Stewart's general tone of Speculation for a moment associated with him in a position so humiliating : And yet, I think, one of the passages which I have quoted from Mr. Stewart does certainly associate him with Horne Tooke, in this doctrine, beyond a possibility of its being explained away. At any rate, I feel it necessary to oppugn the Assumptions of both these writers, jointly and distinctly ; which I cannot adequately designate, in a manner demanded by the interests of Philosophy to prevent the mischievous consequence to which they would lead, unless by an appearance of declamation foreign to my wish, by calling the one a *sounding brass*, and the other a *tinkling cymbal*, alike a discredit to the logical character of the age which gave them birth. By these designations, therefore, I deem it proper to intimate, I intend no personal disrespect ; but only design to mark the depth to which I here stake my judgment to an opposition to these doctrines.

First, therefore, I observe, with regard to the position of Mr. Tooke, that it has been so fully demonstrated, in the foregoing pages, that WORDS are nothing but things analogous to the SHADOWS of our Thoughts, that, it is altogether certain and indisputable, the *Structure or Composition of Language* must strictly resemble the *Structure or Composition of our Ideas* : In other words, the *Parts of Speech*, in *Any Portion of Language*, when duly PARSED, must be disposed in a *perfectly similar*

Arrangement to that of the *Relative Association* of the *Thoughts* which this Portion of Language expresses. What, then, becomes of Mr. Tooke's assertion that "the business of the mind, as far as " it concerns Language, extends no farther than to " receive impressions, that is to have Sensations or " Feelings;" and that what "are called the operations of the mind, are only the operations of " Language?" I would here merely ask, Is the OPERATION OF ARRANGING OR COMPOSING Objects, (*by the Mind*) into RELATIVES and interposed RELATIONS, nothing but a SENSATION or FEELING? And, having asked this question, I should deem it an insult to common sense to bestow any farther time upon this doctrine of Mr. Tooke.

Secondly, therefore, with regard to the position of Mr. Stewart, I observe, in the first place, that, if the Comparison of Ideas be, indeed, as he assumes, a "*mystery*;" it follows, that a demonstration of the connection of the steps of a Geometrical Theorem and that of the connection of equivalency between the Sums of the Quantities on the Two Sides of an Algebraical Equation are mysteries: Which things, above all others in the world, the human mind is believed most clearly and completely to apprehend. But I humbly conceive that the comparison of our ideas, and the formation of judgments in result, form together the least mysterious and most certain department of all our knowledge.

But, to let alone general assertion, and to place the present question in a most conclusive light, I here propose a certain test of the validity of

Mr. Stewart's assumed affinity between *the Comparison of ideas* and the *parsing of a Lesson*: And the test which I propose, is a *lesson to be parsed*; while the lesson, to be so parsed, shall be, at the same time, a *Scientific Proposition*. This expedient, I think, cannot fail to convince the dullest understanding, whether, or not, there is any affinity between the Two Things in question. I therefore propose the following Sentence.

TWO into THREE into FOUR adding ONE, equal THREE into TWO into THREE adding NINE subtracting TWO.

Now, in this *grammatical lesson*, such Words as *Two, Three, Four, One*, must be parsed as *Nouns*; the Word—*into*—as a *Preposition*; the Words *adding* and *subtracting* as *Participles*; and the Word EQUAL as a *VERB*, whose *Nominative* is the *Sum of the expressions on One side of the Equation*, and whose *Accusative* is the *Sum of the expressions on the Other Side*.

Here, then, to use the phrase of Mr. Stewart, we have resolved this sentence into its "*Grammatical Elements of Speech*."

But I ask, Is there any person who can confound this GRAMMATICAL resolution, with that of the *Process, or Series of Processes, of ARITHMETICAL SCIENCE* which is signified in the Sentence thus parsed? It is perfectly self evident, that the *Grammatical Resolution* is ONE Thing; and the *Arithmetical Solution* (if it were here made,) would be infinitely ANOTHER: Although *both* the Sciences in question are signified by the same identical train of Signs.

And here, in order to do full justice to my argument, it is requisite that we should go through the process last alluded to. The Sentence already given for our example, whether it be considered as a *Grammatical* or as an *Arithmetical* Sentence, is a **SYNTHESIS**—that is, it is a *Chain of Elements connected together and forming One Whole*. And we have seen that it has been resolved into a *Grammatical analysis* by the process called *parsing*. In order to complete the argument, therefore, we must now resolve this Sentence into an *Arithmetical analysis*; and then compare the two results together. Now the *Arithmetical* or *Algebraical* analysis, here proposed, will consist in the following *Arithmetical* Elements, each taken as unconnected with another.

$$2 \times 3 \times 4 + 1 = 3 \times 2 \times 3 + 9 - 2$$

And here, in fine, I would ask, Does the **ARITHMETICAL** *Idea* of the **NUMBER 2**, resolve itself into the **GRAMMATICAL** *Idea* of a **NOUN**? Does the **ARITHMETICAL** *Idea of the Action of multiplying*, or of *adding*, or of *subtracting*, resolve itself into the **GRAMMATICAL** *Idea* of a **PREPOSITION**, or a **PARTICIPLE**? Or, Does our *Idea of the ACTION OF EQUALLING* (which now exists between the Sums of the Quantities on Each Side of the Equation) resolve itself into our *Notion of a VERB*; which last, we know, is *Nothing but the EXTERNAL SIGNATURE OR RECORD of that ACTION*; just as the **NOUN TWO**, or **THREE**, is *Nothing but an External Sign or Record of the Arithmetical Idea of 2, or 3?*

In a word, I may ask, Could not any boy, who

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had learned Arithmetic but had never learned Grammar, comprehend that truth of the Science of *Arithmetic* which the Sentence contains, without in the least being able to resolve the Sentence into its *Grammatical* Elements, or so much as knowing a NOUN, from a VERB? And, upon the other hand, Could not any one, who had learned Grammar but had never learned Arithmetic, resolve the the Sentence into its *Grammatical* Elements, without having the least conception whether the *Arithmetical* Relations which it expresses are true, or false?

What, then, becomes of that Doctrine which would introduce so deplorable a confusion into General Logic, as the confounding of the *Laws of the COMPOSITION OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND*,—and of the *SCIENTIFIC AND DIALECTICAL COMPARISON OF OUR IDEAS*,—with the *MERE SYNTACTICAL LAWS OF GRAMMAR*?

In a Subsection in the Introductory Chapter of this work, in the course of pointing out the egregious mistake of Condillac and of those who have in any extent adopted his views with regard to the Nature of Language, I intimated, that it would appear, in the sequel, *what fruits* had flowed from that fallacious doctrine. The mistake of Professor Stewart with regard to Grammar, which I have labored to shew in the present article, is the fruit to which I then immediately alluded: And it will here become manifest to the reader, that his confounding the *Laws of Grammar*, with the *Laws of the Connection of our Ideas in All*, or in ANY, of the *Various Other Depart-*

ments of knowledge, is, in fact, no other thing than a *new and special* instance of the GENERAL mistake of confounding Language with Science, which was exposed in the article above referred to. Any brief commentary, which could be offered upon this result, could hardly be adequate to express the extent of confusion which has flowed, and may flow, from the Original mistake in question. The only remark I shall offer with regard to it, therefore, is, that we find it has produced the portentous event, that, in order to enable the *Grammarian* Stewart to coincide with the *Grammarian* Tooke, the METAPHYSICIAN OF EDINBURGH has coalesced with the METAPHYSICIAN OF PURLEY!!!

Finally, I observe, Mr. Stewart calls the doctrine with which I have sided, in the present argument, by the name of the “*logical doctrine of the comparison of ideas.*” I notice this for the sake of explaining, that, although the doctrine thus denominated is that of Locke and his followers, I have not, in my exposition of it, had the sentiments of any logical writer in view, except merely a general recollection of the ground occupied with regard to it by Locke himself. At the same time, I remark, that the view and illustration of the subject which I have herein submitted, is nothing but what may be fairly and obviously deduced from Locke’s Principles: Which Principles I have merely exemplified, here, according to my own uniform conceptions of the subject, as expressed at large in the Chapter of Judgment and Relations, in the “*First Lines of the Human Mind.*”

3.

If I have been justified by the foregoing reasonings, in the opposition which is now offered to the united doctrines of Mr. Tooke and Professor Stewart with regard to the *Nature of Ideas* and to the *Objects of Language*, I cannot think that the result can be viewed as being other than of the highest importance to the Science of Logic in general, and to that of Language in particular. But I must now close these animadversions, owing to the press of other matter which leaves me no room to prosecute them farther. And, indeed, what are now before the reader comprehend those views of Mr. Stewart which it was most material to the subject to examine: although they embrace not all those Grammatical views of that writer which I cannot help considering as being other than fortunate. I shall conclude this article, therefore, by soliciting the attention of my readers to an additional consideration; which, I trust, will afford a very satisfactory completion of what has been advanced.

In a matter which admits of clear and determinate proof, such as that of the vast distinction which has been shewn to exist between the *Laws of either the Scientific or the Dialectical Connections of our Ideas* and the *Laws of the Grammatical Connections of Words*, it would be altogether sufficient to demonstrate the error of those who have confounded the Two Systems, although we should not in the least be able to gain a sight of the stumbling block, or cause, which had betrayed the party into such a

fallacy. But, still, it must be a matter highly satisfactory to scientific curiosity, when, to a demonstration of the error, we can add an exposition of the way in which it originated. Now it fortunately happens that we have, if I mistake not, in the case in question, a certain clue to the cause which betrayed Mr. Tooke into his error. And, if this prove true, it may probably tend to account for the coincidence of opinion which Professor Stewart has given into, in the present case. In the exposition of this cause, moreover, I shall have to suggest a Principle in Language, which will appear strangely to contradict a universal maxim of Logicians with regard to its general nature; and to which, therefore, I would particularly solicit attention in this place: Although the Principle in question cannot be treated in full, until we arrive at the chapter of NOUNS. I proceed to the fact which is our immediate object.

When I first perused the assertion of Mr. Tooke (Vol. 1, pages 36, 37 of his work) that Locke ought not to “have talked of the *composition of ideas*, but “would have seen that it was merely a contrivance “of Language: and that the only composition “was in the *terms*; and that consequently it was “as improper to speak of a *complex idea*, as it “would have been to call a constellation a complex star;” I never was more surprised at the certain and palpable untruth of any doctrine; nor could I in the least conceive from what cause such a view of the subject could possibly have arisen. At the same time, I noticed that Mr. Tooke, in his context, immediately adds, that “they are not

“*ideas*, but merely *terms*, which are *general* and “*abstract*.” It was plain, however, from this last expression, that the writer had grounded his doctrine of COMPOSITION upon the assumption that it is NOT IDEAS, but MERELY TERMS, that are GENERAL and ABSTRACT: though, (like Mr. Stewart on various occasions,) Mr. Tooke, in the present case, does not furnish his readers with a train of reasoning; but is satisfied with uttering a mere dictum, which leaves much to conjecture, or reflection.

And hereupon I remark, in the first place, that Mr. Tooke’s above-mentioned assumption (which is also that of all sound Philosophers) is *true*: it certainly is NOT IDEAS, but MERELY TERMS, that are GENERAL and ABSTRACT. This position being conceded; We are now to search for the CAUSE or REASON WHY Mr. Tooke makes this assumption a ground for denying the COMPOSITION OF IDEAS: and why Mr. Stewart degrades and denies the doctrine of the *Comparison of Ideas*: For both these doctrines must stand, or fall, together.

This Cause, I confess, did not strike me until after some time and reflection. But I now think it must be found to consist in the following consideration; although I can only derive it from conjecture, as neither Mr. Tooke nor Mr. Stewart expresses any such matter, along with his views of the subject. It is a Maxim of Logicians and Grammarians, which I believe no one has ever thought of calling in question, that the *great bulk of Words in a Language are ABSTRACT GENERAL TERMS*. Now this Maxim being assumed, toge-

ther with the Truth that it is NOT IDEAS, but MERELY TERMS, that are *general and abstract*; these two premises lead syllogistically to the inevitable conclusion, that, in all the Concatenations signified by Language, there is signified *No Concatenation or Composition of IDEAS*, but “*Only a Composition of TERMS.*”

The argument is so manifestly complete in its *Form*, that (“as Logicians love to speak”) if both the Major and the Minor Proposition be true, the Conclusion cannot be false. Thus it is: *Abstract General Terms are Nothing but Names*: But the *bulk* of the Words in a Language is made of *Abstract General Terms*: Therefore, the Compositions expressed by Language are Nothing but *Compositions of TERMS*.

I trust the reader will be of opinion with me in concluding, that this is the very and the only argument upon which Mr. Tooke could have built his astonishing doctrine of Composition.

But what will be said, here, *if we can strike at the root of this argument by denying the Minor Proposition* which it contains? What will be said, by Logicians, if we may, with demonstrable truth, DENY *that there is ANY SUCH THING IN LANGUAGE as an ABSTRACT GENERAL TERM*; provided, always, that the word TERM be taken to mean, as it certainly does mean in the sense of Mr. Tooke and of all other Writers, AN ABSTRACT NOUN SUBSTANTIVE? But I do here expressly and altogether deny this: and I have not the smallest fear concerning the proofs which must support this denial. Nor do I think a greater

service could be rendered to the subject, in this part of my work, than by pointing out the real and great fallacy of the prevailing Maxim, that the bulk of Nouns Substantive in Language are ABSTRACT GENERAL TERMS.

In the *First* place, therefore, I affirm, that Any Such Word as *Thing*, *Animal*, or *Man*, IS NOT A NOUN SUBSTANTIVE. *Secondly*; Neither, with the addition of an *Adjective*, does the complex Term become a Noun Substantive; such as when we say, *White Man*, *Strong Man*, or *Wise Man*. *Thirdly*; But if, to the term *Man*, or *White Man*, we add, or prefix, ANY NUMERAL OR DISTRIBUTIVE DEFINITIVE, such as when we say—A *Man*, THE *White Man*, ANY *Man*, SOME *White Men*, ALL *Men*; This *Distributive Definitive* is an INDIVIDUATING PRINCIPLE; it possesses the *Grammatical Virtue* of LEAVENING THE WHOLE MASS OF TERMS WITH WHICH IT IS CONNECTED, and thus CONVERTS the ABSTRACT GENERAL TERM *Man*, or *White Man*, into a CONCRETE: And thus *Every Noun Substantive in Language* IS, and MUST BE, a CONCRETE TERM. As, for example, when it is said that MAN is mortal; this expression MUST be resolved into ALL Men are Mortal; because the Word—*Man*—until it is CONVERTED into a Concrete term by virtue of the word ALL, (or Some Such Individuating Term) is Not a Sign of any Thing in the Universe, and in fact MEANS NOTHING WHATEVER.

It is hardly worth while to remark, here, that the few solitary persons who still cherish the doctrine of *Abstract General Ideas*, will, of course,

contend that the Word *Man* is the Sign of a *General Man*, and is therefore the *Sign of an Object*, even when it is not converted into a Sign of One or More *Individual Men*. Those persons must be left to their own opinion. It is enough to observe, that both Mr. Tooke and Mr. Stewart, and the great bulk of Philosophers downward from Hobbes and Locke, (together with Aristotle himself,) are unanimous in the conviction that General Terms are the Signs of Nothing *except of Any Number of Individual Objects*. Hence, therefore, my present argument against Mr. Tooke's doctrine must be admitted, as being finally conclusive.

It is now to be pointed out and remarked by what kind of mistake Logicians and Grammarians have always supposed, that the great bulk of Words in a Language consists of Abstract General Terms. The truth is, that the great bulk of Words in a LEXICON is certainly made up of Abstract General Terms. But I have to suggest here, as was hinted in the *First Section* of this Chapter, and is a distinction of very primary importance, that the *Words in a LEXICON are NOT LANGUAGE*. On the contrary, those Words, or Terms, are MERELY MATERIALS ADAPTED to be composed into Language. No Word in a Lexicon either *affirms* or *denies* or *expresses Any Thing except an INSULAR NOUN without Relativeness to Any Thing Else in the Universe*. The Words in a Lexicon bear the Very Same Relativeness to Language, that Letters in the Box of the Compositor bear to Any Portion of Speech which the Compositor AFTERWARDS
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SETS UP *with those Letters.* And the Necessary consequence of drawing Words from a Lexicon and setting them up in a Book, or Speech of Any Sort, is the CONVERSION of these Words from being ABSTRACT GENERAL Terms, to being CONCRETE INDIVIDUATING Terms: While the SIGN OF CONVERSION is, necessarily, either the EXPRESSING or the UNDERSTANDING of SOME DISTRIBUTIVE DEFINITIVE annexed to the Abstract Terms in question. For the Things called Words cannot be made Language at all, except by making them the SIGNS of our IDEAS of the INDIVIDUAL Objects that are, or have been, or shall be, in the Universe.

What may be farther proper to advance, upon the present head, belongs appropriately to the Chapter of Nouns: And, therefore, I shall not enlarge upon the subject at present. Enough, I trust, has been advanced, in this place, to disprove demonstratively the assumption that the bulk of Words in a Language (AS THOSE WORDS MUST BE CONSTRUED) are Abstract General Terms. And, with this exposition, it is manifest that the whole doctrine of Mr. Tooke that *Composition is not in Ideas, but only in Terms*, falls completely to the ground.

What, indeed, could be more deplorable, even considered apart from the proofs now furnished, than an assumption that WORDS should have Composition, and that the THINGS OF WHICH WORDS ARE THE SIGNS should NOT have a Composition, distinct from though collateral with the former. But let us listen, here, to the Language of Mr. Tooke himself, when he comes to treat of Preposi-

tions; where he forgets his Principal Doctrine, and indulges in such Language as follows. And, in so doing, let us draw the proper conclusion with regard to the CONSISTENCY of the two distinguished Writers now in question, from the fact that both Mr. Tooke and Professor Stewart frequently mention the *Ideas and Operations* of the Mind, although they so wonderfully deny to the Mind any Such Functions as the *Comparison or Composition* of Ideas.

“For having occasion” (says Mr. Tooke) “in communication, to mention a *collection of Ideas* for which there is no one simple *complex term* in the Language, we take that *term* which includes the greatest number though not *All* of the *Ideas* we would communicate.”—“*Diversions of Pur-
ley,*” Vol. 1. page 320.

It must be in the recollection of the reader, that I have already pointed out this glaring contradiction in the Doctrine of Mr. Tooke, in the first chapter of this work. And here again I would ask, What becomes of the Doctrine that “the only *Composition is in the TERMS* ;” When “COLLECTIONS OF IDEAS” are herein expressly mentioned as being the OBJECTS of which *Terms* are Nothing but the *Signs* ?

After what has been advanced in the introductory chapter and in the present article, with regard to the fallacy now under consideration, I trust I may pass on, with a hope that the real merits of the Subject are sufficiently exposed, to arrest the progress of those consequences which must other-

wise have continued to flow from it, in perverting the logical views of those whose Office it may be to teach the Principles of Reason, in time to come. But, in quitting this topic, there is one remark which I would particularly suggest for the attention of every reader of what has gone before. It has appeared that Mr. Stewart, in his view of the Subject, makes use of the phrase—" *closer affinity*." Now this phrase, if not qualified by any limitation, is extremely loose or indefinite: for there are no Two Objects in the Universe between which there is not, in a Philosophical sense, *some* affinity or analogy. But Mr. Stewart (very properly) *has* qualified this expression; or, rather, has preceded it with a definite and precise assumption: And the purpose of my present remark is to caution any reader, not to take the word "*affinity*," in this case, for the ground of his judgment, inasmuch as this expression might be explained to a very great latitude. It is upon the definite assertion of Mr. Stewart, that "the Elements into which we "flatter ourselves we have resolved" the Component Ideas signified by any Concatenation of Language "are nothing more than the *Grammatical Elements of Speech*," that we are to reason and draw our conclusion. And here I expressly say, ANY Concatenation or Portion of Language; because we have seen, Mr. Stewart has affirmed that his "observations are general, and apply to every "case in which language is employed."

The question to be considered by future writers on Logic, therefore, is, Whether they will conclude that the *Train of Component Ideas* signified by Any

Proposition or Portion of Speech (let it, for example, be the Train of *co-operating Ideas of Quantities* signified by the verbal expression of an Algebraical Equation, *although a Train of Any Other Ideas would do as well*) can be resolved into No Elements except Those Elements contended for by Mr. Tooke and Mr. Stewart—namely—The “*Grammatical Elements of Speech?*”

SUBSECTION III.

Examination of the Assumption of Dr. Murray and Other Eminent Etymologists, that Verbs existed prior to Nouns.

I HAVE given to the topic, which forms the Subject of the present article, the distinction of a separate head, chiefly in order to shew the unsafety of grounding our views of Language upon mere etymological evidence; and, more especially, in forming conclusions the actual evidences of which cannot certainly be traced back to that epoch of Speech to which the conclusion in question is referred. I proceed, at once, to state the Assumption which the following observations with regard to it are intended to confute.

“Many philological inquirers” (says Dr. Murray, in his *First Volume*, page 236) “have maintained, in a plausible but inconsiderate manner, that nouns, or names of objects, must have been invented before verbs or names of actions.”——
“When the father of men gave names to the animals in Eden, he certainly obtained time to learn their qualities; at least, if the obvious ety-

“mologies, some of which are given by Moses
“himself, may be admitted as evidence, the matter
“is placed beyond any doubt. It is certain that
“the verb was invented before the noun in all the
“Languages of which a tolerable account has been
“procured either in ancient or in modern times.”

It must be evident to every reader, who is at all in the subject, that the place to offer a full or proper objection to the assumption expressed by Dr. Murray in the leading proposition of the passage above quoted, was not until after I had strictly demonstrated that the NAME OF AN ACTION, *when taken alone*, is NOT A VERB; and shewn, that it furnishes a striking test of the deplorable state of the Philosophy of Language, when a writer of eminence, in treating guardedly of the matter in question, deliberately talks of “*Verbs or Names of Actions*” as being Synonymous Terms or One Same Thing. The time however is now come, when it appears proper to state this objection: And, in so doing, I have only to point out the confusion in Grammar which it causes; as furnishing an indisputable proof that Dr. Murray, when he asserted the prior existence of Verbs to Nouns, did not mean, or contemplate, VERBS AT ALL, but had in his imagination *Merely Nouns of Action*.

After this exposition, it must be altogether unnecessary to take up much time with any farther discussion of the subject. For it appears, from all testimonies, to be a fact, which I suppose no one will ever attempt to deny, that SUBJECTS OR AGENTS, in the very origin of Speech, (as far as that origin can be traced,) were usually, or perhaps

universally, denominated by the Name of Some Action which they most naturally performed. Mr. Tooke (long before Dr. Murray) pointed out both the truth and the manner of this designation : and I never saw any reason to question his explanation of the matter.

In the very beginning of Speech, indeed, those Names of Actions which have since been taken to signify the Performers of those Actions may be supposed to have been *Only Adjective Names*. A *Tree or Grower*, (for example) might possibly have been called a *Growing THING* ; A *River*, a *Running THING* ; A *Father*, a *Begetting THING*. And, if this was the fact, the *Substantive—THING—or Whatever Other Word was employed in this office—*Would soon be sunk for ever, for the sake of dispatch in utterance. If this be supposed to have been the case ; then, the *fact* which Mr. Tooke has asserted becomes highly natural and probable.

“ The terms you speak of” (says he) “ however
“ denominated in construction, are generally (I say
“ *generally*) Participles or Adjectives used without
“ any Substantive to which they can be joined ;
“ and are therefore, in *construction*, considered as
“ Substantives.”—“ *Diversions of Purley*,” Vol. 2,
page 17.

I conceive, that this account of Adjectives employed as Substantives holds true of the great bulk, or nearly the totality, of most Languages connected with the origin of our own Tongue. And I farther suppose, that the great bulk of these *Adjectives* are what are called *Participles*, and are *Merely Names of Actions*.

To conclude, however, with regard to the Origin of Words; It is quite undeniable that both Mr. Tooke and Dr. Murray, from the evidence of their own express Language, lived and died in the firm belief that a VERB is Merely a WORD, TAKEN BY ITSELF; and, that it is a Verb purely in virtue of its being the *Name of an Action*. A Verb, says Mr. Tooke, “does not imply assertion; for No *Single Word can.*” And, in the same tenor, Dr. Murray tells us of “*Nouns, or Names of Objects;*”—and of “*Verbs, or Names of Actions.*” The Fundamental Grammatical Truth demonstrated in the foregoing reasonings—namely—that a VERB is NOT a Mere detached Mass of Lingual Stuff taken by itself alone, but is a Lingual Mass forming a Bridge between Two Other Such Masses, never was suspected by either of these eminent Etymologists.

In fine; it is decisively manifest, that, in asserting a priority of existence of Verbs to Nouns, Dr. Murray has fallen into the very same sort of absurdity, as if he had asserted that BRIDGES existed prior to the existence of the BANKS which support them, and which (IN ORDER TO BE BRIDGES) they MUST CONNECT.

SECTION FIFTH.

OF THE VIEWS OF SOME GRAMMARIANS WITH REGARD TO THE NATURE OF THE VERB CONSIDERED AS A COPULA OR CONNECTIVE; INVOLVING SOME CONSIDERATION OF JUXTAPOSITION OR GRAMMATICAL CONTACT.

SUCH is the nature and importance of that Constituent Principle of Language which, in its various modification, demands the different Names of LIMITED SILENCE, APPPOSITION, JUXTAPOSITION, and GRAMMATICAL CONTACT, that I apprehend its analysis demands the rank and distinction of an appropriate Chapter, in a work on Philosophical Grammar. Accordingly, therefore, I shall, in the sequel, duly admit it to this distinction. But, owing to the Principle in question's being one which is interwoven with every other Element of Speech, it is altogether unavoidable that some notice should be had of it in this place, and perhaps at some other intermediate stages of the work.

The leading topic proposed for the present Subsection, is an examination of that view of the subject which has been taken by a learned and ingenious writer, whose opinions I am led to consider on account of certain expressions which he has employed, which admit of two very different interpretations; insomuch, that, if the matter were not explained, it might naturally lead to a supposition

that I have, in some most material points, been hitherto suggesting the very same Principles which had been laid down by this writer. Whereas, in reality, no two expositions of the Nature of Language could be more different, than our respective opinions of the subject.

The investigation itself, besides its more immediate purpose, will lead to the notice of some important considerations in Language; a due apprehension of which will be found requisite for a thorough understanding of Grammar: owing to which, the intended explanation, I trust, will not be found in any respect undesired by the grammatical reader.

The view of the subject which I thus propose to examine, is that furnished by the writer of the article "GRAMMAR," in Dr. Rees's Cyclopedia. It is the same to which I alluded in a former section, in adverting to the ambiguous phraseology of Bishop Lowth. I proceed to the consideration of it, without farther preface.

"A Verb" (says the author in question) "is borrowed from a thing, to express the action of that thing. It implies *connection* of an agent and its object, or more generally the connection of a cause with its effect. But this connection is not expressed by an independent word, but by the *juxtaposition*, or the combination into one word, of the Agent and its object."

In perusing this definition of a Verb, I suppose, any one would naturally imagine it intends to express, that a Verb *connects* an Agent or Nominative with an *Objective Noun Substantive*: because no

other *grammatical* import can be annexed to the word *Object*, except that of the *Accusative* or *Objective* to a Verb, or Preposition. And, if the writer in question had meant this, he would in this point have coincided altogether with a Fundamental Principle of Grammar which I have advanced. But it is sufficiently manifest that this writer, in the expression above quoted, did not mean any *Objective Case*; but, on the contrary, by the word —“*Object*”—he meant to assert that a Verb *connects* an *Agent* with its OWN ACTION or ENERGY. In proof of this, I quote the following passage.

“ Verbs express the operations or active qualities
“ of things; and as the growth of words corre-
“ sponds with the growth of our ideas, it follows
“ that verbs originally were the names of things;
“ but, by combining them with the personal pro-
“ nouns, they became, in consequence of the asso-
“ ciation of ideas, to express not things, but their
“ operations.”

In this passage it is conclusively manifest, that its author, instead of ever supposing a Verb to be a CONNECTOR of an Agent with the *Object* or *Co-Agent* of its Action, asserts a Verb to be nothing but the Sign of an ACTIVE QUALITY of an AGENT, and affirms, that *What constitutes a Verb* is a COMBINATION INTO ONE WORD of the *Name of an Action* and the *Name of its supposed SOLE Actor*, to the utter exclusion of any thought of an *Accusative Noun* as having any part or co-operation in the matter.

Upon this passage, therefore, I observe, in the First place, that it has been shewn at large, in the

First Section of this Chapter, that NOT VERBS, but ADVERBS, are the Signs which must grammatically or rationally signify the ACTIVE QUALITIES of things: Which ACTIVE QUALITIES it is of the utmost grammatical importance to CONTRADISTINGUISH *from* ACTIONS BETWEEN Things. Secondly. I observe, there is another objection to be laid against the account of the Verb given by this writer; of a logical magnitude equal to the one just adverted to. What I now allude to, is his assumption, (an assumption, indeed, by no means peculiar to him, but which he manifestly and fairly derives from the genius of what are called the learned languages)—namely—that a Verb is constituted by a COMBINATION INTO ONE WORD OF TWO DIFFERENT WORDS. In this assumption, it is necessary to point out, that there is a vast and infinite logical distinction altogether confounded and annihilated: I mean that which of necessity exists between COMBINATION and CONNECTION. Owing to the very momentous grammatical consequences of this distinction, it is requisite to dwell for a little time upon the merits of the subject.

We have seen, that “JUXTAPOSITION” is considered, by the writer in question, as being One Same Thing with “COMBINATION.” Contrary to this, however, I must assert them, here, in all the distinction of their two different natures. JUXTAPOSITION in Grammar, (like Juxtaposition in Building, or in Any Thing Else,) LINKS any *Two Different Objects together, without annihilating or destroying their* DISTINCT INDIVIDUALITIES OR PLURALITY; *which last is necessary to their very ex-*

istence. But the Term COMBINATION in Grammar, as in Building or in Any Other Subject, is the proper term employed when we intend to assume that *Any Number of Objects is formed into ONE OBJECT* wherein *all logical distinction of Component Individuals* is designedly destroyed. A BRIDGE, for example, is connected *by Juxtaposition* with each of the Abutments which this Bridge connects: but no intelligent person can ever confound two Objects so officially and logically different, as a *Bridge* and either of the *Abutments* by which it is supported and which it connects.

Any farther occupying of time with a view to illustrate the real nature of this subject must, I conceive, be unnecessary: since it becomes in the clearest manner evident that no confusion could be more absurd, or intolerable, than a confounding of Different Words in the manner which has been herein objected to. I shall conclude this topic, therefore, by observing that the genius of those Languages which admit the confusion in question is to the last degree at war with REASON. Nay, beyond this, it is necessary to suggest, that, While CONNECTION is a most important and Principal Element in Language; the Principle of COMBINATION, (except only in the case of the *Letters, as Elements of Words,*) has NO PART AT ALL IN LANGUAGE: The very existence of Speech depends upon NOT ADMITTING IT.

At the same time, it may be conceded, that, provided the *Principle* be *tacitly understood and admitted in all Languages*, it may certainly be allowable to yield to convenience, to taste, or even to mere

pre-established habit, in tolerating an *appearance* of the blending of a Verb with its Nominative, or any other such apparent coalescence. For there is an infinite difference, between a toleration of such illogical *Forms* and an ignorance of the absurdity which attends construing them according to their absurd aspect. The Whole System of ELISION, in Language, proceeds upon this Principle ; and is to be justified by it. The Immediate Object of Philosophical Grammar is not to produce any general or violent change in the EXPRESS FACE of any Language ; but to change the erroneous GRAMMATICAL IDEAS which have hitherto been annexed to Language, in the minds of those who speak, or hear it. It may, for argument's sake, be supposed to be tolerable, if there existed as much difference between the Express Aspect of a Language and its understood Structure, as between the Picture or Image of a Man and a Real Man with all his Animal Construction : Yet, What should we say of the Rationality, or Pretensions, of a People, who, in their Ideas, should confound these Two Objects as being One and the Same ?

Besides the considerations already discussed, there is a difference to which I deem it requisite to advert, between the views of the writer in question and those which I entertain ; which difference is of a three-fold nature. It consists in an assumption of this writer, that “ the *Verb—Is—is* the “ *Essential Idea of Every Verb ;*” that “ the primary idea of *is* denotes Connection ;” and, that

Juxtaposition can supply the place of the *Verb Substantive*.

Thus, He says, “ If then *is* be the characteristic or essential idea of every Verb ; and if farther, “ as appears from facts, the primary idea of *is* denotes connection ; it follows that not assertion, “ as grammarians have supposed, but *connection* “ is that which constitutes every Verb. But the “ connecting Verb itself will not appear *necessary*, “ if we judge of its use in the ancient languages, “ the *juxtaposition* of the Subject and the Predicate “ being sufficient to supply its place.”

Now with regard to this passage, in the *First* place, I observe, it is true, that the Verb—*is*—like every other Verb, denotes *Connection* ; but NOT a *Connection of a Subject with its PREDICATE* or *ENERGY* as this writer supposes ; but, on the contrary, a *Connection of a Subject with an OBJECTIVE CASE*. This is a Principle sufficiently demonstrated and settled ; and, therefore, I shall not add any thing with respect to it, in this place.

Secondly, I observe, It has been shewn, by proofs altogether analytical, that the Verb Substantive—*is*—is NOT *the characteristic or essential idea of every Verb* ; nor yet that of *Any Verb, itself* alone excepted.

Thirdly. It only remains, therefore, to consider the assumption of this writer—that the *JUXTAPOSITION* of a Subject and a Predicate is sufficient to supply the place of the *Verb Substantive*.

Now with regard to this, I have already shewn, at length, that such is the nature and force of *Juxtaposition*, that it forms, of itself alone, the *PRIN-*

CIPLE OF ASSERTION, *both of VERBS and of ADJECTIVES.* But, along with this, it was equally shewn, that the GENERAL Principle of Assertion and the VERB SUBSTANTIVE are Two Things which have nothing to do with one another; the *former* being a Principle involved in a JUXTAPOSITION OF ANY TWO WORDS; and the *latter* possessing the *Sole and Limited Office* of coupling ANY SUBJECT with SPACE, OR with TIME.

Juxtaposition, although it cannot supply the place of the Verb Substantive, and is a Thing entirely foreign to the peculiar Office of this Verb, is, certainly, so far of the GENERIC Nature of a Verb, that it is a BRIDGE OF CONNECTION between *Some Two Words*, just as a Verb is a Bridge of Connection between *Two Syntactical Nouns*. And the Principal Specific difference between the Two Things in question is, that a Verb is a *Bridge formed of a WORD*; whereas a Grammatical Contact is a *Bridge formed of Nothing but the ACTION OF CONTACTING*. Accordingly, therefore, when this Principle is appropriately expressed, it must be done by the fact of *One Word ACTING WITH Another*, that is, as I have already said, *One Word, GRAMMATICALLY CONTACTING Another*. Now all this is at an infinite distance from giving to the PRINCIPLE OF CONTACTING the Office of the SUBSTANTIVE VERB; which office is nothing but that of connecting *Any Particular Individual Subject* with ONE PRIMARY UNIVERSAL ACCUSATIVE NOUN—namely—SPACE, or TIME; with which, *Every Subject MUST be supposed connected*, in the *Primary Action of existing*, before such subject can

be expressed as being engaged in ANY ADJECTIVE *Act*; as has been justly asserted by Harris, although rashly ridiculed by Tooke.

In the prosecution of his own view of the subject, the writer in the *Cyclopedia* expresses himself thus. “Mr. Harris and other Grammarians overlooking the force of Juxtaposition, and judging of the importance of the Substantive Verb from its frequent use in modern Speech, have supposed that it was absolutely necessary to the existence of language, and that no proposition can be communicated without it.” In opposition to this assumption of Harris, the writer under consideration cites examples from the Hebrew Language, importing in English—“*And Moses said, ‘Who I;’*”—“*And Moses said, ‘I NOT ELOQUENT.’*” Now this Idiom of the Hebrew Language corresponds, precisely and very remarkably, with the statement which I have already laid down, in opposition to the opinion of Mr. Locke and other writers, concerning the Office of the Word *Is*,—when this Word is viewed by itself alone—namely—that it has *Nothing to do with asserting, at all*; but that Assertion, whether it be of an *Action* or a *Quality*, is effected purely by the *Apposition* or *Juxtaposition* of Two Words. And here also it is to be observed, that this mode of assertion is so far from being peculiar to the Hebrew, or to any Dead or Mere Ancient Language, that it exists in Modern Languages of great prevalency: As, for example, in the Hindostanee and the Malayan Tongues; which are spoken by perhaps above a hundred millions of persons. Besides which, it has been

strictly demonstrated, in the foregoing pages, that Englishmen themselves assert by this Principle and by what is called the Participial Form.

Thus in the Hindostanee, the ordinary vernacular Idiom is, “*I coming*,” “*I going* ;”—NOT “*I come*,” “*I go*.” It is true, also, that the Verb Substantive *may* in such case be expressed ; as “*I going AM* :” And when it is not expressed, it is, doubtless, to be understood. But we are never to lose sight of the demonstrated truth—that the *Verb Substantive*, whether expressed or merely understood, has *No Office in asserting* that *I go* : it only asserts that *I exist in SPACE*.

And here it is due to the Structure of the Hindostanee Language to observe, that, admirable as the English Tongue certainly is in its approximation to, and its capability of becoming, a strictly Philosophical Structure, yet it is excelled by that of Hindostan in the point in question. *For*, in the latter, when a speaker, in his ordinary Idiom, drops the Verb Substantive, he *does not alter the FORM* of the Name of an Adjective Act, as is done in English ; that is, he does not, instead of “*I am going*,” say “*I go* :” but he merely substitutes “*I going*,” for “*I going am* ;” and thus, he ALWAYS asserts in what we call the PARTICIPIAL *Form*. In the Malayan Language, according to Mr. Marsden, there are two Substantive Verbs,—namely, “*ADA*,—TO BE, IS ;—*JADI*, to *become*,—“*wax* ;—answering to the Latin *SUM* and *FIO*.” And this author says of the Substantive Verb—*ADA*—that it is much more frequently understood than expressed ; as in the sentence “*your counsel right*.”

It would appear, therefore, that the Hebrew expressions, “*I who*”—and “*I not eloquent*,” as quoted above, are to be confidently regarded as elliptical expressions; and, that the Verb Substantive is to be understood along with them.

At the same time, I observe, it seems very probable that all those who have ever spoken any of the Languages in question, have labored under the same mistake that has hitherto prevailed in the case of the English, in supposing that the Use of the Verb Substantive, whether this Verb be implied or expressed, is to *assert Some ADJECTIVE ACT*. This mistake, at any rate, naturally leads the way to that of the writer in the Cyclopedia; who supposes that *Juxtaposition*, because it proves effectual in asserting, supplies the place of the Substantive Verb. For, if we *first* assume that the Substantive Verb serves to assert an Adjective Act; and then find that the Adjective Act can be asserted by mere Juxtaposition, without the Verb Substantive; the matter becomes established to a demonstration. But I trust that the real Nature and Office of the Verb Substantive has been placed in a light which will never admit of a repetition of the doctrine in question.

It is by the true exposition of the Office of the Verb Substantive, that we are enabled to solve that enigma in the doctrines of accredited Grammar—namely—that the *Substantive Verb* has always the *Same Case after* it that it has *before* it: By which anomaly and absurdity a VERB is placed *between Two NOMINATIVE CASES*; which is precise-

ly parallel to supposing *ONE Bank of a River* to exist under *BOTH ENDS* of a *Bridge*. Writers of Grammars are content, in this case, to state the *Rule*, without stating, or attempting to state, the *Reason* of it: which, indeed, would be an attempt altogether vain within the pale of accredited Grammar; because the reason of it is utterly excluded from the accredited system. The fact is, that the *Second Nominative*, in any such case, is the Nominative NOT *to the Verb Substantive*, but to *Some Adjective Verb*, either expressed or implied. Thus the expression “*THOU ART HE THAT DID IT,*” means “*THOU existing in SPACE—HE THAT did IT.*” And here we are to observe, that we never say “*THOU art HE;*” without, at the same time, meaning to *refer to SOME ADJECTIVE Act* which “*HE*” performed, or suffered; as *HE who stood by; HE whom we spoke of.*

Here, in fact, it is to be observed, that, as often as we signify any *Adjective Act in the fullest manner that the EXISTING OR ORDINARY scope of Language admits*, and which, indeed, the *Real Structure of Language in strictness would always demand*;—as, for example, when we say, “*Peter IS FIGHTING James;*”—this expression is *STILL an elliptical expression*, for it involves the import of *Two Distinct and Complete Sentences or Assertions*: Thus it imports “*Peter EXISTING in Space, FIGHTING James.*” And, owing to this, it follows, in any such case, that the *Nominative*—“*Peter*”—ought in strictness to be expressed, and *must always be understood*, as being *REPEATED* after the Word *Space, or Time*. In order to illustrate this Principle

I observe, that the full and complete expression of the fact or event in question would be, "PETER *existing in SPACE*, PETER *fighting James*;" Or, "PETER *existing in SPACE*, HE *fighting JAMES*." Such, I say, would be the *Express Form or Aspect* of Language, if we were strictly to signify Every Idea and Connection of Ideas according to the Generic Structure of Relatives and Relation. But, if the Principles, thus pointed out, be clearly though only tacitly understood, the circumlocution of expression may doubtless, with much advantage, be saved: For no two things can be more different in Language, or Philosophy, than abbreviation and ignorance or confusion.

If any strength could be lent, by the fact of ACTUAL USAGE or *what is called* ETYMOLOGY, to a Principle which I have thus deduced from the Necessary Structure of Relatives and Relation, and from no other source; I might appeal, here, to those Languages in which the Nominative Pronoun is repeated. And as, doubtless, this appeal will have great weight with many readers, I advert to it, as a matter which I suppose must to them amount to a very powerful corroboration of the Principle in question; although to myself, I must own, it affords no additional confidence in the thing, whatever.

SECTION SIXTH.

OF SO-CALLED PARTICIPLES, AND OF TENSE, MODE, VOICE,
NUMBER, AND PERSON.

SUBSECTION I.

Of the Nominal Part of Speech above first mentioned.
—*No Participles in Language.*

AFTER what has been advanced in the foregoing pages, with regard to the nature of Verbs, I conceive, we may come to a very conclusive judgment with respect to what have been, by Grammarians, called PARTICIPLES. In treating of the Subject, in that work in which my views of it were first broached, I asserted, that the So-called Progressive Participle is the *Pure Simple Form of the Verb*: And this assertion stands confirmed by all that has been stated in the present Volume concerning it; always providing, that the Form in question, or any other Form, can be that of a Verb at no time except so long as it is actually interposed between Two Substantive Nouns.

The whole of the reasonings, which establish this Principle, result, in the fullest manner, in excluding the *Name of Participle* from among the Parts of Speech: Because this So-called Part of Speech

does not in reality possess any one of the several Attributes, or Offices, which Grammarians have assigned to it.

A Participle is defined to be, a Part of Speech derived from a *Verb*; partaking of the nature of its *Primitive* in denoting Action, Being, or Suffering; and of that of an *Adjective* in agreeing with a Noun: but differing from a Verb in this, that a Participle does not imply assertion.

Now with regard to the *First* part of this definition, I observe, that a Word called a Participle is NOT DERIVED from a Verb; because such a Word is either a *Mere Noun of Action*, and then it is *No Participle*; Or, else, when it is *interposed between Two Nouns*, or, otherwise, is annexed to *One Noun only*, it becomes, respectively, a *Verb*, or an *Adverb*. In a Word; a Participle, of the *Grammarians*, is a Grammatical Nonentity, or Chimera in Language.

With regard to the *Second* Part of the Definition, I observe, that a So-called Participle is *not of the nature of an ADJECTIVE*, although it is indeed a Sign which, in a certain manner, indicates a certain Sort of *Quality*: Because it has been shewn, that, when a So-called Participle is annexed to a Nominative only, it becomes an ADVERB; and here it is to be observed, that, although an *Adverb itself* is, certainly, an *Adjected Sign*, it is a vastly different Element of Speech from that of an *Adjective, technically so-called*.

It is customary, in Grammars, to lay down rules in order to shew in what cases a Participle is to be considered as a Participle, and in what other cases

it is to be considered as an Adjective : And these rules, if they were duly applied to their proper Part of Speech, would have a corresponding utility. But this application cannot tend in the least to preserve the assumption that a So-called Participle is in any case an Adjective. When for example we say, “ I saw a *man fighting* :” this, indeed, conveys a very different meaning from that of saying “ I saw a *fighting man* :” and it is certainly very often useful to distinguish the two cases, or characters, in question. But, nevertheless, notwithstanding any conventional fiction which we can invent to distinguish the two cases, it is certain, when considered with strict logical accuracy, that a *fighting man* can be a *fighting man* ONLY DURING THE TIME THAT HE IS FIGHTING, just as a *Bridge* can be a *Bridge* only during the time it stands between Two Abutments ; and therefore, a *fighting man*, is a man INNING a *fighting State*, and the expression, strictly speaking, is the Same as that of a *man fighting*. In each of these expressions, alike, the Word—“ *fighting*”—serves as an ADVERB : but, in order to mark the distinction between the Two Characters—namely—a man whose *vocation* is fighting, and the same, or any other man, who is merely in the present act itself of fighting, we may make a correspondent variation in the import of the ADVERB, in each case : Thus a “ *man fighting*” means a man innning a *fighting STATE* ; but a “ *fighting man*” means a man innning a *fighting HABIT or CALLING* ; and, in each case alike, the Word—*fighting*—is employed ADVERBially.

Here we are to recollect, that ADVERBS are not

Essential Part of Speech ; they are not IMMEDIATE Signs of Ideas, but are *Signs of a Parcel of Words* : and the highly useful device of Adverbs is only carried a step farther, when we conventionally make the Word—*fighting*—signify a PRESENT EXERTED *active Quality* by placing it AFTER a Nominative, and a HABIT of *this Quality* by placing it BEFORE a Nominative. I hardly need add, that an Adverb *may, by an ordinary or established idiom, come before a Nominative* ; as it does in the expression—“ *early man,*”—or “ *late man.*”

Farther I observe, that when there is occasion to employ a So-called Participle with a *comparative term annexed* ; it does not, on this account, become an *Adjective*, or cease to be an *Adverb* : Because *a more learned man*, means only *a man IN-NING a more learned STATE*.

Finally, with regard to the *Third* and Last part of the definition, now in question ; it has been conclusively shewn, that the So-called Participial Form, whenever it is placed between Two Nouns Substantive, DOES ASSERT, and asserts *more primarily, purely, or legitimately, than any other Form of the Verb* : Or, rather, the So-called Progressive Participle, when so interposed, is the *Pure Essential Form of the Verb itself*, as I have all along affirmed. Thus, in the *ordinary full English expression*—“ *I AM GOING to London,*”—the Verb—AM—connects the Nominative—“ *I*”—with SPACE ONLY : And, in order to make the Structure of the Speech conform philosophically to the Necessary Generic Structure of Relatives and Relation, the Nominative—“ *I*”—must be understood as *repeated* ; in

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consequence of which, the Speech must run thus :
“ I EXISTING in *Space*, I GOING to *London*.” A
Speaker of Hindostannee, in its ordinary idiom,
would say “ I GOING to *London* ;” and, in this
idiom, he would express himself with a philosophi-
calness which the English Language, *as it is under-*
stood or interpreted, does not possess ; *but which,*
in reality, demonstrably belongs to its structure,
as has, I trust, by this time been rendered suffi-
ciently manifest.

What has now been advanced, with a view to
exclude the Name of Participle from the page of
Grammar, is all that I conceive to be requisite in
this place ; especially as I propose, in a future
chapter, to shew the former Identicalness of the
So-called Progressive Participle with the So-called
Infinitive Mode of our English Verbs, as a fact
which indubitably existed about the time of Chau-
cer : and shall, at the same time, insist farther
upon the nonreality of any such Element of
Speech as a Participle. In removing this supposed
Element from the Structure of Language, I appre-
hend, we shall remove much complicated absurdi-
ty from the Subject, and save future writers from
that embarrassment, confusion, and obscurity,
which has in time past befallen those who have
attempted to entertain it. Without, however, going
into any examination of what has been advanced
by other writers upon this part of Grammar, I shall
occupy the remainder of the present article with
adverting to the views which have been entertained
of it by Mr. Tooke.

In treating of Participles, Mr. Tooke has expressed himself in the following terms.

“As for the term Participle, I would very willingly get rid of it.”

Accordingly, he says, “I desire, therefore, instead of Participle, to be permitted to call this Word generally a *Verb-adjective*.”

With regard to these expressions, I must object, and must rigorously insist, that No “WORD,” considered as a *Mere WORD by Itself*, is, or can be, a *VERB of Any Sort*. But, in the present case, I have more especially to object, that the term *Verb-adjective* is altogether inapplicable to the Words in question, in whatever situation they may be placed, that is, with whatever other Words they may be associated. In order to justify this objection I shall, in the first place, quote the following passage from Mr. Tooke’s context.

“We had formerly but two” (Participles). “But so great is the convenience and importance of this useful ABBREVIATION, that our authors have borrowed from other Languages, and incorporated with our own, *Four* other Participles of equal value.”

Upon this passage, it could be only necessary to observe, that VERBS, *certainly*, are NOT ABBREVIATIONS; and, according, therefore, to THIS test, offered by Mr. Tooke himself, *No Abbreviation can be a Verb*.

In the next place, however, I observe, that, by admitting our Two Original So-called Participles into the Class of Abbreviations, (which he manifestly does in the passage last quoted,) Mr. Tooke

virtually acknowledges these Participles to be *Adverbs*. And, as for the *Four New Ones* which he has added, and to which he has assigned the Name of "*Verbs-adjective*;" the import of Every One of them is that of a CLUSTER OF SEVERAL WORDS, involving a *String of Distinct Verbs in concatenation*; in which concatenation EACH VERB MUST SERVE, ALTERNATELY AS VERB and AS NOUN SUBSTANTIVE, according to the Fundamental Rule which I have already laid down on this subject.

These Four New Terms he has denominated as follows: Which I note here, for the purpose of observing upon them.

"*The Potential Mood Active, Adjective.*"

"*The Potential Mood Passive, Adjective.*"

"*The Official Mood Passive, Adjective.*"

"*The Future Tense Active, Adjective.*"

To these *Denominations*, I shall add some of Mr. Tooke's *Examples*: which are here transcribed without order from his text, merely to exhibit their general nature.

"UNENARRABLE; or, *that may not be told.*"

"SWADIBLE, that is, *esi for to trete and to be treted.*"

"REVEREND,—i. e. *Which ought to be revered.*"

"MEMORANDUM,—*That which ought to be remembered.*"

"LEGEND.—*That which ought to be read.*"

In these examples, it is perfectly manifest, that Every One of the Words in question—namely—*Unenarrable,—Swadible,—Reverend—Memorandum,*

—and *Legend*,—is an *Adverb* according to Mr. Tooke's own very just definition of an *Adverb*, or, in other words, a SIGN of a COMPLICATION OF SIGNS : For None of these Words is a Sign of an IDEA OR OBJECT OF THOUGHT ITSELF IMMEDIATELY ; but Every One of them stands as the Sign of a STRING OF SEVERAL WORDS. A Verb, on the contrary, is not the Sign of a Sign; but it is the Immediate Sign of an *Idea or Object*, and it is never the Sign of more than ONE SIMPLE OBJECT—namely—that of a Bridge consisting of *One Simple Arch* between two Piers or Abutments. Not only is such a Word as “LEGEND” not a Verb; but it is not even the SIGN of A VERB : For this Word—*Legend*—stands as the Sign of a Concatenation of Three Different Verbs—namely—OUGHT—TO BE—READ : And I have already shewn, from the Generic Structure of Relatives and Relation, that a *Compound Verb* is an impossible Thing ; although it is true that *Simple Verbs* may be, and very usually are, expressed in Strings, consecutively : Each of which Verbs, however, must always be understood as operating in the Office of NOUN and of Verb, under the Law of Alternation ; the Logical Principle and Manner of which will be farther and fully illustrated in the sequel.

To these considerations I shall only add, that any person, who is in the least informed on the subject, will not fall into the mistake of supposing that it is a mere verbal difference, whether we call such a Word as *Legend*, or *Memorandum*, an AD-VERB, or a VERB-ADJECTIVE. For, it being an established and unalterable definition of a Verb,

that it is the *Full and Proper Sign* of an IDEA OR SIMPLE OBJECT; and that of an Adverb, that it is the ABBREVIATED SIGN OF A STRING OF WORDS; it would be introducing a deplorable confusion into Language to call One of these Abbreviated Signs of *a String of Words* by the Same Specific Denomination, as that which is given to the Sign of an IDEA OR PRIMARY SIMPLE OBJECT. I trust, therefore, that the evidence is fully conclusive against admitting these Four New Participles of Mr. Tooke into the CLASS OF VERBS, under the name of *Verbs-adjective*.

At the same time, it is to be observed, that nothing advanced herein is intended to deny the fitness, or utility, of the Kind of Abbreviation now in question. Their accession to our Language was manifestly a vast improvement of it: Although it ought not to pass unobserved, here, that these terms have been suffered to fall into a loose, vague, and often most contradictory or absurd USE.

Upon this occasion it may not be improper to observe, what has been already remarked—namely—that Adverbs are a Species of Sign which may well be divided into *Different Classes*. The First and most legitimate, or most regular Class, I have already shewn, consists of All Words which stand for a *Preposition and a Noun* taken together: And in this I am fully borne out by the etymological testimony of Dr. Murray. The present article shews that Another Class consists of All Words which stand for a Concatenation of Verbal Terms of a certain length. I need not stop, in this place, to consider what other Sorts of Adverbs there may

be in Language; but I may merely add, that various Signs called Adverbs are Signs of a *Whole Sentence*, and not of an incomplete phrase.

SUBSECTION II.

Of the Tense of Verbs.

THE Point of Grammar which I am now proceeding to consider, affords a remarkable proof of the rigorous and unceasing government which the Structure of Relatives and Relation holds over the Structure of Language. It is a Fundamental Principle in the Category of Relatives and Relation, that nothing can be affirmed with regard to it, except while Some Relation, together with the Two Correlated Subjects which support it, exists, either in reality or by supposition. Accordingly, therefore, we find that, in Grammar, it is impossible to signify *Either Future or Past Action directly*, by any Term that could *logically* express it: And, for want of any such term, we are forced to have recourse to Other Signs, which, from their import, serve merely to put the understanding upon *conjecturing* that Future, or Past Action, is *implied*.

In offering this remark, I, of course, do not contemplate the genius of those Languages which effect the purpose in question by inflexions of the Noun of Action; which *Noun of Action inflected* they call a VERB: But confine my view entirely to our own Tongue, wherein this operation is per-

formed in a philosophical manner, especially with regard to FUTURE Action at least.

Thus the Verbs (i. e. Verbs *when duly interposed*) *May* and *Can*, *Shall* and *Will*, serve to indicate the *Futurity* of Any Action whose Name we affix to them : but the Action itself so Named must be expressed *as Presently existing* : And, also, each of these So-called Auxiliaries, themselves, is a Sign of Action *Presently existing* : and, hence, the only cause of their indicating that the Principal Action in question belongs to *futurity*, is, that the Auxiliary Actions are Actions of *Choice*, *Knowledge*, *Duty*, or *Volition*, RESPECTING THE ACTION THAT IS TO HAPPEN, and, *as such*, MUST PRECEDE the latter.

Such is the Logical device by which a FUTURE ACTION is expressed in PRESENT TIME ; and by which alone it can be expressed. And the nature of this logical mechanism seems to be understood, generally, by grammatical writers, and readers. But a very different prospect presents itself, when we turn to the expression of PAST Action : For, in this direction, all that has hitherto appeared in Grammar is nothing but profound darkness. We have, indeed, an *understood conventional Sign* of Past Action : But no person (unless very lately) has ever been able to assign its real nature.

Analogy would lead us, at first sight, to suppose, that, since *Future Action* cannot be indicated by any other means than by a *Sign of Present Accessary Actions*, the like ought to take place with regard to *Past Action*. But this by no means appears to be the case, in practice at least : For the actual

Sign of Past Action, according to all usage, even in the English Language, is not an Auxiliary Verb ; but is a *certain Termination* given to the *Principal Verb itself*, by which it is made to differ from the Termination of the Same Verb in *Present Action* : Thus, in Regular English Verbs, the Form of the Present being “*love*,” or “*loving* ;” that of the Past is “*lov-ED*.”

Since the speculations of Mr. Tooke it has been generally agreed, by our most enlightened Etymologists, that the Termination—D—or ED—expresses Some Sign, or Word, *distinct from the Form of the Present* : but the difficulty has been to determine, upon any certain ground, *what actually is*, or *what ought to be*, the *real import* of this Termination.

Mr. Tooke himself, and other writers after him, have supposed, that “*lovED*” means *love-DID*. But this hypothesis, even if admitted for a moment, does not remove nor lessen the difficulty ; because DID *is itself* a Past Form, and it demands to be accounted for as much as Every Other Past Form.

The account given by Dr. Murray, of the nature of this contrivance, seems to be much more luminous, in appearing to have explained *at least the actual fact or history* of its origin and import ; although it has not led to any Philosophical or Logical advancement of the Subject. As an *Etymological* light, therefore, I conceive it is to be regarded as a very valuable acquisition : but the exhibition of it only serves to shew how unphilosophical were many of the devices, or contrivances, of our fore-

fathers, with regard to the Structure of Language. This writer shews, very extensively, that *Past Action* was originally signified by a MERE DUPLICATION of the Name of Present Action. Thus, in *Vol. 1, page 50*, he expresses himself in the following terms. “ While the Noun underwent these
“ important changes, the Verb, the fountain of
“ language, acquired new and interesting properties. It has been shewn that it was monosyllabic, expressive only of action, and general in
“ its sense; because it was a rapid articulation,
“ framed to communicate to others the presence
“ of some remarkable operation in nature or in the
“ mind. The word used was that which the savage speaker had been taught, or accustomed
“ to articulate on former occasions, when actions,
“ *similar* to that immediately at the time affecting
“ his senses, had taken place. The monosyllabic
“ word, therefore, expressed a great class of actions,
“ not an individual event. Though this word
“ might be repeated after the action had terminated, it was properly an affirmative Verb in the
“ *present tense*. The first effort to mark preterite
“ action consisted in doubling the Verb; of which,
“ traces, more or less evident, are found in all the
“ dialects from Britain to China. For example,
“ LAG, strike, LAG LAG, struck; BAG, beat, BAG
“ BAG, beaten; MAG, press, MAG MAG, pressed;
“ and so on throughout the whole language. These
“ forms, which served for a preterite tense in any
“ person, according to the view of the speaker, soon
“ underwent contraction, and became LELOG, BE-
“ BOG, and MENOG;” &c.

From the passage now quoted, the reader will clearly discern the nature of Dr. Murray's theory of the Past Form; and will consequently be led to conclude, that, if the fact was actually as he has stated, we are to look for the Sign of the Past Tense, in most languages, as being no other than some disguised Form, or relic, of the Verb in Present Time, including some terminal addition.

But if we admit the fact to be made out, (and I see no reason to dispute it,) that those Nations, in the early stages of their Language, did actually employ a Duplication of the Name of an Action, as the Form of the Past Tense; it will certainly be granted that this contrivance has no claim to be called a *Philosophical or Logical* procedure: It was merely the device, or perhaps in the first instance the *sudden and accidental impulse*, of uncultivated reason: It was a device founded in necessity; and, although it demanded a certain exercise of reason to discern and to supply this necessity, it is certain that no mechanism could have been *less Philosophical* for the purpose, than that in question. If, then, any other means can be found, which can effect the same end in a Logical manner; the Philosophical Grammarian is bound to adopt it, even although it should not appear that any Nation had ever employed, or thought of the same before.

This consideration leads me to observe, that there certainly is a medium, by which the desired purpose may be effected in a manner at least *not less logical than that by which we indicate FUTURE Action*; because the medium in question is *precisely*

analogous to that just mentioned. The fact is, that the Auxiliary Verb **TO HAVE**, is the **PROPER AND PECULIAR** Sign wherewith to indicate Past Action; precisely upon analogous ground to that by which the Auxiliaries *May* and *Can*,—*Shall* and *Will*,—indicate Future Action. And, when I suggest this, I do not advert to it as any thing new in itself; since it is already a *part* of the *usual* Sign of Past Time: I only mean to suggest that the Auxiliary—**TO HAVE**—ought to *do away entirely with the Termination* **D**,—or **ED**,—and with *Every Other* **VARIATION OR INFLEXION** of the Name of Action that is called a Verb; insomuch, as to leave only *One Form* of the Verb—namely—a Form analogous to that which is called the **PRESENT**, as *love*,—or *loving*; *hate*,—or *hating*. I shall, therefore, indulge this view of the Subject through the remainder of the present article.

Before I quit this topic, I may perhaps find room to shew some etymological evidence, to render it at least probable that the termination of the Past Tense in English is actually derived from the Word **HAVE**. And, collaterally with this, it is to be observed, that, at any rate, this English Termination is not a Duplication of the Name of Present Action. But chiefly, and in the first place, I propose to shew that, when the Word **HAVE** is used along with the Past Form of the Verb, (as is the existing custom with regard to it, such as when we say “*I have loved*,”) it produces a demonstrable absurdity; and, as such, it cannot be tolerated in Philosophical Grammar, although usage has, so far, sanctioned it. First therefore I assert, that, in the

case of any such expression as "*I have loved him*," the Sign—D—of the Past is in fact an absurd expression; because the Verb *loved*, coming after *Have*, ought to be in the *Form of the Present*. In order to shew this, it must be granted to me, here in the outset, that Every Thing that we HAVE, must be a thing COMPLETE; i. e. it must be a thing EXISTENT *at the time of our HAVING it*, and *No Part* of it can be supposed as being yet in the matrix of futurity. As such, therefore, it is opposed to the Nature, both of *Future* and of *Progressive Action*, and it must be an Action whose existence is PERFECT. But the Word *Have*—ITSELF—EXPRESSES THIS PERFECTION of the Action; and, therefore, the Word *loved* OUGHT NOT to express it. Hence, the expression,—"*I have LOVED him*,"—ought, indisputably, to be "*I have LOVE him*."

I am sensible that this last expression will strike an English reader as being a gross vulgarism. But every reader, who is at all in the subject, is aware, that many of the most vulgar expressions of the present day are good English, and were the proper Idioms of our Language in the days of Chaucer. Mr. Tooke has deemed it necessary to warn his fellow Dialogist, against a rash rejection of terms from their strange or awkward appearance, or, rather, from a distaste at their mere novelty: And this warning ought to be addressed, generally, once and for all, to every reader who would either improve or examine the nature of Language. Indeed, it is impossible to travel into the regions of Etymology without meeting with it, on every hand; and this in very objectionable shapes. I shall con-

tent myself, therefore, by observing, that, throughout the present treatise there will, I believe, appear neither novelty nor awkwardness of phraseology, that is not very much surpassed in the expositions given by every general writer on Etymology. But, to return to the subject; It is to be observed, here, that (although the Word—HAVE—indicates that the annexed Action is PERFECT, and therefore is in reality PAST,) we *cannot* HAVE a PAST Thing, of any sort, any more than we can HAVE a FUTURE Thing; for we cannot have a Thing that *does not now exist*. Hence we cannot, in reality, have a PAST Action; and therefore we can be said to have it, *only by a GRAMMATICAL FICTION*; and, any Action we are expressed as HAVING must be expressed as PRESENT Action. It is the Word HAVE (although this Word is the Name of a Present Action) that has the virtue of indicating that the Word LOVE, although it is the Name of a Present Action, is made the Sign of an Action that is *Past*: And this it does in a way *precisely analogous* to that in which the Word *Shall*, or *Will*, although it is a Name of Present Action, indicates that the Word *love*, although it also is the Name of a Present Action, is the Sign of a *Future* Action.

According to this view of the Subject, when we would resolve the phrase—“*I have loved him*,”—into its real import, we find it means—“*I am IN POSSESSION of OR HAVE the Act of LOVING him*,” and not, “*I am in possession of the act of lov-ED him*.” And I suppose it to be conclusive, here, that the Form—“*I HAVE LOVE him*”—is the *proper*

philosophical form of what is called the *Past* or *Perfect Tense*.

Upon the Same Principle may be philosophically expressed the *Preter-plu-perfect*. Because, for example, when it is said "*He HAD killed him;*" it is only requisite to substitute the expression "*He HAVE HAVE (or HA-HAVE) kill him,*" and the desired purpose will be effected in the most logical manner.

The General Grammatical Principle into which this truth ultimately resolves itself is, that in Any Speech, Sentence, or Expression whatever, it is ILLOGICAL to use a PAST FORM, or TO MIX THE TIMES of the Several Actions therein designed to be signified as being concatenated. And it follows, from this, that No VERB has ever ANY TIME OR TENSE except the RELATIVELY PRESENT: which, also, cannot perhaps, with strict propriety, be called a TENSE; because it is nothing but the consequence of a Verb's being the *Sign of an ACTION*; the *Necessary Condition* of which is, that it CAN BE AN ACTION ONLY WHILE IT ACTUALLY EXISTS.

When the Principle now under consideration is employed in the case of the VERB To HAVE, considered as a PRINCIPAL Verb; this, of course, must produce a DUPLICATION of the Verb. As, for example, instead of saying "*I have HAD the Book,*" we shall be obliged to say "*I HA-HAVE HAVE the Book.*" But this case of Duplication must not be mistaken for an instance of that Duplication, (to form the Past,) which Dr. Murray has brought to light; because, if we attend to it, we shall find that it *arises from a virtue residing in* THE PECULIAR ACTION OF HAVING or POSSESSING, and not from any

virtue in the **MERE DUPLICATION** of ITS NAME, that the two-fold mention or repetition of IT becomes, in this case, the Philosophical Sign of Past Action. A similar Duplication of *Any Other Verb* in Language would bear no analogy to it. To indicate the Past by saying "*I love love him ;*" — "*I fight fight him ;*" — could be no better than mere Jargon, although all mankind were to agree in making it a Sign of Past Action. To indicate a *Second Past* or *Preter-plu-perfect* upon this Jargonal Principle, it must be done by saying "*I LOVE LOVE LOVE him ;*" a procedure which adds outrage to outrage against reason. But to indicate the Same Second Past by saying "*I HA HAVE LOVE him,*" which means "*I POSSESS the Two Actions of HAVING LOVING him,*" is a logical expression meaning I HOLD, DISTINCTLY, EACH of the **THREE CONCATENATED ACTIONS** in question.

The philosophical simplicity and truth which it would introduce into Language, to admit no Form of the Verb except the Present, must be manifest to all. While it is certain, also, (although it would certainly require a Modification of Terms, which I shall not at present stop to consider, and the **DESIRABLE** practicability of which I do not here vouch for,) that the signification of the Past by the use of the Word **HAVE** as I have above suggested, would, in a very striking degree, soften and harmonise the General Tone of our Language. But, supposing the thing thus practicable ; still, I ought to recollect, that Simplicity and Truth are the progeny of Reason ; and it is too well known, that Taste, or even long-fixed Habit, will

not readily adopt them. I do not overlook that the Principle in question would make exterminating work with our "*couldsts*," and "*wouldsts*," and "*shouldsts*," and "*mightsts*." And it is not to be expected that these old grammatical favorites are to be meddled with, or disturbed, with any chance of success.

In the early part of this article, I thought of shewing some ground for believing, that the Termination of the *Past Form*, in the English Language, is actually no other than a relic of the Word HAVE: Which, I here observe, I suppose, may be traced to have formerly meant HAUD or HOLD; and, consequently, to have thus given origin to our regular Terminations of the PAST—D, or ED. As, however, I find this evidence consists in a considerable detail of *etymological* matter, which I do not wish to mix up with this part of the work; and as the end of producing it could be little other than that of raising the credit of the English Language, as being in this respect much more philosophical in its Structure, than any of those kindred Tongues which effect a signification of the Past by a mere jargonal *Duplication of the Present*; I shall postpone it, at least until the conclusion of the work: when it may appear in an appendix.

SUBSECTION III.

Of the So-called Modes of Verbs.

FOR the same reason that Verbs cannot be said to have any TENSE, they cannot be affirmed to

have any **MODE**: And this reason is, that *there can be no Variety in the Signification of an Action*. The **MIND**, which is the Agent that asserts or declares, and of whose assertion the Verb is the Sign, may, and does, think and express itself in *Different Modifications* with regard to Actions,—namely—as to **ACTIONS EXISTING** ;—as to **OUR COMMAND**, or **DESIRE**, that they shall exist ;—and, as to our **POWER**, or, else, to **SOME OTHER ANNEXED CONDITION**, that they *shall*, or *may*, exist. But these *Modes of the Mind's thinking*, with respect to Actions, are *Not Modes of Actions themselves*: And, therefore, there cannot be Any Such Things as **MODES OF THE SIGNS** of these Actions. Accordingly, we find, in our own philosophical Language, that all the *So-called Modality of a Verb* is expressed by **OTHER VERBS**, in the *Declarative and Present Form*,—the *Only Form* of which a Verb is logically susceptible.

In this respect, the English Language possesses a great and beautiful superiority of reason, over all those Languages which pretend to express Modality by supposed integral parts of a Verb itself. And the only fault in this Part of English Grammar consists in retaining the **DENOMINATION of Modes of A VERB**, in imitation of those unphilosophical Languages from which its Structure thus advantageously differs.

I believe the observations now stated, with regard to this part of the Structure of Language, are all that can be deemed necessary for the purpose of its elucidation. And, in point of fact, as the substance of them is involved in what has

gone before, it is chiefly for the sake of form that I have been led to assign them a distinct article.

SUBSECTION IV.

Of Voice.

THE matter which ought to form the Substance of the present article has, owing to the nature of the subject, been anticipated in the *Third Section* of this chapter: And little more requires to be said concerning it. In the place mentioned, it was shewn, (as a necessary consequence of the Grammatical Principle therein laid down,) that a State of Passivity must always be expressed by an AD-VERB, signifying that the Nominative or Sufferer in question is *actively inning a SUFFERING STATE*. It follows, therefore, that there is but *One Voice* in Language; and this the ACTIVE Voice.

It appears, at the same time, that Voice is an Accident which cannot belong to a VERB; but must appertain to the MIND, which is the thing that affirms, or denies. The reason of its being attributed to the Verb is, manifestly, that the *Form of the Verb or Sign of Action* has been *varied* accordingly as the Agent was assumed as being Active, or Passive. But in a Language in which No *Alteration* of Voice is admitted; and, consequently, No change in the Form of the Verb; the illogical procedure of attributing the Accident of Voice to the Verb may certainly be avoided. At any rate, I apprehend, nothing can ever prevent its being a great and deplorable absurdity to annex VOICE to the SIGN OF ACTION.

SUBSECTION V.

Of Number and Person.

NUMBER and PERSON are accidents certainly necessary in Language; but they are not accidents of VERBS: On the contrary, they are affections exclusively belonging to NOUNS, or PRONOUNS.

The English Language, in identifying the *Form* of the *First Person Singular* of a VERB with the *Common Form* of *All the Three Persons Plural*, exhibits an indication of the Philosophicalness of making All the So-called Persons of VERBS of the Same Form, and leaving the accident of Person to be signified by *Pronouns Only*, as is effected in some other Languages.

In addition to this I may observe, that it appears to have arisen from mere negligence, or slovenliness alone, that the *So-called Second and Third Persons Singular* of English VERBS now stand varied, in their Forms, from the Common Form of all the other Persons of VERBS. For it has been shewn by Dr. Murray, that the *Terminations*—ETH and s—of the Second and Third Persons Singular, are in reality no other than the *Old Pronouns* of these Persons: which useless relics ought, of course, to have been discarded when the New Pronouns were first put *before* their Verbs, as is now the practice.

With regard to *Number*; it is an accident so manifestly belonging to *Nouns, or Pronouns, Only*,

that it cannot be confounded with any other view of the subject. It is for the sake of the *Person alone*, that our English Verbs alter their Form in the *First and Second Persons Singular*: In other respects, the English Singular and Plural Number of VERBS is the same, as, in logical strictness, they ought to be.

SECTION SEVENTH.

OF AUXILIARY VERBS.

THE Class of Auxiliary Verbs has shared, in a more than ordinary degree, in that general darkness under which the real nature of Language has hitherto lain buried. By English Grammarians themselves, who, above all Grammarians, ought best to have understood the Nature of these Verbs, they have always been considered *not as complete Verbs*, but merely as a sort of *Verbal Accessary*, or, in real fact, as a Non-descript Element of Speech.

One author of an English Grammar alone (so far as I know) and this a very recent one, has the credit of broaching a different doctrine. The writer to whom I now allude, is Mr. Grant: And, from justice to him, I shall transcribe what he has suggested on the Subject; which matter appears in a Note, in page 116, in his book. I refer to his *First Edition*; not having seen his second.

“ To term, in the usual way, *I have walked, I may walk,*
 “ *I may be walking, I shall walk, &c.* tenses, is not in reality
 “ parsing, but phrasing. Such words as *have, may, shall,*
 “ ought to be considered as Verbs, and leading or principal
 “ Verbs too, rather than auxiliaries, in present time; *be* and
 “ *walk*, as infinitives depending on the Verbs; *walked*, as a per-
 “ fect Participle or a participle supplying the place of a Noun in
 “ the objective case, and denoting a finished action; and *walk-*
 “ *ing*, as an imperfect Participle, referring to the Nominative
 “ I. In *I do murder, I do write; I did murder, I did write;*
 “ I can consider *murder* and *write* as nothing else but Verbal

“ Nouns, merely the specific Names of Action, governed by *do* and *did*, and capable themselves of governing an Accusative.”*

With regard to the passage now quoted, I desire to express my opinion, that, compared with the prevailing doctrines of the Subject, it exhibits a light which is not a little remarkable. Mr. Grant has clearly discerned, that, *Whatever Form* of a Verbal Word follows an Auxiliary Verb, whether it be the *Present* or the *Past*, as *walking* or *walked*, (which Words he, indeed, in the usual way calls *Participles*; but which, I must urge, are the *Present* and *Past Forms of the VERB*,) such Verbal Word becomes, for the moment, a MERE NOUN SUBSTANTIVE in the Objective Case. And the only cause which appears, to me, to have been sufficient to prevent the possibility of his carrying his views farther in this direction, was his not having had a conception of the *Real Structure of the Category of Relatives and Relation*: Owing to which cause, he certainly could not discern that Every Noun of Action, in Any Sentence which admits of the Principle of Alternation, CAN, AND MUST, serve ALTERNATELY, in that Sentence, (IN EITHER OF THE CASES,) AS A NOUN and at the next step AS A VERB.

It is owing to the Same Cause—namely—the vast misapprehension of Grammarians with respect to the Real Nature of the Category of Relatives and Relation—that that *Anomalous Rule* exists in accredited Grammar, which, *in one case alone*, gives to a *So-called Participle*, ALTERNATELY, the

* I reserve an observation with regard to such phrases as “ *I do write.*”

Office of a Noun and the Regimen of a Verb, as I have already remarked in a former place. And the total darkness of Grammarians in this case ; and the partial light let in by Mr. Grant ; furnish distinct and striking proofs of the impossibility of ever arriving at the True Structure of Language, so long as the Real Nature of Relation remained undiscerned.

With regard to the *General Structure* of Language, it will be manifest, I differ from Mr. Grant's Views, in common with those of other Grammarians. But I have great satisfaction in adverting to the point of coincidence just now considered ; and I feel it due to add, that I have been generally impressed by the sound sense and metaphysical acumen which pervades the English Grammar of this writer.

The observations which have now been stated will serve to introduce the Real Nature of Auxiliary Verbs to the conception of a reader. And I suppose that the following suggestions will be found indicative of the subject.

1. The Definition of an *Auxiliary Verb*, I conceive, is, that it is a Verb expressive of an ACT OF THE MIND, or of ANY GRAMMATICAL PERSON, *with a view to, or bearing upon*, SOME ADJECTIVE ACT.

2. In such case, the MIND, OR AGENT, represented by a Noun, or Pronoun, is ALWAYS the SUBJECT, or NOMINATIVE of the *Auxiliary Verb*. And the *Adjective Act*, represented by *Its Name together with the Prefix To* and called the Infinitive Mode, is the OBJECT or CO-AGENT of the *Auxi-*

liary Verb. And thus, the *Auxiliary Verb* is a *Verb only because* (like Every Other Verb) *it is a Name of Action* PLACED BETWEEN TWO NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE OR NAMES OF CO-AGENTS.

As, for example, the expression, “*He will love Her,*” is, (according to our way of expressing an Infinitive,) an *elliptical* expression; and it means “*He WILL to love Her.*” And, in this Sentence, the expression—“*to love*”—is, *first*, an OBJECTIVE NOUN to the Auxiliary Verb *Will*; and, *next*, it is a VERB, whose *Real Nominative* is the *Noun of Auxiliary Action*—WILL—and whose Accusative is manifestly the Pronoun—HER.

According to this view of the Subject, it is plain that *Every Auxiliary Verb* is as Distinct, Complete, and Efficient a Verb, as any in Language; and bears the Very Same Structure as Every Other Verb.

As an illustration of the ALTERNATING PRINCIPLE, (here by the way and in order to render its operation gradually familiar to a reader,) I desire to repeat, as is just above expressed and is a Principle already established in Grammar, that although a Noun of Action called an Infinitive Mode serves, in the first instance, as an Objective Noun to an Auxiliary Verb, in the manner described; yet, it is, by the Principle of Alternation, turned into a *Verb*, in that Same Sentence, merely by adding to it Any Noun whatever. Thus if we say “*He SHALL love Her;*” (which, according to the English Idiom, is an elliptical expression and means “*He SHALL to love Her,*” but which, after all, means only *He SHALL act love Her*) the Noun

—LOVE—becomes a VERB, and its Objective Case is the Pronoun—“HER;”—while its NOMINATIVE is the Word—“SHALL,”—which last, when taken alone, is a mere *Noun of Action*, and serves in the present instance as a *Noun Substantive*.

Not only do Grammarians labor under the error already explained with regard to the *Nature* of Auxiliary Verbs; but they are also at fault in not adverting to the real existing *Number* of these Verbs. For, besides AM,—DO,—and HAVE,—the following is the utmost Number of Auxiliaries usually recognised in our Language: *May,—Can,—Shall,—Will,—Ought,—Let,—Must*.

These Verbs, however, (that is to say Verbs *when duly associated, each between Two Nouns*) form but a very small portion of the Number of Auxiliaries in Language. I shall venture, here, to suggest the following additional list; which, also, does not exhaust the existing Number. And I shall introduce them, appropriately, between a Nominative and an Accusative Noun, in order to illustrate their real Nature along with their Number.

I LOVE to love.

I HATE to love.

I FEAR to love.

I DESIRE OR WISH to love.

I HOPE to love.

I EXPECT to love.

I FORSWEAR to love.

I FOREGO to love.

I ENDEAVOUR, OR TRY, to love.

I REMEMBER to love.

I FORGET to love.

I CHOOSE to love.

I CHANCE, OR HAPPEN, to love.

I NEGLECT to love.

I INTEND to love.

I INCLINE to love.

I YIELD, OR SUBMIT, to love.

It would be vain, for a moment, to deny that Every One of these Verbs is as truly an Auxiliary, as Any One of the previous list, such as *I CAN* (i. e. *I KNOW*) *to love* and *I SHALL* (*OWE*) *to love* : Nor will it be denied that Every One of them is the Sign of a Primary Mental Act that differs, very materially, from all the Other Acts in question. And, if there be two, or three, of these Words which appear to *approach* to a synonyme ; let this be conceded, and it will not materially shorten the catalogue.

And here we are to observe, Not to confound these Auxiliaries, with Another Class of Verbs which appears, at first sight, to carry the same Structure ; as, for example, when we say “ *I read to learn ;* ” — “ *I eat to live ;* ” — “ *I write to eat :* ” For all these are elliptical expressions ; and each of them imports Two different affirmations of *External Principal Actions*. Thus the full import of them is, “ *I read IN ORDER, OR FOR, to learn ;* ” — “ *I eat IN ORDER, OR FOR, to live ;* — “ *I write IN ORDER, OR FOR, to eat.* ”

In fine, therefore, I observe, that it was doing but little, in the learned or inflecting Languages,

to invent *Terminations* to signify the Mental Actions *Shall, Will, May, Can, and their Compounds*; since those Languages are not provided with an appropriate Termination for EVERY ONE of the Verbs in the latter list of Auxiliaries here laid down. And it will furnish a very striking example of the irrationality of the Structure of those Languages, if we only suppose the defect remedied, and every Verb in a Latin Paradigm supplied with a FORM of the Verb corresponding to each of the Auxiliaries in question. Were the inflecting Languages furnished out to this extent, (which, in order to render them consistent with their own genius or Structure, they ought to be,) the aspect they would exhibit, and the additional labor attending their acquisition, would form considerations so cumbrous and repulsive, as could require no commentary to enable us to appreciate them.

One thing, at all events, is perfectly manifest,—namely—that, since all the Verbs in the list which I have supplied are undeniably AUXILIARIES; and are at the same time recognised, on all hands, as being COMPLETE AND DISTINCT VERBS, and NOT MERE ELEMENTS of a Verb; it follows, by analogy of THIS reason, (*even without referring to Necessary Principles*,) that the Words SHALL, WILL, MAY, CAN, &c. must no less than they be recognised as COMPLETE AND DISTINCT VERBS.

To what has been advanced, with regard to the Part of Speech now under consideration, I shall only add, as a fact which must appear curious and unexpected to every reader who is imbued with

the existing Doctrines of Grammar, that there is a *Very Close Affinity* (not to say an *Actual Identity*,) between AUXILIARY VERBS and SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS: the evidences and proofs of which, I apprehend, will appear in no way doubtful.

Here closes what I proposed to offer, as forming the analysis of the VERB. I shall not, in this place, add any general commentary or recapitulation: but shall pass on, to the analysis of the Next Principal Part of Speech; which has hitherto been viewed under a very different Denomination, and as fulfilling a very different Office, from that which it imperatively and of necessity demands.

CHAPTER III.

OF MINOR VERBS, BY GRAMMARIANS CALLED PREPOSITIONS.

SECTION FIRST.

OF THE THEORY OF PREPOSITIONS FURNISHED BY MR. TOOKE, STATED HERE AS PREPARATORY TO GOING INTO THE ANALYSIS OF THIS PART OF SPEECH.

SUBSECTION I.

Of Mr. Tooke's Theory in general.—Inconsistent in his Method.—Mistaken in asserting the Use of Prepositions to be that of preventing a Multiplicity of Complex Terms in Language ;—and in asserting Prepositions to be Imperatives.

THE greatest individual field in Language left by Grammarians, down to the labors of Mr. Tooke inclusive, to be cultivated by those who should come after them, was certainly that of the VERB. It has appeared at large, that, in so far as regards the doctrine of the *Essential Nature* of the Verb, Mr. Tooke has left it as he found it, that is to say in the very same state in which it had remained since the earliest dawn of literature. To this

remark is to be added, that the etymological researches of Dr. Murray, which have been so recently given to the public, have introduced no change in the views heretofore entertained of the Essential Nature of this Part of Speech. Now whether the aspect, or character, which the Verb has thus uniformly borne, approaches in any degree to that of its Real Nature ; or can, at all, be tolerated by a Nation pretending to logical advancement ; is a question to be decided by the competent reader, after having duly examined the analysis which has been stated in the foregoing chapter.

The NEXT Field to the above, in point of grammatical magnitude or importance, is that which embraces the Nature of those Various Classes of Words which have been by Grammarians called PARTICLES. And, among these, by far the most important is that Class hitherto known by the Name of PREPOSITIONS. Accordingly, therefore, the analysis of Prepositions will form the subject of the present chapter.

With regard to my having spoken, just now, of the—"greatest individual field in Language;" it may be proper to explain, that I consider the Principal Several Desiderata of Speech, as left by Mr. Tooke, (without at present descending to a number of very important though minor considerations,) to comprehend at least *Four Great Fields or Special Objects*—namely—The NATURE OF VERBS;—The NATURE OF SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS;—The NATURE OF CONJUNCTIONS;—and The NATURE OF LIMITED SILENCE, *considered as an ELE-*

MENT OF SPEECH :—Not One of which Elements of Language do I conceive to possess that Nature which has been assigned to it by Grammarians. Now, in point of fact, these Four Objects, including the Various Considerations which they involve; together with the Field of ABBREVIATIONS, which last I have not enumerated because it has been partly reaped by Mr. Tooke, and partly made ready for the reapers; make up the *Whole Structure of Language*, with the exception of the NOUN ALONE, including its Various *Modifications*, or *Appendages*—namely—the *Pronoun*,—*Adjective*,—and *Article* or *Definitive*.

I would not however, by this statement, be understood to imply that the doctrine of the Noun and its Departments is perfect; or yet near being perfect: Nor, that the rectification of it is a matter of small importance in Grammar. On the contrary, I contemplate a great deviation from the usual doctrine of the Subject, in the chapter which will be offered in the sequel upon this Half of Language. But I mean to signify, in this place, that the preceding considerations are of greater moment, in their logical and grammatical consequences, than those which are involved by the Half of Language last mentioned.

In entering upon an analysis of that Part of Speech called Prepositions, it is indispensable that a very particular notice should be had of the Speculations, upon this subject, which have been presented to the world by Mr. Tooke. In the intro-

ductory part of this treatise, I was unavoidably led to hazard some strictures on the views of this acute and eminent Etymologist. And here, again, (besides various incidental instances,) I am under the necessity of animadverting, to a considerable extent, upon that Theory and those Assumptions which he has advanced, and which the great real merit of his researches has raised, in the general estimation, so as to make them pass universally for no less than a true genuine account of the Structure of Language. In yielding to this necessity, I feel it to be due to such a writer to remark, that, in the investigations requisite for the attainment of general knowledge, it too frequently happens that there is more occasion to criticise the errors and oversights of preceding inquirers, and to point out wherein they have failed of contributing to the stock of human knowledge, than there is room, or convenience, (even although there should be every inclination,) to dwell with adequate eulogium on what they have actually effected. This, moreover, is an evil the injustice of which is at least as much to be laid at the door of readers, as of a writer. For readers in Philosophy, like men in all other vocations, prefer to press forward; and, in general, would not choose to be diverted by dwelling long on the praises due to those who have furnished them with *past* lights, when they are eagerly looking with expectation of light to *come*.

I would have these reflections borne in remembrance, at any moment when the interests of the Subject may force me to express myself with any apparent severity, with regard to the views entertained

by the Philologer of Purley. And I have, purposely, reserved the mention of the thing, until I should (as is now the case) arrive at the REPUTED Principal Hold or Citadel of all his Grammatical Speculations : because it is HERE that I shall be inevitably constrained to advance opinions, which militate in the last degree against the grammatical positions which he has asserted. With regard to that Principal Part of Speech or Half of Grammar called the VERB, Mr. Tooke had *No Theory of his own*, that is to say with regard to its *Essential Nature or Structure* : he only chimed in, with all preceding Grammarians on the Subject, in making it the Sign of an Attribute of SOME SINGLE Subject. That view of the Verb, therefore, which I have suggested in the foregoing chapter, is opposed to his doctrine ONLY IN COMMON with that of all other writers on the Subject. But, with regard to the Nature of PREPOSITIONS, the case is very different : For Mr. Tooke HAD a Theory of these Words,—a Theory advanced by *himself*, and which is *properly and exclusively his own*. In this theory, moreover, sacrificing his previous general doctrine that “the Causes of Language have been, by the most judicious Grammarians, left to shift for themselves,”—he has RESORTED TO *these Causes*, that is to *General reasoning from the Nature of Ideas*; and has formed his Views of the Subject partly upon this method, and partly upon *Etymological Research* to procure examples in illustration of his reasoning. This was (in the solitary instance now in question) proceeding like a Philosopher : although it was certainly very inconsistent in *him*, as a

writer; since it amounted to a glaring virtual contradiction of his own previous judgment. It is in his THEORY OF PREPOSITIONS, *therefore*, that the real dimensions of his genius as a Philosopher are most advantageously exhibited. And along with this I may observe, that there is no Part of Speech, the true analysis of which involves more curious, more various, or more subtle considerations, than this one. In the whole Structure, however, of the fabric of Prepositions which Mr. Tooke has thus raised, I am laid under the necessity to differ from him. And as, (after the labor devoted to the subject,) I cannot help feeling a considerable degree of reliance on the ground which I have been led to embrace, I shall sometimes be urged, especially by the tone of decisiveness which Mr. Tooke himself has usually adopted, to express my opinions with a proportionate degree of confidence, or conviction.

It is not necessary, in this place, to resubstantiate the charge which I brought in the Introductory Chapter, against Mr. Tooke, of being inconsistent with himself with regard to the *method* which he thought should be prosecuted with a view to solve the Problem of Language: The general evidence of this inconsistency has already been stated, in the place wherein the objection was laid. But I must beg, however, to recall the matter to the recollection of the reader, or solicit him to refer back to it if necessary; because it cannot fail to be of very material moment, in operating upon the judg-

ment which he must form of Mr. Tooke's general procedure, in entering upon a particular examination of his Theory of Prepositions. Having prefaced thus much, I shall proceed immediately to an examination of Mr. Tooke's account of the USE OR OFFICE of the Part of Speech in question: which, the reader will observe, is a very different consideration from that of investigating his theory of its *Etymological Character or Origin*.

In the *First Volume* of the DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY, page 318, Mr. Tooke makes his fellow Dialogist—B—express himself in the following terms.

B.

“ You assert, then, that what we call Prepositions, and distinguish as a separate Part of Speech, are not a species of words essentially, or in any manner, different from the other Parts: but that they are in fact either Nouns or Verbs. And that (like the Conjunctions) Prepositions are only words which have been disguised by corruption: and that Etymology will give us, in all languages, what Philosophy has attempted in vain. And yet I cannot but perceive that such words as Prepositions are necessary in discourse.”

Now with regard to this passage, I have to observe by the way, that, although I have thought it requisite to quote it here, as being introductory of the Subject, it is manifestly not of a *reasoning* character, but is entirely of an *etymological* nature. With regard to the truth of its assumptions, how-

ever, I altogether assent to the general assertion of Mr. Tooke, as herein expressed—namely—that *So-called Prepositions are not an Element of Speech of a different Nature from that of Every other in Language.* And I admit that, in fact, MANY OF THEM ARE “*words disguised by corruption.*” To the discovery of this important light, as far as it goes, Mr. Tooke may justly lay almost an exclusive claim; although, certainly, in the case of a few of these Words, the *clue* was found by others before him. And as to his ascribing his success EXCLUSIVELY TO ETYMOLOGY, after having expressly declared that *Etymology had no hand in forming his System*, I have only to remark, upon this, that it strikes with deplorable force against his consistency. But along with this degree of assent I must object, that the mere discovery that So-called Prepositions are only certain Primary Parts of Speech disguised by corruption is a light which, though certainly very important is yet so vague, and void of steadiness for the requisite purpose of reducing the different Parts of Speech to any thing like a definite character, that, in effect, it amounts to no better than a mere twilight, or to the darkness of night itself; in which *objects indeed appear*, but appear in forms so shadowy and shapeless, that it is impossible to distinguish a reality from the creatures of imagination. And, in fact, I entertain a full reliance on being able to show, in the most satisfactory manner, that such has been the degree of *obscurity* in question, that Mr. Tooke has mistaken these Objects as being of the very oppo-

site Grammatical Character to that which they in reality possess.

With regard to the *other* assumption contained in the passage now under consideration, I have to observe, that it is true, in fact, that if Etymology has not succeeded ; so, also, “ *Philosophy has attempted in vain.*” But it is quite manifest, that, in this assertion, is implied, as the meaning of Mr. Tooke, not only that Philosophy has failed *in time past*; but *likewise that it never can succeed in TIME TO COME* : For this is conformable to the *general tenor* of Mr. Tooke’s opinions, throughout ; although it is contradicted by *occasional lapses in favour of reasoning*. Now against this assumption I have uniformly expressed my dissent : and I shall develop my farther objections to it, in the course of what is to follow. But, in the first place, it is necessary to state the answer which Mr. Tooke gives to his fellow Dialogist, with regard to the NECESSITY or Use of Prepositions.

The Dialogist, H, (Mr. Tooke’s own designation,) says, “ I acknowledge them” (i. e. *Prepositions*) “ to be undoubtedly necessary. For, as the necessity of the *Article* (or of some equivalent invention) follows from the impossibility of having in language a distinct name or *particular term* for each particular individual *idea* ; so does the necessity of the *Preposition* (or of some equivalent invention) follow from the impossibility of having in language a distinct *complex term* for each different *collection of ideas* which we may have occasion to put together in discourse. The ad-

“ dition or subtraction of *any one* idea to or from
“ a collection, makes it a different collection : and
“ (if there were degrees of impossibility) it is still
“ more impossible to use in language a different
“ and distinct *complex term* for each different and
“ distinct *collection of ideas*, than it is to use a dis-
“ tinct *particular term* for each particular and in-
“ dividual idea. To supply, therefore, the place
“ of the complex terms which are wanting in a
“ language, is the Preposition employed : By
“ whose aid *complex terms* are prevented from
“ being infinite or too numerous, and are used
“ only for those collections of ideas which we
“ have most frequently occasion to mention in dis-
“ course. And this end is obtained in the simplest
“ manner in the world. For having occasion in
“ communication to mention a collection of ideas
“ for which there is no one single *complex term* in
“ language, we either take that complex term
“ which includes the greatest number, though not
“ *All*, of the ideas we would communicate ; or else
“ we take that complex term which includes *ALL*,
“ and the fewest ideas *more* than those we would
“ communicate : and then by the help of the Pre-
“ position, we either make up the deficiency in
“ the one case, or retrench the superfluity in the
“ other.”

“ For instance :”

1. ‘ *A House WITH a Party-wall.*’

2. ‘ *A House WITHOUT a Roof.*’

“ In the first instance, the complex term is de-
“ ficient : The Preposition directs to add what is

“wanting. In the second instance, the complex term is redundant: The Preposition directs to take away what is superfluous.”

The connected passages, which I have just quoted, contain the substance of Mr. Tooke's Theory of the NECESSITY *and* USE of Prepositions. In the place whence these quotations are taken there are other remarks, with a view to illustrate and confirm the Theory; and, to these illustrations I would refer the reader, for farther satisfaction: but the essential part, I apprehend, is here extracted, for every requisite purpose.

With regard to this Theory, therefore, I now observe, in the first place, that it has been hailed on all sides, as being a most luminous and beautiful exposition of the subject. The asserted Use or Office of Prepositions is laid out, to superficial observation, with all the aspect of a logical and enlightened discrimination of the *Nature of our “IDEAS,”* with regard to the various Modes of their “*Collection,*”—“*Addition,*”—“*Subtraction,*”—&c.; notwithstanding the Preliminary Doctrine of the writer—that *there are No Such Things in the Mind as these Compositions and Decompositions.* And the instances given, to illustrate the theory, appear to furnish an elegant example of the *Etymology or Derivation* of the Words in question, from their primitive forms in another Language. Such is the general estimate which has been made of the Doctrine of Mr. Tooke, with regard to the USE of Prepositions.

After thus adverting to the aspect and repute of the thing; and to the universal consent and

celebrity which have attended it; it will naturally excite great surprise that one should venture to express any material objection against it. Much more will it do so when I hazard a protest against the whole exposition which has been quoted above, as being a matter completely unfounded and visionary.

As, however, I shall stake my judgment to the hazard of this opinion, it becomes requisite, here, to submit an assumed general outline of the Nature of Prepositions and Conjunctions, as founded upon the result of their respective analyses in the subsequent pages of this work: Which preliminary position I conceive to be necessary, in order to enable a reader to apprehend the bearings of the observations which I have to offer, in this place, upon the above-mentioned Theory of Mr. Tooke.

In laying down this general outline, it is necessary to premise, that, besides Mr. Tooke's theory of the *USE* of Prepositions, he has asserted that Prepositions and Conjunctions were originally, *and still are*, *ALL ONE SAME CLASS OF WORDS*. And it is sufficiently known that he has been followed, in this view of the subject, by all subsequent writers. To this doctrine, also, as well as to that of the *USE* of Prepositions as asserted by him, I object in the strongest manner, as being to the last degree unfounded: And the following is what I humbly conceive to be the real Nature of the Subject; the truth of which I propose to substantiate in the course of a very full analysis, in the sequel.

1. PREPOSITIONS and CONJUNCTIONS form

Anal.

2 M

Two Most Different Classes of Signs, or Parts of Speech; insomuch, that it is, of itself alone, a proof of a very profound degree of general darkness in the Philosophy of Language, that these Two Classes have been confounded into one.

2. ALL SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS *are* VERBS, and DEPENDENT Verbs, in *Relatively Present Time*. This is the invariable and the *necessary* grammatical character or import of Every Word that is entitled to be called a Preposition.

As for the USE of this Part of Speech; it appears to divide itself into *Two Sorts*: but both these, however, resolve themselves into one KIND. With regard to these Two Uses, in the *first* place I observe, Prepositions serve most frequently to DEFINE *the manner of beginning, or of terminating*, ANY PRINCIPAL ACTION; which Principal Action is always signified by its own Sign or Verb: In which case, the VERB signifying the PRINCIPAL Action is a MAJOR VERB; and the SO-CALLED PREPOSITION, signifying the MANNER OF BEGINNING, OR OF TERMINATING the Principal Action, is a DEPENDING OR MINOR VERB. Hence, therefore, I have been led to assign to ALL SO-CALLED PREPOSITIONS the denomination of MINOR VERBS.

As an example of the Use now in question; If we say “*He comes to London,*”—“*He resides in England;*” the Verbs “*comes*” and “*resides*” are MAJOR VERBS, as being the Signs of the *Grammatically* Principal Actions asserted in these two Sentences; and the So-called Prepositions, “*to*” and “*in,*” are MINOR VERBS, as being Signs of the *dependent and defining Actions of* FINISHING London

and INNING England. I shall shew, hereafter, that ACTIONS IN GENERAL REQUIRE to have their extremes defined; and defined by this Principle. To which remark may be added, that, besides beginning and terminating Actions, innumerable Actions may be expressed as Dependent Ones.

The *Other* most frequent Use of Prepositions is, to serve as the Sign of an Action between *Some Noun in the Definitive Case* and *Some Other Noun* which the first defines by means of this Action. As an example of this Use, when we say “JOAN of ARC;” the Preposition—“of,”—which means *offspringing*,—is the Sign of an Action between JOAN and the PLACE OF HER DESIGNATION; by means of which Action the *Noun*—“ARC”—is placed in the *Genitive*, or rather in the DEFINITIVE CASE, and it defines the *Noun*—“JOAN”—or tells us WHAT Joan it is that is meant.¹ It only remains to observe, here, that, although the Word *offspringing* appears, in the present instance, to stand for a *single or solitary* Action, and not for a *defining or dependent* Action, depending upon any *Principal Act*; yet, the *Nature of Things* resolves it into a Dependent and Defining Action, like those described in the first-mentioned Use of Prepositions: because JOAN *offspringing* ARC, (whenever she is mentioned,) MUST BE “Joan LIVING *offspringing* Arc,”—or “Joan DEAD *offspringing* Arc,” or “Joan CONQUERING *offspringing* Arc,” or “Joan DEFEATED, TAKEN, OR EXECUTED, *offspringing* Arc:”²—And, thus, we cannot conceive

¹ The Definitive Case will be explained, in the sequel.

² Here if any reader, who is versed in Etymology, should

Any Noun put in ANY CASE, but we must involve the conception that such Case is DEPENDENT upon *Some Action which is GRAMMATICALLY MAJOR OR PRINCIPAL*, with respect to the *Action which forms the Case*.

I could not have stated this general sketch of the Use of Prepositions in less room than is here taken up. And it must remain for the sequel to shew what views of Language it will open, in its consequences.

The General Nature of CONJUNCTIONS, upon the other hand, now remains to be suggested. A CONJUNCTION, that is to say an IMPERATIVE Conjunction (which is the only Species of this Class of Words with which we have at present any thing to do,) is an ABBREVIATED SIGN OF A WHOLE SPEECH OR SENTENCE; and this, too, *not of a Simple*, but of a *Compound Sentence*. As such, therefore, a CONJUNCTION can never be a VERB: And nothing could be more unfounded, or could create more confusion in Language, than the assumption or doctrine of Mr. Tooke which construes Some Prepositions as IMPERATIVES, and then CALLS them VERBS;—a doctrine scarcely less monstrous than his other assumption—namely—that Some Prepositions are NOUNS!

In furnishing this statement, I have to notice the collateral fact, that the views of Mr. Tooke, happen to entertain a notion that “*Offspringing*” is not the real meaning of the word “*Of*,” I only solicit him to suspend this, or any other such objection, until I shall come to the proper place for his laying it, or for my discussion of it.

which I confidently deem to be so profoundly objectionable and visionary, are altogether subscribed to by Dr. Murray; I mean in so far as regards the doctrine that Prepositions may be IMPERATIVES, NOUNS, &c. Upon this, however, at present I shall only observe, that I entertain a full persuasion that the vast error of this doctrine is so completely demonstrable; and the deplorable state of the Philosophy of Language resulting from it is a matter of such certain proof; that, notwithstanding my great respect for the judgment of Dr. Murray as an Etymologist, his views and his evidences have not given rise in my mind to any thing, except a more confirmed conviction of the unreality of the ground which he has asserted in common with his meritorious predecessor.

At the same time, it is due to both these writers to observe, that it is ETYMOLOGY, and not any visionary range of their own imaginations, that has forced them to the adoption of the views in question. For certain it is, that our Teutonic ancestors have, by a preposterous violation of reason, made use of both Imperatives and Nouns to serve, *in a way*, for Prepositions; and when we contemplate the looseness of expression which has always prevailed in early Languages; and the masses of absurdity which frequently occur in the specimens of early dialects which have been furnished in evidence; we can never be surprised that even Nouns and Imperatives have been put in the place of Minor Verbs. It must be accorded to Tooke, and to Murray, that it was indeed the duty of an ETYMOLOGIST faithfully to trace

out, and to record, these facts: But it must at the same time be insisted that it is the Office of a PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMARIAN to expose every existing absurdity in the Structure of Language, and to demonstrate what Part of Speech OUGHT to occupy its place. It would have been a wonderful violation of the known laws of nature, and a real miracle, if the early Teutonic Savages, or the Barbarians of any Tribe, were endowed with a prescriptive judgment in the Science of Language, insomuch that all the expressions they had stumbled upon, or hastily employed, in the necessities of their situation, ought for ever to be received as the *pure legitimate offspring of reason*, and to be made the models of verbal communication for civilised nations and philosophers: But it is sufficiently known to be no miracle, that civilised nations and philosophers have (from a variety of reasons and inducements) taken the ready-made absurdities of barbarians for models of verbal expression.

The preparatory outline, which I had proposed to sketch of the Subject, is now before the reader: And I proceed, therefore, to examine Mr. Tooke's account of the Use of Prepositions.

With regard to the present view of Mr. Tooke's Theory, I observe, *First*, that, in the examples which he has given of

“A House WITH a Party-Wall;”

“A House WITHOUT a Roof—;”

He has been “*misled by Etymology*” to construe

the Words WITH and WITHOUT as IMPERATIVES. And, by so doing, he has turned these Words fairly (or rather unfairly) out of the Class of PREPOSITIONS, and has made them IMPERATIVE CONJUNCTIONS. The consequence of this error is, that the USE he supposes them to have, in their respective sentences, is, in the first place, a most awkward and illogical USE; while the desired purpose would have been far better answered by construing them as PREPOSITIONS, i. e. as MINOR VERBS *in what is called the Progressive Participial Form*, as in reality I affirm they are. This construction would reduce the phrases in question to the following form :

“ A House WITHING (i. e. *tying*) a Party-Wall.”

“ A House WITHING OUT (i. e. *tying out or tying the want of*) a Roof.”

I shall leave it to the reader, for the present, without farther illustration, to judge whether this form of expression is not more natural and probable, than to say, or even to mean,

“ A House, I DIRECT YOU, THAT YOU ADD A Party-Wall.”

“ A House, I DIRECT YOU THAT YOU TAKE AWAY A Roof.”

The real truth, however, is, that, so far are IMPERATIVES from being necessary to express either the *added* or the *subtracted* “ IDEA,” in the examples in question, that we can express the very same addition, or subtraction, *and this more concisely*, in TWO OTHER WAYS, without using the

clumsy, and in fact the inadmissible, instrumentality of an *Imperative*. For, not only can we say, (as has already appeared) “A House JOINING a Party-Wall;” but, besides this Verbal form of expression, we could express the very same “COLLECTION OF IDEAS” by a MERE ADJECTIVE, thus: “A PARTY-WALL House;” just as we say “a DOUBLE-BARREL Gun,” or a “BROAD-WHEEL Waggon.” What, then, becomes of Mr. Tooke’s doctrine, that IMPERATIVES are NECESSARY to prevent Complex Terms in Language from being infinite, or too numerous?

If it should be observed, that Mr. Tooke has said, only, that “Prepositions, *or Some Other equivalent invention,*” is necessary for the purpose in question. I answer: It is indisputable, Mr. Tooke has here expressly, and by name, assumed PREPOSITIONS to be IMPERATIVES; and he has furnished *Examples of these Imperatives as serving to prevent a multiplicity of Complex Terms*: And, against this, I have shewn, in the little matter that is already advanced, that the Prepositions in question cannot, without a stretch amounting to little short of absurdity, be construed as Imperatives; and, that there are *Two Other Modes of expression* in Language, which serve the purpose in a vastly superior manner. But I have now to suggest a fact which carries the matter much farther against the Use of Imperatives, in the present case. For the real truth is, that, so far are Imperatives from being necessary to save a multiplicity of Complex Terms, that there is a Certain Class of Words in Language *necessary* to save an intolerable

bly numerous repetition of **IMPERATIVES**, in those cases wherein *Imperatives* **DO**, or **COULD**, enter into Complex Terms. The Class of Words I at present allude to, is that *Species of Adjectives* called **NUMERAL DEFINITIVES**. Thus for example, if we had no Numeral Definitive for the Number **A Thousand**, nor for any lower Number beyond *One*; and if we wanted to express a Thousand Men; we should, in this case, in expressing a *Thousand Men*, be under the necessity of saying “*A Man AND A Man JOIN A Man AND A Man JOIN A Man*, and so on, until the End of the Thousand; besides the fact that, for want of Names for Numbers, we could never tell when we had got to the Number in question. In this example, it is plain, that the DEFINITIVE — “**A THOUSAND**”—saves *Nine Hundred and Ninety-Nine* REPETITIONS of the IMPERATIVE “**AND**,”—or “**JOIN**;” besides saving the like Number of repetitions of the NOUN **MAN**, which the *Imperative* would otherwise have connected with the **FIRST Noun Man**.

In a word; In so far as Mr. Tooke's account of the Use of Imperatives, in the present case, is true at all, the passage in which he lays it out so formally, and with so much fallacy intermixed, ought to have been expressed in the brief and usual terms employed by popular Grammar writers—namely—that “**CONJUNCTIONS**” (for the examples he has here given of *Prepositions* are in reality *Nothing but Imperative Conjunctions*) “connect like Cases of Nouns and Modes of Verbs:” For all that he has shewn on the subject, in his examples, in reality amounts to no more. And

if he had had the most distant conception of the Nature of Prepositions—or of the fact that **EVERY SO-CALLED PREPOSITION MUST BE A VERB—A PROPER LEGITIMATE OPERATIVE VERB**—he never could have offered the account of the matter which he has done; since it certainly never entered his mind, nor that of any other writer, that the **USE OF VERBS** is to *save an infinity or multiplicity of Complex Terms* in Language.

In closing this preliminary objection, there is one consideration which I would particularly suggest for the attention of the reader; as I think it cannot fail to strike him with its full moment. Mr. Tooke assumes that a Preposition **DIRECTS US** to add, or to take away. Now I leave it, without farther comment, to the judgment of any person, Whether a *Preposition* **EVER DIRECTS AT ALL,—or possesses any thing like an Office of DIRECTING US.** In the expressions,—He went **TO** London,—She lives **IN** London,—They talk **AT** random,—We came **FROM** England,—Man lives **BY** Bread,—I ask, Is there a possibility of pretending, for a moment, that any one of these Prepositions has an Office of **DIRECTING US** to do any Act? On the contrary, Do not these Prepositions **ACT THEMSELVES**, by connecting the Noun which goes before them, with that which follows after them; in the very same manner in which a **VERB ACTS**, by connecting its Nominative with its Accusative Noun? And, assuredly, no person will pretend that a **VERB DIRECTS US** to add its Nominative to its Accusative; because this addition is effected **BEFORE a VERB can be a VERB.** **AN IMPERATIVE**

can ONLY DIRECT, it CANNOT FORCE Us, to add One Idea, or Word, to Another: And we may, (even though the grammatical consequence should be absurdity, or nonsense,) NOT ADD any Idea, or Word, directed by an Imperative. But a PREPOSITION leaves us no such Power, or Option to rebel: For it connects One Idea, or Word, with Another BY ITS OWN GRAMMATICALLY-INTRINSIC POWER. Most certainly, therefore, any man with a logical head will vastly distinguish between these Two Grammatical Principles.—An IMPERATIVE can only connect Two Portions of Speech WHEN WE CHOOSE IT SHOULD: but a PREPOSITION connects Two Nouns BEFORE it can be a PREPOSITION: For Any Such Word as IN, WITH, or BY, is NO PREPOSITION *until* AFTER it is INTER-POSED between two Nouns, or Words. IN FINE; An Imperative, I have already observed, is NOT ANY PART of Speech; because it is the ABBREVIATION OF A WHOLE SPEECH: But a Preposition is a PART OR ELEMENT of Speech, properly so called; and the difference between these Two Things is grammatically infinite.

To all persons, who are in the habit of logical discriminations, the distinction which I have now urged must be sufficiently manifest: But for the sake of the general reader I farther observe, that an IMPERATIVE CONJUNCTION is a Thing analogous to the *Sentence* of a Judge, or the *Warrant* of a Magistrate. The Sentence may be just: but it may never be carried into execution: and, if it should be executed; this must be done through the Medium of an *Act of Volition in Some Mind*.

But a **PREPOSITION** is analogous to the *Fetter*, which **LINKS** a Culprit to his Prison Wall; or, to the *Instrument of Death*, which ties him to his Fate: Which Thing *can be* No **FETTER**, or No **INSTRUMENT OF DEATH**, *except during its Action in this Office*; but its **POWER OF CONNECTING** IS THEN **INTRINSIC TO ITSELF**. I may safely venture to believe, therefore, that it never will be deliberately affirmed, by any person of a competent knowledge of the Subject, that the Philosophy of Language has ever yet seen the light; when it is confidently and dogmatically asserted, by our most luminous and approved Grammarians, that **IMPERATIVES and PREPOSITIONS are ONE AND THE SAME PART OF ELEMENT OF SPEECH**. What Persons (I might ask) are so low in logical pretension, that they would not blush for their understanding, if they were supposed to imagine that the *Moral Principle* which gives a Sort of Secondary Virtue to a Piece of Paper, or Parchment, and (which **MAY**, or **MAY NOT**, lead to the production of Death) is *One Same Thing* with the *Physical Principle* of the Iron, or the Hemp, which, *in a logical sense*, ties an Animal to its Fate? Yet the confounding of these Two Principles is nothing less monstrous, or less deplorable, than the confounding of **PREPOSITIONS** with **IMPERATIVES**.

SUBSECTION II.

Prepositions if construed as Imperatives invert the Relative Situations of the Subjects, or Objects, intended to be expressed.

HAVING thus far discussed the consideration of the USE of Prepositions ; I proceed now to observe, *as for the supposed Etymological authority* produced by Mr. Tooke, by which he construes these Words as *Imperatives*, that if this construction shall be irrefragably shewn to lead to absurd consequences, or a manifest perversion of common sense, it must be conclusively regarded as being altogether visionary. And, even, supposing Mr. Tooke to have been *right* in asserting that our Gothic, or Anglo-Saxon forefathers *did actually* in some instances force Imperatives, or did *believe* they had forced them, into the Office of Prepositions ; yet, I must insist, that very sufficient reasons may be assigned, why they may have done so through negligence alone, (not to mention various other causes,) whereby they may have changed the *So-called Participial* Forms of a Verb to that of an *Imperative*; or, rather, may have taken the one for the other: For I shall shew, distinctly, that *One Same Form* has, at certain stages of our Language, served for *Both* these Nominal Parts of Speech.

The truth is, that Ancient Language, i. e. the Dialects of the Ancient Teutonic, *abounds* with absurd forms of expression. And this truth will be denied by no one who impartially consults the

labors of Etymologists. As examples of this, I shall, in the sequel, in an appropriate article, exhibit especially the case of Two remarkable *So-called Prepositions*—namely—the *French Preposition* CHEZ and the *English Preposition* THROUGH: both which, indeed, appear to be NOUNS, as Mr. Tooke has called them. And the exposure of absurdity which will be exhibited in these examples, will, I have no doubt, carry with it all the weight and impression that could be desired. It is the Office of the Philosophical Grammarian, in such case, not to follow the absurdity of our ancestors; but to detect and remove it.

But, although I have admitted that Mr. Tooke is justified *as an Etymologist*, in some instances, in his Derivation of the Words *now in question*; yet, a very grave objection is to be laid against his Derivations in the case of a number of the most important Words, and especially in that of IMPERATIVES. For it is unequivocally asserted by Dr. Murray, whose authority cannot fail to be considered as higher than that of Mr. Tooke, that he “differs widely from the latter in his account of “particular Words.” This remarkable Schism between those two eminent Etymologists, if we were to suppose their authorities nearly equal, would exhibit another of those instances of error which have brought Etymology into disrepute. But if we allow that Dr. Murray has gone by far the deepest into the Nature of Early Dialects, the very least result, in this case, will be to oblige us to *reject the Derivations of Mr. Tooke*, in the various instances (and they appear to be equally nu-

merous and important) in which he differs from his illustrious Successor. Much more, then, must we reject these Derivations of Mr. Tooke, if we find them not only differing from those of Dr. Murray, but at the same time involving the Subject in gross and deplorable absurdity.

As a single and curious example of this etymological fallacy in Mr. Tooke, I am led to furnish the reader with the following one, previously to my going into the absurdity to which I here allude: Because, *from all the attendant circumstances*, I think it cannot fail to impress his mind, and to caution him, as to the degree of *trust* which is sometimes due to even the *most triumphant or confident etymological assertions*. In Mr. Tooke's *First Volume*, page 181, he has explained the Conjunction,—“ELSE”—as an IMPERATIVE, *importing* DISMISS; and he has supplied a string of examples, in illustration of this theory. This derivation, however, was afterwards objected to, by a Critic on Mr. Tooke's writings; and the latter was thereupon led to defend his derivation, farther on, in page 248. In this place, accordingly, he is more than usually positive and sarcastic. Among other examples of this, he says.

“*Nothing Else.*”

“You shall have a fool's cap for your pains;
“and *Nothing ELSE.*”

“You shall have a fool's cap for your pains;
“and *Nothing BUT* a fool's cap.”

“You shall have a fool's cap for your pains;
“and *Nothing EXCEPT* a fool's cap.”

“ You shall have a fool’s cap for your pains ;
 “ and IF NOT a fool’s cap, *Nothing*.”

“ You shall have a fool’s cap for your pains ;
 “ and DISMISS the fool’s cap, *Nothing*.”

“ You have shewn impotence and malice
 “ enough ; DISMISS them, *What* have you shewn ?”

Thus he runs on, for the space of two, or three pages, in the same triumphant and cutting manner, and deals out the most unqualified contempt to his opponent : insomuch, that one would naturally conclude, that if there was any one of his Derivations more sacred or unassailable than all the others, it was this very exposition of the Word “ ELSE.”

In Dr. Murray’s *Second Volume*, nevertheless, a vastly different account is given of the Word ELSE ; and an account which bears internal evidence of profound research and indubitable truth.

In page 12, he says, “ From ANEL, by contract, came AL, meaning *other, different, foreign*, “ whence the adverb ELS, ELLES, *else*; and the “ Latin ALIUS and AL-TER, *other*.”—

In farther explanation of this, (back in pages 5 and 6) Dr. Murray says, that the Word—“ ELSE”—is the *Genitive Case* of EL and AL, OTHER. And, in the same place, he has explained a whole tribe of other Adverbs, as being also Genitive Cases of Nouns, such as ONES, and ANIS, EFTSONES, WHENES, HWILES, &c.

According to this exposition, therefore, (of the soundness of which I entertain not a doubt,) the Word ELSE,—*instead of being an IMPERATIVE*, is

an ADVERB compounded of a NOUN AND A PREPOSITION—*namely*—EL-ES, that is OF OTHER.

Now, then, Mr. Tooke's opponent, if he had been possessed of the etymological light thrown upon the Subject by Dr. Murray, might have turned Mr. Tooke's examples upon himself, thus :

“ You shall have a fool's cap for your pains ;”
OF OTHER, *Nothing*.

“ You have shewn, &c. &c.”—OF OTHER,
“ *What* have you shewn ?”

“ If a Nation's liberties cannot be secured by
“ a fair representation of the people,” (Mr. Tooke says) “ DISMISS it,”—(but Dr. Murray would say)
“ OF OTHER ;” “ *How* can they be secured ?”

Independent of what I conceive to be the authority of Dr. Murray's Derivation, I may leave it here to the reader, which is the most natural, or rational, exposition of the last example—that of Mr. Tooke or that of his Successor.

It may be proper to remark, however, that the import of the Word—ELSE—is not any matter of particular importance, to determine. And the sole purpose of my bringing this example is to shew how profoundly Mr. Tooke has been in error, with regard to some of his ASSUMED IMPERATIVES, when he has so dogmatically asserted a Word to be an IMPERATIVE, which turns out to be a NOUN IN THE GENITIVE CASE *with its* PREPOSITION TAKEN TOGETHER.

With the exception of the Etymological illustration of PREPOSITIONS, (when I shall come to them,) I can seldom afford room in the present work for such a complete exposure, *with regard to Single*

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Words, as is herein exhibited. But I trust the above example has furnished a very impressive proof of the fact, how easily the *assumed ground* may often be knocked from under the feet of the most confident Etymologist. Indeed I cannot quit the present instance without observing, how very questionable a thing it very often is, when Etymologists assert that they proceed upon INDUCTIVE Ground. Can it be said that Mr. Tooke has proceeded upon Inductive Ground with regard to this Word ELSE?

I by no means intend, hereby, to underrate the *real* pretensions of Etymology. But the example now furnished cannot fail to put every reader upon his guard, how far he ought to put implicit faith in what Etymologists often *call*, and what they of course *believe to be*, INDUCTION.

The example and remarks which I have here offered are the more deserving of attention, because it is to be observed, that even Dr. Murray asserts (in *Vol. 2, page 169*) that “Every
“Conjunction and Preposition may also be translated by a VERB, ADJECTIVE, NOUN, or PARTICIPLE.” In *page 11*, also, he says, that Adverbs, Prepositions and Conjunctions, in the Teutonic Dialect, “may be in all cases,” (i. e. NOUNS in all cases.) And, that “A few of them are Verbs
“in the Imperative and Subjunctive Moods.” Upon these assertions, therefore, I am urged to repeat, that I feel the most perfect conviction of being enabled to shew, that if Dr. Murray was quite sure of his ground; (which, with regard to some of them, I have no wish to deny;) it

follows, at least, that our Teutonic forefathers, in forcing either a NOUN or an IMPERATIVE into *what they supposed* to be the Office of a PREPOSITION, *only fell into the use of an expression, the real grammatical character of which they did not comprehend.* And I shall so definitively show *What is the Nature* of this error; and, also, point out *What the logical expression ought to have been*; that I apprehend it would be to the last degree discreditable to Philosophy, to continue to admit into Language any such jargon, as is made of the Subject according to the exposition of either Mr. Tooke or Dr. Murray; although it should ever so fully appear, that these writers have all the sanction for their doctrine, that can be afforded them by the Barbarians whose *Forms of Speech*, RIGHT *and* WRONG, they have equally embalmed in their writings.

As a single and passing example of this, (although I cannot stop here to discuss the passages in question,) I observe, Dr. Murray, after CONFOUNDING “*Prepositions*” with “*Conjunctions*,” says, they “may be in ALL CASES.” Now, according to the Languages he was quoting, *a Noun in Any Case* means a NOUN AND A PREPOSITION TAKEN TOGETHER AS ONE WORD. Could any thing, then, (I would ask,) be a more manifest absurdity, than forcing a NOUN AND A PREPOSITION to serve for a PREPOSITION?

Having stated the foregoing remarks; I have now to suggest a consideration of REASON, as forming a striking objection to Mr. Tooke’s Theory

of Prepositions, in so far as he has construed these Words as IMPERATIVES ;—an objection which, in as much as it is matter of reason, must be paramount to every other argument ; although I observe that it by no means stands alone, as an evidence against the doctrine in question. The matter to which I now allude, is the fact which is here immediately to be stated.

When a So-called Preposition is construed as an *Imperative* ; it very remarkably INVERTS AND FALSIFIES the *Reciprocal State of Relativeness* of EACH of the *Two Objects* whose Relativeness we intended to express ; or, as it were, turns *Any Cluster of Related Objects* UPSIDE DOWN, or the HIND PART BEFORE. The fact in question is equally remarkable and important in its logical consequences : and it is very surprising that it should have so long remained altogether unnoticed.

In order to illustrate this matter, I have to observe, in the first place, that Mr. Tooke has construed the following Prepositions as Imperatives :—*Beneath*,—*Behind*,—*Before*,—*Beyond*,—*Without*, *Within*,—and various others. Now, Every One of these Words, if construed as an Imperative, *inverts the meaning* which the Word is *meant and understood to convey* ; and Every Time we use it thus, we SAY *One* thing and MEAN *the direct contrary*.

Thus, for example, If we say, “ *The House* BE-
“ *NEATH the Hill* ;” And, if “ *beneath*” be an Im-
perative ; then, the real import of the phrase is,
“ *The House*, I COMMAND or DIRECT THE HILL TO
“ BE BENEATH it.”

Again. If we say, “*I walk* BEHIND *you* ;” And if “*behind*” be an Imperative ; then, the real import of the sentence is, “*I walk, I command or direct you to be behind,*” that is to *walk after me*.

That the *real import* is directly opposed to the *reputed import*, in each of these examples, is a truth which I think no ingenuity will ever attempt to deny. And this absurd result, as an *objection of reason*, would of itself alone be sufficient to explode Mr. Tooke’s derivation of Prepositions as Imperatives, without the aid of any other argument.

There is, moreover, another consideration to be taken into the scale: Which, though it be not an objection in *reason*, is an *Objection in Vernacular Grammar* ; and which, therefore, as an objection in *Etymology*, must make no less momentously against Mr. Tooke’s derivation. The matter to which I now allude is this : When Mr. Tooke furnishes the examples of,

“*A House* WITH *a Party Wall*,”

and

“*A House* WITHOUT *a Roof* ;”

these examples (supposing them to contain Imperatives) involve no grammatical solecism, because the real and full import of them is, “*A House, I direct THEE that Thou shalt join a Party Wall* ;” — “*A House, I direct THEE that Thou take away A Roof.*” But in other examples of the use of Prepositions, which continually occur, the case becomes very different ; and the most glaring solecism is the result. Thus if we say, “*He stood behind HER* ;” and, if “*Behind*” be an

Imperative ; then the *Pronoun* HER ought to be SHE. We cannot say, “ *Be* HER *hind*, *Be* HIM “ *hind*.”—We say, “ *Be* THOU *Whole* : ” and NOT “ *Be* THEE *Whole* . ”

Having thus shewn what *Absurdity in Reason*, and *Solecism in Vernacular Grammar*, flows inevitably from Mr. Tooke's construction of Prepositions as Imperatives ; I have now to suggest, that the Whole of this mixed mass of error is done away the moment we construe the same Prepositions as the *Progressive Forms of Verbs*.

Thus, for example, if we say, “ The *House* BE-
“ NEATH the *Hill* ; ” This means, “ The *House*
“ NEDDERING the *Hill* ; ” or, more strictly, “ The
“ *House* ONNING the *Nedder of the Hill* : ” Which finally means, *The House* ACTING UPON, or AGAINST, (i. e. RELATING TO) the *Lower Side of the Hill*.

I have already shewn, that *Any Subject, or Noun*, which is ever expressed as being in *Any State of Relativeness* to *Any Other Subject, or Noun*, is always expressed as ACTING *upon* or *relating to*, that *Noun, or Subject* : Because ALL RELATING *is* ACTING ; and, accordingly, it is expressed by the VERB TO RELATE. Hence EVERY PREPOSITION, placed between Two Nouns, is the SIGN OF AN ACTION between these Nouns : Which is a thing infinitely differing from the *Sign of a Command to us to perform Any Action* with regard to them ; as would be the Office of an *Imperative*,—were it placed between these Nouns.

The propriety, and force, of construing the Word

—“BENEATH”—as is done above, will appear more clearly if we *vary the example*. Thus, if we say, “The Trees seen **OVER** the *Hill* ;” there is no one who will dispute that this carries the very same import as “*The Trees seen* **OVERTOPPING** the *Hill*.”—Here, then, we have the Preposition—“**OVER**”—expressed in its *true Progressive Verbal Form*. And this Word, **OVERTOPPING**, might certainly be construed—**OVERING** ;—which (as well as many other Words of a similar Idiom) is *perfectly vernacular in our Language*, and affords a conspicuous example of the rationality which must attend construing many *disguised Prepositions* upon this Principle.

Thus it appears, from the above example, that there are, (fortunately,) still remaining a number of “*roots*” (and *trunks also*) of **REAL** Prepositions, in their *proper Verbal* or what are called *Participial Forms* ;—a number fully sufficient to answer all the demands of **ETYMOLOGY**, when I shall come to put the question to **HER**, upon the score of **DERIVATION**: Which I shall certainly do, at large, in its proper place. At present; or, indeed, in the result; I am very indifferent although it should never appear that this, or that, Particular Preposition has ever actually carried the Form which I shall ascribe to it: It is the **GENERAL PRINCIPLE ALONE**, and Not the History of **EVERY SINGLE** Preposition, that it is important to establish upon certain and indubitable ground.

SECTION SECOND.

OF THE GENERAL NATURE AND OFFICE OF MINOR VERBS.

SUBSECTION I.

General Remarks on the doctrine of Grammarians with regard to the Nature and Use of Prepositions — Mr. Tooke's Theory of Prepositions more prejudicial to Grammar than that advanced by Mr. Harris.

To speak here, in the first place, of the doctrine entertained by Grammarians in general concerning the Nature and Use of Prepositions ; I observe, it has been usually understood, that Any of these Words denote Some "RELATION" (*as it was and is absurdly called*) of Things or of One Noun to Another. And it has been farther supposed, that Prepositions originally denoted only Relations of SPACE ; and, that they were subsequently applied, in a figurative or analogous sense, to signify Moral and Other Relations.

Now the leading remark which it appears requisite to be offered, with regard to this general doctrine, is to observe, that there is a small approximation to truth in the assumptions it entertains : but, at the same time, to suggest that the

whole comprehends so large and serious an extent of error, as has in effect buried the Nature of Language, with regard to this part of its Structure, in the most profound darkness.

First therefore, I state, that, although Prepositions certainly do signify RELATIONS BETWEEN Things; and though the Prepositions which were earliest in use (owing to the more immediate demand for them) do, by their PARTICULAR import, literally denote Relations in Space, and were afterwards employed analogically to signify also Moral and Intellectual Relations; yet it is to be objected here, as a truth which has been rigorously had in evidence in the foregoing parts of this treatise, that, in employing the phrase—"A RELATION" OF *One Noun or Thing* "TO *Another*," Grammarians have had *No Conception of Any Object except that of the RELATIVENESS of One Noun or Thing to Another*. What THEY call a "RELATION" is Nothing but a RELATIVE SUBJECT OR CO-AGENT, *viewed with reference to SOME OTHER RELATIVE SUBJECT*. And, as for ANY MIDDLE THING OR BRIDGE OF CONNECTION *necessarily interposed between Every Two Relative Subjects*, they never so much as dreamed either of the existence or the possibility of such Connectors. Hence, When Grammarians talk of Prepositions as denoting the RELATIONS OF One Noun to Another; and When I assert that Prepositions denote RELATIONS BETWEEN Two Nouns, They and I no more assert the Same Nature, or Office, of Prepositions, than if *They* had affirmed Prepositions to be LINES, and *I* had affirmed

them to be ANGLES. And I may very safely affirm, that it could not produce a more profound Absurdity and Confusion in Geometry to assert that LINES ARE ANGLES, than it does in Grammar to assert that RELATED SUBJECTS ARE RELATIONS.

In point of fact I may observe, although it will at first sight appear, to the generality of readers, to be a most extravagant assertion, that PREPOSITIONS (inasmuch as they are VERBS) and ANGLES are Things of ONE SAME GENERAL NATURE: For Each of these Things is an INTERPOSED OBJECT, necessarily CREATED BETWEEN *Two* RELATED Subjects, IN THEIR LOGICAL ACTION *with Each Other*.

The natural consequence of the grand logical mistake here again adverted to, with regard to the Structure of the Category of Relation, has been, that Grammarians in general have been altogether bewildered in their conjectures concerning the *Sort of Objects* which So-called Prepositions represent, and have fallen into the most ridiculous conceits with respect to the Nature of these Objects: Some writers having, even, supposed them to perform an Office of parade, and to serve as *running footmen* to the Nouns which they precede: While the Author of HERMES, on the other hand, has assumed these Words not to have any meaning of their own, or, in other words, *Not to represent or be a Sign of ANY OBJECT*; but to serve as PEGS OR NAILS, which make *Two Words or Grammatical Signs of Objects* "COALESCE," *that otherwise would not* "UNITE:" in which supposed Office, the Preposition, or at

least the Nail which it is feigned to represent, DISAPPEARS from our logical view, and is not supposed to exist as *Any Distinct Object*, of the Nature of a BRIDGE BETWEEN the *Two Related Nouns* which it connects, such as I shall uniformly maintain it is.

The doctrine of Prepositions taught by Mr. Harris is manifestly formed with a view, although a most erroneous view, to the Category of Relation: and, vast as is the fallacy which it involves, it was, perhaps, the nearest approach to truth that could have resulted from the Conception which all Logicians and Grammarians had invariably entertained of that Category. Its grand mistake consists in a confounding of the CONNECTION of *Two Grammatical Objects* by the MEDIUM OF A THIRD ONE, into a mere COALESCENCE or COMBINATION of the said *Two Objects* into a supposed UNITY without Any Third One appearing between them as their LOGICAL CONNECTOR; than which, No Two Logical Conceptions can, or must, be more distinct, both in LOGIC and in GRAMMAR; nor any, the confounding of which could introduce more deplorable confusion into philosophy.

The doctrine of Harris has been followed by that of Tooke; which has been considered as having swept away the former, from all philosophical considerations. Instead of the *No Objects* represented by Prepositions according to Harris; these Words possess an *Absolute Intrinsic* meaning according to Tooke. And we have been called upon, in the foregoing pages, to observe WHAT is this meaning; Or, WHAT ARE THE OB-

JECTS which these Words represent. Now it has appeared, in the extracts already given, that Prepositions are asserted by Mr. Tooke to represent, or rather to be themselves, SOME of them IMPERATIVES, and OTHERS of them NOUNS: And the Use assigned by him to these Words, is to SAVE AN INFINITY OR MULTIPLICITY OF COMPLEX TERMS *in Language*; the *manner* of doing which, moreover, we have seen described.

I have deemed it, here, to be a matter of philosophical justice, to place the Substance of these two celebrated Grammatical Theories side by side; for the purpose of comparing them together and of drawing a fair conclusion between their respective merits. And in so doing, I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion, that the Theory put forth by the Author of HERMES, is far less unphilosophical, or gratuitously visionary, than that of the Philologer of Purley. Upon this subject, therefore, I must beg to observe, that the reading community has labored under a profound mistake with regard to the nature of that triumph, or at least that advantage, which is generally supposed to have been obtained by Mr. Tooke, over Mr. Harris. In the following general remarks, I shall state what appears to me to be the principal amount of the difference between the Two Schemes, or Writers, in question; in so far as regards their respective doctrines concerning Prepositions.

Both of these writers were equally and utterly in the dark with regard to the LOGICAL OR GRAMMATICAL OBJECT which Any Preposition repre-

sents ; which (I am to shew) is that of a BRIDGE, presenting to our Logical view its *Fair and Distinct Arch, or Volume, interposed between Any Two Nouns.*

Both of them were equally, THOUGH OPPOSITELY, mistaken with regard to Any Preposition's having a *meaning or representation*, or no *meaning or representation*. Mr. Harris assumed Any Word called a Preposition to signify No Object of Conception, *even when it was duly associated between Two Nouns and was thus performing the Office of a Preposition.* Mr. Tooke, on the other hand, assumed Any Word called a Preposition to be a Preposition *even when it was Not associated with Any Noun, or Word* ; that is, he asserted the Words called Prepositions to be Prepositions *absolutely and intrinsically*, without at all supposing that their Grammatical Import as Prepositions depend upon each of them being INTERPOSED between Some Two Words, operating for the moment as Nouns. Now I have shewn at large, in the Fourth Section of the foregoing Chapter, that Mr. Tooke's doctrine of the *Absolute Grammatical Character of Words* is altogether without foundation in reality, and is in the highest degree absurd : And, though Mr. Harris's Theory of Prepositions is manifestly false in this respect, it is certain that Mr. Tooke's is no less false and unphilosophical.

As a third consideration ; Mr. Harris has not indulged in any visionary or gratuitous conceit concerning the USE of Prepositions, other than that of assuming them to be a SPECIES OF CONNECTIVES of Words : Although he has *vitiating and*

confounded these CONNECTIVES, into CONJUNCTIVES. Whereas Mr. Tooke has feigned a Utility for Prepositions which in reality is no better than a DRAMA—or what Lord Bacon has called, in Philosophy, an IDOL OF THE THEATRE.

After stating this comparison, I am led to affirm, agreeably to what I before intimated, that I think the Theory of Prepositions furnished by Mr. Tooke is more prejudicial to the advancement of the Philosophy of Grammar, than that proposed by Mr. Harris. In other words I assert, that, much as Mr. Harris has carried Grammar out of the way of truth, the Theory of Mr. Tooke has carried it still farther. And, although the latter has certainly let in a light of a certain kind from the regions of ETYMOLOGY; the change which he has thereby effected is only a change from *darkness* to *illusion*: The latter of which I apprehend to be much more bewildering than the former. The Etymological light let in by Mr. Tooke, I freely grant, has been calculated to awaken curiosity, and to excite inquiry: It is herein, and herein alone, that I deem the Philologer of Purley to have gained a great triumph, or advantage, over the Author of Hermes. It has been justly observed, that every new and well founded doubt in Science is a negative discovery. Mr. Tooke's discovery, with regard to Prepositions, has been much more than negative: but, still, I affirm, it has been most indefinite and most ILLUSORY: and I may add, that it was rendered a much more difficult labor to unveil the face of Grammar, from the illusive aspect which has been feigned for it

by this eminent Etymologist; than it would have been to have started from that Total Darkness in which Mr. Harris left the Subject,—if it be true that a traveller, who is staid from being benighted, is in a less trying and difficult case than one who has been misguided into a devious road, through which he has to retrace his steps.

In fine; I consider Mr. Harris to have proceeded, in his Theory, like a Philosopher, although like a *mistaken* Philosopher, who was endeavouring to erect the Structure of Grammar upon that false Foundation of Logic which had been handed down to him from the Ancients; and to which, unhappily for his own literary fame, he had ever looked up with an implicit idolatry. While that of Mr. Tooke, elated by his successful excursion into the regions of Etymology, and by the apparent advantage he had gained over Harris as well as other Grammarians, has been that of a strong but too self-confident Mind, which at the same time was incumbered by the most inveterate prejudices against “PHILOSOPHY,” and neglected that due circumspection, or use of his great and undoubted powers, which was requisite for a complete rational investigation of his subject.

I have thought it certainly due, both to the genius and merits of Mr. Harris and to a thorough understanding of Grammar, to state the above comparison and result; with a view to correct the general opinion of the Subject, which has been greatly too much at that writer's expense. But I have carried this consideration as far as was requisite: And I shall proceed, now, to state what

I suppose to be an analysis of the Part of Speech called Prepositions. It remains, therefore, in great part, for the sequel to shew, Whether the Principles of the Subject which I am going to hazard, are of a Nature that can entitle them to a better claim to the title of Scientific, or Philosophical, than is due to those celebrated but contending Theories which I have herein presumed to criticise.

SUBSECTION II.

General Definition of the Nature of Minor Verbs, by Grammarians called Prepositions.—Suggestion of the Triplicate Structure of Action ; Upon which Structure is founded a Principal Class of Minor Verbs.

As I have already been led, (for the requisite purpose of examining Mr. Tooke's Theory,) to lay down, antecedent to proof, a loose definition of that Part of Speech whose Analysis forms the Subject of the present Chapter ; I shall, in the outset of this article, restate its Definition, in more precise or rigorous terms ; and shall depend upon what is to follow, for the justification of it.

EVERY MINOR VERB OR LEGITIMATE SO-CALLED PREPOSITION (for I have said there are So-called Prepositions, and those in high repute, that are NOT LEGITIMATE, that is, are NOT PREPOSITIONS AT ALL) is a VERB. And the *Sole Specific Difference or Differential Circumstance*, which distinguishes a MINOR VERB from a VERB, or which can *convert* the ONE into the OTHER, is, that a MINOR Verb is the Sign of An Action that

is, in *some way*, *Logically and Grammatically* DEPENDENT upon Some Other Action that is *Logically and Grammatically* a PRINCIPAL with respect to the former.

Before I proceed to offer an example, illustrative of this Definition, I merely observe, that not only is there almost a continual occasion, or necessity, to express ONE Grammatically-dependent Action, along with its Principal; but there is very frequently need to express MORE than ONE Such Action. Thus a Number of Actions, consisting of a Principal and Several Grammatically-dependent Ones, are often expressed in a SERIES; in which, Every Succeeding Verb, or the Action of which it is the Sign, is *More* Grammatically-dependent than that which immediately precedes it.

As an Example of Such a Series, I now observe, If we say, "He SPOKE CONCERNING *thwarting* "the Enemy;" We have, in this expression, a Series of *Three Verbs*, which are the Signs of *Three Actions*: And herein we are to note, that the Order of *Logical and Grammatical* Principality, of the Three concatenated Actions in question, is INVERSE to the Order of their *Physical and Moral* Principality, or Consequence. For the Action of THWARTING may be supposed to have been the leading Act of a Battle, in which a hostile fleet was defeated, or destroyed, and the fate of an empire decided; Whereas, Any Thing that *only concerned* it, or *Any Speech* which a man could afterwards make with regard to it, must be of less consequence in a Moral, or a Physical view. But, in a Logical and Grammatical view of the Sen-
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tence, the SPEAKING is the PRINCIPAL Action ; the CONCERNING (of the speaking) is the NEXT PRINCIPAL ; and the *thwarting* (of the Enemy) is the *Least Principal*, or *Most Dependent* Action, of the Three.

Now I have chosen the particular example in question, not only because it serves to illustrate the Principle under consideration, but also especially because it is an instance which displays the co-operation of TWO PREPOSITIONS, in their Office of Minor Verbs. For the Words—*concerning* and *thwarting*—are undeniably Prepositions: The Word—“CONCERNING”—is an acknowledged Preposition in our Language: And the Word—*thwarting*—is equally and indubitably a Preposition ; although it is rarely adverted to as such : It is an established and well known Term in Naval Tactics. Thus, they say, “The Enemy STOOD *thwarting* our Course ;”—“The Enemy CAME *thwarting* our Fore-foot ;”—“The Enemy FELL *athwart*—i. e. *thwarting*—our Hawse.”

In this initiatory example, therefore, I present the reader with indubitable evidence of the *existence and operation of So-called Prepositions IN THEIR REAL AND UNDISGUISED VERBAL FORMS*. And this example alone may serve to carry the discernment of an acutely intuitive mind a considerable way into the true theory of the Subject. It is only requisite that he follow the same course, upon the logical basis of Necessary Principles: Which, if done, cannot fail to conduct him to satisfactory conclusions.

As a corroboration, in the mean time, of what

is now laid down or asserted, I merely remark, that the following String of English Prepositions has been DULY RECOGNISED BY MR. TOOKE HIMSELF. And I confidently trust that their existence in our Language, in their PROPER VERBAL OR WHAT IS CALLED PARTICIPIAL FORMS, must present, to the most diffident, or jealous, or prejudiced reader, an undeniable claim that he should examine well the farther evidences of the Subject which will be brought before him. I furnish this string of Prepositions to the reader, however, Not as the Objects which led *me* to the conclusions that are to follow ; for they certainly did not do so. Far different, indeed, has been the road, and the labor, of deducing the Nature of Prepositions, than that of deriving it from any Etymological Source or Evidence. But, as an Etymological Evidence presented to his hand in the outset, it ought to impress HIM, and urge him to investigate the Subject with all due attention and impartiality ; especially if he be a reader already imbued with the existing doctrines of Grammar, and, of course, biassed in his opinions of the subject. The Words in question are,

“ TOUCHING,” — “ CONCERNING,” — “ REGARD-
 “ ING,” — “ RESPECTING,” — “ RELATING TO,” —
 “ SAVING,” — “ EXCEPTING,” — “ ACCORDING TO,” —
 “ GRANTING,” — “ ALLOWING,” — “ CONSIDERING,”
 — “ NOTWITHSTANDING,” — “ NEIGHBOURING.”

DIV. OF PURLEY, *Vol. 1, page 455.*

The only commentary which I shall at present offer upon this String of Minor Verbs, is to observe, that it furnishes several examples of these So-called

Prepositions' being employed in a SERIES of Two, or More, depending upon Some PRINCIPAL Verb. Thus, to SPEAK RELATING *to* Any Thing, is to SPEAK RELATING *finishing or ending* That Thing. And to ACT ACCORDING *to* Any Thing, is to ACT ACCORDING *finishing* That Thing.

Having laid down the foregoing General Description of the Foundation and Nature of So-called Prepositions ; I shall now proceed to suggest What is the Basis of the Principal and Most Important or Requisite Class of these Words ; and which Class forms, in fact, the Tribe of Minor Verbs that is of most frequent use, or recurrence.

When we attend to the GENERAL NATURE OF ACTION we shall find, that, unless in the case of a very few Acts, (which, perhaps, may claim a distinct consideration,) it is impossible to conceive ANY OUT-AND-OUT ACTION, without conceiving it to have a THREE-FOLD STRUCTURE OR THREE DISTINCT MEMBERS ; Each One of which is in ITSELF AN ACTION : For BEGINNING an Action is ONE ACTION ;—and CONTINUING an Action is ANOTHER ACTION ;—and ENDING an Action is a THIRD ACTION : And Each of these three concatenated Actions is marked by a Peculiarity of Nature, and followed by a Peculiarity of Consequence, which vastly distinguish it from Both the Others and will never admit of its being logically confounded with either of them.

Thus, when we say, “ I BEGIN writing ; ” — “ I

“CONTINUE writing;”—“I END OR FINISH writing;”—we express Three as Distinct Actions as can be : And it is certain that No Part of the Middle Action, of CONTINUING writing, can ever be confounded with the Action of either FINISHING or BEGINNING to write.

Moreover, Not only is the Three-fold Structure of Action, (now suggested,) a Real and Necessary General Truth, and a most serious consideration in Logic : but it is at the same time to be observed, that the MARKING and SIGNIFYING of this Triplicate Structure is a matter of the highest utility, and necessity, in our intercourse with the World around us : It is a thing of continual and indispensable recurrence : We can hardly mention Any Thing, as acting with or upon Another, but we must *Define the Manner* in which this Action TERMINATES, or COMMENCES ; and, often, define BOTH these extremes : And, if we do not thus EXPRESSLY define either of them, we must UNDERSTAND them as being SILENTLY and IMPLIEDLY defined ; because, without such construction, Language would, in great part, be no better than a mere jargon.

For the purpose of distinguishing, and reasoning upon, Any Action that comprehends the Whole Triplicate Structure in question, I have called this KIND by the Name of OUT-AND-OUT ACTIONS. But I shall have no objection if any one, who may in future treat the Subject, should adopt some other denomination ; provided it be not one which will involve him in a tissue of absurdity, when it is too late to retract.

It can hardly be necessary to observe, that *Every Beginning* and *Every Terminating Action* must be Logically and Grammatically DEPENDENT upon the MIDDLE OR CONTINUING Action to which it is attached. Accordingly, therefore, Every Verb that expresses Either a Beginning or a Terminating Action is a DEPENDENT OR MINOR VERB. It will be shewn, immediately, that our Most Ordinary So-called Prepositions are the Verbs which express, or signify, these Beginning and Terminating Actions.

For the purpose of illustrating this by a leading example, I shall employ one which has been made use of, successively, by Mr. Harris and Mr. Tooke, and which is as well adapted to the proposed end as any that could be given.—It is the following—namely,

“Figs come *from* Turkey *to* England.”

Now in this example, it is manifest, that the Action of COMING is, in a Logical and Grammatical Sense, the PRINCIPAL. And the So-called Prepositions—*From* and *To*—I affirm to be the VERBALS—*beginning* and *finishing*; which, *from their interposed situation*, become herein VERBS.

The true Logical and Grammatical analysis of this Sentence, therefore, I affirm to be,—Figs COME, Turkey *beginning* The Coming,—The Coming *finishing or ending* England.

With regard to this exposition, I now remark, that, in it I do not contradict, or deviate from, the Etymology or Derivation of the Words—*To* and *FROM*—furnished by Mr. Tooke himself; any farther than to affirm that what he asserts to be the MERE

AGENT-NOUNS—A BEGINNING and AN ENDING—and assumes that they are NOUNS *while they serve in a Sentence in the Office of Prepositions*; I, on the contrary, affirm to be VERBALS, NECESSARILY CONVERTED INTO VERBS *in Every instance in which they serve as Prepositions, inasmuch as, in this Office, they must be inter-posed between a Nominative and an Objective Noun.* I propose to shew, distinctly, farther on, by what Cause Mr. Tooke was led into the mistake of assuming the Two Words in question to be MERE-AGENT NOUNS, instead of VERBALS—*i. e.* NAMES OF ACTIONS.

I here explain, that the reason of my selecting, for a leading example of the Subject, that one which is furnished above, is, that the Prepositions—FROM and TO—importing BEGINNING and FINISHING—are the PRIMARY OR ABSOLUTE Names of the Two Extreme Actions of EVERY OUT-AND-OUT ACTION. But now it is to be suggested, as being a ground of *Other Ordinary Prepositions*, that Any Beginning, or Any Terminating Action may, besides its ABSOLUTE Character, possess a VARIETY OF RELATIVE Characters or Offices; in doing which, it must be signified by an APPROPRIATE RELATIVE NAME. Thus, for example, if instead of saying “Figs *COME to* England,” we say Figs “*COME by* Sea;”—in this case, we observe, the *finishing or ending* of the Action of COMING does not preserve its ABSOLUTE Name of *finishing or ending*; which, if it did, would be signified by the Word “TO;” but it takes the RELATIVE Name of *touching*; which, I affirm, is herein signified by the Word

“*by*.” And thus, the true import of the Sentence —“Figs COME *by* Sea,”—is Figs COME *touching* Sea.

Now upon this Principle (of the signifying of the *terminating*, or the *beginning* Action, of Any Out-and-out Action, Not by its PRIMARY or ABSOLUTE Name, but by a SECONDARY AND RELATIVE Name,) I affirm it is that All our Ordinary So-called Prepositions, such as IN, WITH, BY, ON, OVER, UNDER, &c. &c. &c. &c. are founded. And, when the time comes for the illustration and proof of this by ETYMOLOGICAL evidence, I propose to shew, in the case of a Number of the most usual and important of these Words, that they have at one time actually existed in our Language, in the FORM OF VERBALS, and in the ACTUAL OFFICE OF VERBS.

In contemplating the operation of the Principle thus laid down, however, it is to be taken in, as an additional and dependent consideration, that many of the Minor Verbs or So-called Prepositions of this Class are not to be understood in a STRICT OR LITERAL SENSE, as signifying the *beginning*, or the *terminating* Action, of Any Out-and-out Action : but they are to be understood in an *analogical*, or a *figurative*, or even a *feigned*, sense ; for which device and interpretation there is an indubitable rational ground. Thus, in the Example already furnished—*namely*—the COMING *by* (i. e. COMING *touching*) Sea—the *touching* is an Action that in strictness is NOT the *terminating* of the Principal Action of COMING ; because No Action can literally terminate the COMING, *except* the Action of *ending* or *finishing* : It follows, therefore,

that the Action of *touching* is signified, herein, only in a figurative, and even a feigned sense, to stand *Relatively* in the stead of the Action of *finishing*; which last, if expressed, would be signified by the Preposition—*to*,—that is—*ending or finishing*.

It does not follow from what is now asserted, that we are to found Any So-called Preposition thus analogically, figuratively, or feignedly, upon either the beginning or the terminating Action of Any Out-and-out Action, in any case except those that appear to demand, or admit of, such device; the selection, or discrimination, of which cases must depend upon an exercise of our Judgment. Because it has already been laid down, that the Sole Specific Difference or Differential Circumstance between a MINOR VERB and a VERB is, that a MINOR VERB expresses Some Action that is Grammatically DEPENDENT upon Some Other Action: And, therefore, it is NOT ESSENTIAL in the Nature of a Minor Verb that it should signify either a beginning or a terminating Action, taking these terms in their literal acceptation, by which they relate DIRECTLY to the PRINCIPAL ACTION itself upon which Every beginning and Every terminating Action depends, while they relate to TIME COLLATERALLY.

This appears to be the stage of analysis for my suggesting, that the Foundation of Prepositions (i.e. Minor Verbs) expressive of Relations of PLACE, or SPACE, have NO LOGICAL PRIORITY in *Language, or in the Nature of Things*. It merely happens, that, (All the Objects of Language, including ourselves, being necessarily immersed in Time and

Space ; and we, consequently, being continually and most seriously affected by the Situations and the Motions of Objects in Space ;) Mankind have, from the beginning of their existence, found it most useful and important to employ Words significant of these Relations. I may here add, that the VERB and the NOUN are as Essentially founded in Relations and Relativeness in SPACE, as can be said of Any Preposition: And I finally observe, that when Any Preposition signifies a Relation in Space it does so by its SPECIAL, INDIVIDUAL, AND PECULIAR import ; and does not do so by its GENERIC NATURE OR BY THE SOLE VIRTUE OF ITS OFFICE AS A PREPOSITION. Every Preposition, indeed, PRESUPPOSES the existence of BOTH TIME AND SPACE : but so, also, does EVERY VERB, and EVERY NOUN, and EVERY ADJECTIVE, and EVERY ADVERB. And the reason of this is, that ALL THE OBJECTS OF LANGUAGE are founded in Time and Space, as being the Necessary Theatre of their Existence and of Any Supposition which we can form concerning them.

It is at the same time true, that Prepositions literally significant of Relations of Space are employed analogically, or figuratively, to express Moral and Intellectual Relations. And out of this device has grown a very extensive use, and utility, of our Ordinary Prepositions.

Previously to the farther discussion of the Subject, it appears requisite, in order to its due illustration, that we should examine the views which have been entertained by Grammarians with regard

to the Triplicate Structure of Action. I proceed therefore, to this consideration, in the next article.

SUBSECTION III.

The Triplicate Structure of Action not adverted to by Mr. Tooke, or by Other Grammarians. Hence One Cause of their not having discerned the Real Nature of Prepositions.

IT becomes necessary, in order to a complete illustration and understanding of the Structure of Language, to shew here, that the Triplicate Structure of Action has not been adverted to by any Writer on Grammar. From which fact it will, in the first place, appear manifestly, (over and above the grand defect of Grammarians' not having taken up any thing like a right Conception of the Category of Relatives and Relation,) that it was impossible for any Grammarian to ground the Principal or Most Useful Class of Prepositions upon its Real Foundation.

If there is any Writer in whose works we might expect, above every other, to meet with some notice, or hint, concerning this matter; it should, certainly, be Mr. Tooke. I shall, therefore, principally here examine, in what manner HE has treated this subject; or, whether he has made any approach to truth, concerning it.

As preparatory to this, it is first requisite to observe, I by no means intend to assert that Grammarians have overlooked altogether the Commencement, the Continuation, and the Ter-

mination or End, of Actions in General. On the contrary, these **THREE STAGES**, of Almost Every Out-and-out Action, are vastly too obvious to remark, and too important in their consequences, to admit of their having escaped observation. What, then, (it may be asked,) do I assert; since I have already affirmed something which, to a hasty or superficial reader, may appear very like a contradiction? I answer: There is no contradiction in the case. But I have stated the subject in this way, with a view to excite adequate attention to its nature, and to a very important Logical Distinction which it involves. The fact is, that Grammarians have discerned the **THREE STAGES OF ACTION** in **ONE SENSE**; but **NOT IN ANOTHER**: And they have discerned these Stages in that Sense which is unphilosophical, or in a great degree useless with respect to Grammar; and have overlooked them in that Other Sense which alone forms the Foundation of the Principal Class of Prepositions, already described. It is requisite, therefore, that I should here point out the Distinction which in reality exists between Any Out-and-out Action as consisting of **ONE ACTION** divided into **THREE STAGES**—namely—a **COMMENCEMENT**,—a **CONTINUATION**,—and an **END**;—and, as consisting of a **TRIPPLICATE STRUCTURE** *or forming* **THREE DISTINCT ACTIONS**—namely—an **ACT OF BEGINNING**,—an **ACT OF CONTINUING**,—and an **ACT OF ENDING**.

That the consequences, both to Logic and to Grammar, of laying down, and reasoning from, this Distinction must be very important; is a

truth which cannot fail to be manifest to every intelligent person who reflects but for a moment upon the Subject. And the overlooking of it, hitherto, affords one, among a number of very remarkable examples, of Philosophical First Truths having been discerned in *One* Sense or Aspect, and *Not in Another* : The consequence of which has been the introduction of vast fallacy and confusion into Human Speculation. I proceed, therefore, to shew, that the matter in question has been altogether overlooked by Mr. Tooke—the most luminous Grammarian of latter times ; and, that the most profound darkness has *at all* times reigned with regard to it.

FIRST, with this view, I observe, as a negative evidence of the fact, that Mr. Tooke no where mentions the THREE ACTIONS of Any Out-and-out Action.

SECONDLY, On the other hand, as a positive evidence of the matter, he employs himself in adverting to and discussing the nature of Action as consisting of THREE STAGES ; and in reasoning from this Principle. In order to put this in evidence, it is necessary to quote this Writer in the following passage. In his *First Volume*, (pages 347, 8,) he makes his fellow Dialogist express himself thus :

B.

“ If then you are right in your explanation of
“ FROM ; (and I will not deny that appearances
“ are hitherto in your favor ;) since FROM means

“ *Commencement* or *Beginning*, To must mean
 “ *End* or *Termination*.—And since we have as
 “ frequently occasion to mention the *termination*,
 “ as we have to mention the *commencement* of
 “ motion or time, no doubt it was as likely that
 “ the word *End* should become a Particle or
 “ Preposition, as the word which signified *Begin-*
 “ *ning*.”

Now the fact that the *beginning* of Motion (which is a Species of Action) is expressed by a NOUN—namely—“ COMMENCEMENT;”—and the *ending* of it is expressed also by a NOUN—namely—“ END OR TERMINATION,”—as is the case in the passage above quoted, is a decisive evidence that the Dialogist—B,—(who is indisputably in accordance with Mr. Tooke on this head,) viewed Action as consisting of a *Beginning*, a *Continuation*, and an *End*, in the Same Sense that we talk of a STICK, or a POST-ROAD, as having these Three Noteable Parts. And the sequel of the passage confirms what goes before it: for, we observe, he talks of “ THE *termination*” and “ THE *commencement*;”—and NOT of *terminating* and *commencing*,—of Motion, or Action, as ought to have been the case if he had viewed Action as being of a TRIPLICATE STRUCTURE.

Mr. Tooke has other expressions which farther confirm this statement; although I deem it quite unnecessary to quote them, at length, for the sake of obtaining their evidence to the fact. And I suppose there can remain no question, but he viewed the *Beginning* and the *Termination*, of Every Out-and-out Action, in that Sense alone

in which we view the ONE END *of* a STAFF and the OTHER END of it.

I conceive we are now brought to a clear discernment of the CAUSE WHY Mr. Tooke, under his views with regard to the Structure of Action, (altogether beside the influence of his *Etymological* views,) was led to conclude that the Prepositions—FROM and TO—are NOUNS, importing COMMENCEMENT and TERMINATION; instead of discerning that they MUST BE VERBS, as being significant of the ACTIONS of *beginNING* and *terminaTING*. And hereupon I shall first proceed to shew how he has applied his Theory, or Assumption, in the interpretation of Language: And shall afterwards explain, that his Derivation of the Word—FROM—is, in substance, contradicted by Dr. Murray; who, on the other hand, in effect, bears out the Etymology or Grammatical import which I have ascribed to this Preposition.

In his *First Volume*, page 342, Mr. Tooke says, “From means BEGINNING, and nothing else. It “is simply the Anglo-saxon and Gothic NOUN “FROM, *Beginning, Origin, Source, Fountain, Au- “thor.*”

Again, in page 345, he says,

“The Larum rang BEGINNING Morning;”

“i. e. Morning being the *time* of its BEGIN-

“NING to ring.”

This, also, he explains, just before, upon the assumption that “FROM relates to every thing to “which a Beginning relates, and to nothing else,

“and, therefore, is referable to *Time* as well as
“motion.”

Farther back, he says,

“Figs come—BEGINNING Turkey ;”

that is,

“Turkey the *Place* of BEGINNING to come.”

Now I affirm, that, in the Construction which Mr. Tooke has put upon each of these several examples, he has been misled by the joint influence of his darkness with regard to the Category of Relation,—his misconception of the Real Structure of Action,—and his imperfect knowledge of the Dialects upon which he has built his Etymological Assumptions,—to ascribe a wrong Grammatical Character to the Word FROM, and a wrong Logical import to the Sentences which contain it : Although, at the same time, I all along admit that FROM means BEGINNING ; i. e. the Word BEGINNING, CONSIDERED *as a VERBAL and CONVERTIBLE INTO a VERB.*

In order to illustrate this objection ; I observe, in the First place, that it is the constant practice of Mankind to express, Not only *Men, or Persons*, but equally INANIMATE THINGS,—and TIMES,—and PLACES,—and even Passions or Thoughts,—as being the AGENTS of Actions. Thus the Historian, in his appropriate phraseology, tells us that “ ENGLAND *began* the War ;” Or, “ FRANCE “ *ended* the Negociation.” We say, “ YOUTH *begins* our Hopes :” and “ AGE *ends* the Delusion.” —And, in this way, Every Object in Nature is occasionally and daily personified, as being Actors in

the Great Theatre of the World. Now upon this Principle I affirm it is, that the Sentences, furnished as examples by Mr. Tooke, must be construed : For, (*beside the Necessary Principles which rigorously demonstrate that Every Preposition MUST be a VERB,*) nothing can be more *natural* than this mode of interpretation.

Thus, in the case of “ *Figs COMING ;*” we might, with the greatest fitness, say, *either* ANTONIO—THE MERCHANT—*begin-ing* the COMING, or TURKEY *begin-ing* the COMING : And thus, I conclude, the Analysis of the Sentence must run as follows ; as I have already once before suggested :

“ Figs COME *from* Turkey *to* England ;”

i. e. Figs COME,—Turkey *beginning* the Coming, —The Coming *ending* England.

In offering this exposition of the matter, I must request of my readers, (as Mr. Tooke, in a similar case, has done before me,) not to suffer the novelty, or strangeness of appearance, to operate against the reason of the thing. And, indeed, I may safely assert that the appearance of it, while it is strictly founded in reason, is far less strange than is exhibited in very many of the Etymological Expositions of our best Philologists. This caution, perhaps, is more than was necessary : but I trust, at least, that it must prove effectual, and fully sufficient.

It may not be superfluous, here, to remind the reader, that, in the Construction of the Sentence which is now offered, the PRINCIPLE OF THE ALTERNATION OF A VERB IN A SENTENCE operates, and must

be followed in the interpretation of it ; as it must also, in Every Other Sentence, in All Language, that happens to be *Sufficiently Complex* to admit of this Law. For the PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATION is the GREATEST PRINCIPLE in the Whole Structure of Language ; and, as I have already said, it forms, as it were, the AXIS upon which the Entire Fabric revolves. I may, perhaps, put it here again in the recollection of the reader, that this Principle gives to the Structure of Language a SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE, by which it deviates, in a very remarkable manner, from The GENERIC STRUCTURE OF AN ARCHITECTURAL BRIDGE ;— which specialty consists in the fact, that EVERY ARCH in a *Complex Bridge of Language* must serve, *alternately*, AS AN ARCH and AS A PIER ; whereas, the ARCHES of an Ordinary Bridge, (Any More than the Piers,) *can never change their Name, or Character.*

I next proceed to shew, that there is a palpable absurdity in Mr. Tooke's exposition of the examples in question, even upon his own shewing ; and such a one as would completely explode his Theory, although no other could be offered in its stead. We have seen that he says,

“ Figs come, beginning Turkey ; that is Turkey the *Place* of beginning to come.”

and,

“ The Larum rang BEGINNING morning, i. e. Morning being the *Time* of its beginning to ring.”

The criticisms which I shall here offer upon the

First of these examples, will apply also to the *Second* and to Every Other such case.

And, certainly, it is to be admitted, in the first place, that TURKEY is the PLACE where the COMING of the Figs begins. But, for this very reason, the Word—"FROM"—*cannot possibly mean this PLACE*; because TURKEY is the NAME of this PLACE, and THIS NAME is here EXPRESSLY PUT FOR this Place; and, hence, the Word—"FROM"—must necessarily mean SOMETHING ELSE, and NOT THIS PLACE.

Collaterally with this, I observe, that, when the assumed AUTHOR, or SOURCE, of any coming, happens to be ITSELF A PLACE, (and Mr. Tooke asserts that "FROM" means "AUTHOR," or "SOURCE,") it must, then, be a manifest exhibition of Jargon to talk of the PLACE of the SOURCE; because, in the ASSUMED case, the PLACE IS THE SOURCE.

As a still farther consideration, I remark, that even the absurd mention of the PLACE under the *Two Different Names*, of TURKEY and of SOURCE OR PLACE, is *not sufficient* to make out Mr. Tooke's exposition: but he is obliged to extend the Speech, by introducing ANOTHER PREPOSITION,—"Tur-
"key the PLACE OF beginning to come." And here we are to take notice, that, according to Mr. Tooke, the Word OF is a Noun, as well as the word FROM;—and, in point of fact, he asserts that it means the *Very Same Thing* as the Word FROM—namely—AUTHOR, or SOURCE: And thus, we have "TURKEY" for ONE SOURCE; and FROM and OF for TWO OTHER SOURCES; and all these

Three Names expressed in order to signify the SOURCE of Figs *coming*.

Here I must not be understood as intending to deny, that Several Prepositions may, logically, succeed each other in a connected Series: I have already shewn, that this is a very frequent case. But, along with this it must always be taken, that a SERIES of PREPOSITIONS is a SERIES of ALTERNATE VERBS. As for a SERIES OF CONNECTED NOUNS, (unless they form ONE CONTINUED NOUN, as being All explanatory of One Same Identical Thing,) put as pretending to form, or even to be employed in, Any Speech, or Sentence; it is an absurdity so thick, and palpable in its aspect, that LOGIC,—PHILOSOPHY,—COMMON SENSE,—must equally wash their hands of it. Now, assuredly, Mr. Tooke, or any Grammarian for him, would not for a moment pretend that the THREE DISTINCT NAMES OR WORDS—"TURKEY"—"PLACE"—and "OF"—are all requisite for the mere purpose of signifying that TURKEY is the SOURCE of Figs coming.

I trust that the bare statement of the foregoing considerations is much more than sufficient to explode the exposition of the Word—"FROM,"—as given by Mr. Tooke: but I will now conclude the argument by citing the account of this Word which has been given by Dr. Murray; in which, it will be seen that he, in effect, offers a Derivation of it that agrees with the view of the Subject which I have here deduced from Necessary Principles. At the same time, however,

I give notice, that this is not the part of my work wherein I propose to enter appropriately upon Etymological Ground: but I merely indulge this incidental citation, owing to the importance of its bearing upon Mr. Tooke's example, now under discussion.

“ In Teutonic, FRAGM or FRAM means *originating, running, proceeding*. Frogma, which is the derivative of FRAG, run, through the medium of the preterite, is in use for a root, or beginning. The reader must here recollect that to begin is itself from BI, upon, and GAN, to go; BEGIN and BI-GANG, to set a going.”

“ HIST. OF THE EUR. LANG. Vol. 2, page 24.”

Here, then, we have the full Etymological History of the Word—FROM.—And here it is expressly evident, that, although this Word naturally came to be in use for “ A Root,” or *Beginning* ;” (in which use it is, certainly, an AGENT-Noun, as Mr. Tooke asserts it is, and Not a VERBAL Noun) yet, IT WAS IN ITS ORIGIN A VERBAL, as I affirm it was. Dr. Murray begins his account by saying, that FROM means the PARTICIPLES “ ORIGINATING, RUNNING, PROCEEDING.” Now these are all VERBALS ; which want nothing but *inter-position* between Two Other Words (operating at the moment as Nouns) to convert them into VERBS: Whereas the AGENT-Noun—“ AN ORIGIN,” “ A SOURCE,” or “ AN AUTHOR,”—(which is Mr. Tooke's assumption of the matter,) CANNOT IN ANY SITUATION *be converted into a Verb*.

In fine ; It is conclusive, here, that the Word

FROM, according to the Derivation given of it by Dr. Murray, is the *Progressive or So-called Participial Form* of the VERB TO BEGIN, as I confidently affirm it is.

To this amount of evidence I shall only add, that the assumption of Any Preposition's being a MERE AGENT-Noun,—(by which I mean ANY NOUN *that is* NOT the Name of SOME ACTION, and therefore is NOT IN ANY case convertible into a Verb,)—is an absurdity of the grossest kind in Language, and is precisely analogous to asserting that a BANK OR SUPPORTING PRINCIPLE is ONE SAME LOGICAL OBJECT, or SUBJECT, as a BRIDGE OR CONNECTING PRINCIPLE.

Although the citation of Tooke's views, with regard to the Structure of Action, might alone be sufficient for the purpose here intended; yet, it would not be doing strict justice to the Subject, were I to conclude it without at all adverting to what has been laid down on this head by Mr. Harris; because it will be seen that his account involves the views of the Ancient Grammarians, with regard to it. For this purpose, therefore, I quote the following passage from his HERMES.

In Chap. 4, Book 2d, (which I believe is the only place wherein he approaches the subject at all,) he says, “Among the various Relations of Substantives denoted by Prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the *Term* or *Point* which something commences

“FROM, and the *Term or Point* which something
“tends to. These Relations the *Greeks* and
“*Latins* thought of so great importance, as to dis-
“tinguish them, when they occurred, *by peculiar*
“*Terminations of their own*, which exprest their
“force *without the help of a Preposition*. Now it
“is here we behold the Rise of the ancient Geni-
“tive, and Dative; the Genitive *being formed to*
“*express all Relations commencing FROM itself*;
“THE DATIVE, *all Relations tending TO ITSELF*.
“Of this there can be no stronger proof, than the
“Analysis of these Cases in the modern Lan-
“guages, which we have mentioned already.”

Now, this “*Term or Point* which something
“commences FROM;” and this “*Term or Point*
“which something tends to,” as asserted by Mr.
Harris and the Ancient Grammarians, are Two
Points, *either of SPACE or of TIME*, put by them
instead of “the COMMENCEMENT” and “the Ter-
“mination” of Any Action according to Mr.
Tooke. And it is always to be admitted, that to
mark, and to *signify*, the ACTION THAT OCCUPIES
each of these Points, UNDER SOME ASPECT
OR ANOTHER, is a matter of the first importance
to Language; insomuch, that, as I have already
said, these TWO EXTREMES of Every Out-and-
out Action, (when they are duly viewed AS
BEING THEMSELVES ACTIONS *depending upon their*
PRINCIPAL,) form the OBJECTS represented by
what may be called the TWO FUNDAMENTAL
Prepositions or Minor Verbs in Language—namely
—FROM and TO; since these Two Words are the
ABSOLUTE Names of Any beginning and Any ter-

minating Action, and a large Proportion of ALL OTHER Minor Verbs may be said, in ONE SENSE OR ANOTHER, to be a SORT of beginning or terminating Actions, or, at least, may be figured as being such, in the Structure of any Sentence in which they appear. It is plain, therefore, that I entirely concur with Mr. Harris and his Greek and Latin Authorities, in the IMPORTANCE of marking and signifying SOMETHING THAT CO-INCIDES with the Points in question. And it only remains that I should here, first point out and clear up a serious error and confusion which are interwoven with the view of Mr. Harris and the Ancient Grammarians, as above quoted: and then conclude, by offering a general observation with regard to the Cause of their not having discerned that Prepositions are Signs of Actions.

In the First place, then, I observe, that “The POINT OR TERM which Some Thing,” (i. e. Some Action) “commences FROM,” and “The POINT OR TERM which Some Thing,” (i. e. Some Action) tends TO, *never is, and never can be*, the Object of Any Preposition:” Because the Object signified by Any Preposition (*except only* Any Preposition that signifies a Relation between Some Two Parts of SPACE ITSELF, or TIME ITSELF) must be a Relation (that is a Link of Connection) between Some Two Subjects that OCCUPY or MEASURE *Some Portion*, or Point, of SPACE, or TIME. Thus, in the example given by both Tooke and Harris—namely—

“The Larum RANG *from* Morn TILL night,”—
The *Preposition*—“FROM”—does NOT signify

the POINT OF TIME when the singing began : Because, agreeably to what I have already laid down with regard to Mr. Tooke's example of "*Figs coming*," I affirm that it is the NOUN—"MORN"—that signifies this POINT OF TIME : And the *Preposition*—"FROM"—signifies the *beginning* of the RINGING ; which ACTION, OF BEGINNING, is CO-EVAL OR CO-INCIDENT with that POINT OF TIME CALLED "MORN." And here, I observe, it is a self-evident truth, that EVERY ACTION between Any Two Subjects in TIME, OR IN SPACE, must be as DIFFERENT A THING from EITHER *Time or Space*, as a MAN, or a HORSE, is Different from the *Time*, or the *Space*, which he *occupies or measures*.

Now, the *consequence* of the important distinction which I have here last pointed out, is, that, whenever we desire to signify in One Same Speech or Sentence BOTH a BEGINNING ACTION AND the PLACE, or TIME, of its beginning ; if we wish to do this in the *strictest and simplest manner*, we must consider the PLACE, or TIME, as being an AGENT,—that is as being the BEGINNER. The Mode of effecting this purpose, in the case of SPACE, OR PLACE, I have already shewn, in the exposition which I offered of the Sentence—"Figs COME *from Turkey to England*." And the Mode of effecting the same in the case of TIME OR SEASON, I conceive to be the following—namely—When it is said,

"The Larum RANG *from Morn till Night*:"

This means,

Anal.

The Larum RANG, Morn *beginning* the RINGING, The Ringing *ending or finishing* Night.

This proceeding is founded in *Necessity*: Because *Every Beginning* and *Every Ending Action* are related to their PRINCIPAL ACTION DIRECTLY; so that the *Whole Three Actions*, of Any Out-and-out Action, form a *Logical Chain of Three Links*, *extended onward as it were in a Right Line*: Whereas, this *Whole Chain*, and *Every One of its Links*, relate to SPACE, or to TIME, ONLY COLLATERALLY; since this Chain of Action exists SIDE BY SIDE with the Parts, or Points, of the *Space*, and the *Time*, which it MEASURES, as any Ordinary Chain lies measuring the ground, or any other such thing.

Hence it follows, that, if we desire to mark or signify BOTH the RINGING of a Larum and the TIME when it begins to ring, we must do this by One of Two Ways; That is, we must either consider the TIME (say the MORNING) as being the Leading AGENT OR BEGINNER of the ringing; and then we say, "MORN BEGINNING the ringing:" Or else, we must express the Time by the introduction of an ADDITIONAL PHRASE—thus,—The Larum *began* RINGING AT Day-break. In like manner, in the case of a *finishing* Action, we say "the Battle continued the Whole Day;—NIGHT *ending the* FIGHTING:" Which is of the same import as "the FIGHTING *ending* AT Night."

In fine, therefore, I observe, that the OBJECT of certain Prepositions assumed by Mr. Harris and the Ancient Grammarians—namely—a POINT or TERM where Any Thing commences from, or

leads to—(whether this be meant of SPACE, or of TIME) is STILL MORE UNREAL than that assumed by Mr. Tooke: Because the latter at least supposed THESE Prepositions to have, for their OBJECT, a THING IN *Space*, or *Time*,—namely—The COMMENCEMENT, or The TERMINATION of MOTION OR ACTION; and NOT a Point of SPACE, or of TIME, itself; although he did not discern that the Words—*Commencement* and *Termination*, when they regard MOTION OR ACTION,—are *Nothing but* ABSTRACT Names employed for *commencing* and *terminating*; both which last are the REAL CONCRETE NAMES OF ACTIONS, and therefore are VERBALS, convertible into VERBS.

Of course, I do not here advert to Mr. Tooke's GENERAL doctrine of the Use of Prepositions; which asserts that these Words are employed to *save a multiplicity of Complex Terms* in Language.

It remains, then, that I should advert, (as I proposed,) to the Cause Why the Grammarians, who have treated the Subject prior to the Speculations of Mr. Tooke, did not discern that Prepositions are Signs of Actions. And, in what has been advanced, it is conclusively evident that the reason of the oversight has been of a two-fold nature—namely—*First*, their not having viewed Actions, in general, as consisting each of *Three Concatenated Actions*;—and,—*Secondly*,—Their never having discerned that AN ACTION is a LOGICAL LINK (i. e. a RELATION) *between* SOME TWO Subjects, and is NOT an “ATTRIBUTE” of ANY ONE “Subject or Nominative.”

Having thus animadverted upon the different Views of the Philologer of Purley and of the Author of *Hermes*, respectively, with regard to the Nature of Prepositions; including also the reference which the last mentioned Writer has made to the Greek and Latin Grammarians; I shall now drop this consideration, and proceed, in the next article, with the sequel of the analysis.

The only observation which I shall add, in this place, is to remind my readers, that, although the greater part of this Subsection appears to be taken up in demonstrating the Nature of ONLY TWO So-called Prepositions—namely—*To and From*—yet, the Nature of these Two Minor Verbs involves, in fact, the Basis of what may, in one sense or another, be considered as a great part of the Whole Denomination of Minor Verbs; and contains, at least, the Basis of ALL THE MOST USEFUL AND REQUISITE of these Verbs.

SUBSECTION IV.

1. *Continuation of the Analysis of So-called Prepositions, as founded in Necessary Principles.*—2. *Remarks on the View of Prepositions entertained by Dr. Murray.*

From the whole of what has been advanced in the foregoing pages, in demonstrating that Part of Speech heretofore called Prepositions, it is plain that the following statement comprises the General Laws of their Nature.

FIRST. The SOLE DIFFERENTIAL CIRCUMSTANCE which constitutes a SO-CALLED PREPOSITION OR MINOR VERB, *as distinguished SPECIFICALLY from ANY OTHER VERB*, is the MERE CIRCUMSTANCE OF DEPENDENCE: The various manner of expressing which has already been described.

SECONDLY. But, owing to the *Triplicate Structure of Actions in general*; and, to the *continual occurrence and importance* of Actions between All the Objects, or Subjects, in the World around us; it HAPPENS, that the MOST USEFUL OR REQUISITE CLASS OR TRIBE of Minor Verbs we have, is that Sort which signifies (either by an *Absolute Name* or a *Relative Name*) the BEGINNING and the TERMINATING ACTS of *Out-and-out Actions*.

Thus, for example, we may say either, “He GOES *to* London,” that is “He GOES *ending* London;” Or, “He GOES *by* the Coach;” that is “He GOES *touching* the Coach:” In which case we observe, that, in the *First* of these examples, the *Action of ending* is signified by its *Primary and Absolute Name*; whereas, in the *Second*, the *Action of ending* is signified *by only a Relative Name*—that is by the Word “*touching*.” And here, if instead of either of these expressions, we had said, “He GOES *with* Despatches;” this would have meant—“He GOES *tying* Despatches:” which Word—“*tying*”—is only *Another Relative Name* for the *Action of ending*.

THIRDLY. Although it is true, in logical strictness, that those Most Requisite Minor Verbs which signify Beginning and Terminating Actions,

(whether it be by their *Absolute* or by their *Relative* Names,) amount only to a very Limited Number, and, in fact, form but a *small proportion of All the Minor Verbs in Language*; yet, in the Ordinary and Natural Structure of Speech, there appears a Logical Ground for viewing a Very Large Proportion of ALL THE OTHER Minor Verbs in Language, as being, either in a *figurative sense*, or at least in the PLACE which they occupy in a Sentence, significant of Beginning or Terminating Actions.

Thus, for example, If we say, "He stood supporting Her:" In this case, we observe, that the Minor Verb—"supporting;" although it expresses an Action which, from its beginning to its end, must have been *contemporaneous with*, and certainly was in *No Sense ending*, the Action of STANDING; appears, in this Sentence, to *terminate* the Action of STANDING; and is, indeed, over and above its Syntactical Appearance, the MORAL END of "His STANDING." Along with this consideration, however, it is *always to be remembered*, that it is the CIRCUMSTANCE OF DEPENDENCE; and NOT NECESSARILY the Circumstance of being, in ANY SENSE, either a BEGINNING or a TERMINATING Action; that ESSENTIALLY constitutes a MINOR VERB, as distinguished from a VERB.

Having laid down these Grammatical Laws of the Part of Speech now under discussion, as deduced by reasoning from Necessary Truths; and to be yet collaterally evidence upon *Distinct Appropriate Etymological Ground*; I shall, in the present

Subsection, conclude the RATIONAL Analysis of this Element of Language, by stating such Subordinate Principles and Illustrations as appear to be requisite in this part of my work.

FIRST, therefore, I observe, that, according to the Laws of Minor Verbs thus delineated, it follows, that ALMOST EVERY NAME OF ACTION IN ALL LANGUAGE *may serve, occasionally, for a MINOR VERB*: Because Every Name of Action in Language, whatever, may serve as a VERB; in order to do which, it is only necessary that Such Name be *interposed* between *Any Two Other Words*, serving at that moment in the office of *Syntactical Nouns*: And ANY VERB WHATEVER must be EITHER a VERB or a MINOR VERB, accordingly as it stands for the Sign of a PRINCIPAL Action or of a DEPENDENT One, *viewed entirely in a Logical and Grammatical Sense.*

The Vast FIELD, as well as NUMBER, of So-called Prepositions which this General Corollary presents to our view, will, doubtless, strike every reader who is imbued in the existing doctrines of Grammar with great surprise. And much, indeed, does it militate against the notable assertion of Mr. Tooke, (in page 299 of his *First Volume*,) “that of different languages, the least corrupt will have the fewest Prepositions: and, in the same language, the best Etymologist will acknowledge the fewest.” While at the same time, it puts an end to all the difficulties and differences of opinion which have hitherto subsisted between Grammarians, as to the *Number* of Prepositions that are Requisite in Language: For the NUMBER of So-

called Prepositions in Language must be just the Number of Actions which we ever signify as being, *in Any Sense*, GRAMMATICALLY DEPENDENT upon Any Principal Act. Here, then, I redeem the implied pledge, which was given in the Introductory Chapter of this work, when I affirmed, in opposition to the views of Mr. Tooke, that the Most Perfect Language and the Most enlightened People, will have the GREATEST Number of Prepositions. The real truth of the matter is, that *No Language*, and *No People*, can exist without occasionally expressing a *Very Great Number and Variety* of Minor or Dependent Verbs : Every One of which has as good a Title to the Name of PREPOSITION, as Any So-CALLED Preposition in Any Tongue.

It is plain that, in the View which Mr. Tooke has taken of the Subject, he has supposed CORRUPTION OF FORM to be an ESSENTIAL FEATURE in the Character of a *Preposition* : Hence alone he could have supposed, that the Most Perfect Language must have the fewest Prepositions : And hence, alone, he could have imagined that a CORRUPTED NOUN makes a Preposition, as well as a CORRUPTED VERB. But, against this, in the first place, is to be objected the Participial Prepositions which Mr. Tooke himself has recognised in our own Language : And, to this, (without searching farther at present,) may be added the remarkable Tribe of FRENCH Participial Prepositions—namely—DEVANT, —AVANT, —DURANT, —PENDANT, —SUIVANT, —TOUCHANT, —MOYENNANT, &c.,—a Number, most certainly, sufficient to explode any supposition that CORRUPTION is a *Neces-*

sary Element in the Character of this Part of Speech. Besides this, moreover, it may be asked, Is it not a manifest and glaring inconsistency, to suppose, *First*, that No Word can be a Preposition until it be corrupted or disguised; and, *Secondly*, along with this, to affirm that Prepositions are *Necessary* to Language, and are employed therein *to prevent Complex Terms from being too numerous*: both which Principles, or Assumptions, together, have been asserted by Mr. Tooke.

At this stage of the Subject, (for the credit of Philosophy or Human Understanding,) I humbly conceive there is a manifest necessity for dropping, once and for ever, the NAME—PREPOSITION,—in Language;—a Name which, whensoever it may be mentioned, must exhibit a monument of that profound darkness under which the Inventors of this Name, and all succeeding Speakers and Teachers of Language, have deplorably labored, if the Principles herein laid down be deemed founded in Necessary Truth. For it is certain that the SIGN *called* a PREPOSITION can be *No More* a PRE-position, than it can be a POST-position: And it certainly can be NEITHER of these, that is to say, *not even in its PLACE* in a *Phrase*, or *Sentence*; because Every So-called Preposition can be the Sign in question in No Case or SITUATION—*except* only while it is SUPPORTED AT ITS BACK by Some Noun or Word serving immediately as its NOMINATIVE, as it is SUPPORTED IN ITS FRONT by Some Noun or Word serving as its ACCUSATIVE CASE.

I trust, therefore, that the Monstrous FALLACY
Anal.

as well as Monstrous Barbarism, which is implied in the NAME—PREPOSITION—is herein rendered sufficiently palpable and conspicuous, to cause its being discarded from the page of Philosophical Grammar, after so much use shall be made of the *mention* of it as may be requisite for bringing about a change of views: in doing which, we cannot avoid mentioning the Sign in question under Each of its Titles—namely—of PREPOSITION and of MINOR VERB,—as I have been obliged to do throughout.

—And here, although this is not the place for my entering into the Etymological Evidence of the Nature of *Single or Particular* Prepositions, I shall, (as being preparatory to the observations that are now immediately to follow) advert particularly to that valuable, or inestimable Army of Prepositions, which has already been cited from Mr. Tooke, arrayed in its Proper Participial Garb. These Words, we have seen, are the following,

“ TOUCHING,” — “ CONCERNING,” — “ REGARD-
 “ ING,” — “ RESPECTING,” — “ RELATING TO,” —
 “ SAVING, EXCEPTING,” — “ ACCORDING TO,” —
 “ GRANTING,” — “ ALLOWING,” — “ CONSIDER-
 “ ING,” — “ NOTWITHSTANDING,” — “ NEIGH-
 “ BOURING.”

The First observation to be made in this place, with regard to these Prepositions, is, to remark, that they are, all, NOT ONLY VERBALS, but they

are VERBALS *in the* PRESENT OR PROGRESSIVE FORM.

Upon this fact, accordingly, I have now to point out, that it is not merely matter of ACCIDENT, or a Variety of Form which admits, in Any Case, of a CHANGE: On the contrary, it is a NECESSARY Result of the Nature of Things; and, especially, of TIME—the Great Theatre of Speech and of Action, upon the Nature of which All Language is founded. I therefore here lay it down, as a NECESSARY PRINCIPLE OF GRAMMAR; that is, as a *Special Principle, Subordinate* to those *General Principles* of the Subject delineated in the beginning of this article; that Every So-called Preposition or Minor Verb MUST be in the PROGRESSIVE FORM: And the following are the Necessary Truths upon which this Law is founded.

Every Verb, expressive of Any Dependent Action, must be expressed in the PRESENT TIME of that *Action upon which it is* DEPENDENT; because a Manifest Absurdity is involved in signifying Any Dependent Action in the Form of the FUTURE, or the PAST, *whatever* may be the Form in which the *Principal Action* is expressed. The Principle now laid down is self-evident, and only requires to be viewed in the Examples which exemplify it. Thus we say, with strict logical propriety,

He SPEAKS *regarding* them.

He SPOKE *regarding* them.

He WILL SPEAK *regarding* them.

But, upon the other hand, we should only utter a gross absurdity if we were to say,

He SPEAKS *regarded* them,

He SPOKE *regarded* them,

or,

He WILL SPEAK *regarded* them.

For it is self-evident, that, whether He SPEAKS ; or whether He SPOKE ; or whether He SHALL, OR WILL SPEAK ; the *Action* of REGARDING, which is here expressed as being *Dependent upon the ACTION OF SPEAKING*, must be in the *Present Time of the Action of speaking*.

The Next consideration for notice, here, is one to which I have already adverted ; but which requires being farther exemplified in this place. It is the Fact, that Minor Verbs are very frequently expressed in SERIES of *Two*, or *More*, together : All of them being *Dependent upon One Same Principal Verb*.

Thus, as Examples of Two Minor Verbs in a Series, we say,

He CAME *riding upon* A Charger.

He TALKED *of repairing* His House.

He WENT *about learning* His Lesson.

Again, as Examples of THREE in a Series, we say,

He FELL *in scrambling up* the Rocks.

He FAINTED *in retreating over* the Plain.

He DIED *in fighting at* The Head of His People.

He GLORIED *in thinking of* His Achievements.

He BLUSHED *in alluding to* His Services.

He IMPROVED *by serving under* A Great General.

He SUCCEEDED *by acting with* His Companions.

He SUFFERED *from sleeping upon* Wet Ground.

He DIED *from living upon* Bad Provision.

In each of these last examples, I have introduced a *So-called Progressive Participle*, (to serve as a Preposition,) between Two of our *Acknowledged but Mutilated and Disguised* Prepositions, such as IN, WITH, FROM, BY, &c. And here I would ask of any person, If he can assign a reason, why any such Word as, *scrambling,—retreating,—fighting, thinking,—alluding,—serving,—acting,—&c.* (*when thus interposed or associated*), is not as much a Preposition, as the Word—*up, or over, or at, or in, or to, or Any Other such Word*; BETWEEN TWO OF WHICH, (the reader will observe,) each of the above mentioned Verbals is placed?

As for the assumption which has been set up by some writers, with regard to Two, or More, of our acknowledged Prepositions, which, fortunately, happen still to exist in our Language in their *Proper So-called Participial Forms*—namely—that they are to be considered *as Prepositions because the VERBS* to which they once belonged are now lost; which assumption manifestly involves the consequence, that No So-called Participial, belonging to Any Verb that still exists in our Language, can be considered as a Preposition; I hesitate not to affirm it is void of the smallest degree of logical pretension. In a Word, it is an assumption worthy, only, of going along with Mr. Tooke's assertion, that PREPOSITIONS *are the OFFSPRING OF CORRUPTION.*

And here I would have any one, for a moment, reflect upon this last mentioned doctrine of Mr. Tooke.—PREPOSITIONS, *that is* MINOR VERBS, (which have herein been demonstrated to be a PRINCIPAL AND A NECESSARY ELEMENT AND LINK in that Structure or Fabric which is shewn to Form the COMPLEX BRIDGE OF LANGUAGE,) are the PRODUCT OF CORRUPTION; insomuch, that, if there had been such a Thing among Mankind as a PERFECT LANGUAGE, this Bridge could not have contained that Link or Element of Speech which Grammarians have known, and have been obliged to employ, under the Barbarous and Unmeaning Name of Preposition!

Without deeming it necessary to offer another comment upon this doctrine; I affirm, in direct opposition to it, that Every One of our known Ordinary Prepositions are Nothing but MUTILATED AND DISGUISED VERBALS;—VERBALS *which have* BECOME *Mutilated and Disguised* in consequence of having been HACKNIED AS PREPOSITIONS, by which process of *repetition and attrition* they have been *worn down to the last stump*, from their ORIGINAL PREPOSITIONAL Size and Shape. Thus the Ordinary Prepositions—UP,—OVER,—AT,—OF,—TO,—UNDER,—&c.—employed in the last string of Examples, I affirm to be Verbals, IMPORTING—*Upping*,—*Overing* or *Topping*,—*Joining* or *Touching*,—*Offspringing*,—*Ending*,—*On-neddering* or *One-neddering*, &c.

If I wished here to offer, in a single sentence, a SUMMARY CONFIRMATION *of this truth, drawn from* ETYMOLOGY ITSELF; I should have only to re-

mind my readers of the United Suffrages of all our first-rate Etymologists, as to the fact that, in the Earliest Stages of Language, ALL NOUNS WHATEVER were *Verbals or Names of Actions*; and, consequently, they were all in a SHAPE OR FORM to be employed as Prepositions, WITHOUT ANY CORRUPTING, OR MUTILATION: While the process of their Corruption, under the continual attrition of their use AS PREPOSITIONS,—and as EVERY-DAY Prepositions *of incessant occurrence or employment*,—is a consequence *so natural*, and *so certain to follow in such a case*, that it cannot leave a doubt as to the REASON WHY the Words in question are MORE *Mutilated* than *Any Other Words*.

One fact is quite certain and indisputable—namely—that, if these So-called Ordinary and Mutilated Prepositions be construed, or parsed, as the Verbals last mentioned, they exhibit *a most perfect and rational sense*, and certainly explode the use of any Other Words which could be substituted for them, unless it were some Words of a *similar import*.

In a Word, There can be no question, but the employment of Verbals, instead of All the So-called Prepositions in our Language, would completely do away with the use of these Mutilated and Disguised Expressions.

At the same time, it is proper to observe, I do not suppose it would be a perfection; but, on the contrary, a fault or defect in our Language, to change the FORM, or EXPRESSION, of our Ordinary So-called Prepositions from their present Mutilated

Shapes. I only conceive it to be requisite, that Every learner, and Every Speaker of our Language, should be taught to UNDERSTAND these Disguised Words as being All Verbals; and to know, that they serve as Minor or Dependent Verbs, in serving as Prepositions.

It may be mentioned, here, among the Subordinate Considerations belonging to Minor or Defining Verbs, that there appears, in point of fact, to be occasion for only *a very small variety* of them in signifying BEGINNING Actions. Thus, for example, While the variety of Modes of TERMINATING Actions (as has been seen,) is, in the Strictest Sense, very considerable; and is, perhaps, in One Sense or Another, almost as extensive as the Variety of Verbs in Language; we have only Some Such Changes or *Relative* Names for BEGINNING Actions as are contained in the following expressions: and even some of these are now become only vulgar expressions, although they are, undeniably, Pure Grammatical English.

Thus, Instead of saying “I am COMING;”—it is a usual expression to say, “I am *a* COMING.”

Instead of “He is WORKING;” it is said, “He *is a* WORKING.”

Instead of, “They are going, or intending, to ride;” it is said, and said with great propriety, especially in the Scottish Dialect, “They are *for* RIDING;”—In like manner, they say, “He is *for* his Dinner;” that is, “He is *for* DINING.”

In a similar idiom it is said, "He is *upon* QUAR-
"RELING." And, "He is *about* BUILDING."

By the way, it may not be superfluous to remind the reader, once more, that, in the above Examples, or in Any Examples whatever of *employing the SUBSTANTIVE VERB in signifying Any Adjective Act*, this Verb has Nothing to do with the Adjective Act: It merely signifies the EXISTENCE (i. e. EXISTING) of the *Agent*. Thus, "I am *a* coming,"—means, "I exist in space—I *on-ing* (*one-ing*) COMING: In which instance, as in every other, the Pronoun, (or Noun,) which is the Sign of the Grammatical Agent of the Adjective Action is, or ought to be, *repeated* to form the *Nominative* or Agent of that Action.

In the small variety of Names for Beginning Actions which thus appears, there is perhaps not one that is more logical, although at the same time none more vulgar, or debased, than the Phrases, "I am *a* COMING;"—"I am *a* GOING."—Thus, when Children, or Servants, or Other dilatory Persons, are called upon to do any thing which they must commence forthwith, but which they have not yet begun, and proceed to do with hesitation or reluctance; the ordinary reply is, "I am *a* COMING;"—I am *a* GOING to do it. Now it is agreed among Etymologists, that A means ON, and ON means ONE. Hence, the real import of the Phrase, "I am *a* COMING," is—I am *on*—(*onning*)—(*one-ing*)—the ACT OF COMING,—that is (*figuratively, and feignedly also,*) I am MAKING MYSELF ONE WITH THE ACT OF COMING,—

Anal.

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which amounts to feigning, “I am COMING *This Moment.*”

It is equally usual, likewise, to say, “He is a FISHING,”—He is a RIDING;—He is a FIGHTING; even during the *continuation* of either of these Actions: In which case, it is plain, the expression is less *figurative, or feigned*; because the Agent is actually at the moment DOING the Action although he cannot be LITERALLY ONE with it.

The Idiom now under discussion brings to mind, and remarkably justifies, the assertion of Dr. Murray, that, “It is fortunate for this inquiry “that of all illustrations, those drawn from old, “common, or even vulgar English, are particu- “larly suitable.” And “that the mysteries of lan- “guage in its ruder state, can be explained by the “words of our own tongue to better purpose than “by those of any other speech.”

Along with these considerations it is to be observed, as a very Essential Principle, and one which is necessary to be attended to in order to prevent misapprehension of the Subject, that ANY BEGINNING and ANY TERMINATING ACTION may be signified AS A PRINCIPAL ACTION. Thus, When we say,

“He BEGAN *by teaching* Them the Principles of “Religion;”—the intention in this case is to express PRINCIPALLY the Act, or Manner, of His BEGINNING; and to express only subordinately the Act *teaching.*

Again, When we say,

“He ENDED *with giving* Them Good Advice;”

the intention, here, is, evidently, to draw our notice **PRINCIPALLY** to the Act or Manner of his *concluding*.

It follows, manifestly, from this, that when either a Beginning or a Terminating Action is signified as being a **GRAMMATICALLY PRINCIPAL** Act, the **VERB** which is its Sign may take *either* the **PRESENT** or the **PAST FORM**, *like Any Other Principal Verb*.

In fine. Having thus shewn the Requisiteness, and the Manner, of employing Minor Verbs in **SERIES**, of *Two*, or *More* of them, depending upon One Same Major; it remains to point out, more particularly than I have yet done, the Requisiteness or Utility of **SINGLE** Minor Verbs, in their Office of Defining Major Verbs. The Nature, and Extent, of this Requisiteness, indeed, may be pretty well gathered from all that has gone before: but I shall illustrate it, however, in this place, by furnishing One, or Two examples of its operation.

I have proposed in a former place to point out the fact, that **ACTIONS IN GENERAL**—that is **MAJOR** Actions in general—“**REQUIRE**” to be defined by Minor Verbs. The following examples, then, are to serve for a proof of this Principle: which proof every person may, without farther aid, apply to innumerable other Sorts of Action.

If we say,—“ He **WRITES** English;”

Or,—“ He **WRITES** a Book:”

Each of these Expressions, although it is a

certain Idiom of our Language, is in reality an ELLIPTICAL Expression: for it means, “He WRITES *in English* ;”—Or, “He WRITES *in a Book*.”

At the same time we are to observe, that the above mentioned affirmations, concerning the Action of writing, amount *Only to a Very Small Part* of the possible VARIETY of this Action, which we have almost a continual occasion, or necessity, to signify: And All the Remaining Special Modifications of this *General Action* must be signified by OTHER AND APPROPRIATE MINOR VERBS or *So-called Prepositions*, which, in such case, must serve the Necessary Office of DEFINING the MAJOR,—that is the ACT OF WRITING. For I lay it down, as NECESSARY AND A PRIMARY PRINCIPLE IN LANGUAGE, deduced from strict demonstration, that ACTIONS (*in general*) MUST BE DEFINED BY NOUNS OF LESSER ACTIONS, in like manner as AGENTS OR GENERAL NAMES MUST BE DEFINED either by the NAME OF SOME QUALITY or the NAME OF SOME ACTION.

Thus, for example, the Efficiency of Language to signify the GENERAL ACTION CALLED WRITING would be altogether inadequate to the wants of even the most Ordinary or Unenlightened Nation, if we could only say,—“He writes English ;”—“He writes a Book ;”—“He writes Letters :” For we have continually occasion to signify such Special Modes as the following ; viz.

“He WRITES *to His Friends*.”

“He WRITES *of His Health*.”

“ He WRITES *about* His Affairs.”

“ He WRITES *on* Philosophy.”

“ He WROTE *in* Trouble.”

“ He WROTE *against* Irreligion.”

“ He WROTE *with* Sincerity.”

“ He WROTE *beyond* his Strength.”

“ He WROTE *under* Affliction.”

“ He WROTE *from* Principle.”

“ He WROTE *before* Dinner.”

“ He WROTE *after* Supper.”

“ He WROTE *by* Night.”

“ He WROTE *at* All Hours.”

“ He WROTE *beside* His family.”

“ He WROTE *over* His Meat.”

“ He WROTE *through* Life.”

“ He WROTE *between* the Lines.”

“ He WROTE *over* the Other Writing.”

“ He WROTE *across* the Pages.”

“ He WROTE *round* the Margin.”

“ He WROTE *beneath* The Text.”

It is plain that the existing *or possible* Variety, of these *Special Modes* of the GENERAL ACTION of WRITING, is much greater than is here exemplified. And I affirm, that Every One of the Prepositions in this String of Examples is a DISGUISED VERBAL in ING, and is TURNED INTO A VERB—that is into a MINOR VERB—by virtue of its being INTERPOSED between the VERBAL NOUN WRITING and a NOUN IN THE OBJECTIVE CASE: While its OFFICE is *to* DEFINE, *or* DETERMINE, THE SPECIALTY of the GENERAL ACTION.

Such, then;—(AND NOT ANY THING LIKE “TO SAVE, OR PREVENT, A MULTIPLICITY OF “COMPLEX TERMS IN LANGUAGE;”—) do I affirm to be the USE, and the NECESSITY,—of Those Words, or that PART OF SPEECH which has hitherto been called PREPOSITIONS, UNLESS VERBS are made to prevent such multiplicity.

2.

Having, in the foregoing part of this article, stated the Subordinate Consideration and Remarks which appeared to be requisite, in order to complete the Analysis of the GENERAL Nature of So-called Prepositions, as founded in the NECESSARY Principles and Structure of Language; altogether collateral to, and independent upon, ETYMOLOGICAL Evidence, or authority; which last, however, I have herein quoted and appealed to, in an extent fully sufficient to satisfy any doubt that could have arisen with regard to it; I conceive it must be impressive upon the judgment of a reader, that I should contrast the result of the whole, with that View of the Nature and Use of Prepositions which has been taken up by the latest and (unless with one co-equal exception) by far the most illustrious Etymologist whose labors have yet been given to the public. The several Views of this Part of Grammar which have been entertained by the Author of HERMES and by the PHILOGER OF PURLEY, respectively, have already been placed in a concise form before the reader. It remains

only, therefore, in order to complete the task I had proposed for the present part of my work, that I should here subjoin the estimate of the Subject which has been made by the "HISTORIAN OF THE EUROPEAN LANGUAGES."

In the analysis which is now before the reader, it will be observed, that a NECESSARY AND RECIPROCAL Dependence of the NOUN, the VERB, and the MINOR VERB OR SO-CALLED PREPOSITION, has been demonstrated, as forming the *Essential Principles of that Chain of Signs called GRAMMAR OR LANGUAGE*. This Necessity, moreover, is self-evidently founded upon a *Similar Necessary and Reciprocal Dependence of HUMAN IDEAS upon Each Other concerning the THINGS OF THE UNIVERSE*: Of which Ideas or Thoughts LANGUAGE OR WORDS are Nothing but a TYPE and SHADOW; possessing no meaning, or virtue, any farther than they are construed, or considered, as the Shadows in question. It is for every man to judge, by his own intuitive faculty, whether, or not, his Ideas, and the Signs which are here demonstrated as representing them in Grammar, are constructed in the manner herein asserted; and, whether there can be any option, or latitude, for any People or Nation to INSTITUTE a Form or Structure of Language in violation of these Principles; or, in any manner to deviate from them, without thereby incurring the just imputation of expressing themselves illogically and in a mere jargon, so far as any such deviation extends.

Now, toward a solution of this Part of Grammar, we have seen, upon the one hand, Mr. Har-

ris, aiming indeed at Philosophy, but unfortunately taking, for his Basis, that Assumed Structure of the Category of Relation which the *Logicians* had built to his hand, failed in his purpose, through the utter insolidity of his Foundation : While, upon the other, Mr. Tooke, laboring in the same darkness with regard to the Category above-mentioned ; and being, at the same time, as he himself very ingenuously and laudably acknowledges, but partially enlightened by Etymological research; has put forth a Visionary conceit of the Use of Prepositions, and has mistaken these Signs for IMPERATIVES in order to suit his conception with regard to this Use. We are now called to contemplate a THIRD Scheme of the Subject—namely—that view of it which is, at least with a great degree of probability, the result of tracing out, through the rough and painful road of Etymology, the Very Manner in WHICH OUR TEUTONIC Forefathers actually THOUGHT and SPOKE. And the purpose for which I shall bring this Scheme forward, is in order that the reader may judge, for himself, Whether those Tribes or Nations SPOKE, or THOUGHT, PHILOSOPHICALLY ; or, Whether their thinking and speaking can be considered as MODELS, for Logicians and Philosophers to form their Theories of Language upon ?

In the *Second Volume* of the “HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN LANGUAGES,” page 11, Dr. Murray has expressed himself as follows :

“ Having explained those original classes, I proceed to the easy task of enumerating the principal adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions, in the Teutonic dialects. The reader must recollect,

“that such words may be in all cases and in all
 “the participial terminations. A few of them are
 “verbs in the imperative and subjunctive moods.
 “The radical being known, all is clear.”

“No verb has produced more of these words
 “than AG, and its derivatives AUK and EAC, to
 “join, continue, begin, persevere. These secon-
 “dary series all rose from the original idea of
 “motion. Undivided action is the primary sense;
 “that which is undivided is one; to unite one
 “thing with another is to join; to preserve in an
 “undivided or united state is to continue; to con-
 “tinue action is to persevere. The place or part
 “in which an object joins with another is its limit,
 “its beginning or end; for in ancient language the
 “same word denoted either. In another very or-
 “dinary acceptation, continued and intermitted
 “action are contrasted. Continual is viewed as
 “close, incessant, unpausing, quick, speedy, mo-
 “mentary. Applied to Time, this is called *im-*
 “*mediate*; to place, *strait*; to various actions, *si-*
 “*multaneous*. When applied to several places or
 “things, it means *together*; to a surface plain or
 “level, even; to the qualities of objects concor-
 “dant, similar, like; to the agreement of a ques-
 “tion with its answer, union of sense.”

Now taking this entire passage of Dr. Murray,
 as the ASSUMED COMMON GROUND whereon he
 has erected this supposed *One* INDISCRIMINATED
 HOMOGENEAL MASS, which he asserts to compose
 the NATURE OF ADVERBS, the NATURE OF PRE-
 POSITIONS, and the NATURE OF CONJUNCTIONS;
 I would ask, Could any imagined confusion of

Elements be more manifestly in violation of the First Principles of Reason? I hardly need ask, Whether any man could, upon the surface of this Assumed Ground, discover the Distinct Points of Foundation, whereupon, under guidance of reason, must be erected those PURELY AND VASTLY DISTINCT *Elements of Speech*, an ADVERB,—a PREPOSITION,—and a CONJUNCTION: Because it does not appear to me that, in the aspect of this surface, it is possible to discriminate any Points, or Positions, from which ANY ORDERLY STRUCTURE could be erected.

Upon the other hand, however, the CONFOUNDING of *Adverbs, Prepositions, and Conjunctions* TOGETHER, is the manifestation of a darkness so deplorable in the knowledge of Signs; and, of course, of darkness with regard to the Structure of Human Ideas, upon which these Verbal Signs are founded;—(the assertion, for example, that “*such words may be* IN ALL CASES; and in ALL THE PARTICIPIAL TERMINATIONS;”—“a few of them Verbs in the IMPERATIVE and SUBJUNCTIVE MOODS;”) that, whatever degree of sanction Dr. Murray may have from the Teutonic Dialects, to warrant his assertion that our Early Forefathers thought and spoke in this manner, (and I here make no question that he WAS well warranted in what he has advanced,) it is altogether indisputable that the whole mass is an exhibition of a barbarous jargon, which has not the smallest pretension to be followed, or approved.

To insist upon this by means of any farther illustrations, after the statement of analysis which has gone before, would be a proceeding wholly and use-

lessly redundant. I shall, therefore, in this place, only remark, that a **SQUARE**, a **CIRCLE**, and a **TRIANGLE**, are Subjects *Not More Distinct*, or *More Necessarily and Eternally Distinct*, in their Different Natures; than are an **ADVERB**, a **PREPOSITION**, and a **CONJUNCTION**. And I confidently affirm, that it could not be a more irrational confounding of Logical Objects, for the Geometer to assume that **A FEW CIRCLES ARE TRIANGLES**, than it is for the Grammarian to assert that "**A FEW PREPOSITIONS ARE IMPERATIVES**." Nor could it be more monstrous to insist, that **TRIANGLES** and **CIRCLES** may be in **ALL SHAPES**; than it is to affirm that "**PREPOSITIONS** may be" (**NOUNS**) "**in ALL CASES**."

If the Ground and the Superstructure which Dr. Murray has, as one of the results of his meritorious researches, cited from the Teutonic Nations, be esteemed as forming the **SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE**, or the **TRUE THEORY OF SIGNS**;—then, that statement which I have thus far presumed to offer, as an Analysis of the Subject, or as a Fabric of Demonstrable Science resulting therefrom; and which I confidently apprehend to possess the **VERY SAME SORT** of evidence and Necessity as the Deductions of Euler and the Conclusions of Euclid; must be regarded as no better than Sick Dreams, or Visions of the Night. But if what I have ventured to lay down, as forming the Structure of Language, founded in the Principles of a Rational Logic, shall be admitted as valid; in this case, the **PHILOSOPHER WILL BE BOUND** to recognise it, and to shake off the Etymological biases and fascinations which have misled him.

One consequence of this result must be immediate ; and the necessity of it manifest. The Subject, from this time, must be divided into **TWO DISTINCT DEPARTMENTS** ; which have hitherto been considered as **ONE AND THE SAME**. The Profession, Province, and Labor, of the **PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMARIAN**, and those of the **INDUCTIVE ETYMOLOGIST**, must, henceforth, be recognised as being as different from each other, as that of the Mathematical Architect is from the Operative House-builder, or Shipwright, who works from a *precedent*, the Principles of which, whether good or bad, he receives with implicit obedience and with little or no understanding (*unless extra-official*,) of either their perfections or defects.

I have once before observed, that it would be a violation of the Laws of Human Nature—a real miracle—if our Teutonic Forefathers had been endowed with a prescriptive knowledge of the Rational Principles of Language. The bare supposition of the thing (and, of course, the search after the Logical Principles of Language among any such Barbarous Tribes of men,) is at war with all the History of Philosophy, or of the Human Mind. The Human Species, at any such stage of its advancement, **MUST** have *thought* and *spoken* **SOMETIMES RATIONALLY**, and **SOMETIMES IRRATIONALLY**. To doubt this, were to think in the face of all our experience of mankind, from the merest savage, up to the most cultivated and intellectual of our race. And if, from any accident, we have been led to Logical Principles of Speech ; Can it then be imagined, that Philosophy

will longer truckle to the fabrications of barbarism ; or take up with the Jargon which necessity and haste had wrenched from the brain of the unclothed savage ?

But I am not here to part with so truly illustrious a Linguist as Dr. Murray ; whose genius and attainments, at all events, will claim admiration and reverence so long as language shall be a subject of research. Neither do I in the least consider the Dialects, which he has traced, as being of small account in the present case. On the contrary, I shall seize, with peculiar satisfaction, upon some very remarkable Points of Co-incidence between those Early Dialects and the Structure of Language, such as I have laid it down. I do not intend it as arrogating unduly in favor of my own labors, when I humbly venture to believe, that, had Dr. Murray prosecuted his Etymological Course with the foregoing analysis of Language in his hand, it might have had some occasional influence upon his conclusions with regard to the real import of early terms or phraseology. I shall only add here, that, AS IT IS, many very curious co-incidences have occurred to my own observation, in what he has actually recorded of those Dialects : One alone of which I shall cite here, from a supposition that it cannot fail to impress every reader.

As Preparatory to this, I beg to remind my readers, that I have usually asserted such expressions as the following, as being the real Structure of Prepositions, in their proper office in a Sentence.

“ He STOOD *supporting* Her.”

“ He SPOKE *regarding* them.”

“ The Larum RANG, MORN *beginning* THE RING-
ING.”

“ Figs COME, the COMING *ending* ENGLAND.”

Now therefore, I would solicit attention, to mark how curiously it turns out, that our Teutonic Ancestors, with regard to THIS Part of Language, *did actually* express themselves agreeably to the Structure which I have delineated.

In page 10, of his *Second Volume*, Dr. Murray says, “ Another race of Adverbs sprung from the “ use of the Present Participle, or at least from one “ of its terminations. Callunga, Dearnunga, AE-
“ ninga, Unceapunga, Arwunga, Faeringa, Sen-
“ nunga, which signify entirely, or by all means;
“ dernely, or in a secret manner; singly, one by
“ one; in an unbought manner; by way of honor,
“ gratis; hastily, in a body, or together. The A
“ at the end is, AG, possessing or having. The
“ Adjective or Noun is made a Verb: Instead of
“ saying, they came Man by Man, or Individually,
“ not in a Body, our ancestors chose to say, they
“ came *manning*; and, instead of they came wholly,
“ they preferred *alling*.” i. e. He means, they CAME
alling.

It is true, Dr. Murray is here speaking of AD-
VERBS: But I have formerly observed, and every
person knows, that *All our Prepositions become* those
Abbreviations called ADVERBS whenever they
terminate a Phrase or Sentence. Thus, in the ex-
ample, They CAME *over*, i. e. They CAME *overing*,
The Word OVER, (OVERING,) which is otherwise

a *Preposition*, becomes an *Adverb* by virtue of its place at the end of the phrase.

The explanation given in the above passage, that “*The A at the end is AG, POSSESSING OR HAVING,*” is most valuable : because it proves, indisputably, that the PREPOSITION *involved* in EVERY ONE of the Adverbs in question, is the VERBAL “HAVING OR POSSESSING ;” as, UPON GENERAL PRINCIPLES, I affirm it must be.

And here I cannot refrain from observing, that if, in the course of illustrating my own views of the subject, I had at any time employed such a Phrase as “They CAME *manning* ;” “They CAME *alling* ;” it is more than probable that, had there been no authority to back such a procedure, some etymological readers might have demurred, and this indeed with good shew of reason, against it, as being at least a strained phraseology, and perhaps but a visionary conceit. I apprehend, therefore, that the present co-incidence cannot fail to be impressive upon the judgment of even the most prejudiced person. At the same time it is certain, as I have remarked in a former part of this work, that, in the elaboration of my own views, my judgment or imagination could not have been influenced by any co-incidence, or evidence, in the writings of Dr. Murray ; because I had already, in my “First Lines of the Human Mind,” (a work published a considerable time antecedent to the appearance of Dr. Murray’s posthumous labors,) expressed my affirmation, that PREPOSITIONS are altogether of the NATURE OF VERBS WHICH DEFINE OTHER VERBS.

Other co-incidences, such as that which has just

been adverted to, occur very frequently in Dr. Murray's work; although I cannot take up room to cite or observe upon them at present. The one which I shall presently quote may alone claim admittance, in this place. The Real Etymological truth is, (and the following example affords us an instance of it,) that although it may be very true, indeed, as Dr. Murray has asserted, that our Teutonic Ancestors made NOUNS and IMPERATIVES serve, *in a way*, for Prepositions, yet the GENERAL TENOR of their Language *very remarkably accords* with that Analysis of Speech which I have stated in the foregoing pages; and it is, in point of fact, highly deserving of notice, how very *extensive*, and *essential*, this accordance is exhibited to our view, the moment our attention is called to contemplate the phraseology and expressions which Dr. Murray has recorded, with a due and collateral regard to the Principles of the Subject which I have suggested. I mention this, chiefly, to induce every reader of my own work to consult the details of expression which Dr. Murray has quoted as Specimens of Early Language: in which, although he will find many very untenable Forms of Speech,—Forms which Philosophy, certainly, never can think of approving,—yet he will throughout discover, though for most part in a half smothered or disguised state, the GERM of a general agreement with the Principles which I have laid down.

In page 26 of the Same Volume, Dr. Murray says, “The Verb AG, go, produced the oldest of the “Prepositions. It is found in Gaelic and British

“ in its radical active sense of moving, touching,
 “ effecting. Its derivatives are AGD, and ACT,
 “ moved, touched, *at*; and AGANA, or ANA, on.
 “ With BA, the second consignative AG, formed
 “ AGBA, by contraction ABA, moving, touching,
 “ going at or on; hence it is synonymous with
 “ AD; for AF TAIHSWORN SITAN, at the right
 “ hand to sit, is the same with AD DEXTRAM SE-
 “ DERE. The idea is to sit adjoining or touching
 “ the right hand.”

I would beg of the reader, here to take notice,
 HOW REMARKABLY AND PRECISELY the Expres-
 sions now quoted are IDENTICAL with those
 Forms which I have all along laid down, as being
 the Real Structure of Prepositions.

“ To SIT *adjoining or touching* the Right hand.”

That the Preposition *at* is, in real fact, the Mi-
 nor Verb “ *adjoining or touching* ;” and, that this
 Minor Verb must be dependent, (either immediately
 or mediately) upon Some MAJOR VERB, as it does
 in the example which I have last quoted; is a
 Point of Grammar which is here settled and
 fixed, upon the double basis of Necessary Truth
 and Etymological Authority. And when I come
 to enter appropriately upon Distinct Etymological
 ground, I shall have occasion to cite the testimony
 of Dr. Murray to a sufficient number and variety
 of other facts, which, I have no fear, will form a
 mass of evidence of THIS kind, of a nature and
 extent which may satisfy the most reluctant be-
 liever, in a Structure founded on Necessary Prin-
 ciples.

As for the STRICT SCIENTIFIC READER—the RATIONAL LOGICIAN OR PHILOSOPHER,—so far as regards Prepositions or Minor Verbs, I shall not, in the remaining Sections of this analysis, have to advance any thing with a view to convince HIM: because I can neither desire, nor conceive, any kind, or extent, of proof, or evidence, that could be more demonstrative, or imperative, than that which is already before him; although I beg to affirm this with submission, and a full sense of my liability to be deceived. The Principal intention of the Sequel of this Chapter, therefore, will be to satisfy a liberal curiosity; and to RECONCILE PHILOSOPHY WITH ETYMOLOGY, in the case of certain Single Prepositions which have, by Mr. Tooke and other Writers, been considered as the most dark in their Origin and Nature; but have, *notwithstanding*, been referred with much confidence to the Class of NOUNS.

NOTICE.

THE state of my health, (after a continued succession of serious interruptions,) has compelled me here, however reluctantly, to stop in my task, and publish that part of it which is already printed. Having, more than twelve months back, announced the work as being nearly ready for the press;

I do not choose any longer to delay its appearance, lest it might possibly be thought that I had met with some serious or insuperable obstacle in the nature of the subject itself, at least in that of my own views with regard to it. I hope that what has been done will prove the best evidence, that I have not been retarded by any discouragement of **THIS** nature: Although I own that the development of the Principles in question, (simple as they may now appear,) have cost me an intensity of application, far beyond what I had contemplated in the outset.

Finding it thus unavoidable that I should divide the Publication into Two Volumes ; I have deemed it the most logical procedure, to stop at that Point of investigation of the Nature of Prepositions, at which the labor must put on a *change of character*—that is, from being of a nature **PURELY ANALYTICAL** in the strict sense of that term ; to become an Etymological inquiry, in which the Evidence must be mere Matter of Fact or a Species of History ; and not, except by *accidental co-incidence*, a Matter of Science or Philosophy.

After the conclusion of the present Chapter, (the sequel of which will form the opening of the Second Volume) I shall resume the Analysis ; and shall therein treat of the remaining Parts of Speech, including **CONJUNCTIONS** and **ADVERBS** OR **BRIEVES**, together with the Whole of that half of Grammar which is properly to be comprehended under the Denomination of the **NOUN** ; which Part includes **ALL SO-CALLED PRONOUNS, ADJECTIVES, and AR-**

TICLES OR DEFINITIVES. To this I propose to add a Distinct Summary, or Syntactical View of Speech; in which will be introduced (as was hinted in an early part of the Work) a Diagram of a Complex Bridge of Language. And, along with this, in order to leave nothing to misapprehension, will be furnished some Specimens of Parsing, upon the Principles laid down. These considerations, together with a suggestion and investigation of the NATURE OF LIMITED SILENCE AND GRAMMATICAL CONTACT CONSIDERED AS AN ELEMENT OF SPEECH, will form the bulk of the concluding Volume.

The intimation, now given, may afford some conjecture of the actual state of the materials which I contemplate, as forming the completion of my intended labor on this subject; and may serve to inform the reader, that what is already before the Public has not gone forth, without my having previously embraced what has appeared to me to be its whole extent.

To this intimation I shall only add, that, in the Analysis of the VERB *and the* MINOR VERB, including the incidental notice which has been already had of the Nature of NOUNS AS BEING THE NECESSARY PIERS OR SUPPORTERS *of the Verb*, I conceive the Main Part of the Structure of Language is determined and concluded. And we have seen, that the investigation of it has involved the suggestion of a Most Useful and Principal Class of ABBREVIATED SIGNS OR ADVERBS; which occur in Every Instance wherein *Any Name of*

Action is annexed to a NOUN OR NOMINATIVE, WITHOUT ANY ACCUSATIVE NOUN COMING AFTER IT; such, for example, as when we say,—“*I WRITE*,”—“*I READ*,”—“*I THINK* ;” which means, “*I innning* A WRITING STATE,”—“*I innning* A READING STATE,”—“*I innning* A THINKING STATE” or HABIT,—a construction which manifestly consigns ALL OUR SO-CALLED CONJUGATED VERBS, in their SUPPOSED PARADIGMS, over to the ORDER OF ABBREVIATED SIGNS. In other words ; I conceive the Principal Part of the Structure of Language to be erected, when we can SIGNIFY ALL GENERAL ACTIONS between the RELATED AGENTS OF THE UNIVERSE ; and, in addition to this, can EXPRESS THE MANNER of these General Actions, by their ESSENTIAL DEFINITIVES—the NAMES OF DEPEND-ING ACTIONS ;—by doing which, we signify ALL THE VARIOUS MODES IN WHICH THEY AFFECT THE AGENTS CONCERNED.

For the Subject of the proposed Specimens of Parsing, I shall take the same passages of Scripture that were selected by Bishop Lowth, in his “INTRODUCTION :” Which will be done with a view to contrast the operation of my own Scheme with that which now passes current. And my immediate object, in furnishing these examples, is to prevent the possible consequences of leaving the machine to the chance of being set in action by a careless or negligent hand. I trust this may be found of some service ; because, if there be any tolerable proportion of truth, or utility, in the

Principles thus hazarded, it will be impossible for writers to persevere in promulgating the Rules of that Idol, or Drama, which is now taught every where under the name of GRAMMAR.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

Printed by A. J. Valpy, Red Lion Court, Fleet Street.

RICHARD E.
Bl...er

Fearn, John

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